Tanker Split Buy Bad Idea: AMC Commander

Tanker Split Buy Bad Idea: AMC Commander

On top of that, Air Force Gen. Arthur Lichte, commander of Air Mobility Command, is worried that “the poisonous nature of some of the comments” that have come from the two companies and their supporters will make it very difficult to “make peace with everybody.” Making his job even more complicated, he is resigned to another protest. He told reporters at the Defense Writers Group breakfast that “when the RFP comes out I wouldn’t be surprised if one side or the other files a protest.”

Boeing and Northrop Grumman should note that Lichte said several times, in several different ways, that he really hoped no one would file another protest after the next contract award. I asked him if he had told his bosses there was a cutoff date for a contract award beyond which the risk to the fleet would become overwhelming. “I have not come up with a date,” he said, adding that “we need a new tanker now” and he does not care which plane is picked as long as something gets picked.”

Congress should note that Lichte hoped the tanker contract would be awarded around the end of the year because he’s worried that if it’s delayed then a new administration “will want to study the issue,” pushing any decision even further out.

On the split buy, which has largely been pushed by Boeing supporters, Lichte said that if he is ordered by Congress to handle two different tanker fleets then he will salute and implement. But he clearly doesn’t want it to happen. “I’m not really in favor of it,” he said, and ticked off the reasons why: two logistics lines, two training programs, two … well, you get the idea.

Still, he was careful to leave the door open. “However, if you were to tell me that was the only way to get out of [the current situation] then I’d take it,” Lichte said.

Lichte also voiced frustration with the effects of congressional restrictions that stop the service from retiring airplanes, including the KC-135 E models. The engine struts on the KC-135 E models are suffering from “a lot of corrosion” and should be retired by the end of 2008, he said.

Instead, the congressional language forces Air Mobility Command to put the planes in “XJ” status. That means they sit on the ground, having their tires rotated every seven to 10 days and their engines started every 45 days. If any problems are found then the Air Force has to fix them even though they can’t fly.

He just wants to retire the planes, park them in the desert and strip them of all spare parts possible.

But Lichte’s bottom line on the tanker issue was stated pretty clearly: “We need a new tanker now. I don’t care which one it is. And we need to get on with this quickly.”

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PFCEM vs Cole thread part VII

Let the quibbling begin!

Heh, I resembled that remark in the past, but gave up on the subject when it got progressively nastier on both sides. This cat has long surpassed its nine lives, and there must be other things to discuss.

What Boeing supporters are pushing for a split buy.

But there are two comments of note.

Gen. Lichte, like many in the USAF & DOD at this point, does not care which tanker it is as much as he (they) care that SOMETHING to replace the KC-135Es enters the fleet sooner rather than later. It is important to keep that in mind on most everything that has come out of the USAF & DOD since 2007…

Just as the USAF has been saying since 2001, the KC-135Es should be retired sooner rather than later. Unfortunately they won’t be replaced for quite some time.

The charade continues, eh pfcem?

Corruption is hard to shake, isn’t it?

But, got to hand it to you. say it often enough, loud enough people might just believe you

By the way, have you read the amended RFP? Section M says: MPLCC (or whatever they renamed it to) and fuel offload vs radius range. Seems like Boeing 1 amd NGC 1

If Boeing would just let the chips fall Gen. Lichte would get his tankers sooner rather than later. Head to head, No extensions, May the best proposal win. No more protesting. What say you pfcem?

If it’s got Boeing, it’s not Going.

I am very sure that if Congress (House & Senate)get involved then the AF may have to consider mailing a gallon of Avgas…because the likes of Reed and Polocksi (sic) will screw the bid process up. Perhaps with OBama as thier fearless leader they can “talk” a fighter full of gas.

mojojojo,

Airbus/EADS is EASILY as (if not more) corrupt as (than) Boeing.

It is EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid Drinkers hoping to put forth their lies & misrepresentations often enough & loud enough that others might believe them.

Yes I read the draft RFP. It is NOT even whatsoever. Incorrect MPLCC methodology/calculation was one of the things the GAO suggested be corrected (I wonder how many of Mr. Gates “points” that adds up to). But instead of doing that, Mr. Young split MPLCC up into two parts (likely so that HE could give more weight to the lower developement costs of the KC-30 & less weight to the MUCH lower operational costs of the KC-767AT). In the previous solicitation, offerors were unambiguously informed that their proposals would not receive additional consideration or credit for exceeding a KPP objective & thus CLEARLY (& unambiguously) asked for a smaller KC-135-like tanker - the “new” RFP is a complete contradiction to that.

If the selection would have been made in accordance with the previous solicitation, Boeing would have won & the GAO would unlikely have sustained a NG/EADS protest with such harshness & suggested a new solicitation be done.

AND if Congress in its infinite wisdom (NOT) felt it could fix the errors the USAF made with the tanker lease by demanding a full competition despite the fact that the A330 platform was found to be noncompetative & not what the USAF wanted or asked for and instead demanded a study into the best (not cheapest, best) way for the USAF to get the KC-767s (whether they be the varient proposed for the tanker lease of a “full spec” varient that meet all requirements) it chose sooner rather than later we would be getting new tankers YEARS earlier than we would even if everything went perfectly with the last solicitation.

