As for Hcksaw235’s comment “Something that the article doesn’t address is the fact that JIEDDO is passing on their knowledge in the form of funding IED-Defeat Ranges on a number of posts Army-wide.”, I hope they do better at that than the training we received at Bragg Pre-deployment. The stuff they taught us there was strictly Iraq based, and as we found out in Afghanistan, sometimes led to very wrong I&W’s. We had soldiers looking and reacting to I&W that had some real “hearts and Minds” consequences. The two wars are completely different, and while it is true that there are some bleed overs, TTP’s are different.

Robert, your comment about using money as incentive, VERY good idea. They have been using it in Afghanistan for about a year. I can’t speak for how well it did in the rest of Afghanistan, but I can tell you it was the MOST effective operation for finding weapons and IED material in Laghman Province. I believe they have started it in Iraq, but not sure. Again, they are two different battle spaces, so not sure how well it would work there.

How about using the $4 billion budget as an incentive for Iraqi’s to turn in artillery shells, say $100 each. Sounds like a win-win to me.

The only thing we can (and should) do, in my oinion, is send in at least double the amount of troops and support now deployed there (and we get them as we draw down the forces in IRAQ), blast the Taliban and Al Quida as much as we can possibly blast them-especially HARD, then claim Victory and get the hell out.

It’s what we will do someday anyway, so why sacrifice any more young brains to IED’s ? Getting OUT is the best and only long-term solution, as the Russians learned long ago.

A dirt or austere strip just south of Ghazni would allow us to resupply the fuel needs of a heavier force to guard the essential Highway 1 route between Kabul and Kandahar while also supporting the troubled center-east, as well.

The 3 battalions mentioned earlier could support up to 30 platoon-plus combat outposts, task-organized with 1–2 Strykers, 1–2 Bradley’s and 1–2 light infantry squad with uparmored HMMWVs or MRAP-light.

That force could withstand nearly any Taliban attack augmented with Afghan National Army or Police, and with other combat outposts not far away and AH-64 quick reaction attack-weapons tteams based at a new center airbase. The Strykers and up-armored Hummers/MRAP-light would conduct the patrols with police trucks to save fuel.

I read an Infantry magazine article about an outstanding 173rd Airborne officer who built a combat outpost from scratch in the mountains and had to jump through all kinds of hoops to make it liveable…losing several vehicles to the treacherous road trying to get it into place.

Seems like the IED task force could be tasked to create a self-contained partially armored 15,000 lb. shelter that could be lifted into place by CH-47 to support an instant combat outpost. Different versions would have air-conditioned sleeping quarters and rest room/shower facilities, built in computers/satellite TVs, microwaves/refrigerators.

Other command post versions would have all the bells/whistles for communications/intelligence access. They would also have an aerostat inside to be elevated to several thousand feet (constant altitude-block for airspace deconfliction) for long distance 360 degree surveillance and laser designation.

Up-armor the upper portion of the modular shelters and sand-bag on-site the lower half to withstand small arms and mortar/rocket attacks.

Don’t we need to leave the larger bases and get out more into the field to shorten the patrol distances and enhance local security. Modular shelters would allow our troops to do that without enduring morale-reducing conditions during multiple deployments.

It also occurred to me that with another semi-large C-130/C-17 capable airfield with Chinooks and UH-60s south of Ghazni, we could use water buckets (used for fighting fires) to carry water from the few lakes near mountains to towns in lowland hotter areas to fill small concrete pools that we build for town residents for their water needs. Enhance our sustainment and that of the local residents through more aerial resupply. If that gets more convoys off the road and shortens their supply routes, so much the better.

But there are flat valley areas (where main roads run) where armored vehicles could help. Not sure you should take any armored HMMWV or MRAP-light into most Afghanistan mountainous terrain. I’ve seen to be documentaries and You Tube videos of commanders who must have had a death wish driving their Hummers along narrow roads next to cliffs where an ambush by landside would have been sufficient…but IEDs were waiting as well.

When the distance between Bagram and Kandahar airfields is well over 350 miles, its pretty clear that we may need another air line of communication at some mid point to help out Ghazni and Khost area and help secure the main north/south highway. Do it by LAPES or new GPS parafoils if you can figure out how to do it without busting open fuel drums/containers.

But seems to me that the best prevention of IED attacks against our convoys is to eliminate as many as we can. $4 billion a year spent on counter-IED efforts would buy a lot of jet fuel and aircraft maintenance. Do more by both fixed wing and Chinook/UH-60.

The Soviets could not do it by air because we helped the Afghans shoot down so many of their aircraft: 118 jets and 333 helicopters lost according to a source cited in the RAND study of medium armored vehicles. They also lost a staggering 470,000 casualties. mostly to illness, and 15,000 dead, along with countless lost tanks, APCs, and trucks. We aren’t anywhere near that in Afghanistan and never will be as long as we don’t try to do it all with air attacks that cause collateral damage and further alienate the population.

I read that 73% of the enemy casualties in Iraq have been caused by Apaches. I found that hard to believe, but it seems to indicate that someone doesn’t have too much of a problem taking out several mounted/dismounted insurgents with expensive Hellfires. That is how you support from the air without killing wedding parties and family remembrances of their fallen.

We both probably know the wonderful things you can do with unmanned aircraft, but only if you are within range to use the smaller versions. That means more combat outposts operating UAVs. NLOS-LS is certainly cost-effective vs. the cost of aerial refueling and overhead orbits of F-15Es and B-1s…and their own expensive munitions. More armed Predators and Warrior-A in Afghanistan would certainly help as would more A-10s.

