Senate Tough Hump for Boeing Tanker Language

pfcem July 31st, 2008 at 9:42 pm

Just a quick correction Colin.

(2) The Secretary shall follow the guidelines in the evaluation criteria that no consideration will be provided for exceeding key performance parameter objectives.

That’s OBJECTIVES, not (miminum) THRESHOLDS.

But just to add…it seems that you are admitting that if the USAF/DOD simply follows the rules, the KC-767AT has a better chance of winning.

LC August 1st, 2008 at 2:21 pm

Hmmm, last time Congress got involved in the Tanker selection, they told the Air Force to go look at leasing aircraft.

Anyone remember how that turned out?

pfcem August 1st, 2008 at 3:10 pm

LC,

Get you facts straight.

Congress DID NOT tell the USAF to look at leasing tankers. The USAF informed Congress that if Congress provided the appropriate language the USAF could proceed with replacing its KC-135s sooner rather than later (6 years sooner than the existing roadmap called for) through an operational lease.

When Congress got involved in a way of telling the USAF what to do it told the USAF to conduct a competition even though there was no competative competition to the KC-767 the USAF had selected.

Chris August 2nd, 2008 at 1:30 pm

Uh oh! The Boeing Mole is at it again, coming on these boards and toeing the company (BOEING) line. It’s funny that he is the only one on these boards who thinks Boeing has produced the BEST tanker. Boeing is slumping to new lows now.

Cole August 2nd, 2008 at 11:24 pm

Well Daskro, suspect NG/EADS and the people of Alabama have an equal stake in the outcome, not to mention the primary customers…the collective Army/Marines/Air Force trying to get from CONUS to South Korea, or elsewhere in Asia or the World, in a crisis.

Example Mission: Support 4 C-17s and 4 F-22s enroute to South Korea from Hawaii EVERY TWO HOURS, and 4 more C-17s returning in the same timeframe from South Korea to Hawaii, which is a distance of 3900 nautical miles (nm).

The C-17ERs have a range of just 2,800 nm so to support inbound/outbound aircraft, the KC-X aircraft must orbit midway between at 1950 nm. So assume we need sufficient fuel for each of the 8 C-17s to fly another 1100 nm (2800 nm + 1100 nm = 3900 nm to/from South Korea). To fly 1100 nm more at 450 knots will take the C-17s 2.44 hours at 21,500 lbs per hour. That means KC-Xs will be required to offload 52,555 lbs for each of the eight C-17s or 420,440 lbs of fuel total. The four F-22s will need to top off with 26,000 lbs each of internal and aux tank fuel for a total of 102,000 lbs. The total fuel required at the midway refueling orbit will be 522,440 lbs. every two hours!

We have known values for KC-X aircraft offload at 1000 nm…153K vs. 117K lbs…so if we subtract 950 nm more fuel, each way, from the 1000 nm offload quantity, we know how much fuel is available for offload at a 1950 nm radius.

KC-30: 153,000 lbs – 61,383 lbs (950 nm added distance to orbit location and back) = 91,617 lbs to offload at 1950 nm. Requirement: EVERY TWO HOURS, six (6) KC-30s carrying 549,702 lbs of fuel for the eight C-17s and four F-22s, plus one more spare KC-X aircraft. If the Air Force launches 7 KC-X aircraft every two hours, it will require 84 KC-X aircraft x 91,617 lbs = 7,695,828 lbs of fuel each day.

or

KC-767: 117,000 lbs – 49,442 lbs (950 nm added distance to orbit location and back) = 67,558 lbs to offload at 1950 nm. Requirement: EVERY TWO HOURS, eight (8) KC-767 carrying 540,464 lbs of fuel for eight C-17s and four F-22s, plus one more spare KC-X aircraft. If the Air Force launches 9 KC-X aircraft every two hours, it will require 108 KC-X aircraft x 67,558lbs = 7,296,294 lbs of fuel each day.