If he’s actually read the RFP as he claims, then pfcem is either somehow connected to the source selection team on the Government’s side or he does work for Boeing.

Either way kind of disturbing based on his attitude and arrogance.

Boeing ball washer writes
“Airbus/EADS is EASILY as (if not more) corrupt as (than) Boeing”

LOL!!! Nobody from EADS went to jail in the last 5 years did they??????Funny thing about criminals, they are always crying about how there is someone else out there MORE corrupt then they are.

LC, a draft version of the RFP was posted on the Aviation Week site a while back.

Said I want to avoid getting back into this, but from reading multiple articles written about General Lichte’s comments, you get a different take on it…he may be less against a split buy than is implied here. In none of the other articles is it mentioned that he is in violent opposition to the idea.

He says he would salute and drive on if so ordered…as Congress may do. Although he mentions in your quote above “I’m not really in favor of it,” that is hardly vehement opposition.

Then I read this from an AFP article:

“I mean this is a lot of money, I understand the business nature of this,” the general said. “But I don’t understand how at some point you stop and say, this company wins, and this company loses, or this company is successful and this company is not.

“I don’t know how we get through something like that. With the poisonous nature of all the comments that are out there right now, I don’t know how we make peace with everybody to say, okay let’s go forward,” he said.

That sounds like he is implying that a split buy is the sole solution that makes peace….

Again, you could easily forego KC-Y and KC-Z with a 60/40 split buy of both aircraft varying from year to year on who gets the lion’s share. There would be more than sufficient KC-30s to compensate for the 59 KC-10s. You could put those aircraft in Washington state (Boeing would love that),Hawaii, Alaska, and Florida to handle oceanic flight extensions for the air bridge in peacetime and war. Put the KC-767s in internal state Air National Guard for interior flights and in forward deployed locations to support warfighters who may not need the huge fuel loads in Afghanistan/Iraq.

Still believe that the MPLCC comes out a wash when you use KC-767 for the shorter, lower-volume loads and tighter airfields. Then use, for example, 3 KC-30 for big cross-oceanic missions to substitute for 4 KC-767 to save fuel that way.

Final point is that I just read that a new law requires contracts over $100 million to be awarded to multiple contractors. They cited an A-10 contract renewal as the first case. Doesn’t this apply to a $35 billion aerial refueling contract?

LC,

I said I read the draft RFP, which was publicly readeace & linked to in a previous thread here.

***

Cole,

No you can not forgo KC-Y & KC-Z with a KC-767AT/KC-30 split buy. There is no way in hell EITHER is going to remain in production long enough to replace the entire USAF tanker fleet - even at a total of 30 aircraft per year it would take 20 years to so do & with a total of less than 20 being more realistic unless Congress starts to take national defense MUCH more seriously, it WILL take more than 30 years. And just as the KC-30 is a poor replacement for the KC-135, it is ALSO a poor replacement for the KC-10.

2008 Authorization Act Changes pertians to Task & Delivery Order Contracts, not to systems/platform procurement contracts.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00002304—d000-.html

pfcem, thanks for the explanation of the different contracts. Same principle could apply, as it does for F-35 engines, etc.

Variants of the 737 and 747 are 40 years old and still in production. You also assume a need for 600 aerial refuelers to support much smaller air arms with exponentially higher fuel costs which will drive more peacetime stopovers. 500 or fewer/larger aerial refuelers will be more than adequate. 20 years of producing 25 aircraft split 15/10 would work perfectly.

If you go the KC-Y/KC-Z route…you still have additional different aircraft types. Lock it in with the current aircraft so we don’t go through this B.S. again.

BTW, you haven’t mentioned that Boeing employees voted to go on strike…that would have started tonight if not for a 48 hour governor interlude. Guess that 38% additional compensation over 3 years wasn’t good enough and didn’t gouge the taxpayer or airline customer sufficiently…;)

Cole,

737 & 747 varients are still in production because a replacement hasn’t yet been developed, INSTEAD “replacements” have come through new more modern varients.

Replacements for BOTH the 767 [787] & A330 [A350] ARE under developement. Short of MASSIVE failure/delay of the 787 &/or A350, it is unlikely there will be any orders for 767s or A330s airliners beyond ~2015 (perhaps some freighters but even they won’t last past 2020).

I do not assume you need 600 tankers. Although the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan is to replace the current fleet with the equivalent of 600 KC-135R. I doubt however anyone who knows jack about real world US tanker operations believes that the US can get by with less than 450-500 booms reguardless of how much fuel capacity the entire fleet has. Of course this depends on the USAF being able to maintain at least its minimum force size requirements/demands (which may be EXTREMELY difficult to do unless F-22 production continues, F-35 reaches full rate production around 2015 & the new bomber actually makes it into service around 2020 - not to mention the over optimistic service life of the A-10s, F-15s, F-16s, F-18s et cetera). The KC-X is intended to “replace” 1/3 of the fleet (200 KC-135R equivalent) yet is planned to be 175 operational (& 4 SDD) tankers. Just an educated guess but it appears the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan is/was to ultimately produce 350-400 medium KC-135 replacement tankers & 100-150 large KC-10 replacement tankers with a total of 450-500 tankers.

