http://www.esnips.com/doc/79c22395-7bd6-4299-92db-cf392e381698/kutiman—this-is-what-it-became

Peace

The systems must be effective and efficient because we do have some good systems in the Army so why would we develop something, with less protection, less mobility, less range, less connectivity? We can not build systems to only fight the “last war” or OIF/OEF for us. The effectiveness must include the ability to operate in most regions of the world and in full spectrum operations. Connectivity is very important, but there must be redundant communications to ensure that a Soldier always has communications. This is where our tacticians and the Boeing technicians must exhaust every means to produce relevant systems.

Time stops for no one. Conceptually the FCS can give us the leading edge in military technology, but if the process takes too long we will have a good system that will be equivalent to comparative nations at best or as done in the past with new equipment a little behind. This does not mean we lose our super power status, but why not continue to ’lap‘ (a track term) all other competitors?

The price is huge. Why shouldn’t be? You can not do something to leap in the future of war and expect to pay low prices, but this is no excuse to waste even a penny. In fact, Boeing and the Army must make hard decisions to save as much money at every possible turn and ensure most money is used specifically for the FCS at the greatest extent. I will give an exaggerative example. The paper used for marketing should be only used for what is necessary. If people want details invite them to the website.

There are many future changes for our great nation the need for someone to support and defend the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic is not one of them. Most of our major combat systems are decades old. The effectiveness, efficiency, timeliness, and smart use of money can facilitate the FCS program accomplishment of known and unknown requirements concerning the Army.

“Another question is what and where is the additional money for the non-FCS units (otherwise known as the remaining 65–70% of Army units that are not scheduled to be FCS-equipped units)? This great expenditure for only 30% of the Army?“
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So you recommend that we do nothing to modernize the Army until such time that we must upgrade 66% or 100%.

As MAJ Blake points out, FCS spin outs are going to the Infantry BCTs now and Heavy BCTs later…nearly the entire Army and Joint force will benefit from FCS technology.
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MattM: “Why do we need more blue water ships, another strike fighter, FCS solely programmed to fight a near-competitor opponent that is 15–20 years in the future instead of concentrating on the next 10–14 years.
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The past 8 years have cost as much as $10–12 billion a month. The cost of war in dollars won’t be cheaper in the future, because M1 tanks and F-35s will still be burning lots of fuel at much higher prices. Much of current wars cost is due to fuel expense for both ground and air forces. Joint aviation fuel represents 70+% of the total DoD fuel. COL(BG?)McMaster could point out that reliance on RMA airpower, even ignoring limited ability to find hidden targets, is a losing proposition due to future cost of warfare with predicted rises in fuel costs as demand outstrips supply. But the ground force can do its part to keep down training and O/S fuel and maintenance costs, as well.

A mounted combat system medium tank does not burn 500 gallons every few hours in the local training area, and can exploit its embedded training simulation to train while stationary. A medium tank that shares 80% of its parts with other manned ground vehicles will be far less expensive to maintain and operate.
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MattM: “Many in the Army are pushing FCS solely on the basis that the Navy and Air Force got new toys and the Army did not.“
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Suspect from reading COL℗McMaster’s article that he is rightfully concerned that many RMA true-believers subscribe to the airpower-can-do-it-all philosophy. He realizes that if we face the “fog of war” at ground level, that it won’t be any easier to find targets at 25,000′. The idea that we can take out key nodes from the air and the enemy will stop fighting has been disproved by 7 years of continuing conflict.

Clearly an FCS force can fight an insurgency because its vehicles, except the tank replacement, are better protected across the board than the legacy heavy, Stryker, or light force. It has more infantry to cordon and search, patrol, and occupy combat outposts and checkpoints. It has a smaller, less frequent logistical tail that insurgents have repeatedly ambushed. And its unmanned assets will improve our ability to safeguard convoys and find hidden IEDs.
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MattM:“Many in the Army are pushing FCS solely on the basis that the Navy and Air Force got new toys and the Army did not.“
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All services got into the current pickle due to the Clinton procurement holiday. Continuous modernization of all services precludes a larger bill coming due at some distant date when nothing will be cheaper. Spin outs now, will help us win the current wars and improve future combat equipment through lessons learned in combat.

