Army FCS Restructure Draws Mixed Reaction

Art June 30th, 2008 at 2:22 pm

The DoD, more correctly the defense-industrial-congressional complex, doesn’t do simple and effective. Simple systems with simple, clearly defined and modest objectives are too easy to judge. They either function according to the contract specifications or they don’t. It isn’t a judgment call that can be spun by sweet talking a congressman or handing critical judgments off to a team of officers and insiders who are looking to break into defense contracting or lobbying.

Look at something dead simple, like a bayonet. It either meets cost, durability and effectiveness tests or it doesn’t.

On the other end of the spectrum huge, complicated systems are almost impossible to judge. There are too many interlocking specifications and subcontracts to judge it on a pass-fail system. So you get provisional acceptances and requirements for ‘progress’. And virtually anything can be termed progress. Just spending money and writing reports counts in the strange world of defense contracts as progress.

Imagine hiring a hand to string fence. Simple. You can every day count the amount of fence strung. And a section either meets spec or it doesn’t.

Now imagine you hire the same hand to string fence, dig a well, cut brush and count cattle. If he does it the standard defense contractor way he would dig a couple of fence posts, move a little dirt over at the well site, cut a bush down and count two cows. For the rest of the day he writes glowing reports about how progress is being made on all fronts. Meanwhile the dirt caves in on the two post holes, the wind fills in the well hole, the two cows mingle with the rest of the herd and the rest of the brush continues to grow.

It is process without production. And as long as the hired hand keeps submitting reports of progress he gets paid. The longer he can drag out the process the more he makes.

If along the way someone who can’t be bought off steps in and notes his lack of production he claims he had to low-bid the job to get it and this forced him to use inadequate tools. The post-hole digger is an inferior model. The shovel is not up to snuff. The brush hook is dull and the chalk he uses to tally the cows damp and ineffective. That if the ranch is going to made to function he will need a serious investment in tools.

Of course give the finest, and most expensive, post-hole digger, shovel, brush hook, and chalk known to man — each demanding its own study and development sub-contract — nothing would get done. That is the point. Getting something done means the process of making the big bucks will have an end.

For the defense contractor completing a contract ‚successfully or not, means thousands of lobbyists, engineers, consultants and well-paid executives are out of work. These people don’t like being out of work or having to compete in the real world where actual results are demanded and harshly judged by people not looking to curry favor.

As for the ‘lowest bidder’ issue. Well, get over it. Everything we do or buy is selected, in part, by cost. You don’t buy a $400 can of beans do you? You buy the cheapest can of beans that meet your minimum requirements. In effect, buying from the lowest bidder.

Rip July 2nd, 2008 at 10:04 am

Ref Bob’s observations.

Gee.…another example of a lack of systems engineering management and no one responsible at the higher echelons for doing this critical task. To permit the contractors to do such is pure folly, these people are naturally going to butter their own bread.

This is huge hole in our national skill set well beyond the problems of the DoD, so many projects, so few capable of managing them. Further compounding the problem is that this is an acquired skill requiring a substantial acquired experience base. No quick fixes. No one year sabbaticals to learn the skills from some academic. And the experience gained is not applicable across sectors. I suggest this is evidenced by the philosophy of “I have a MBA, the product is immaterial.” which has flushed some fine companies down the toilet.

Here’s another good example also relating to the FCS. Somebody had a vision of using the Sky Warrior in an auxiliary role (since it’s flying around up there anyhow) as a relay backbone for WIN-T (or whatever the current nom d’jour is…). Just add of few pounds of electronics, etc., Some Captain, apparently in his spare time, did an analysis of the geographic area to be covered and the necessary bandwidth to be provided for a FSC UA. Guess what.…it was hugely more than the 12 U/E to be assigned at a Divisional level. Want an airspace management problem one would need a couple of dedicated Cray’s to solve? Nobody questioned the suggestion for months but let it spend time and money.

When I grow up I’m going to make toilets!

Cole December 18th, 2008 at 1:27 am

“I agree with Mr. James “Why not upgrade and fix what we have now.”“
——————————–
It WOULD be nice to reset current Army equipment damaged by the valued service of repeated deployments, without being presented with the curtain 1 or 2 choice between restoration and future procurement.

The USAF is not facing that dilemma. They have two kinds of costly new fighters/upgrades, $100 billion new tankers, $ Billion new bombers, and new $15B CSAR-X aircraft in works along with special ops V-22s, C-130Js, and $300M C-17. Total price…probably approaching 3/4 a trillion.

The Navy has new carriers, new destroyers, new subs, new littoral combat ships, and new fighters in the works…and has little to reset from the current wars.

Marines will reset yet are also buying V-22, CH-53K, new AH/UH, EFV, new fighters, and new ships to carry their EFV.

The Army will reset and get some badly needed new helicopters and FCS, that’s about it. So you are saying that upgrading 15 of 45 active BCTs by 2030 is too costly? When do you propose that we start modernizing the Army?

Obviously we will build NLOS-Cannon. That buys taxpayers substantial R&D toward the remaining family of manned ground vehicles that are better protected and more capable than every equivalent vehicle in the current heavy BCT except the Abrams. Even the mounted combat system has sensor, network, lethality, and survivability features that favor it vs the M1A1 in many situations.

Add the available many minutes of quiet maneuver using electric drive and the substantially reduced fuel and bridging requirements, and even the FCS “Tank” will be a marvel when supporting other FCS systems. Manned ground systems versus EFV or Stryker…it’s not even close.

When coupled with C-17 and joint high speed vessel deployment, FCS brings our nation the ability to secure airheads and ports in friendly territory…that otherwise may not stay so friendly…until heavy and additional FCS forces deploy by sea. Want airpower??? Secure the airfields first.

In theater, you want a mix of many different BCTs for many campaign objectives and multiple campaign logistical constraints. Afghanistan will require 70,000 40′ containers a year to support the surge…for a fairly light surge force. Imagine needing to support an armored force in any numbers.

70,000 containers annually is 192 containers a day. C-17s could theoretically support that number briefly at 48 to 96 sorties per day to multiple airfields…assuming multiple short sortie round trips by 24 C-17s/C-5/Russian Giants. But a lighter total Army force in theater, facilitated by a mix of Stryker, FCS, and Infantry BCTs supporting/supported by heavy BCTs is the only way to go for sustained combat.

You don’t need an entire Army as heavy as the worst case tip of the spear. And you don’t get the heavy BCT tip of the spear into theater if the airheads and ports are seized by the bad guys before they arrive by sea. You don’t support a force filled with nothing but the tip of the spear if the enemy renders your tip dull by hindering resupply.

It’s easier to secure convoys with 90 vehicles than ones with 200, and if you are forced to perform aerial resupply for brief periods (early deployment) a lighter force helps you get there. It’s easier to sustain the long war costing #10 billion a month than one costing $12 billion. It doesn’t take long to add up to “real money” at a savings of $2–3 billion a month…while still deploying adequate force.