What you & other EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinkers continue to fail to realize/acknowledge is that the number of tankers needed is depented MUCH more so on the number of booms needed to meet the demand by the number of receivers than the amount of fuel needed to be transferred. Thus it does not matter whether the KC-X is a KC-767AT or a KC-30, the number procured & the number operatied in any conflict/theater will be more-or-less the same.

And of course Congress won’t fund procurement of 20 new tankers a year much less 25, that is one of the reasons why the USAF had previously attempted to lease tankers in order to spread the cost out over a longer period of time.

PLUS you are forgetting (or deliberately ignoring) the reason why the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan exists. That is for the KC-X to produce a “basic” medium tanker (although unlike the tanker lease a fully capable tanker) to replace the KC-135s with the KC-Y & KC-Z being either new varients of the KC-X platform or new platforms to fulfill additional/new requirements/missions.

For example, the increased emphasis on the Pacific theater DOES NOT remove the need for a medium KC-135-like tanker meant to operate from smaller airfields closer to the operation for maximun effectiveness/efficiency. It just emphasizes the USAF’s need for a large KC-10-like tanker to supplement/complement the medium KC-135-like tanker & that the USAF desires a greater number/proportion of large KC-10-like tankers.

Doing a split buy for the KC-X IS NOT going to prevent us from having to go through this again with the KC-Y &/or KC-Z, it just splits the KC-X buy between two platforms.

Notice how pcfem keeps saying The Air Force wanted the smaller 767 size tanker. It is not the Air Force that wanted the samller size 767 it was Boeing that told the Air Force this is what you will take as a tanker. The Air Force did make a decision to use a bigger tanker as the General said, More Fele, More Cargo and More Capability, that is why they choose the KC-30.

What ever happened to the aerospace industry developing new aircraft based on what they saw as a need in the military rather than asking for money to develop something then asking for more to pay for production.
We have only one maufacturer of airplanes in this country today and the lack of compition has made Boeing bold.
We should never be dependent on a manufacturer from outside this country for our military products but Boeing has not earned the right to be our sole supplier of military aircraft.
Lockeed, General Dynamics and Boeing all get together and decide what each can build to get max profit and effectively end compition.
I have not read the RFP but Im sure its full of retoric that amounts to nothing when the plane is fielded.
Why are even looking at the 767, an airplane that is on its way out when we should and deserve a fresh new dedicated tanker/airlifter.
A true airlift capable tanker with 4 engines and the ability to carry the whole squadron on a deployment.
Dont get me started on the V-22

Why didn’t Boeing design a KC-777? Then that tanker could have competed on a more level playing field with the KC-30.

Gorilla_rocket,

We are looking at the 767 because of the commercial platforms available it best fits the requirements.

Not having to compete with airlines for production slots is a GOOD thing.

***

Dover Pro,

Boeing DID consider & study a KC-777 for the KC-X. The USAF told Boeing it did not want a KC-777. And Boeing/s own studies found the KC-767AT to be superior for the KC-X requirements.

The problem is that the playing field WASN’T level. If it was, based on the even the 2007 solicitation, the KC-767AT MUCH more closely fits & meets the requirements.

Boeing/s own studies found the KC-767AT to be superior for the KC-X requirements

-Mistake #1 by Boeing

pfcem said: “Replacements for BOTH the 767 [787] & A330 [A350] ARE under developement. Short of MASSIVE failure/delay of the 787 &/or A350, it is unlikely there will be any orders for 767s or A330s airliners beyond ~2015 (perhaps some freighters but even they won’t last past 2020).”
—————————————

The A350 is a 777 competitor…not a A330 replacement. The A330F commences in 2009 and may be the basis for the NG/EADS tanker. It could easily go 20 years. Don’t assume that because the 767 is near the end of its life, that the A330 is as well. The 787 line will be too busy to make tankers. The 777 is too long to rotate enough for a 7,000′ take-off.

Guarantee that with orders in hand, both manufacturers would keep cranking them out until end of contract if it was a split buy.

Newsflash…at 15 aircraft a year it will take 12 years for either sole source manufacturer to make 180 aircraft. Then you say we start this crazy process all over again with a different larger KC-Y aircraft to replace KC-10s…and then back to still another different medium KC-Z aircraft? It makes no sense.

Congress funds the wars at $10 billion a MONTH. An extra $1.5-2 billion ANNUALLY sounds like money well spent by Congress to double up aerospace jobs in the U.S. from two sources. Inside Defense (subscription so can’t access) has a google headline that implies Gen Lichte would favor a split buy if it was funded….

Cole,

The A350-800 will replace the A330-200 & the A350-900 will replace the A330-300 in the Airbus lineup. Hell, the A350 even started out as a “warmed-up/improved” A330 before customers demanded more.

Newsflash, 12 years from the first KC-X delivery puts the last in ~2025, 17 years from now. Yes it is unfortunate that the KC-135Es need to be taken out of service & replaced 1st but that the desire for more large KC-10-like tankers is such that the decision has been made to PROPABLY replace the KC-10s before the last of the KC-135Rs.

It is easier to get Congress to fork over billions of dollars a month to fund a war than it is to get it to fork over $1-2 billion for procurement above what is already planned.

Gen. Lichte DOES NOT favor a split buy but would take it if it is the only way to get new tankers soon.