Compare FCS to the USAF KC-X, KC-Y, KC-Z approach to modernizing 1/3 of the fleet in equal $35 billion segments totaling well over $100 billion when you add inflation (or buy Boeing). Obviously it costs more to equip 1/3 of the Army than all aerial refueling tankers over the next 40 years. But do we need so many tankers if we buy fewer than 1760 USAF F-35s?

All services must take some cuts to maintain some modernization across the board. Personally, I could envision:

1) decreasing the number of USAF F-35s to 1,000 and keeping the A-10 and buying more Reapers to cover the difference,
2) cutting the number of carriers, and
3) reducing FCS brigades from 15 to 9 with a third of the BCTs on standby as ready brigades at any given time in line with ARFORGEN.
4) Getting the Marines to come on board with FCS vehicles instead of EFV and LAV.

Spin out FCS technology to the refitted heavy BCTs and upgrade light BCTs with JLTV. This kind of compromise will let all services modernize in coming tighter budget years.

This sounds like people back in the 1940s saying that jet engines weren’t worth developing because they would require thousands of dollars before they’d be useful, and we could do the same job by purchasing another ten thousand B-29 and P-51.

There are some in the military that seriously need to fully pull their head out of the sand and accept our future conflicts will be very similar to what we have been fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What we do not need is an overpriced, over hyped FCS system that remains technology-centric. Technology can’t replace the Soldier; technology can enhance the Soldier. But, most of FCS technology barely exists. The “sprials” and “spin-outs” are nothing more than to get some basics to the troops to “prove” FCS is doable. The “flying beer keg” might show me that somebody is behind a wall, but is the sensor telling me if he is a bad guy or not?
Where in FCS do they discuss the need for the Soldiers to man and cover the sensors and senor fields? All technology still needs Soldier overwatch. How about the unmanned ground vehicle carrying the rucksacks that can’t make it through the ditch or over the fallen tree?
Most of the bigger FCS “toys” are great to go fight the Fulda Gap or DS 1/OIF 1 (first 3 weeks of Iraqi Freedom that is) all over again as long as we stay as far away as possible from urban areas and people. To me, that doesn’t look possible if we are going to be engaged within the “gap.”

FCS is way too expensive of system relying heavily on technologies that haven’t been developed and still doesn’t do what we need it to do. However, it looks great in recruiting ads and promotional videos. It is a leftover Cold War relic.

Why do we need more blue water ships, another strike fighter, FCS solely programmed to fight a near-competitor opponent that is 15–20 years in the future instead of concentrating on the next 10–14 years. Many in the Army are pushing FCS solely on the basis that the Navy and Air Force got new toys and the Army did not.

Before we pay and hope for FCS, how about concentrating on a replacement for the M4; a small arms weapon improvement for the M249 SAW; increased treatment and funding for the VA; additional resources for families; resetting and refixing our current equipment?

Another question is what and where is the additional money for the non-FCS units (otherwise known as the remaining 65–70% of Army units that are not scheduled to be FCS-equipped units)? This great expenditure for only 30% of the Army?

Defense contractors need the big, high-value programs (FCS, Blue Water ships, joint strike fighter aircraft, etc.)where they can send cost overruns through the roof and engorge their pockets equal to Big Oil.

It may not be the best solution, but I don’t necessarily think we’re headed in the right direction if we keep pouring dollars into old systems that are doomed to breakdown and become obsolete at some point. By the time some of the artillery systems are due to phase out they will be over 100 years old. I think we’re shooting ourselves in the foot if we don’t look seriously, to include allocating monies, at effective systems for our future Army.

Solomon

There does need to be more debate about FCS, but the LSI has censorship provisions in place that require clearing any speech about the program. The problem then becomes that only naysayers get a say. Naysayers often know little about the system and focus on the things that the LSI thinks are most important…the network and software, which are the two areas with the most potential problems.