I suspect the USAF could find an effective use for the daily 24 aircraft difference on just one route. Add the Guam route, and you could easily be talking about nearly 50 fewer aircraft to accomplish the same air bridge mission. Such an air bridge is unlikely to be temporary. This could go on for months or more…with the KC-X also being used to move 463L pallets and casualties, or carrying both fuel AND pallets.

I know pfcem will claim this is KC-10 work. But with just 59 KC-10s available and 10 of those in depot maintenance, using an 85% readiness rate for the remaining 49 would indicate only 41 aircraft (more than used in OIF) are available to support operations at any given time. Splitting half the aircraft to support Hawaii to Guam and the other half for Hawaii to South Korea, leaves 20 aircraft for each route for aircraft going both directions. Over a 24 hour period, that would mean only 10 aircraft to support day and 10 to support night operations per route. The few KC-10 can help but not replace the KC-X for the air bridge going toward both Guam and mainland Asia.

At 4 hours 20 minutes to fly to the refueling orbit location midway between Hawaii and South Korea, that will mean at least a 9 hour and 40 minute round trip including the hour to offload fuel on station. Essentially that means each KC-X/KC-10 crew can make just one round trip per 24 hour period.

Once more, I will suggest that with a split buy, you could put the KC-767s into the midpoint orbit to have those refuelers burning less fuel in orbit. Larger KC-10 and KC-30 aircraft could be used to top off the KC-767 to offload the most fuel at the 1950 nm one way distance to the midpoint.

In addition to all services benefiting from a split buy, jobs are jobs whether in Washington/Kansas or Alabama…and the long term prospects for good jobs in all parts of the country is enhanced with a split buy. Having the U.S. as a primary hub of most cargo/passenger aircraft manufacturing cannot hurt the industrial base, either. The House can put any language it wants into its bill, but there is the matter of the Senate, as well, where a filibuster could easily be envisioned over such inappropriate House language.

pfcem August 3rd, 2008 at 4:50 pm

Cole,

Why do you continue to site KC-10 missions as examples of why we “need” the KC-30? The KC-X is a KC-135 replacement! And as I have said before, the KC-135 is capable of perfoming the missions you bring up & HAVE DONE SO FOR DECADES.

pfcem August 3rd, 2008 at 5:51 pm

LC,

That’s right, Section 8159 did not “require” a competition. OTHER solicitation/procurement laws (which the USAF tried to get around) did however. The language of the bill was A DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE USAF ASKING FOR SUCH LANGUAGE — aka the USAF had already made the determination as to what it wanted & asked Congress for the appropriate language in order to proceed. The USAF did, however, send out a RFI & received responses from Boeing & Airbus. It is was obvious from the responses that the KC-767 was the only offer that fit the requirement.

June 2001. On June 28, Brigadier General Daniel P. Leaf, Chairman, Air Force Requirements Oversight Council issued a memorandum, “Future Air Refueling Aircraft; AMC 004–01 (ACAT1),” in which he stated that the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council had reviewed the “Mission Need Statement (MNS) AMC 004–017 for AMC Future Air Refueling Aircraft” and concurred with the document as written. Further, the Chairman stated that the mission need had been defined through the Tanker Requirements Study – 05 and an Economic Service Life Study.

September 2001. Events of September 11, 2001, accelerated Air Force efforts to begin recapitalization of the aging KC-135 fleet.

On September 25, Boeing (Messrs. xxxxxx, xxxxxxx, xxxxx, xxxx, xxxx, xxxxxx and xxxxxxxx) met with Ms. Darleen A. Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition and Management) to discuss the revised Boeing KC-767A tanker aircraft proposal. Discussions involved the leasing of tanker aircraft, building 18 to 20 tanker aircraft per year, a 10-year lease, replacing 136 KC-135E models with 100 Boeing KC-767A aircraft, and working with Congress, including a Senator and a Representative. As a result of the meeting, xxxxxxxxxxxxxx at Boeing was tasked to develop briefs on the tanker aircraft lease concept by September 26, 2001, for xxxxxxxxxx and Ms. Druyun to take to Capital Hill.