Which A330 is replacing the BRAND NEW YET TO BE BUILT A330F that will be built in Mobile starting around 2009 or later? Boeing was planning to build 767 tankers at the same plant where they build 787s, correct? Either company can walk and chew two different gum products simultaneously. Think maybe someone might want to replace their multiple A330 engines in 15 years rather than buy an all new aircraft?

It’s easy for the USAF to find an extra #1.5-2 billion a year in “cash flow.” Stop buying F-22s, stop buying C-17s in two years, reduce F-35A annual purchases, cease or delay funding of the 2018 bomber, let 160th SOAR perform the CSAR mission. Do one or two, or a little bit of each and its a zero sum gain.

BTW, those fine American Boeing employees go on strike at midnight tonight…not content to get an added $34K over the next 3 years plus benefits.

You have a real reading comprehension problem.

Replacements for BOTH the 767 [787] & A330 [A350] ARE under developement. Short of MASSIVE failure/delay of the 787 &/or A350, it is unlikely there will be any orders for 767s or A330s AIRLINERS beyond ~2015 (perhaps some FREIGHTERS but even they won’t last past 2020).

No, Boeing was not planning to continue building 767 AIRLINERS much longer after the 787 hit full steam. But what you seem incapable of realizing is that once the 787 & A350 enter the market, who will buy 767s or A330s? Like I said, freighters will linger on a few more years after the airliner orders dry up but it won’t be too long before the 787 & A350 freighters take over as well. Remember even at 20 KC-X per year, it will be ~2025 before the KC-Y.

I agree, finding $1.5-2 billion a year is not hard, the hard part is redirecting it. It isn’t up the the USAF to stop buying F-22s, stop buying C-17s in two years, reduce F-35A annual purchases, cease or delay funding of the 2018 bomber, let 160th SOAR perform the CSAR mission. Not to mention the fact that not continuing to buy F-22s or not buying F-35s as quickly as possible or delaying the 2018 bomber will break the USAF a whole lot faster than buying 15 tankers a year instead of 20-25.

I mistyped A330 instead of A350 in the first sentence of my last post. Point is that Boeing and NG/EADS are both willing to produce KC-X tankers after the passenger version is gone. At least one of them, with a spanking new aircraft as the probable basis, will no doubt be willing to produce the tanker (alongside other newer commercial products on the assembly line) for 18-20 years…instead of just 12-14 years. 18 years at 25 split buy KC-X a year is 450 aircraft. Convert newer DC-10s to KC-10s for the other 50 aircraft at much less expense.

Most folks look for solutions, alternatives, and compromises to difficult problems and are willing to acknowledge different advantages/disadvantages of different products and ideas. You apparently look at your pet (or paid) project with nothing but rose-tinted glasses. Meanwhile, 5 nations have selected the Airbus product when they looked at both products with 20/20 vision. But Congress disregarded that clear vision and told the USAF that they must have been blind to make their choice. In reality, it was Congressional meddling, Boeing’s lame protest, and GAO nit-picking that needed the glasses.

Now its time to do right by our servicemembers and current/potential aerospace employees throughout our nation and the world which has never been flat and gets rounder each year. If that means living with about 235 C-17s and F-22s, 90 F-35s a year instead of 110, a few less CSAR-X acknowledging that someone else is fully capable of performing that mission,then the USAF just might be able to afford to solve its airlift and aerial refueling problem while still building a new bomber a few years later down the line. Its called compromise, and Congress, DoD, and the USAF can do it just as other services and the civil sector manage to do on a daily basis.

Cole,

Yes I know you mistyped A330 when you meant A350. I am smart enough to have realized that & unlike many EADS/KC-30 supporters who don’t have a valad argument & have to resort to attempting to discredit others by ignoring substance & instead harking on typing/spelling errors, I did not make a big deal of it.

Nice to know you have such distain for the USAF & its plan to recapitalize its tanker fleet that you want it to cancel its plan & replace its entire fleet with a split buy of KC-767s & KC-30s…I the process saddling us with the larger & heavier than KC-10 but not as good as a KC-135 at doing what the KC-135 does or as good as a KC-10 at doing what the KC-10 does (but is a very good pallet/passenger transport) KC-30 that the USAF REJECTED when it was in control of the process.

Have you not read the AOA? Converting DC-10s is
not cost-effective in the long run.

What are you smoking? I am the only one to have aknowledged the different advantages/disadvantages of the KC-767AT & KC-30. You & your fellow EADS/KC-30 Kool-aid drinkers utterly fail to aknowledge the overwheling advantages of the KC-767AT &/or the disadvantages of the KC-30 which make it the WRONG tanker for the USAF.

Stop bringing up that BS about 5 nations have selected the Airbus. It is ABSOLUTELY irrelavent to what the USAF requires and you are an absolute fool it you actually think that things other than the relative merits of the KC-767 & KC-30 did not have something to do with each & every choice.

You are right, however, Congress did disregard the clear vision the USAF had when it chose the KC-767 & worked so hard to get it ASAP rather than waiting until 2012 (which is how long it would have had to wait to purchase a full spec tanker which meet all 26 requirements) to get it & meddled in USAF affair by demanding a “full competition” knowing full well that the USAF had already rejected the only “competition” to what it had chosen.