I am no longer associated with FCS due to a 60% cut in the training budget for this fiscal year. But I still believe in the concept which should tell you something.

Physics and fuel shortages won’t be obsolete in 2030 Solomon. Anti-armor weapons will get stronger; airlift and sealift will not expand in any dramatic way. We must find other ways to detect and defeat threat that we can logistically support and rapidly deploy.

We do need more debate and FCS cuts…but they need to be smart cuts. We shouldn’t throw the concept out with the bathwater.

I appreciate your blog, but I disagree with your position. Although I enjoyed the discussion last Monday from General Wallace, I am still under-whelmed at the Army FCS. We need to drop this program immediately. We are wasting valuable dollars for a system conceptualized by General Shinseki, which won’t be fully fielded until 2030. The system costs too much and may be outdated by the time it is fielded. The recon system is poor and a rehash of old systems. Lastly, no contractor oversight exists.

The $300 billion for Army FCS could be put to better use. Every dollar designated to FCS takes a dollar away from current systems. The OH58 and artillery will suffer due to this system, which will be obsolete by 2030. We could use that money to improve current combat systems. I agree we need transformation, but we should be smarter about how we choose to spend our money. I am ashamed as a taxpayer.

The concept was designed before 9/11 and may not be as user friendly to urban operations like many think. Technology will evolve tremendously in 5 years, so the 2030 fielding will put us decades behind other technology. Every change or update pushes the fielding back several years, while simultaneously increasing the FCS budget. This is unacceptable. Additionally, we have not sorted out the contractor maintenance package, so we may have a unique system without support. I know the system will be “user friendly” but every system has issues. We experienced this with other transformation initiatives (Trailblazers, TLQs, etc).

I though we learned our lesson from the AN PPS-5s and REMBASS systems. Why would we spend millions to self place a system, which may be as unreliable as the aforementioned systems?

The LSI issue is dead. Congress voted on it in the FY2009 Defense Bill. We should never let contractors make decisions that are inherently governmental. Additionally, the LSI wanted to circumvent the federal acquisitions guidelines. We can’t do it so why should contractors?

We need to accept our losses and reallocate money to current systems NOW!

Solomon

There is an ongoing debate at the congressional level about the anticipated cost of the FCS for our combat Soldiers. Currently the highest Army funded research and development project for AY08 and AY09, many are questioning the justification of such large expenses, potentially approaching amounts as high as 10 billion dollars. As an argument to the estimated cost I would ask the worth of a single Soldier. The ability to mitigate risks to the men and women of our Armed Forces is priceless. The components of the FCS, such as the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), the Class I UAV or the Micro Air Vehicle, are designed to diminish the threat to the Soldier by providing a picture of the danger prior to encountering it. For this reason, the FCS should continue to be fielded and developed.

The FCS is designed to integrate new technologies, link people, platforms, weapons and sensors, creating an architecture for dynamic joint connectivity and situational awareness. A battlefield comprised of a technologically connected force can lead to extensive advantages over an adversary. With our current systems the Armed Forces face many challenges when it comes to synchronized shooting, moving and communicating. The proposed FCS will assist in decreasing this challenge and allowing for the linkage required to give our Soldiers the enhancements necessary to win our nations wars.

Today’s threat is one of increasing complexity. With the current enemy fighting as insurgents, and the future enemy unknown, it is paramount that the Armed Forces enhance our adaptation abilities to meet our contemporary opposition, and prepare for that which we do not know. Technology is changing at an alarming rate and the Army’s acquisition process must begin to allow for flexibility in the design, modification and fabrication phases so that our Soldier’s are equipped with the most technologically advanced equipment of our times. If we are not adaptable in this arena, we are doing our Soldiers a disservice.

