A split by is a BAD idea, everybody (except Cole) knows it.

However, like so many others, I realize that as bad an idea a split buy is, it may be the only way for us to get ANY new tankers.

But if there ends up being a split buy, this is what will happen [just a prediction, I don’t have a crystal ball or anything like that]. It will become very clear that the KC-767ATs are much better tankers due to the REAL WORLD operational limitations of the KC-30s but everybody will LOVE the KC-30s as airlift assets (& to a lesser but still significant extent as air bridge tankers). Thus the KC-767AT will do most of the MEDIUM INTER-THEATER TANKER work (along with the KC-135Rs) that is SUPPOSED to be the primary job of the KC-X & the KC-30 will mostly do airlift work to “lighten” the load on other airlift assets & suppliment the KC-135Rs, KC-767ATs & KC-10s during air bridge operations.

Sorry but a KC-X split buy will NOT remove the need for the later KC-Y & KC-Z. Although upgrading KC-10s & converting retired DC-10s so that the KC-10 replacement can be pushed back to the KC-Z as previously planned COULD allow for the KC-Y to be an updated KC-X but a KC-X split buy still ADDS to the number of platforms rather than subtracting. BUT you have to keep in mind that the KC-Y is ~2025, by then the 787 & A350 technologies (not to mention the possibility of BWB) will undoubtably be expanded to smaller & perhaps even larger airliners with the operational cost advantages (particularly fuel costs) maybe being enough to justify the KC-Y being a new platform (or such an advancement of the KC-X platform as to essentially be a new platform).

The KC-10s don’t have a 70 year life & retired DC-10s have even less service life left than the KC-10s.

The biggest problem with the tanker recapitalization plan is that it is simply too slow, procuring too few tanker each year. As it is, we will have to start replacing the first KC-X’s shortly after receiving the last KC-Zs. Not to mention that it is FAR to relient of the KC-135R lasting until 2050. Remember that this all started in 1996 because the long-term viability of the KC-135 became a concern & that the USAF chose to lease KC-767s in order to kick-start tanker recapitalization in order to be able to retire the KC-135E sooner rather than later.

Kind of reminds me of fitting in a middle passenger seat of a 600 seat BWB airliner and then trying to find your way through a maze to an emergency exit…or find your seat in the first place. ;)

Anybody see Dirty Jobs last night? Mike went to clean out the fuel bladder of a KC-135R. Afterwards they did a refuel on a B52. It was pretty cool. Archaic, but pretty cool.

pfcem continues: “Yes the KC-10 could (& assuming the money could be “found” to do so) be upgraded & retired DC-10 converted in a manner similar to the KC-135R was (a force of 100 would be nice) but it would only be a “short-medium term stop-gap” to a new replacement tanker. I would actually like to see this happen & have the large KC-10 replacement pushed back to the KC-Z as previously planned — that “fixes” your biggest gripe with the current KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan BUT will cost more money in the end & based on your opposition to the tanker lease deal has its own problems…“
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Heh we almost agree on something (KC-10)! BTW, I never said I was against the lease and don’t know much about it other than that McCain was against it. Water under the bridge and irrelevant to the current problem/solution.

Frankly, I wanted to stay out of this argument until I realized that a 4-star was actually saying he could live with a split buy, and Murtha had mentioned it as well. Just seems like the only solution that keeps everyone happy.

dsueii, I am not a lobbyist, or a NG/EADS or Boeing employee. I do live in Alabama and resent the Washington clan bad-mouthing us and trying to steal our potential jobs. I frankly doubt that pfcem is a lobbyist either because I don’t believe his insults of others in every post are anything Boeing would wish to be associated with. Unions?…you never know.

“Buying 25 KC-X (reguardless of whether it is KC-767AT or KC-30) is less expensive than buying 10–15 KC-767AT & 10–15 KC-30 for a total of 25 tankers per year. Not to mention the increased developement & operational costs of two platforms for the KC-X.“
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The study did not address KC-X being a mixed buy. The RAND study concerned replacement of the KC-135R only. Because KC-X and KC-Z would replace KC-135R, you would still have two separate R&D efforts and two separate productions of 25 aircraft annually in a “mixed” buy. Same if you produced 80 KC-767s followed by 99 KC-30s back to back (dumb).Because of the time gap on when production commences for each KC-135R replacement, the later production cost of KC-Z will/would be much higher. Add the additional R&D for KC-Y (KC-10 replacement that you say might be BWB)and costs are far higher vs. 18 years of a split buy and a KC-10 re-engining.