Claiming that Boeing’s protest was lame & that the GAO was nit-picking so your lack of character & how low you are willing to go better than I could even hope to demonstrate.

“Living” with about 235 C-17s and F-22s, 90 F-35s a year instead of 110, a few less CSAR-X is NOT right by our servicemembers and current/potential aerospace employees.

pfcem, blah, blah, insult/lie, blah, blah, insult/lie…is that all you got? ;)

A split buy makes as much or more sense as the planned KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z strategy:

2013-2024: 179 KC-X, 59 KC-10, 300 KC-135R
2025-2037: 179 KC-X, 179 KC-Y, 200 KC-135R
2038-2050: 179 KC-X, 179 KC-Y, 179 KC-Z

2013-2024: 120-180 KC-767, 120-180 KC-30, 59 KC-10, 200 KC-135R
2025-2030: 180-270 KC-767, 180-270 KC-30,54 DC-10 to KC-10 conversions conducted 3 per year

Only in the first 12 years does the aerial fleet have 4 aircraft types instead of the 3 in the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z strategy. For the other 24 years and beyond of either approach, both have 3 aircraft types.

Note that not only do you have enhanced pallet transport capability 20 years sooner to save C-17/C-5 flight hours (something the USAF should consider in the MPLCC) but you also have 20 outyears without the $3 billion annual expense spent on KC-Y/KC-Z available for other USAF projects…such as either a F-22 replacement, increased B-3 bomber buy, C-17/C-5 replacement, or C-130J replacement. In the case of the latter 2, you will have a third manufacturer on U.S. shores with the potential to compete in the competition.

Contracts every few years for who gets the larger of the 60/40 splits, retains competition for the taxpayer. Elimination of development costs for new and potentially non-commercial KC-Y/KC-Z aircraft coupled with the D-10-20 to KC-10 strategy would also be cheaper overall.

Guess I misunderstood that there are few newer DC-10-30 than KC-10s so there would be no need to convert to replace the 1981-1987 vintage KC-10s. You could augment them since they are much younger than the 60’s KC-135. You also could re-engine them for better fuel economy. Or simply build more KC-X in the split buy to end up with two aircraft types in the end instead of 3 of KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z.

Cole,

Stop talking to yourself & posting at the same time. We already know you are full of it. YOU & your fellow EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinkers [that is not an insult, it is calling you what you have demonstrated yourself to be] are the ones constantly insuting & lieing.

No, a split buy of KC-767AT & KC-30 makes NO sense EXCEPT if it is the only way to get new tankers sooner rather than later. Even then in order for it to be realistic for Beoing & NG/EADs it requires an increase in the number of tankers procured each year which while SHOULD be easy to do, is not.

The KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan is NOT for 179 KC-X + 179 KC-Y + 179 KC-Z. And (aside from the USAF wanting a larger number/proportion of large KC-10-like tankers) the reason why the KC-10 are to be replace before all of the KC-135R is that despite them being younger they are not expected to last as long. It would be nice if you could for once get your facts right.

There are a number of problems (aside from the fact that the KC-30 is simply WRONG for the USAF) with your plan. 1st, if you are going to give yourself more money to procure new tankers each year it is only fair to compare what the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z would look like with the same increase. 2nd, you are neglecting the operational costs. 3rd, the AOA found that converting KC-10 was not cost effective. 4th, your plan does not provide enough KC-10-like tankers (just as the KC-30 is a poor medium KC-135-like tanker, it is a poor large KC-10-like tanker despite being larger & heavier than the KC-10). 5th, the KC-Y & KC-Z are to potentially take advantage of technology improvements - for example, rumor has it the USAF would love for the KC-Y could be based on the Boeing BWB platform & by the time the KC-Y comes around an unmananned flying wing/BWB [or something even more radical] may be the choice while your plan saddles us with platforms which are ALL outdated buy the standards of the very near future (787 & A350).

The only thing “wrong” with the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan (aside from taking far too long to recapitalize the entire tanker fleet - so long in faact that the KC-X will need to begin to be replaced shortly after we are expected to get the last KC-Y) is that the reality is that KC-135E HAVE to be replaced 1st but the KC-10s need to be replaced before the KC-135Rs. That is not a fault of the plan but a reality.

insuting & lieing

-Learn how to spell before insulting others…

Took your advice and read the Executive Summary of the 2006 RAND AoA study: “Analysis of Alternatives for KC-135 Recapitalization.” Thanks for the ammo:

http://www-tc.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/tanker_rand.pdf

Page 12 of the AoA under first paragraph: “A mixed fleet consisting of more than one of these alternative candidates also has comparable cost-effectiveness, so there is no reason to exclude a priori an Airbus-Boeing mixed buy on cost-effectiveness grounds.”

While you choose to focus on the first sentence, the second sentence is clearly an option…also page 12: “Acquiring used aircraft as tankers is not as cost-effective as acquiring new aircraft. However, the AoA’s estimates of the cost penalty are not great enough to exclude this option from any future competition, as long as electronic survivability in a nuclear environment is not required of them.”

Page 12 also has evidence that, contrary to your statement, an end mix of refurbished, re-engined KC-10s by buying up to 41 used KC-10-30 (170 were built) to complement the existing 59, would be cost effective: “Even if such aircraft are found to be cost-effective, analysis of the numbers of suitable used aircraft likely to be available on the commercial market indicates that they would only meet between 10 and 25 percent of the total requirement, and so they would have to be part of a mixed fleet of new and used replacement aircraft.”

