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DoD Names Nuke Generals

By Colin Clark Thursday, September 25th, 2008 3:50 pm
Posted in Air, Land

Carefully balancing the need to punish and demonstrate accountability and the need to preserve rare institutional knowledge about nuclear weapons, the Air Force has reprimanded or admonished six generals, including the deputy chief of staff for logistics, installations and mission support and the former commander of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center.

“The Air Force has no more solemn obligation than the security and reliability of the nation’s nuclear arsenal,” Gen. Norton Schwartz, Air Force chief of staff told reporters Thursday afternoon. “Commanders are accountable for all aspects of their commands, as are general officers for their functional responsibilities.” The punishments were announced at the Pentagon by Schwartz and Acting Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley.

A report by Navy Adm. Kirkland H. Donald, director of naval nuclear propulsion, into the nuclear enterprise detailed a loss of oversight from senior Air Force leaders and lowered performance related to the nuclear mission. Defense Secretary Robert Gates had to intervene personally and ordered Donald’s review after sensitive nuclear parts were sent mistakenly to Taiwan. In a separate incident, a B-52 bomber had flown across the country carrying at least five armed nuclear cruise missiles.

The nuclear personnel review began as a result of Donald’s report. A panel led by Tom Moorman, former Air Force vice chief of staff, Marty Faga, former director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and Gen. Stephen Lorenz, commander of the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command, conducted the personnel reviews.

In addition to those announced Thursday, a source familiar with the issue said that a wider range of lower ranking officers and noncommissioned officers have been punished for their roles in the Taiwan incident, but the panel only dealt with colonels and above.

Only one general officer is leaving the Air Force as a result of the review launched in July after several nuclear mishaps. Lt. Gen. Kevin Sullivan, deputy chief of staff for logistics, installations and mission support, did as the former Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Mike Moseley, did in the face of serious allegations of inaction and requested retirement.

Lt. Gen. Michael A. Hamel, former commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base, Calif., was admonished, according to a source who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue. He is retiring effective Oct. 1, according to the official Air Force web site. Hamel’s retirement was placed on hold while his case was considered and his punishment was recently downgraded from a more serious reprimand to admonition. Hamel was responsible for managing the research, design, development, acquisition and sustainment of space and missile systems, launch, command and control, and operational satellite systems.

Two Air Force major generals, Roger Burg and Kathleen Close, were issued admonitions “for not exercising effective command oversight,” according to the Air Force press release announcing the punishments. Burg, commander of the 20th Air Force, did not identify and correct problems with shipping sensitive components and in his role overseeing the ICBM nuclear force. But he will keep his command because the Donley and Schwartz believe he is “needed to restore effective stewardship of the ICBM force.…”

Close, who also did not recognize “systemic weaknesses in supply chain management of sensitive components” and did not take “adequate action to correct previously identified materiel control and maintenance deficiencies” in her job as commander of the Ogden Air Logistics Center, will also remain in her job to “restore Air Force stewardship of the ICBM force,” the release said.

Two Air Force brigadier generals, Francis Bruno and Arthur Cameron, received letters of admonition. Bruno, director of logistics for Air Force materiel Command, had already asked to retire. Cameron received a “routine reassignment” at the end of his tour as commander of the 309th Maintenance Wing before the nuclear review began, according to the Air Force release.
In addition to the generals, five colonels received letters of reprimand “for not exercising effective command oversight to detect and correct deficiencies in materiel control, engineering or maintenance activities associated with the ICBM force,” according to the Air Force press release. Two of them were removed from command. One of those is retiring from the service. The other three are remaining with the service.

Three colonels were admonished for “failing to exercise effective command oversight to detect and correct deficiencies in their units that continued after the Taiwan incident,” the Air Force release detailed. One colonel was removed from command; the other two will remain in their current positions.
One colonel received a letter of counseling for failures not involved with the Taiwan incident. That colonel is retiring.

Two Army brigadier generals, Lynn Collyar and Michael Lally, were issued memoranda of concern for their actions while commanding the Defense Distribution Center. In a press release, the Army said neither officer was “directly responsible” for the mistaken shipment of nuclear fuses to Taiwan in 2006. The military was supposed to send helicopter batteries but mistakenly sent fuses used in the trigger mechanism for Minuteman missiles. “But there were systemic weaknesses in the supply chain process identified in previous audits that” the two officers did not fully correct, the release said. Both officers are in command jobs today and “the Army leadership has great confidence in both” generals, the release said.