On October 9, 2001, Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force sent a letter to a Representative, which was basically the same as the draft prepared by Ms. Druyun on October 7.
In the letter, the Secretary stated:
“
Dear [Representative]:
I appreciate your interest in jump-starting the replacement
program for our venerable KC-135 tanker fleet. These critical aircraft,
which are the backbone of our nation’s Global Reach capability, have an
average age of over 41 years and are becoming more and more expensive
to maintain. Due to the effects of age, these aircraft are spending over
300 days on average in depot maintenance, which affects our ability to
respond to the many global demands on our force.
I strongly endorse beginning to upgrade this critical warfighting
capability with new Boeing 767 aircraft. If Congress provides the
needed supporting language, we could initiate this program through an
operating lease with an option to purchase the aircraft in the future. This
leasing approach will allow more rapid retirement and replacement of the
KC-135Es. However, if the Congress determines this approach is not
advisable, completing the upgrade through the purchase of new 767
airframes beginning in FY 02 will be in the best interest of the Air Force.
To implement this transition, we intend to work with the USD(AT&L)
and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Comptroller to amend
the FYO3 budget currently being vetted through the Department.
From the warfighter’s perspective, this initiative could provide
the opportunity to expand our tanker vision from air refueling and limited
airlift to include other key mission areas. We intend to consider elements
of command and control, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) for the KC-X-in other words, a smart tanker. This
initiative will further enhance our efforts to expedite development and
fielding of a Joint Stars Radar Technology Improvement Program on a
767 multi-mission command and control aircraft platform which we are
hopeful the Congress will also expedite in the FY02 Appropriations Act.
I very much appreciate your support in the FY02 Appropriations
Act as we work to upgrade our overburdened tanker and ISR fleets.
Your interest and support are crucial as we move forward with this
critical recapitalization effort.
”

On November 7, 2001, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, provides a draft of the KC-767 Operational Requirements Document, dated November 5, 2001, to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Boeing Military Aircraft, Derivative Airplane Programs.

On January 10, 2002, in Section 8159 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2002, Congress authorized the Air Force to make payments on a multiyear pilot program for leasing not more than 100 general purpose Boeing 767 aircraft for not more than 10 years per aircraft, inclusive of any options to renew or extend the initial lease term, and for not more than 90 percent of the fair market value of the aircraft obtained under the lease.

On February 20, 2002, Brigadier General Darryl A. Scott, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Contracting), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) signed out a request for information to The Boeing Company and Airbus North America, Inc. (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, Incorporated) to begin the Air Force’s market research and assess market capabilities in the area of commercial aerial tankers.

On February 26, 2002, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Aeronautical Systems Center sent an e-mail to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Mobility Division, Air Force Director of Global Reach Programs; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Air Force Strategic Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); and xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Air Mobility Command with a cc: to xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxxx, and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx at the Aeronautical Systems Center.
In his e-mail, xxxxxxxx stated that:
“
Given the competitive path we are now marching down, [I] request [and]
direct [that] you terminate all contacts with Boeing, to include planned
facility visits, until the competitive vs sole source decision is reached.
There is an RFI [request for information] briefing to Mrs. D [Druyun] on
18 March after which I am sure a decision will be made as to which
direction we are marching. As the attached states, contact ASC/GRC
[Aeronautical Systems Center] to discuss the issue or to seek further
guidance. Please pass this on to any other organizations/team members
within your purvue [purview].
”

March 2002. On March 6, Air Force receives request for information responses from Boeing and Airbus.

On April 8, 2002, negotiations with Boeing began. Air Force’s position was to begin replacing the KC-135 fleet as soon as possible due to increasing challenges with maintaining a 40 plus-year old aircraft and the demands of the War on Terrorism.

On April 21, 2002, Major General Leroy Barnidge, Air Force Director of Legislative Liaison sent an e-mail to Dr. Roche; General Jumper; General Foglesong; Mr. Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force; Lieutenant General Joseph H. Wehrle, Jr., Air Force Assistant Vice Chief of Staff; and Ms. Druyun with a cc: to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; Mr. William C. Bodie, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Executive Officer to the Air Force Chief of Staff; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Office of the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force; xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Office of Legislative Liaison; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxx, Office of Legislative Liaison; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Office of Legislative Liaison; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Office of Legislative Liaison; Major General Essex; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Office of Legislative Liaison; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
Office of Legislative Liaison; and Brigadier General Thomas L. Carter, Military Assistant to the Director of Legislative Liaison. In his e-mail, Major General Barnidge discussed a meeting Ms. Druyun and Major General Essex had with congressional staff concerning the status of the KC-767 lease.