I hope only that this competition will produce the right aircraft for the AF to meet any required IOC date. As an retired AF maintenance officer (never in AMC though) I have no favorite a/c as I recognize I’m not qualified to evaluate this RFP. My opinion is that DD was trying to “do the right thing” but really screwed up in bedding down with Boeing in such an unskilled manner. That’s history however. As is Northrop’s win.

The Reuter’s news per mojojojo’s link today suggests as I have before that this is really a matter for the next president. Senator McCain has often expressed his support for open competition under the WTO agreements and was directly involved in this procurement’s direction earlier on.

Senator Obama has declared himself to be less of a free trade advocate and is more vocal over keeping jobs in the USA. Are you both convinced the AF (and Mr. Young this time) will make the final decision? I believe that’s happened twice now and got turned around. Reality is what it is.

So guys, can you keep hassling and insulting each other for 4 more months or longer? It’s rather fun to read I admit. I’m sure once the decision is made this dialog will shift to politics.

Fair & Balanced? This is not a news program. I am MUCH more fair & am balance to the EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinkers who appear to not even be able to do any research beyond reading news headlines & press releases to get the facts straight.

No, a MIXED buy is not the same as a SPLIT buy. A mixed buy means that the KC-X, KC-Y & KC-Z are not all the same platform, a split buy means that the KC-X is TWO platforms.

Buying 25 KC-X (reguardless of whether it is KC-767AT or KC-30) is less expensive than buying 10–15 KC-767AT & 10–15 KC-30 for a total of 25 tankers per year. Not to mention the increased developement & operational costs of two platforms for the KC-X.

Are you even capable of making an honest argument? The KC-135R upgrades took place in the 1980’s & 1990’s.

Yes the KC-10 could (& assuming the money could be “found” to do so) be upgraded & retired DC-10 converted in a manner similar to the KC-135R was (a force of 100 would be nice) but it would only be a “short-medium term stop-gap” to a new replacement tanker. I would actually like to see this happen & have the large KC-10 replacement pushed back to the KC-Z as previously planned — that “fixes” your biggest gripe with the current KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan BUT will cost more money in the end & based on your opposition to the tanker lease deal has its own problems…

At the moment, many customers are perfectly happy with their 747s so the A380 isn’t doing as well as thought but as the existing 747s age the actual NEED for VL airliners will increase (did you happen to se the price of a barrel of oil). So there is hope for a large BWB airliner by the time of the KC-Y or KC-Z & if not, it is possible the same BWB platform could be used as a C-5 replacement (& or one hell of a HUGE bomber) thus spreading the developement costs…

http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN0928904820080909

I Can’t wait to see what the Boeing monkeys and their sock puppets have wedged themselves into.

By the way congratulations to all you Boeing/Aeronovali/JADC folks on the 4 years late anniversary for the Italian tanker!

Today’s Non-Ethics Word: Boinginate
Pronunciation: \Bo-ing-i-nate\
Function: Verb
Etymology: North Western US & Boeing/Aeronovali/JADC Consortium
Date: 2008
Transitive verb
: to habitually lie, cheat, bribe or steal if you really, really want to win

Are you absolutely sure you are not a Boeing employee? I have to tell you, I am a Boeing employee and I was even slated to support Boeing’s tanker program back in 2003 had we won. Obviously, I would like to see Boeing win the contract ultimately. But damn, you make even me look fair and balanced.

MIXED buy is the same as SPLIT buy if you are purchasing in similar annual quantities, i.e. 10–15 per manufacturer for a total of 25.

Guess the USAF was dumb to re-engine the KC-135 into an R-version since it wasn’t cost-effective…

There are still 59 KC-10 that could gain from the same treatement. Understand what you are saying about the extra hours on commercial DC-10-30s…although additional split buy aircraft would be more than sufficient given the capacity of the KC-30 which could be expanded with fuel between the floors.

Blended Wing-Body might potentially be a great freight or tanker aircraft. Unfortunately, high fuel costs, and the A380 show that huge passenger aircraft no longer sell well. If BWB cannot be a passenger aircraft, it won’t be a freighter/aerial refueler.

Why not a passenger aircraft other than its large size? How about the sardine treatment, lack of windows, lack of safe egress in an emergency, not to mention timely entry/exit at the airport. It would be expensive R&D-wise relative to continuing to buy the KC-X split buy. Make it into a B-3 bomber instead that could potentially take a refueling pod/boom in lieu of ordnance.

Suspect the USAF chose to replace the KC-10 with KC-Y just to ensure it got a KC-10 replacement since the KC-Z may be an affordability “offramp.”