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	RGW September 25th, 2008 at 4:09 pm Roger W. Burg is Commander, 20th Air Force at F. E. Warren AFB andnot the 29th Air Force mentioned in the article.
	bobbymike September 26th, 2008 at 9:47 am It is unfortunate that this is happening when the Air Force should be modernizing the nuclear deterrent ICBM force. The nuclear mission is still an important factor in the nation’s defense. The US needs RRW and other new systems so I fear these occurrances can be used against the prudent policy of deterrence.
	Jack September 26th, 2008 at 3:49 pm Spent 40 years with Nukes. God help the new generation.60 to 1985 Minuteman. 85 till 2005 Peacekeeper. Now we have nothing but the Subs. FE Warren AFB Cheyenne. 50 year old system and still the best and most powerful. Jack
	Jack September 26th, 2008 at 4:07 pm Hey Dave even we never got in this much trouble. Why Jack
	Al Shockey September 27th, 2008 at 6:51 am BG Cameron and I were maint. Captains together at Edwards AFB 87–89. I do not think it is chance that a bunch of Maintenance Officers were in charge of an organization where massive problems went undetected by officer leadership. As an enlisted maintainer for 6 years I always thought that the officer leadership didn’t know what us enlisted guys were doing. My final 7 years in the AF, as a Maintenance Officer before I retired, confirmed that suspicion. The Air Force has a goofy way, in my opinion, of training its Maintenance Officers. They shuffle them around from OIC jobs in the back shops of EMS, LSS, AGS, etc, and the flight line. They never get an in depth understanding of what really is happening in the areas in which they are supposedly Officers in Charge (OIC’s). The enlisted corp had a joke about it. They called them Oh I SEE’s. The whole training concept of the Maintenance Officer Corp in the Air Force makes it ripe for the kind of lapses we have seen with the taxpayer’s nuclear deterrent. How many more lower profile failures have occured the public has not seen and what could the cost of those failures be? In the last decade I have become friends with some Marine Ordnance personnel. I was delighted to find out how Marine Corp Ordnance personnel took over their respective bomb dumps. A Marine Ordnance Man becomes Chief of the Bomb Dump by first being an enlisted man, then a Warrant officer and then the Officer In Charge. They know what is happening at the very lowest level. Contrast that to the Air Force Maint Officers who spend 50% of their time proofreading and writing awards and decs. You maintainers know that is true. OPS guys run the Air Force and my experience has been they are by in large great leaders. They need to jump in the Maintenance arena with both big boots and revamp the whole model so these types of incompetence don’t continue to happen. I loved my Air Force Career. For me it was the greatest career anybody could have bar none. But when it came time for me to accept regular officer, I chose not to take it because of the irreconcilable problems I saw with responsibility and authority in the maint. community. I felt retiring as soon as possible was the best bet for me and regular officer, at that time, had draw backs for retirees.
	Old Missile Guy September 27th, 2008 at 12:08 pm Mishandling live nukes is far more serious than mishandling sensitive components. Far more serious (I know; I’m an old SAC weenie). Yet several (non-flying) generals were sacrificed for the lesser incident, and none for the more serious event. Yes, some colonels at Minot were punished. But so far, no generals. The next echelon above Minot is 8AF. The 8AF commander IMO should be held ultimately responsible for setting the training priorities and command climate in 8AF. Comamnders are ultimately responsible for the actions of their subordinates. That’s how it’s always been — up til now, apparently. The 8AF comamnder is a pilot. Nevermind. The Pilot’s Protective Association is alive and well in the Air Force.
	Al Shockey September 29th, 2008 at 5:54 pm During my time in the Air Force, keeping track of nucs fell to the Munitions Accountable Supply Officer (MASO) who was a maintenance guy and who might now be called a logistics guy. From my years as a MASO/maintainer, I can tell you OPs guys knew nothing about the MASO tasks and virtually nothing maintenance related. They put their trust in the maintainers to build a workable system. They did not design the training process of the MASO or any other aspect of the maintenace arena. Maintainers did. Ops guys have their hands full and then some putting bombs on the target. The maintenance Generals should have direct understanding of the complex systems put in place to account for nucs and components. Every officer from the General on down should know all intricacies involved in accounting for nucs. The problem is, in my opinion, the maintenance officers don’t know what is going on. They have been trained in the Oh I SEE method of leadership. They have grown in the maintenance community from little bureaucrats into big bureaucrats. Logic and reason do not guide them, bowing to the alter of complex bureaucracy guides them. Case in point was that silly TQM stuff. What a boondoggle. That is why, in my opinion, ops guys need to make sure each maintenance officer has absolute accountability and authority over their shop,branch,squadron, group or wing. Why pay them to relay info. and write awards and decs? True authority can only come with an extremely high level of knowledge. Officers can’t acquire this knowledge level being shuffled around from shop to shop during large portions of their careers and being burdened with meaningless bureaucracy. They become great politicians not great maintenance officers.
