I would agree in many ways especially in relation to UAVs. There are too many fighter jocks in the Air Force unwilling to let go of the old paradigm of the close in dogfight and it is hurting us.

While I think there is a place for manned fighters, the life cycle cost of a UAV is a fraction of a manned fighter and they can do many of the same strike missions.

A healthy balance of UAVs and manned fighters and bombers, IMO, is the way to go. What adversary can stop hundred of armed UAVs attacking radars, C2 and AAA in the first wave of an attack followed by manned fighters and bombers?

What war has the USN fought and won since the war in the Pacific in WW2? Seems to me they’ve been largely in a support role for the past sixty plus years. Probably no need for all those expensive aircraft carriers now when a UAV or stealth bomber can fly half-way around the world and hit a target.

See how easy it is to turn that near-sighted logic you employed around?

You should be angry at your service for putting you in facilities that HUD would not accept for low income housing occupants. The Air Force certainly knows how to take care of their people.

The Air Force also has supervision; it’s called the DoD and the Secretary of Defense. While the current propoganda would have everyone believe the Air Force is in a limited role in SWA, nothing could be further from the truth.

Who do you think brings in troops and supplies by air? Who do you think flies the majority of CAS missions? In addition, it is the Air Force providing close to 30% of our people in ILO missions for the Army and Marines.

As had been said earlier in this thread, every branch has its day and currently the Marines and Army are carrying most of the load; just like the Air Force did for forty years of the Cold War. The AF’s time will come again in some future conflict and people will start making stupid talk again about disbanding the Marines, etc.

Any serious student of warfare understands two things: 1) You fight far more “small wars” than large ones, 2) You CAN NOT lose the large ones. There is an inherent tension between these two realites…going to either extreme on the continuum is not helpful and we must be the best we can at both ends of the spectrum. Finally, any serious student of air warfare understands air superiority is job #1, end, dot, period. There’s a need for all the Services and depending on the circumstances some core capabilities will be in greater need than others. That’s reality…no need for inter-service fratricide IMHO opinion. Let’s focus on winning the current and future fights and let the credit go to the joint team.

As I said earlier, if most requirements people knew how to spell JCIDS, we’d probably have far fewer Nunn-McCurdy breaches.

Congress needs to tear down the POM structure and force the branches to work together. How much money, time and personnel are put against similar requirements? I know of one particular capability that was being developed not only by different branches but different commands of that very branch. Stupid waste of money.

Second, I know its fashionable to bash the Air Force and talk about it being outdated based on the current war, but let’s be realistic. There was a time when people actually said we could do away with the Marine Corps because combat was going to be ICBMs flying across thousands of miles against enemies we’d never see.

That “reality” never occured. Who can really predict what the next war will be? Do we want to take the chance that an enemy gains Air Superiority over us with the ability to attack our troops from the air…something that hasn’t occured since Korea?

Winning today’s war is obviously crucial but hedging against future threats is also vital.

The AF was once on the right track when they selectively manned System Program Offices and then complemented them with Deputy PMs for Logistics, some of the latter going on to be SPMs, the successful KC-10 program being one example. ASD and AFALD staffs were manned with competent 0-4s, 0-5s and 0-6s chosen from the field to offset the shortfall with civilian experience as defined well by Radarnav. There was still lots of slack however, there aways is.

We might say “those were the days” because the AF had significant weapons in acquisition and as the money disappeared along with new programs there was less need for this size of acquisition infrastructure. Manpower cuts were made reshaping and reducing these larger organizations but without retaining the attributes that made the prior system work.

There have been subsequent proposals for acquisition management changes, some involving “purple suit” organizations. some letting users have a greater role (one even wanted to collocate PMs at operating commands) and one recently wanted to restore Air Force Systems Command. Acquisition reforms have been failures in general. The successes are few.

Right’s comments reveal the need for defense planning and acquisition across services with less parochialism and less independent actions. The AF budget should be determined by joint planning for current and future threats as should the other service budgets. It’s why I mentioned Hitch & McKean. The planning process is top down to an extent but component funding and execution of planning does not follow and the quality of execution in acquisition is not remarkable.