When TRADOC Commander, General William S. Wallace spoke to the Command and General Staff College on 20 October 2008, he emphasized the support for the FCS with some proposed modifications. He specified the added need for Engineers, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Reconnaissance Teams. Although a strong proponent for FCS, GEN Wallace highlighted the importance of the Soldier, stating that “the most effective precision weapon on the battlefield is the Soldier”. There are certainly other aspects of the equipment that would make sense to improve. As an example, I believe the program should consider changing the color of the Class I UAV from black to white in order to conceal it better in the air. It also should work on its noise reduction as to not draw attention to it while conducting air reconnaissance and surveillance over enemy terrain. Finally, although primarily a budget issue, the Army should consider maintaining the LSI (Boeing) throughout the project. I argue that an LSI is needed with such a large, complex project and can provide better technical oversight and innovation.

The FCS is no doubt an enormous undertaking with an enormous cost. With the ability to mitigate risk to our Soldiers, increase joint connectivity on the battlefield, and enhance adaptation capabilities to our current and future threats, I have to ask if we can afford not to pursue this system of systems.

BFVS-A3 System Characteristics:

Weight, combat loaded (without armor tiles) 67,500 lbs.

Weight armor tiles 6,410 lbs

Add and stir: 73,910 lbs.
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30 C-17s deploy 90 armored MGVs that each use 200 gallons of fuel every few days in the defense.

30 C-17s deploys 30 M1 tanks that each use 500 gallons of fuel every few hours in the defense.
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Never said anything about forced entry using FCS and C-17s. Land in safe adjacent territory as we did in northern Iraq…and as we could in neighboring nations who are probably concerned that they are next.

Just because you are part of a brigade does not mean you must deploy an entire brigade by air. If you are in the defense at an airfield, and all your supplies are coming out the back of a C-17/C-130 initially…you don’t need all the extra trucks early on.

What you DO need is a credible security force to allow follow-on force deployment by sea and air…something an airborne brigade would not have been in southern Georgia, for instance.

Keep on dreaming…

As I said before, FCS makes sense on a Company-sized level — an UNSUPPORTED Battalion level at best (as SMALL Air Mech units). But that IS NOT how the FCS is organized or intended to be used. The UOA (Unit of Action) is a BCT (Brigade Combat Team) — a BRIGADE, not a Battalion or a Company.

A FCS Maneuver Brigade consists of 320+ FCS MGVs, 550+ trucks, 180+ towed vehicles & 180 ‘other’ (unmanned) vehicles, your 90 vehicles would represent about ONE FCS Combined Arms Battalion (just the FCS MGVs, no support vehicles) & without ANY of the supporting vehicles it ain’t going to last long…

M2A3 combat weight is 33 tons (66,000 lbs), they are HOPING to keep the FCS ICV around 30 tons (60,000 lbs) — not a very significant difference. Take a wild guess what the FCS MCS will end up weighing…

I also LOVE how you try to justify FCS through the use of an AIRBORNE mission that Heavy Maneuver Brigades were NEVER intended for.

Wouldn’t you rather have 90 armored vehicles on the ground than greater numbers of airborne troops.…and an airborne platoon can sit alongside the armor on the same C-17 to have the best of both worlds.

An up-armored Bradley is 75,000 lbs…much heavier than a 27 ton FCS Infantry Carrier Vehicle that transports more infantry than a Bradley…and is better armed.…and has equal and in some cases better all around protection.

Here is THE problem with FCS…

There are a LOT of vehicles that go into a Maneuver Brigade besides the combat vehicles & across the ENTIRE unit only TWO vehicle types of a FCS unit are any smaller or lighter than the equivalent vehicle is a Heavy Maneuver Brigade — the MGS (vs M1 Abrams) & the NLOS-C (vs M109A6 Paladin).

The fact is that in order to deploy a Maneuver Brigade (or even Battalion) is going to require a LOT of airlift sorties to accomplish & while FCS does lessen the number, it does not do so by nearly as much as you might think. It would take 410 C-17 sorties (based on an AVERAGE load of 60 tons) to deploy an entire Heavy Maneuver Brigade vs 340–380 C-17 sorties (based on an AVERAGE load of 50–55 tons) for a FCS Maneuver Brigade. Another way to look at it is that an entire Heavy Maneuver Brigade weighs ~120,000 tons & a FCS Maneuver Brigade ~95,000 tons…