Show me evidence that re-engined and additional KC-10s could not make it to 2050, making them 70 years old vs. some KC-135R that would be 80 years old by 2040 in the USAF plan. This would give the USAF a 20 year hiatus from cash flow dedicated to tankers if it adopted the accelerated split buy. As you say, you would not be immediately spending to produce the KC-X replacement at the end of its complete purchase.

Found this enlightening regarding the blended wing argument you make for KC-Y on page 13: “New-design tankers—i.e., aircraft developed de novo to be tankers—are not cost-effective. Improved aerodynamic efficiency and purpose-built tanker features can make them more effective per aircraft than commercial-derivative tankers. However, the additional effectiveness of such specialized design features does not offset their higher research and development costs and their higher production costs. Production costs are higher because there are no shared production-learning economies with a commercial version of the aircraft.”

And finally in the Conclusion, pg 16: “Fleets consisting of just one kind of such aircraft or consisting of two kinds of them have comparable cost effectiveness.”

The final two sentences of this quote from page 16 of the Conclusion, illustrate that you can pay Peter now or later: “If the AoA-guidance KC-135 fleet meets or exceeds the future aerial refueling requirement, the present value of all life-cycle costs, both of operating the KC-135s until they are retired and of acquiring and operating the replacement aircraft, is relatively insensitive to the timing of recapitalization. In this case, the decision of when to recapitalize should be based on considerations other than the present value of life-cycle costs. Arguments favoring earlier (sooner or more rapid) recapitalization include hedging against the technical risk associated with the KC-135 fleet, the existence of future constraints on annual procurement budgets, and the additional capabilities of the new tankers. Arguments favoring delayed (later or less rapid) recapitalization include hedging against uncertainties that could reduce the desirability of new tankers and the existence of very near-term budget constraints.”

Stretching the tanker purchase through 2045-2050 (instead of 2030) is analogous to the guy who never pays off his credit cards and continues to amass more and more debt. It doesn’t get prettier down the line when future bills (procurements of other aircraft) come due. Cutting back and stopping some procurements now, leaves you future opportunities for new developments of aircraft that actually would make a difference when/if China/Russia eventually becomes superpowers in the future…because they certainly aren’t superpowers currently, nor will they be for the next 20 years.

Your argument that the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z strategy allows future improvements in aerial refuelers ignores the reality that these aircraft are least likely to realize significant gains from modernization. A KC-135R has and will work well during its entire life whereas an F-4 produced around the same time would be a disaster if still in use today and in 2040…no matter how many times you re-engined/upgraded it.

Cole,

Thanks for demonstrating you lack of reading comprehension.

Note that MIXED buy is NOT the same as a SPLIT buy.

EVEN IF such aircraft are found to be cost-effective means NOT cost-effective.

Developement cost of a BWB platform would be already be paid for from its developement as an airliner which would still make them commercial-derivative.

The manned vs unmanned situation will be quite different post 2025.

Sorry, but the USAF has already determined that the KC-10’s need to be replace before the KC-135Rs, it is YOUR responsibility to domnstrate otherwise. The USAF KC-10 fleet is flown at much lower utilization rates than its civilian DC-10 counterparts, so retired DC-10 will be (in terms of service life) is WORSE condition that the KC-10s. IF we had the money, converting retired DC-10 would be a viable SHORT TERM solution to the desire for more KC-10s but would cost MORE in the long term than replaceing the KC-10 with a new large tanker.

Are you now saying we SHOULD spend MORE money on tankers because we can do so by spending less on procurement now & the short term knowing full well it will cost more later & in the end? So why are you so adamant that the tanker lease was a bad idea?

No, stretching the tanker purchase in analogous to the guy NOT wanting to run up debt to buy something he can not afford to buy now & staying more within his means.

What part of you fight with what you HAVE don’t you understand?

Geez,

MIXED buy is the same as SPLIT buy if you are purchasing in similar annual quantities, i.e. 10-15 per manufacturer for a total of 25.

Guess the USAF was dumb to re-engine the KC-135 into an R-version since it wasn’t cost-effective…

There are still 59 KC-10 that could gain from the same treatement. Understand what you are saying about the extra hours on commercial DC-10-30s…although additional split buy aircraft would be more than sufficient given the capacity of the KC-30 which could be expanded with fuel between the floors.

Blended Wing-Body might potentially be a great freight or tanker aircraft. Unfortunately, high fuel costs, and the A380 show that huge passenger aircraft no longer sell well. If BWB cannot be a passenger aircraft, it won’t be a freighter/aerial refueler.

Why not a passenger aircraft other than its large size? How about the sardine treatment, lack of windows, lack of safe egress in an emergency, not to mention timely entry/exit at the airport. It would be expensive R&D-wise relative to continuing to buy the KC-X split buy. Make it into a B-3 bomber instead that could potentially take a refueling pod/boom in lieu of ordnance.

Suspect the USAF chose to replace the KC-10 with KC-Y just to ensure it got a KC-10 replacement since the KC-Z may be an affordability “offramp.”