	Existentialist September 29th, 2008 at 10:50 pm The Air Force in it’s wisdumm combined the munitions officer and the maintenance officer career fields. This made a bigger “pool” to select from, which led to a dilution of knowledge. The original munitions officer was specialized in all aspects of munitions i.e. armament, nuclear ammo, conventional ammo etc. An officer spent an entire career becoming supervisors, managers, and commanders of units involved with explosive munitions and their associated systems. Now they are combined with aircraft maintenance. I believe this combining of job series should have never been done.It is probably one of the reasons for the recent nuclear SNAFU. PS: In addition the MASO was NOT a maintenance officer. He or she was a supply officer that was specialized in accounting for munitions.
	Active Duty September 30th, 2008 at 3:00 am Good points. A major contributing factor is the never ending stream of additional duties, paperwork, line of sight taskers, etc. that detract from the core responsibilities. Very difficult to maintain any type of process when the crew spends 50 percent or more of their time on non-mission related responsibilities.
	jpwhite September 30th, 2008 at 5:36 am Don’t know from MASO etc. but a nuke is a nuke and an aircrew should be able to recognize a live missle from a training shape and back away from a loaded jet, call the cops and the wing C.O. Which tree did the Aircraft commander swing from?
	Richard White September 30th, 2008 at 6:07 am We need to bring back SAC regs and SAC Suplements, and put the Cops back out on the ramp.
	Al Bullock September 30th, 2008 at 6:24 am This is what the voters need when evaluating Congress. Fire the B’s
	Lorin Berry September 30th, 2008 at 6:41 am Back when I was active duty AF we still had nuke alert birds. To move a nuke required a op order, an armed convoy to move from storage to alert/flightline and acceptance signatures alone the path. Since we went away from armed alert forces it should have been a red flag to move live nukes from storage (Ops Order), convoy to flightline, and loading onto ready aircraft. Again command and control of nukes is not something done lightly. Ops should have shared responsibility for the SNAFU and not just the Maintenance guys. But wait, Ops guys are protected from all responsibility except hitting target (which they always blame on maintenance issues). This is just another giant cover-up without determining root cause issues. Knee-jerk reactions do not correct underlying causes. Do more with less has been the way to go since previous CC decided to give up people for more exotic weapons. What have they done with my AF?
	Al Stearns September 30th, 2008 at 6:54 am Trained as a munitions officer in early 70’s. Served as a Explosives,Nuclear Safety Officer 6 years, then served as an A/C maintenance supv. I also was a MASO (not a supply officer in my case). Nuclear weapons were my responsibility and I took it seriously. Apparently, with the end of the cold war, there is a more cavalier attitude today. Yes, I wrote awards and decs and dull swords and apr’s, but I also paid attention to the troops and what they were doing. The commanders paid attention to us Lts, Capts and sometimes Majors. When we screwed up, we paid. I’m glad that today screwups are still being hammered. With nukes and even iron bombs, there can be no second chances.
	RichMMT September 30th, 2008 at 7:54 am Everyone here is beating the “Os” up, and maybe so, but some of this needs to be pointed at the “Es”. The senior enlisted leadership is just as responsible, they have the immediate “hands on” the situation. They need to be telling those in command what is broke, and provide suggestions on how too fix it. In my humble opinion, they like some of the officer corps have become too worried about what signature was at the bottom of that performance report instead of the mission. Promotions seem come to fast-there isn’t as much time developing systems knowledge, instead more focus seems to be spent on manageing people. Used to be you went to the Chief or Senior to get your technical question answered–not so much these days; yes they may be book smart, obviously they passed the test, but in some cases that’s all. “Back in the day” going from SrA to Sgt didn’t mean any more pay, but it forced you to take more time to learn why and how to do things, how to supervise and complete a task–not just spend a year or two then get promoted to SSgt and put in charge of a team. I remember a time when we were excited to see an 8 or 10% promotion rate to SSgt. What has happened is a direct result, I feel, of changing from SACR, or regulations in general to AFIs; going from “this is how it will be done” to “I interpret this to mean…” Dont’ be so worried about what our uniform looks like, let’s worry about how we are handling our weapons. BTW Jack, Mighty Ninety ’86-’07!