The USAF should consider spending the extra money now for the KC-X because:

a) It has the opportunity to get more money from Congress due to this nightmare dispute and the added long-term jobs and aerospace competition it would create in a troubled economy…

b) The USAF needs to reduce C-17/C-5 flight hours that the war on terror is gobbling up. KC-X is less essential as an aerial refueler (in numbers) in this war, so it could fly more passenger and pallet miles in peacetime than it might in high intensity combat, while letting the KC-135R burn up hours doing more refueling for the next few decades

c) Rather than fight tooth and nail more more F-22s that are 90s technology, why not start a new fighter in 2030 and buy more B-3 bombers that start not in 2018…but maybe 2025. That would provide an up-to-date answer to China and Russia at the time they are starting to gain strength. It would be very handy having that extra $3 billion a year around at that time…

Thanks for demonstrating you lack of reading comprehension.

Note that MIXED buy is NOT the same as a SPLIT buy.

EVEN IF such aircraft are found to be cost-effective means NOT cost-effective.

Developement cost of a BWB platform would be already be paid for from its developement as an airliner which would still make them commercial-derivative.

The manned vs unmanned situation will be quite different post 2025.

Sorry, but the USAF has already determined that the KC-10’s need to be replace before the KC-135Rs, it is YOUR responsibility to domnstrate otherwise. The USAF KC-10 fleet is flown at much lower utilization rates than its civilian DC-10 counterparts, so retired DC-10 will be (in terms of service life) is WORSE condition that the KC-10s. IF we had the money, converting retired DC-10 would be a viable SHORT TERM solution to the desire for more KC-10s but would cost MORE in the long term than replaceing the KC-10 with a new large tanker.

Are you now saying we SHOULD spend MORE money on tankers because we can do so by spending less on procurement now & the short term knowing full well it will cost more later & in the end? So why are you so adamant that the tanker lease was a bad idea?

No, stretching the tanker purchase in analogous to the guy NOT wanting to run up debt to buy something he can not afford to buy now & staying more within his means.

What part of you fight with what you HAVE don’t you understand?

http://www-tc.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/tanker_rand.pdf

Page 12 of the AoA under first paragraph: “A mixed fleet consisting of more than one of these alternative candidates also has comparable cost-effectiveness, so there is no reason to exclude a priori an Airbus-Boeing mixed buy on cost-effectiveness grounds.”

While you choose to focus on the first sentence, the second sentence is clearly an option…also page 12: “Acquiring used aircraft as tankers is not as cost-effective as acquiring new aircraft. However, the AoA’s estimates of the cost penalty are not great enough to exclude this option from any future competition, as long as electronic survivability in a nuclear environment is not required of them.”

Page 12 also has evidence that, contrary to your statement, an end mix of refurbished, re-engined KC-10s by buying up to 41 used KC-10–30 (170 were built) to complement the existing 59, would be cost effective: “Even if such aircraft are found to be cost-effective, analysis of the numbers of suitable used aircraft likely to be available on the commercial market indicates that they would only meet between 10 and 25 percent of the total requirement, and so they would have to be part of a mixed fleet of new and used replacement aircraft.”

Show me evidence that re-engined and additional KC-10s could not make it to 2050, making them 70 years old vs. some KC-135R that would be 80 years old by 2040 in the USAF plan. This would give the USAF a 20 year hiatus from cash flow dedicated to tankers if it adopted the accelerated split buy. As you say, you would not be immediately spending to produce the KC-X replacement at the end of its complete purchase.

Found this enlightening regarding the blended wing argument you make for KC-Y on page 13: “New-design tankers—i.e., aircraft developed de novo to be tankers—are not cost-effective. Improved aerodynamic efficiency and purpose-built tanker features can make them more effective per aircraft than commercial-derivative tankers. However, the additional effectiveness of such specialized design features does not offset their higher research and development costs and their higher production costs. Production costs are higher because there are no shared production-learning economies with a commercial version of the aircraft.”

And finally in the Conclusion, pg 16: “Fleets consisting of just one kind of such aircraft or consisting of two kinds of them have comparable cost effectiveness.”

The final two sentences of this quote from page 16 of the Conclusion, illustrate that you can pay Peter now or later: “If the AoA-guidance KC-135 fleet meets or exceeds the future aerial refueling requirement, the present value of all life-cycle costs, both of operating the KC-135s until they are retired and of acquiring and operating the replacement aircraft, is relatively insensitive to the timing of recapitalization. In this case, the decision of when to recapitalize should be based on considerations other than the present value of life-cycle costs. Arguments favoring earlier (sooner or more rapid) recapitalization include hedging against the technical risk associated with the KC-135 fleet, the existence of future constraints on annual procurement budgets, and the additional capabilities of the new tankers. Arguments favoring delayed (later or less rapid) recapitalization include hedging against uncertainties that could reduce the desirability of new tankers and the existence of very near-term budget constraints.”