The USAF should consider spending the extra money now for the KC-X because:

a) It has the opportunity to get more money from Congress due to this nightmare dispute and the added long-term jobs and aerospace competition it would create in a troubled economy…

b) The USAF needs to reduce C-17/C-5 flight hours that the war on terror is gobbling up. KC-X is less essential as an aerial refueler (in numbers) in this war, so it could fly more passenger and pallet miles in peacetime than it might in high intensity combat, while letting the KC-135R burn up hours doing more refueling for the next few decades

c) Rather than fight tooth and nail more more F-22s that are 90s technology, why not start a new fighter in 2030 and buy more B-3 bombers that start not in 2018…but maybe 2025. That would provide an up-to-date answer to China and Russia at the time they are starting to gain strength. It would be very handy having that extra $3 billion a year around at that time…

pfcem,

Are you absolutely sure you are not a Boeing employee? I have to tell you, I am a Boeing employee and I was even slated to support Boeing’s tanker program back in 2003 had we won. Obviously, I would like to see Boeing win the contract ultimately. But damn, you make even me look fair and balanced.

Hey Brownshoe, are you just boinginating us? If you are a Boeing/Aeronovali/JADC employee why aren’t you out on the picket line? Just one more Boeing/Aeronovali/JADC risk for the tanker acquisition!

By the way congratulations to all you Boeing/Aeronovali/JADC folks on the 4 years late anniversary for the Italian tanker!

Today’s Non-Ethics Word: Boinginate
Pronunciation: \Bo-ing-i-nate\
Function: Verb
Etymology: North Western US & Boeing/Aeronovali/JADC Consortium
Date: 2008
Transitive verb
: to habitually lie, cheat, bribe or steal if you really, really want to win

reuters is reporting some news regarding tanker today.

http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN0928904820080909

I Can’t wait to see what the Boeing monkeys and their sock puppets have wedged themselves into.

Cole,

No, a MIXED buy is not the same as a SPLIT buy. A mixed buy means that the KC-X, KC-Y & KC-Z are not all the same platform, a split buy means that the KC-X is TWO platforms.

Buying 25 KC-X (reguardless of whether it is KC-767AT or KC-30) is less expensive than buying 10-15 KC-767AT & 10-15 KC-30 for a total of 25 tankers per year. Not to mention the increased developement & operational costs of two platforms for the KC-X.

Are you even capable of making an honest argument? The KC-135R upgrades took place in the 1980’s & 1990’s.

Yes the KC-10 could (& assuming the money could be “found” to do so) be upgraded & retired DC-10 converted in a manner similar to the KC-135R was (a force of 100 would be nice) but it would only be a “short-medium term stop-gap” to a new replacement tanker. I would actually like to see this happen & have the large KC-10 replacement pushed back to the KC-Z as previously planned - that “fixes” your biggest gripe with the current KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan BUT will cost more money in the end & based on your opposition to the tanker lease deal has its own problems…

At the moment, many customers are perfectly happy with their 747s so the A380 isn’t doing as well as thought but as the existing 747s age the actual NEED for VL airliners will increase (did you happen to se the price of a barrel of oil). So there is hope for a large BWB airliner by the time of the KC-Y or KC-Z & if not, it is possible the same BWB platform could be used as a C-5 replacement (& or one hell of a HUGE bomber) thus spreading the developement costs…

Brownshoe,

Fair & Balanced? This is not a news program. I am MUCH more fair & am balance to the EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinkers who appear to not even be able to do any research beyond reading news headlines & press releases to get the facts straight.

don’t forget the popcorn, pfcem (I.e., with our kool-aid). Watching Boeing and their sock puppets flounder is more fun than going to the movies. Keep it coming :D

As entertaining as this dialog between Cole and pfcem is, I have to ask if they’ve identified themselves anywhere relative to the competing contractors with respect to employment? It would seem to be the ethical thing to do. Is this about your companies or are you looking only for the best buy for the AF? Or both?

I hope only that this competition will produce the right aircraft for the AF to meet any required IOC date. As an retired AF maintenance officer (never in AMC though) I have no favorite a/c as I recognize I’m not qualified to evaluate this RFP. My opinion is that DD was trying to “do the right thing” but really screwed up in bedding down with Boeing in such an unskilled manner. That’s history however. As is Northrop’s win.

The Reuter’s news per mojojojo’s link today suggests as I have before that this is really a matter for the next president. Senator McCain has often expressed his support for open competition under the WTO agreements and was directly involved in this procurement’s direction earlier on.

Senator Obama has declared himself to be less of a free trade advocate and is more vocal over keeping jobs in the USA. Are you both convinced the AF (and Mr. Young this time) will make the final decision? I believe that’s happened twice now and got turned around. Reality is what it is.

So guys, can you keep hassling and insulting each other for 4 more months or longer? It’s rather fun to read I admit. I’m sure once the decision is made this dialog will shift to politics.

pfcem said: “No, a MIXED buy is not the same as a SPLIT buy. A mixed buy means that the KC-X, KC-Y & KC-Z are not all the same platform, a split buy means that the KC-X is TWO platforms.”