	BD TUNSIL September 30th, 2008 at 11:01 am CUT THE CRAP!—UP FRONT AND SIMPLE The series of events boil down to senior management failing to take care of business in both officer and enlisted ranks to include: • Failure to provide appropriate training • Failure to provide tangible directives • Using TQM as an inspection tool rather than inspection criterion • Eliminating cross feed between units • Promoting butt-snorkelers rather than experience personnel
	Mark September 30th, 2008 at 4:09 pm At some point people need to be accountable for their actions or inactions …a few more hangings and the the seriousness of this might be realized…retired AF 1985 to 2006
	ChiefJohn September 30th, 2008 at 8:17 pm It took almost a year of training when I became Mission Ready in 1976. Back then the emphasis was on performance of your primary duty, poor Standboard / QC evals were career enders. Those who didn’t / couldn’t learn got SACimcised, this fear made you terrified but kept you on your toes, you knew your job inside out and upside down. When I retired in 2000, the emphasis had shifted to whether or not you broke the base blood drive record or delivered Meals on Wheels, making incidents like this just a matter of time …
	Michael 852 September 30th, 2008 at 11:14 pm A lot of these problems can be traced backed to congress back in the late 1980’s when they told DOD to make all the branch’s smaller. So TAC absorbed SAC and became ACC. All the top jobs at ACC went TAC people who knew nothing about nukes and did not want to know any thing about nukes. A few years later the old TAC pilot generals went to USAF HQ did the secret hand shake and got rid of those pesky ICBM’s to Space Command. With the exception of a few ANG interceptor Sq.‘s never really controlled combat forces let alone nukes. The old SAC bases were put on the back burner by ACC, there OMF funds cut to support ACC’s fighters the bomber bases personnel being so large were tasked to support the fighter missions so the personnel on the fighter bases would get more for a break, no matter what kinds of problems it caused back at the Bomber bases. So what has happen was a long time in the making. My only surprise is that it took so long for things to go so wrong. One final point the AF in the 1950’s could figured out we needed a SAC for nukes, how come AF of today can not figure out we need a SAC for nukes. I thought we were supposed to be smarter and better educated than at any other time in out history. Maybe all those extra college degrees we think are so important for an officers advancement just makes them unable to make decisions, cheat, pass the buck or just better able to cover one’s own ass!!
	Wardoc64 October 1st, 2008 at 5:50 am @RickMMT: Your point is taken, but may be overly simplistic or narrowly focused. Being ‘Khaki’ has always carried with degrees of responsibility that verge on the political. It’s tenuous balance, at best; that being said, the degree of discipline I derived from attending Naval Basic Training at Great Lakes in the winter of 1964 and then a year later attending the Marine version for Corpsmen served me well. Still, the challenge was all around and constant throughout. Today and in the recent past, say back to the 70’s (Zumwalt era) a paradigm shift occurred and with the end of the draft and the influx of ‘volunteerism’, things went lax. The military services increasingly suffering from indolence and an obese social state. ‘Fat, dumb and Happy’ was one of the unfortunate turn phrases that accurately described us increasingly. Complacency, engorged senses of entitlement and a spreading lack of appropriate consequences for infractions became the rule. We need to return to ‘rocks and shoals’ if we ever think of extricating ourselves from what looms ahead. Trouble people…BIG trouble. Big badaboom.
	Spaceman Spiff October 1st, 2008 at 7:08 am When I see this sort of thing, something in me just starts laughing. It’s the same as it has been ever since I was commissioned as an OLD 2Lt in 1982. Officership before anything else. Be a great officer, and then, if there’s some time, spend a little of it doing what you were trained for. Look great, fill all those nonsensical squares on your OER/OPR (yeah, back in my day is was OER) and don’t be so concerned with your specialty. You’re an officer first and an engineer, pilot, navigator, supply officer, administrator, or whatever your specialty is… All second fiddle to looking good and schmoozing for face time. Well, this is another instance where folks led by the clueless did something that could have been a disaster of Biblical proportions. I used to go against the grain when I was a Lt/Capt. I made no bones about the fact I am an engineer and my real value to the AF was doing the best job I could as an engineer. I pursued that part of my career, and because I did, I was passed over for Regular commission and later for Major. Didn’t do all that Special crap that adds nothing to your ability, but a lot to your promotion package. When will they ever learn??? Hope that one day we get a handle on it, so that highly skilled engineers, scientists, and others don’t end up on the outside looking in, while the clueless continue to lead. By the way, I’m now a Civil Service CES guy and am glad to still be with the AF in my newer capacity. Love to mentor the new LT’s when they come in.