Stretching the tanker purchase through 2045–2050 (instead of 2030) is analogous to the guy who never pays off his credit cards and continues to amass more and more debt. It doesn’t get prettier down the line when future bills (procurements of other aircraft) come due. Cutting back and stopping some procurements now, leaves you future opportunities for new developments of aircraft that actually would make a difference when/if China/Russia eventually becomes superpowers in the future…because they certainly aren’t superpowers currently, nor will they be for the next 20 years.

Your argument that the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z strategy allows future improvements in aerial refuelers ignores the reality that these aircraft are least likely to realize significant gains from modernization. A KC-135R has and will work well during its entire life whereas an F-4 produced around the same time would be a disaster if still in use today and in 2040…no matter how many times you re-engined/upgraded it.

–Learn how to spell before insulting others…

Stop talking to yourself & posting at the same time. We already know you are full of it. YOU & your fellow EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinkers [that is not an insult, it is calling you what you have demonstrated yourself to be] are the ones constantly insuting & lieing.

No, a split buy of KC-767AT & KC-30 makes NO sense EXCEPT if it is the only way to get new tankers sooner rather than later. Even then in order for it to be realistic for Beoing & NG/EADs it requires an increase in the number of tankers procured each year which while SHOULD be easy to do, is not.

The KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan is NOT for 179 KC-X + 179 KC-Y + 179 KC-Z. And (aside from the USAF wanting a larger number/proportion of large KC-10-like tankers) the reason why the KC-10 are to be replace before all of the KC-135R is that despite them being younger they are not expected to last as long. It would be nice if you could for once get your facts right.

There are a number of problems (aside from the fact that the KC-30 is simply WRONG for the USAF) with your plan. 1st, if you are going to give yourself more money to procure new tankers each year it is only fair to compare what the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z would look like with the same increase. 2nd, you are neglecting the operational costs. 3rd, the AOA found that converting KC-10 was not cost effective. 4th, your plan does not provide enough KC-10-like tankers (just as the KC-30 is a poor medium KC-135-like tanker, it is a poor large KC-10-like tanker despite being larger & heavier than the KC-10). 5th, the KC-Y & KC-Z are to potentially take advantage of technology improvements — for example, rumor has it the USAF would love for the KC-Y could be based on the Boeing BWB platform & by the time the KC-Y comes around an unmananned flying wing/BWB [or something even more radical] may be the choice while your plan saddles us with platforms which are ALL outdated buy the standards of the very near future (787 & A350).

The only thing “wrong” with the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z plan (aside from taking far too long to recapitalize the entire tanker fleet — so long in faact that the KC-X will need to begin to be replaced shortly after we are expected to get the last KC-Y) is that the reality is that KC-135E HAVE to be replaced 1st but the KC-10s need to be replaced before the KC-135Rs. That is not a fault of the plan but a reality.

A split buy makes as much or more sense as the planned KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z strategy:

2013–2024: 179 KC-X, 59 KC-10, 300 KC-135R
2025–2037: 179 KC-X, 179 KC-Y, 200 KC-135R
2038–2050: 179 KC-X, 179 KC-Y, 179 KC-Z

2013–2024: 120–180 KC-767, 120–180 KC-30, 59 KC-10, 200 KC-135R
2025–2030: 180–270 KC-767, 180–270 KC-30,54 DC-10 to KC-10 conversions conducted 3 per year

Only in the first 12 years does the aerial fleet have 4 aircraft types instead of the 3 in the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z strategy. For the other 24 years and beyond of either approach, both have 3 aircraft types.

Note that not only do you have enhanced pallet transport capability 20 years sooner to save C-17/C-5 flight hours (something the USAF should consider in the MPLCC) but you also have 20 outyears without the $3 billion annual expense spent on KC-Y/KC-Z available for other USAF projects…such as either a F-22 replacement, increased B-3 bomber buy, C-17/C-5 replacement, or C-130J replacement. In the case of the latter 2, you will have a third manufacturer on U.S. shores with the potential to compete in the competition.

Contracts every few years for who gets the larger of the 60/40 splits, retains competition for the taxpayer. Elimination of development costs for new and potentially non-commercial KC-Y/KC-Z aircraft coupled with the D-10–20 to KC-10 strategy would also be cheaper overall.