As for the armor, seems like 3 battalions: one of light infantry, one Stryker, and one Combined Arms with mostly Bradleys would easily cover the 300 miles of valley floor highway between Kabul and Kandahar..but give all 3 battalion commanders all 3 systems.

If it works, do it in other places in country. And if it works, it gives you proof of principle that armor can work in many non-traditional venues. One of the RAND conclusions in its medium armor study was that medium armor worked the best in Afghanistan, coupled with air insertion of lighter forces. They lost for a lot of other reasons…not because of armor or helicopters.

Stability ops, rebuilding, and training the Afghan Army and Police are fine. All require security. The Afghans can take over combat outposts once we teach them how to secure them and the surrounding population and routes.

Flying smaller, lighter UAS’s with upgraded sensor packages to allow them to operate at night to look for heat signatures, traces of ammonia, carbon monoxide, or other biophysiological signs of habitation where there should be none, are more practical. Tunnel detection technology, and forensic examinations of known insurgents, is working smart, not hard. These guys are not ghosts. They have to eat, sleep, and crap just like any other human being. Exploiting these human weaknesses is also working smart instead of working hard.

Finally, killing a couple of suspected insurgents with $110,000 missile is hardly cost-effective, or efficient. Our forces will have to do it the old fashioned way…at the point of a bayonet. I don’t see a “surge” working in Afghanistan…some is good, more is better does not work in counterinsurgency. We have to give the Afghan people a reason to live, rather than a treason to die.

Agree with much of what you said about Congress picking on the wrong DoD agency, given the good they have apparently done. But many of the systems that have done the most good seem to fall outside JIEDDO’s influence, i.e. MRAPs and unmanned aircraft. Not sure why JIEDDO would need $4 billion and 3,000 folks annually if it does not include those two key systems.

But anyway, with no first hand info and pure speculation based on press reports, let’s assume that Iran and foreign fighters were responsible for bad-guy IED successes in Iraq. Further speculate that now it’s likely they have moved on to Afghanistan. The difference may be that Iraq had all kinds of ordnance laying around for conversion to IEDs, whereas Afghanistan does not…so they need Iranian and Pakistani ISI help??

So how do we stop the flow of IEDs and Taliban/foreign fighters from Pakistan and Iran? Speculation: the borders and key roads of which there are few. But if we patrol few roads frequently we are exposed to more IEDs…the dilemma driving MRAP-Light. And the more we patrol the more fuel we use in a landlocked country with long supply lines…dilemma number two.

In a perfect world with no supply constraints, wouldn’t we bring in heavier armor like the Soviets did, instead of just MRAP-light?

What if:

1) We deployed several heavy combined arms battalions with primarily Bradleys and a few Abrams with aux power systems to conserve fuel, and more Stryker battalions to augment the light Infantry BCTs.

2) Task-organize platoon-size elements of heavy, Stryker, and Infantry BCT systems together in the field.

- Use a combination of all three types of units, plus Afghan Army and Police at more combat outposts in/near towns to safeguard the population and provincial reconstruction teams. Base a few Strykers and Bradley at each but plan on using only Strkers and up-armored HMMWVs/MRAP-Light for road patrols to conserve fuel. Use the Bradleys as mobile pillboxes and nightime sensors. Use the light infantry for foot patrols, distributing goods to the town population, and for combat outpost perimeter defense.

- Employ a combination of Infantry BCT with up-armored HMMWVs, two Strykers, and 2 Bradleys/1 tank to establish field combat outposts “midway” (based on METT-TC near likely chokepoints/IED spots) between town combat outposts, adjacent to roads for checkpoints that can withstand attacks and to serve as a rapid reaction force for convoys traveling the road.

- Use CH-47s to transport 500 gallon fuel drums to both town and roadside combat outposts and to bring other supplies and replacement troops on a every-other-day basis. Also use Chinooks and UH-60s to place light infantry atop mountains for foot patrols.

- Test FCS Class I UAVs (flying beer kegs) to patrol the roads between the combat outposts and to look at overwatching terrain near the roads. Fly them out of the midway combat outpost and town combat outposts. Use strategically placed Shadows, as well, and fly high along the routes with Predator and Army Warrior-A. Have so many unmanned aircraft overhead along routes that setting up bombs is difficult, changes are detected, and patterns emerge. Test FCS NLOS-Launch System missiles at combat outposts to launch missiles for quick response when UAVs spot targets.

- Use C-17s/KC-130s/KC-135/Contract aircraft to bring fuel into Kandahar and Bagram and widen part of the main highway between Kabul and Kandahar…and Kabul and the Pakistan border for KC-130/C-17s to land and drop off fuel drums for ground troops. Park Apaches and UH-60s with troops at these secure field locations with revetments where they can serve as an aerial Quick Reaction Force and can get airborne to protect incoming aerial fuel supplies. Put fire control radars and self-propelled howitzers and MLRS there as well in case the Taliban gets frisky with mortars.

Not sure why a surge would not work in Afghanistan the same way it has in Iraq. A few heavy/Stryker battalions would go a long way to safeguarding the population and infantry BCTs and convoys. Give the population freebies, medical care and services to win their trust. Build, and teach them how to grow alternate crops. Pashtun tribes are the key. Make them like us more than the Taliban.

Just my opinion.

JIEDDO is doing some good things.

Nothing that is said will satisfy some.