	Spaceman Spiff October 1st, 2008 at 7:28 am To Michael 852… The reason we can’t convince the powers-that-be that we still need a separate SAC is that everything is supposed to be simplified. We have to merge commands. We have to merge jobs and specialties. We have to continually “reorganize” for better efficiency, and instead manage to make things even more chaotic because we never get to really settle into a new system before some other organizational wonk sells the heirarchy on the need for ANOTHER reorganization for better efficiency because the one we’re in now just isn’t efficient enough. Read “The Dilbert Principle” and be amazed at how well the Air Force stacks up against what Scott Adams says in the pages of that book. I laughed when I read the book, but got serious really quick when I realized I was seeing a macrocosm of the Pointy-Haired Boss and his company’s organization in our own work environment. I think that book should be required reading for all personnel with any supervisory requirements that are part of their jobs.…
	Jazzy October 1st, 2008 at 1:41 pm Will someone please read the “good book”, THe Holy Bible, becasue not only are we seeing it on Wall Street but not even in the new military. I’m an old Strategic Air Command (SAC), baby who took pride in-Intergity, Service before Self, and Excellence in all we do. They (whom this term apply) has “PIMPED” lil Ms America so much she is broke and all the theives are runamuck. Now what they have been doing in the dark has come to light and we are are reaping what they have sown. Need I say more? Amen.
	Al Shockey October 1st, 2008 at 5:12 pm I just read a great article that was right on with its analysis of the paradigm (learned this word in TQM training 19 years ago) problem we have today in the Air Force. Do a google search of “In From the Cold” 25 Jan 08. It spells the problem out EXACTLY RIGHT. The first comment on the article is priceless. It lays the problem out in the open. Should leaders be politicians or knowledgable overseers of their craft. I think it is also priceless, after so many years in maint. watching the silliness, that maint. officers at Minot, who abdicated their power to control maint. ops, got slammed by a clueless female E-9 who was basking in the glory of being the first woman in her job. Yes, the law of compensation is alive and well.
	J Graham October 1st, 2008 at 9:51 pm When USAF Generals Commanded and oversee USAF assigned Nuclear materials, They were accounted fore. Now we have Navy , Marines,and Army Generals commanding USAF programs..The new USAF Propose uniform even Looks like a Marine uniform..President Truman Made USAF a seperate Military service. Leave it to Knuckles heads to Fix somthing that,s not BROKE, Who,s stupid idea was that , A Marine?
	Michael 852 October 1st, 2008 at 10:49 pm To Spaceman Spiff… I just read your comments and could not agree more. The problem is I am scared. If this kind of conduct is going on in the active duty Air Force it must be going on in the other military branch’s and the DOD civilian sectors as well. Were at war and a good percentage of the O-6′ through O-10’s can only think about them selves and their careers
	Spaceman Spiff October 2nd, 2008 at 6:39 am Great comment, Michael. I am scared, too. When I think of some of the directions our DoD has gone over the past 40 years, it frightens the daylights out of me. When I went on Active Duty in 1982, I almost immediately saw the erosion of benefits for service members and their families. I am not opposed to spending our tax dollars wisely, but I AM opposed to Congress and our Chief Executive/Commander In Chief being someone who has never spent a day in uniform (Clinton, possibly Obama) having some strange idea that they as total amateurs can lead the military. I was opposed to cutting so much strength at the start of the first War in Iraq. I was opposed from the first day I put on the Air Force Blue to the fact that at the 10-year point in my career, I would be separated if I didn’t get promoted. That was what happened when the “Big Skedaddle” happened in 1992. We cut thousands of officers, tens of thousands of enlisted folks, and much of the “meat” of our force for no other reason than to save money. But, there was no careful examination of WHO to cut. We need to keep competent people in the Force (all DoD, not just AF) without caring whether they want to be Squadron Commanders or Wing Kings. Some