“Buying 25 KC-X (reguardless of whether it is KC-767AT or KC-30) is less expensive than buying 10-15 KC-767AT & 10-15 KC-30 for a total of 25 tankers per year. Not to mention the increased developement & operational costs of two platforms for the KC-X.”
=====================================
The study did not address KC-X being a mixed buy. The RAND study concerned replacement of the KC-135R only. Because KC-X and KC-Z would replace KC-135R, you would still have two separate R&D efforts and two separate productions of 25 aircraft annually in a “mixed” buy. Same if you produced 80 KC-767s followed by 99 KC-30s back to back (dumb).Because of the time gap on when production commences for each KC-135R replacement, the later production cost of KC-Z will/would be much higher. Add the additional R&D for KC-Y (KC-10 replacement that you say might be BWB)and costs are far higher vs. 18 years of a split buy and a KC-10 re-engining.

pfcem said :”Are you even capable of making an honest argument? The KC-135R upgrades took place in the 1980’s & 1990’s.
==================================
So you are saying that it was smart to re-engine the KC-135 20-30 years into production but it’s not smart to re-engine the 81-87 KC-10 30-40 years into its possible 70 year life???
==================================

pfcem continues: “Yes the KC-10 could (& assuming the money could be “found” to do so) be upgraded & retired DC-10 converted in a manner similar to the KC-135R was (a force of 100 would be nice) but it would only be a “short-medium term stop-gap” to a new replacement tanker. I would actually like to see this happen & have the large KC-10 replacement pushed back to the KC-Z as previously planned - that “fixes” your biggest gripe with the current KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan BUT will cost more money in the end & based on your opposition to the tanker lease deal has its own problems…”
=============================
Heh we almost agree on something (KC-10)! BTW, I never said I was against the lease and don’t know much about it other than that McCain was against it. Water under the bridge and irrelevant to the current problem/solution.

Frankly, I wanted to stay out of this argument until I realized that a 4-star was actually saying he could live with a split buy, and Murtha had mentioned it as well. Just seems like the only solution that keeps everyone happy.

dsueii, I am not a lobbyist, or a NG/EADS or Boeing employee. I do live in Alabama and resent the Washington clan bad-mouthing us and trying to steal our potential jobs. I frankly doubt that pfcem is a lobbyist either because I don’t believe his insults of others in every post are anything Boeing would wish to be associated with. Unions?…you never know.

pfcem will argue to the ends of the earth against a split buy. There will be no split buy. Boeing won’t have it. A split buy not only acknowledges the competition, but it allows the competition to become established in Boeing’s back yard. This is an all-or-nothing that Boeing must confirm. That’s why I enjoy the follies as much as I do (I have no dog in the fight). It’s hypocrisy and gerrymandering to the highest degree.

Anybody see Dirty Jobs last night? Mike went to clean out the fuel bladder of a KC-135R. Afterwards they did a refuel on a B52. It was pretty cool. Archaic, but pretty cool.

mojojo, saw part of that episode a while back. Talk about claustrophobia, not to mention fitting through that wing opening in the first place. At 6′-2″ and 240 lbs at least it would never be my dirty job.

Kind of reminds me of fitting in a middle passenger seat of a 600 seat BWB airliner and then trying to find your way through a maze to an emergency exit…or find your seat in the first place. ;)

Cole,

Sorry but a KC-X split buy will NOT remove the need for the later KC-Y & KC-Z. Although upgrading KC-10s & converting retired DC-10s so that the KC-10 replacement can be pushed back to the KC-Z as previously planned COULD allow for the KC-Y to be an updated KC-X but a KC-X split buy still ADDS to the number of platforms rather than subtracting. BUT you have to keep in mind that the KC-Y is ~2025, by then the 787 & A350 technologies (not to mention the possibility of BWB) will undoubtably be expanded to smaller & perhaps even larger airliners with the operational cost advantages (particularly fuel costs) maybe being enough to justify the KC-Y being a new platform (or such an advancement of the KC-X platform as to essentially be a new platform).

The KC-10s don’t have a 70 year life & retired DC-10s have even less service life left than the KC-10s.

The biggest problem with the tanker recapitalization plan is that it is simply too slow, procuring too few tanker each year. As it is, we will have to start replacing the first KC-X’s shortly after receiving the last KC-Zs. Not to mention that it is FAR to relient of the KC-135R lasting until 2050. Remember that this all started in 1996 because the long-term viability of the KC-135 became a concern & that the USAF chose to lease KC-767s in order to kick-start tanker recapitalization in order to be able to retire the KC-135E sooner rather than later.

mojojojo,

A split by is a BAD idea, everybody (except Cole) knows it.

However, like so many others, I realize that as bad an idea a split buy is, it may be the only way for us to get ANY new tankers.

But if there ends up being a split buy, this is what will happen [just a prediction, I don't have a crystal ball or anything like that]. It will become very clear that the KC-767ATs are much better tankers due to the REAL WORLD operational limitations of the KC-30s but everybody will LOVE the KC-30s as airlift assets (& to a lesser but still significant extent as air bridge tankers). Thus the KC-767AT will do most of the MEDIUM INTER-THEATER TANKER work (along with the KC-135Rs) that is SUPPOSED to be the primary job of the KC-X & the KC-30 will mostly do airlift work to “lighten” the load on other airlift assets & suppliment the KC-135Rs, KC-767ATs & KC-10s during air bridge operations.

*required