Subject: Back brief on Meeting with [a Congressional Staffer]
“
Escorted Ms. Druyun, Maj Gen [Major General] Essex and xxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx over to see [a congressional staffer] today
to discuss the AF [Air Force] evaluation of the responses to the tanker
lease request for information (RFI). It was a very productive and
worthwhile meeting on very many levels, due mainly to Mrs. Druyun’s
ability to speak authoritatively to all subjects. She started by giving [the
congressional staffer] background on how we got to where we are with
respect to the RFI responses and then proceeded with the prepared
briefing on the tanker lease RFI evaluation.
[The congressional staffer] seemed very interested in the process by
which EADS [European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company]
formulated their response to the RFI, i.e., was the AF available to take
their calls, did EADS believe their questions were answered timely and
accurately etc. [The congressional staffer] was satisfied that EADS was
provided all information requested from the AF for use in their RFI
response, and that they had missed the mark. There was a short
discussion on EADS’s future viability and competitiveness.
[The congressional staffer] asked about the way ahead and when would
the AF be able to come to the Hill with their findings.
Mrs. Druyun explained that we need to develop the classic business case
along with a net present value workup IAW [in accordance with] OMB
[Office of Management and Budget] Circular A-11, then present this to
the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Leasing Panel after the
leadership in the AF has all been briefed. She predicted this would be
sometime in mid to late May.
[The congressional staffer] asked about the GAO [then General
Accounting Office] process and expressed that he did not want that to
slow this lease process down. He stated that the going forward with the
lease satisfies the desires of Congress (mentioned the overwhelming
majority of Congress wants this to go forward). He made the specific
point that there is a law in the books today that tells the USAF [U.S.
Air Force] to go forward with a lease, so we need to go forward. Short of
any change in the law we need to press forward with the lease.
[The congressional staffer] stated that [a Representative] and most
Members believe the USAF needs these aircraft. He commented that the
leasing approach may not be the best way to get it done but the bottom
line is we need a platform and a lot of people (overwhelming majority)
thought this legislation would move this process forward. [The
congressional staffer] stated that if a small minority succeeds in stopping
this current lease effort, we will be without a KC-135 replacement for a
long time. There is a window of opportunity here that if it closes might
not be available for some time. Certain Members and their staffs need to
get over when they were notified– first or last– and get on with what is
best for the country. Mrs. Druyun stated that the best she thought we
would be able to negotiate is a six or seven-year lease. The driving factor
for this is the market value of the aircraft at the end of the lease. It will
be very difficult to remarket 100 767 tankers. [Emphasis added.]
[The congressional staffer] said several times how much he appreciated
us coming. He said that there is a strong but silent majority who want
this to go forward. He said he is satisfied we are moving along despite
some of the official comments by the AF. He reiterated that if this falls
through, re-engagement will be difficult.
Several other topics were discussed:
[The congressional staffer] asked about the status of the 737 lease. Mrs.
Druyun stated that the business case will be tough to make. Mrs. Druyun
said that she received the Boeing proposal and she did not like it. She
has engaged Boeing senior management and she is working the issue to
get the best deal available. [The congressional staffer] stated that the
business case is not everything, that there are other factors involved.
[The congressional staffer] stated there are a lot of people expecting to
use of the two Ford Aerospace BBJs this July. Mrs. Druyun said she
understands and will do her best. She said the results of the business
case should be over to the Hill around the 20th of May.
Another issue discussed pertained to the Berry Amendment (buy only
American forged specialty metals), and how in this case it will
significantly increase the costs of manufacture for both the 767 and 737
while allowing unfair advantages to foreign manufacturers like EADS.
[The congressional staffer] was surprised by the implications and asked if
relief could be provided through legislation.
There were two taskers pertaining to requests from [the congressional
staffer] for draft legislation:
–Provide draft legislation which may provide relief/clarification on the
Berry Amendment with respect to amending Section 8159 of the
Approps Act.
–Provide draft legislation WRT [with respect to] to Sect [Section] 8159
which provides for lease options such as lease to buy etc.
”

