Think the FCS needs to be scaled down and break apart in to core areas. For one is personal protection, another is vehicle protection. There was a huge amount surrounding communication, but technology was limiting because most suppliers do not have the capacity to explore R&D avenues nor would they want to. So R&D needs to be separated out, and find out which companies are actively producing R&D results.

I thought Chobham armor primarily defeats shaped charges. Depleted uranium stops Sabot rounds. Point is that only tanks shoot Sabot round and no tank will ever engage an FCS vehicle before those vehicles know a tank is out there. The sneak and peak guys are covered by the armor in this article and active defense.

No DC2, I’ve moved on to another project but still strongly believe in FCS.

DC2

They may be using a comparison that includes the effects of an active protection system.

I was truly impressed by what you were saying.…. Until you got into the kill other services stuff in favor of mine. BTW, you still working as a contractor on the FCS program? Just curious.

I am amazed that the least protected armor composite (B-1) is still comparable to the chobham armor on the M-1. Great job to those guys.

FYI, if we want to get our butts out of this recession technological innovations like these are going to be the impetus. We cannot sell the world t-shirts and stay competetive. We can sell them technology. Maybe not this type, but more investment in research will allow us to sell other things.

DC2

Keep in mind that Stryker already weighs well in excess of 40,000 lbs and cannot be carried aboard a C-130 with its slat armor. If you must use C-17s anyway, an FCS manned ground vehicle (MGV) in the vicinity of 54,000 lbs provides far greater protection for the additional 14,000 lbs, while still carrying three MGV per C-17 vs. a single Abrams or two Bradleys. And remember, they are only discussing the passive armor that can perpetually be upgraded through future armor replacements. FCS weight also includes active protection and dual-use sensors for finding inbound rounds and enemy forces.

Add the under-hull v-shaped kit armor to counter mines/IEDs and you easily surpass current 74,000 lb Bradley M2A3 (with armor tiles) all around protection. Tankers will try to tell you that it has inadequate armor vs an Abrams, but recall that infantry, scout, and artillery armored vehicles and attack reconnaissance helicopters accompany tanks with far less protection. Why should tanks be charging about the battlefield thinking they can’t be killed when their partners-in-arms can be defeated if excessive recklessness occurs.

The answer is not all tank-sized vehicles ala the Israelis who don’t need to deploy and travel short distances vs. their threats. When thousands of miles of U.S. Army deployment are involved, lighter/smaller vehicles more efficiently utilize costly, scarce intertheater airlift and sealift.

Forward deployed FCS forces also would be more easily transported intratheater distances from say Italy/Germany to the Middle East or Poland/Ukraine in an emergency. Forward deployed FCS forces in Alaska and Hawaii would similarly rapidly reinforce in the Pacific theater. The key is get a credible tripwire/deterrent and airfield/port security force on the ground early enough before enemy aggression is a fait accompli and he goes to ground to hide from airpower. Airborne and Stryker forces are not a credible deterrent to threat armor. Early entry FCS forces are.

Such medium-sized vehicles further enhance future warfighting and counterinsurgency by reducing the number and vulnerability of logistics forces/convoys. If the enemy kills a tank or a follow-on fuel truck crew…Soldiers are still dead. Making a tank crew invulnerable at the expense of logistics crews who must travel in convoy more often and in greater numbers to support an Abrams 2-gallons-per-mile, is favoring the life of one class of serviceman vs. another.

The days of rapid movement by blindly advancing in a you-can’t-kill-me movement to contact and meeting engagement only endangers combined arms partners that can never be armored at the level of a tank. In addition, why do follow on forces need to be as protected as the point of the spear? Sensor technology and networking of joint ISR, will enable future commanders to track both their own and threat forces to pick the best route and speed of advance. Smaller hunter-killer teams may sneak thru but that’s what active protection and the armor mentioned in this article are for.

Now add the hybrid-electric engine and band track and you can literally sneak up silently on enemy forces in full scale war or insurgency while using fuel quantities nearly similar to a Stryker. Tracked vehicles also have inherently superior off-road mobility in terrain where Stryker and Marine LAV III gets stuck. But overly heavy current tracked vehicles end up getting transported around on Heavy Equipment Transporters (which also use lots of fuel) and surpass the weight of bridges in many theaters of conflict.

Great article. Let’s hope the DoD and Congress take note that continuing investments in our Army, that has been the force making the greatest sacrifices in the past 100 years, is a survivability and warfighting technology investment long overdue.

The great news is we CAN have the best if we all agree to live with numbers smaller than we may want. Reducing F-35 purchases to 160 million matching FCS, would fund half of FCS. Eliminating overreaching ballistic missile defense and nuclear forces are other area where savings are potentially great.

There’s no need to kill many programs to live within future budgets. Just match projected purchases to the actual threat…not the Cold War or sky-might-fall threat. The Army has and will continue to modify FCS to reduce scope and costs, while getting spin outs into warfighter hands early. When others follow suit in their own programs, all the services can continue to modernize without breaking the DoD bank.