Comments on: Army Vice Touts TIGR; Success “In Spite of” System

By: Chris

Chris — Wed, 31 Dec 2008 22:30:27 +0000

Without impugning anyone’s intelligence, parentage or motivation, there is another factor at work, i.e., that the procurement process is so opaque and apparently random (i.e., risky) that only the very lowest grade people from the requirements office are assigned to have contact with it. The communication difficulties and confused roles (upper-echelon project people talking out of turn, etc.) that proliferate from this result in malfunctioning contracts and skewed programs. Nothing life-or death in my experience, but the principles would apply.

By: MKelley

MKelley — Tue, 30 Dec 2008 14:49:30 +0000

searp has it right — we need to push TIGR as the warfighters collection and archiving tool — on the ground with the troops — hosted on FBCB2 — available 24–7 — sync on return to the FOB — with significant events and data-information-knowledge selected and nominated by the leadership for porting to CPOF and CIDNE and injested into DCGS-A.

To simple — therefore too hard.

MOK

By: searp

searp — Sat, 06 Dec 2008 13:09:54 +0000

TIGR put developers in the field from the beginning. That tight connection between the developers and the troops in contact made all the difference. I sure got the lesson of a lifetime.

TIGR created a requirement. I heard lots of folks from the requirements organizations (NOT the same as the troops in the field) talk about the absence of a requirement. They only got on board when the BCTs started telling them to get on board.

Lots of lessons-learned, but my takeaway is that we have build enormous barriers between materiel providers and the troops, barriers that are so high that the normal Army process ensures that the developers never talk to the users.

Customer feedback/customer relations is everything. For DOD the customer for materiel providers is the acquisition command, not the end user. Big, big problem.

By: Rhyno2-327

Rhyno2-327 — Fri, 05 Dec 2008 16:08:38 +0000

The people that procure the weapons WE use seem not to listen to our complaints. The M-4 is a prime example. The round has to be placed in the right spot to stop a hopped up on adrenaline insurgent, guys put 2,3 rnds center mass, only a shot in the pelvis stopped him. I said stopped, not killed. I still believe a good compromise would be a 6.8mm round. Do away with the gas impingememt system. Adams Arms is said to have a kit to change the system, by all means, get to doing it. The M-14 has been brought back, and are coveted by thier users. Kudos to the armorers for making the M-14 EBR. Damn fine weapon, and weight is not a problem.

By: DensityDuck

DensityDuck — Wed, 03 Dec 2008 18:03:25 +0000

Afghandoc: We’ll do that when we get past the idea that competition improves products. There’s no need for competition when you have clearly-defined requirements. Either you meet those requirements or you don’t.

Indeed, this whole tanker debacle is a refutation of the idea that competition is useful. NG’s offering had a lot of superior features that weren’t part of the contract requirement–but, according to Boeing supporters, those features shouldn’t have been deal-makers BECAUSE they weren’t in the contract!

By: George Lewis

George Lewis — Wed, 03 Dec 2008 17:37:52 +0000

Procurement needs to start in the field and the troops need to do the assessment. From shoes to weapons the war fighter needs to be the requester and the assessor of how the item works. As long as it starts from the top down it will not work. Send the developers of weapons into the field to look for what the troops want and need. The troops often don’t know what is being developed, and what for, before it is handed them. Often it was never needed. But if it looked good and it cost more than what we had, the developers were right there to make it look like it was the best thing on the market

By: Afghandoc

Afghandoc — Wed, 03 Dec 2008 16:49:03 +0000

This is the problem! The disconnect between the part of the military that is developing next gen technology and the people doing the fighting is well known! These two communities might as well be seperated by the Grand Canyon. When are we going to kill this cumbersome Aquisition process and bring in the experts and just develop this stuff like we did during WWII and the Cold War! V/R SF VET

By: soonergrunt

soonergrunt — Tue, 02 Dec 2008 17:59:21 +0000

Following on the DensityDuck, the other problem in R&D and procurement in the Army is that the people who do get programs have their careers wedded to the program’s success. If the program is cancelled, it is a failure, and thus their career is as well. The result is that the guy responsible for small arms is wedded to the success of the M4 carbine and will do everything in his power to kill any competitors to that system so that he still has a shot at one of the few O-7 billets in contracting or logistics. His career stays intact, and we keep a flawed weapon system. Insert your device/system/widget of choice in place of M4 carbine, and the same thing happens across the board whether you’re talking about camoflage patterns that don’t camoflage effectively, or rifles with known design flaws, or whatever. The guys who run these programs are never Combat Arms officers.

By: DensityDuck

DensityDuck — Tue, 02 Dec 2008 17:24:11 +0000

One of my co-workers is ex-Army, and he had an amusing rant about development and procurement. He declared that the reason procurement is invariably screwed up is that in the military, procurement is the dumping-ground for idiots and screwups. You don’t want idiots and screwups managing your logistics, you don’t want them doing your mission planning, and you DEFINITELY don’t want them out in the field. But if you kick them out, then you hear a lot of crap about “retention rates” and “force size”, because the grand strategic plan still assumes that we’re all going to die fighting an Atomic War with Russia.

So you put the idiots and screwups in procurement (or in joe-jobs like rear-area security, which is where you get Abu Ghraib.)