On July 30, 2002, General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff sent a memorandum, “Air Refueling Aircraft (ARA) Operational Requirements Document (ORD),” to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in which he stated that:
“
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviewed and
approved the ARA ORD [Air Refueling Aircraft Operational
Requirements Document] and validated the enclosed Key Performance
Parameters (KPPs). The JROC considered the KPPs essential to meet the
mission need. The JROC also recommends delegation of ORD approval
authority to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
“
The key performance parameters included fuel offload versus range, tanker air refueling, boom air refueling, drogue air refueling, receiver air refueling, worldwide airspace access (Global Air Traffic Management compliant), and
interoperability. The following discusses those key performance parameters and
associated thresholds and objectives:
• Fuel Offload Versus Range. To meet the threshold, “The aircraft shall
be capable of a no-wind offload versus range as depicted in Chart 1.”
The chart showed that the fuel offload decreased as the radius distance
increased. The objective was higher than the threshold.
• Tanker Air Refueling. To meet the threshold, “The aircraft must be
able to use (non-simultaneously) both boom and drogue air refueling
systems, day or night, on the same flight.” The objective was the same
as the threshold.
• Boom Air Refueling. To meet the threshold, “The aircraft must be
capable of accomplishing boom air refueling of all boom-receptacle
equipped receiver aircraft identified in AF [Air Force] technical orders
1-1C-1–3 and 1-1C-1–33, the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) using
current procedures and refueling airspeeds with no modification to
existing receiver air refueling equipment and no restrictions to the
refueling envelope due to lighting/shadows.” The objective was the
same as the threshold.
• Drogue Air Refueling. To meet the threshold, “The aircraft must be
capable of accomplishing drogue air refueling of all drogue-refuelable
receiver aircraft identified in AF [Air Force] technical orders 1-1C-1–3
and 1-1C-1–33 and the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] using current
procedures and refueling airspeeds with no modification to existing
receiver air refueling equipment.” The objective was the same as the
threshold.
•
Receiver Air Refueling. To meet the threshold, “The aircraft must be
capable of operating in various inclement/adverse weather
environments (IAW [in accordance with] KC-135/KC-10 aircraft
directives) for day and night receiver air refueling to maximum fuel
load from a KC-10, KC-135, or this aircraft using current air refueling
procedures.” The objective was the same as the threshold.
• Worldwide Airspace Access. To meet the threshold, “The aircraft
shall be capable of worldwide flight operations in all civil and military
airspace including Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) and
Future Air Navigation System (FANS) 1/A airspace.” The objective
was the same as the threshold.
• Interoperability. To meet the threshold, “100% of top-level
Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) designated critical will be
satisfied.” To meet the objective, “100% of top-level IERs will be
satisfied.”

Cole August 4th, 2008 at 5:53 am

pfcem,

a) Side effect of replacing the KC-135E with KC-30s is an offload-at-distance capability more closely approximating a KC-10. A KC-135R only offloads 54,400 lbs in the earlier 1950 nm radius scenario (the E is pathetic). The KC-767 isn’t much better at 67,500 lbs while the KC-30 excels at 91,600 lbs…far closer to the KC-10s 149,000 lbs. Unlike the KC-767, two KC-30s substitute nicely for one KC-10 providing “more stations” as you often say. This will be a critical advantage, and purchase of sufficient KC-30s might eliminate the need for a larger KC-10 replacement or allow the DC-10–30 substitute to save money.

b) Not sacrificing a thing. The KC-30 can do either the local or air bridge mission. BTW, I was wrong about using the KC-767s on station to burn less fuel. The 7 KC-30s burn less fuel than the 9 KC-767s. Another strike against the smaller aircraft.