I believe Sec Rumsfeld set out to improve defense planning and acquisition but was diverted by 09.11.01 actions and the Iraq War. Sec Gates is attempting to put some of it back on track but it will take the new SecDef to make it happen. Let’s hope the candidates have a good name in mind. Let’s hope he or she is thinking about it right now.

From what I heard up until a few months ago was that MC and Army CAS was good enough that Navy pilots on the carriers in the gulf were sometimes frustrated they had nothing to bomb. I didn’t see or hear anything of AF support on combat operations.

The AF can bomb a stationary target from a long range. Strategic bombing of infrastructure and supply logistics is very important too. But, that is the only relevance of the AF today or 20 years in the future as they are now.

I think I read somewhere that the thought was that the AF should be converted into the Space Force to handle long range and suborbital weapons rather than direct combat.

I don’t see the AF as being justifed to have a budget or “force” as large as they have now. That money should go to the other branches of the DOD. Until the AF updates their system to adapt to an immediate threat for any kind of war (if they can), they will continue to be obsolete and carrying a useless inventory of military war machines.

I mostly agree with your points. I work with a lot of useless civilians and with some exceptions, the ones who are really good are generally former or retired officers.

The problem with offering the retired 0–4 or 0–5 a GS-14 right out of the military is civilian morale. There are civilians who do deserve these jobs and if the hiring authority is military, they may not get a fair shake when some Colonel can hire one of his buddies that is retiring.

It’s a big ugly catch-22. I’ve worked in industry and in the DOD and I can tell you first hand, out in the “real” world they would not tolerate half of these civilians and they’d be out on their ears. Unfortunately, with the unions, it takes years of documentation to even think about firing someone from civil service. No doubt that’s why the unions are against NSPS (which while perfect, at least makes people perform if used the right way).

It’s not just the Air Force either. I’ve worked joint programs and seen just as many lazy civilians in other service too.

I have never understood why the USAF doesn’t offer retiring O-4 thru O-6 the equivalent civil service position. Many like myself would have loved to stay on-board.

Hill AFB ran an experiment a few years ago where they hired PMs from Industry. There was great resistance from Active Duty and Civilians alike, but after 6 months every Program Director was actively demanding more. They quickly realized the benefits of experience in service and in industry from these industry candidates who did what it took to get the job done correct and on time.

If offered a GM-14/higher position as a PM today, I would jump at it. However, AFPC does not seem interested and someone like myself with over 20 years as a PM goes to the bottom of the selection criteria for acquisition positions since incumbent personnel have a hiring advantage. So the system keeps rewarding mediocrity, and self limits itself from injecting new talent.

The argument we need military in acqusition to “understand” the users rings hollow when you have many field and flag officers in the career field who have never served a day in an operational unit.

My acquisition unit is at about 35% manning for active duty and is in direct support of the users in SWA. Something has to be done but filling it up wtih a bunch of second LTs is not the snswer.

If DOD was serious, they’d figure how out to attract experienced PMs from outside and pay the current talent what they deserve.

Blue Suit Acquisition and Contracting personnel were sent on long term TDYs to the CENTCOM AOR to support real world ops. This gutted the intellectual capital needed to manage high tech programs.

Unless the USAF, as a minimum, ramps up their blue suit Acquisition personnel, they will either continue to make these dumb mistakes, or maybe they will be forced to ignore the lawyers and trust contractors to provide that expertise.

In the current political environment, I am not optimistic of either happening. So, more trials and tribulations will continue.

However, I know Gen Schwartz (Norty) from our mutual alma mater. He has the insight, leadership, and savy to make real headway here — if allowed by SECAF and SECDEF.

USAF does require rebuilding but leadership failed to pay attention to the “how to” while over-emphasizing “how many.” Using personnel reductions to cover cuts in current procurements does not reflect balanced thinking about future requirements. I do not buy that USAF was backed into that option.

I truly hope someone in the “new” administration will reach back and read Hitch and McKean’s book “The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age.” As outdated as it is, its basic propositions for defense spending need to be considered. They were never properly addressed and implemented and are the best ideas I’ve read then or now.