of us are extremely good at what we do and DON’T want to command. Why should we be forced to lead or forced out? The problem is that we have a leadership that is so obsessed with promotion and power that no one has the time to learn their jobs from the ground up, so they can lead PROPERLY. I’m all for making sure that leaders, especially those for highly technical positions and high security positions such as Nuclear Assets, Engineering, Aircraft Maintenance, and the like, should be required to come up through the ranks from enlisted ranks and later to Officer Training School, and with more emphasis on the JOB than on the career. We have, at least in the Air Force, gotten far too corporate and not nearly enough “results oriented” in our leadership. We need folks who know the jobs that they are supervising. Not just “great officers”. And, on the subject of a possible new uniform??? What in the name of Gen LeMay for? I still remember the Bus Driver suit that Gen McPeak tried to pawn off on us at that time, the one that did away with all the “doo-dads” as he called them. Well, those Doo-Dads are part of what we ARE! They tell how well we have done our jobs. And they define us as Military Professionals, and not corporate executives. Once again, when we are in the middle of a war, we are considering a major change in uniforms. There is absolutely NOTHING the matter with the current uniform. Anyone who attempts to spend one CENT of taxpayer money on such foolishness should be banished to a job pushing papers at Diego Garcia, and should have to pay for the “research” and “Wear Tests” of these silly things out of their own pockets.
	Al Shockey October 3rd, 2008 at 5:18 pm Broken down scraps of a faulty leadership model litter the Air Force flight lines around the world. I think the last two Nuc horrors point to a failed leadership model for the Officer/Enlisted corps in the Maint/Loggy community. The Generals responsible for the horrors are kept in place. Obviously leaders in the Govt don’t recognize these nuc incidents are the most catastrophic outcome of a failed leadership model in Air Force. And yet the very Generals who prospered in the failed model and perpetuated the model for decades are left in place. I can’t remember any errors of this magnitude involving this many personnel getting international play for months and months. How can anyone trust any officer raised in a leadership model that would allow these types of breachs? Are the leaders responsible for these lapses damaged goods? Senior leaders running around telling Air Force personnel they have to be responsible for their actions just rings hollow to me.
	RetiredFirstShirt October 8th, 2008 at 1:07 pm Harry Truman had a placard on his desk in the White House that said “The Buck Stops Here.” That principle applies here and everyone responsible (O-10 to E-1) should be held responsible. The key point here is that all the Generals should be held responsible because they are “responsible.” Remember another principle: Leaders give the credit when things go right and take the blame when things go wrong. It seems that sort of leadership, from Truman on, is missing in many of the posts I’ve just read. Hang ‘em all, but do it right and fix the problem. (25-year VN & Desert Storm vet)
	hg October 25th, 2008 at 8:08 am Maintenance and Munitions are currently separate. — Years of being together was a problem that created the lack of specialized knowledge in the munitions career field … when together, no maintenance officer wanted to be in the “bomb dump” … they wanted to be generating sorties. Because of this, the best officers were put on the line, and rotations in munitions were short. The only folks that would salivate over an AMMO job were the logistics career field officer that talked their way into a MX (usually AMMO) rotation. Those folks would then wear the piss pot on their BDU cap after they returned to logistics as a badge of honor because they had done something other than logistics … Aircraft Maintenance Officers want nothing to do with it. Shocky … Going under ops is not the answer if you are looking to build competent, specialized maintainers … period. There are now training records for young maintenance officers — something I hated, but it forced officers to become knowledgeable of their craft. Are there some exceptions .… MX officers that are sent around to non-er office jobs where they finish their degrees while the hard chargers are sent to the flight line to do the Lord’s work … sure. However, keeping maintenance under maintenance and munitions separate is the right way to go. And about BGen Cameron … he was the Maintenance Wing CC and did not have anything to do with the warehouse screw up … my opinion. He was pushing jets through depot and overseeing back shop operations … that warehouse was nothing but something that the supply folks used to get the parts to the maintainers that needed them. The letters are just something that has to be done … they are looking to be able to say, “see, we did something about it.” Ok … let’s learn from it, increase compliance focus, and move on.