c) In the scenario listed, the worst case is 12 receiver aircraft arriving at once. At 400‑1200 gpm offload, how long do you think it takes 7 KC-30s to refuel the 12 aircraft to be refueled…under 10 minutes even counting positioning? Some of 12 receiver aircraft will still have to wait if you have 9 KC-767 on station.
——————–
Unused fuel and low offload is a function of years of habitually assigning groups of receiver aircraft to less capable KC-135R and E. Suspect that KC-10s get more and larger receiver aircraft assigned to it. You tailor the KC aircraft to the mission. The KC-135R, KC-10, and KC-X will operate together for years. The KC-30 would give you a true mid-capability between the two older aircraft, giving you options to substitute for either older aircraft or satisfy the “3-bears-Just-Right” middle mission.

pfcem August 4th, 2008 at 2:09 pm

Cole,

a) WE DON’T NEED THE KC-135 REPLACEMENT FUEL OFFLOAD VS RANGE TO MORE CLOSELY APPROXIMATE A KC-10! We need it to closely approximate a KC-135R with a bit more being desireable AS LONG AS THE COSTS IN GETTING THE ADDITIONAL CAPACITY DO NOT OUTWEIGHT THE BENEFIT IT PROVIDES. And your numbers are wrong, the KC-135R can not offload 54,400 lbs at 1950nm. The THRESHOLD for the KC-X IS the KC-135R fuel offload vs range & that is 44,000 lbs at 2000nm — the KC-767AT can offload 70,480 lbs. THE KC-X IS NOT A KC-10) REPLACEMNET. IT IS A KC-135 REPLACEMENRT!!! The KC-30 does NOT have the capacity/capability to eliminate the need for a larger inter-theater KC-10 replacement!

b) YES YOU ARE SACRIFICING YOUR ABILITY TO DO THE MEDIUM INTRA-THEATER TANKER MISSIONS! The KC-30 is not even as good as the KC-135R at that because it is too big & too heavy & thus you CAN NOT opertate enough of them close enough to the refuel points & waste BILLIONS of dollars in fuel flying from airfields farther away. And 7 KC-30 are not ANYWHERE near as capable/efficient as 9 KC-767AT at medium intra-theater missions. The most capable/efficient way to do airbridge missions is with a large inter-theater tanker like the KC-10. Trying to do both with one tanker sacrifices you ability to do BOTH types of missions!

c) Sorry, but the VAST MAJORITY od receivers can’t receive fuel at more than 900‑1000 gal/min and those VARY FEW that can SHOUDL be refueled by a large intra-theater tanker like the KC-10.

___

No, unused fuel and low offload is a function of the number of booms needed to effectively & efficiently refuel ALL the receivers being so much MORE important than the amount of fuel each tanker can transfer.

BINGO!!! YOU TAILOR THE TANKER TO THE MISSION! Not the other way around, which is what you have to do in order for the KC-30 to even APPEAR competative. IF we get stuck woth the KC-30, still having the KC-135 will be the only thing saving us from a disaster of monumental proportions. And EVENTUALLY ALL KC-135 & KC-10 will be replaced. You SHOULD replace them with tankers that can do what they do as well (& preferrably better) than they do. While the KC-30 is better at the large inter-theater tanker missions than the KC-135, large inter-theater tanker missions are what large inter-theater tankers like the KC-10 are for and the KC-30 is not as good at large inter-theater tanker missions as the KC-10 nor is it as good at medium intra-theater missions as the KC-135R.

Cole August 5th, 2008 at 3:23 am

pfcem,

Air Mobility Planning Factors lists a 76,400 lb offload at 1500 nm for the KC-135R using a lower 180,000 lb take-off fuel (200,000 lbs possible if refueled after take-off). How do you manage to lose an additional 32,400 lbs of fuel to go another 900 nm at 411 knots block speed at a 10,921 lbs/hr burn rate? Sounds like 23,900 more pounds of fuel burned to me which leaves 52,500 lbs of fuel to offload. I used 450 knots for simplicity across the board earlier which distorted my values slightly. But that is still closer to my original figure than your 44,000 lb number…and it does not include the real possibility of topping off the KC-135R after take-off. So why are we in such a hurry to spend $100 billion to replace the KC-135R, with 40 years of life remaining, to gain essentially an identical capability with the KC-767?

BS_Buster August 5th, 2008 at 5:28 am

In the, “pfcem August 3rd to LC diatribe, covering 20 plus paragraphs, from Jun 2001 — July 2002, pfcem demonstrates the cardinal Boeing line! “If you can’t dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with BS”! Too bad pf never got to the punch line of the lease deal! Boeing Bribery, Boeing Executive Jail Time, Boeing has added new meaning to shame. Don’t forget to look for the new word in Websters next release!

Today’s Word: Boinginate
Pronunciation: \Bo-ing-i-nate\
Function: Verb
Etymology: North Western US & Boeing/Aeronovali/JADC Consortium
Date: 2008
Transitive verb
: to habitually lie, cheat, bribe or steal if you really, really want to win

pfcem August 5th, 2008 at 10:38 am

BS_Buster,

The problem is that all your BS about the punch line of the lease deal is just that A BS PUNCH LINE tyhat does NOT accurately descibe what occured.

Yes Darleen Druyun & Michael Sears went to jail for negociating a job at Boeing for Druyun WHILE negotiating the tanker lease program. Government employees negociating jobs with contractors is nothing new & in fact a VERY common occurance BUT Darleen Druyun & Michael Sears crossed the line by doing so WHILE negotiating a defense contract.

And it is truly pathetic how you EADS/KC-30 Koold drinkers talk out Boeing lobbying & bribery when EADS IS WOSRE THAN BOEING.

daskro August 5th, 2008 at 3:31 pm

Cole, it’s pretty hard to reconcile your point with what the GAO sustained pretty blatantly.

pfcem August 6th, 2008 at 1:14 am

Cole,

We aren’t in a hurry to replace the KC-135R. We ARE in a hurry to replace the KC-135E & BEGIN to replace the KC-135R & KC-10 which at the rate we are projected to procure new tankers will take 35–45 years. And just because the KC-135Rs have an expected 40 years of airframe life left in them DOES NOT mean they actually do. More than likely, like the KC-135E, the cost of maintaining them (&/or the inability to maintain desired mission capability rates) will prompt their retirement before the airframes wear out.

NOBODY is “figuring that meeting or marginally exceeding the lower threshold requirement is just as good as coming closer to the desired objective”. There was a clearly stated THRESHOLD being that of the KC-135R & the OBJECTIVE WAS NOTHING MORE THAN TO EXCEED THE THRESHOLD. The KC-767AT exceeded the THRESHOLD/met the OBJECTIVE by >25,000 lbs across the entire range give in the SRD — which is hardly marginal given that the majority of the time the full capacity of the KC-135R is not utilized. Besides, as solicitation law dictates, meeting or exceeding OBJECTIVES is to be evaluated in vs the costs (& not just monetary costs) incured in meeting or exceeding the OBJECTIVES vs the benefits of doing so. The costs the KC-30 incurs over the KC-767AT in obtaining its greater capacity FAR outweigh the benefits of the greater capacity.

I never said that air bridge missions were not important (it is after all why many feel that we should have more large inter-theater KC-10-like tankers) but for a medium intra-theater KC-135-like tanker there are MUCH more important missions that it will be conduncting MANY times more often than air bridge missions.

No the USAF did not screw up by not implying that the objective fuel offload requirement was unbounded. It screwed up by not assessing the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation. Nearly everthing from every document created for the KC-X solicitation implies the desire for a tanker comparable to (if not a LITTLE bit bigger/more capable than) the KC-135R. Having an unbound objective fuel offload requirement is completely contradictory to that. When it comes to replacing the KC-10, having as greater objective fuel offload requirement would also be desireable but it too should not be unbound because although a large inter-theater tanker is not as restricted as a medium intra-theater medium tanker in terms of basing requirements & such it too is not without limits.