If you model fighting in the Middle East and Central Asia on surgical precision and attempt to counter small arms and RPGs with defensive systems that protect lives you will fail.

You may want to go back an look at history of the region. The successful armies were city killers. They pacified the region by leveling the cities and not fighting one-on-one with the indigenous forces.

Unless you destroy the “armor” the irregulas use — cities and civilians — you are reduced to fighting a defensive battle.

The counterinsurgency in Iraq is starting to work because it nutralizes the cities and civilians with “hearts & minds” political tactics. The other option is to level the cities like Putin did in Chechnya.

RPG to RPG or expensive armor to RPG or reactive APS to RPG will fail.

Semper Fi

The primary lesson of the 2006 Lebanon war was refutal of the airpower-can-do-it-all premise. We already know that but a little affirmation never hurts.

Wanat illustrates that light forces vs. light forces is not a winner when the bad guy knows the terrain better and has the advantage of surprise. That’s why we shouldn’t fight fair anymore than the Israelis do. Fight light with armor. Light threats can launch RPGs as artillery all day long against a Bradley, M1 tank, or FCS manned ground vehicle…less so against a Bradley or up-armored HMMWV. (recall that even in the remote chance that an RPG-30 fools active protection, there is still Chobham like armor behind it). Armored vehicles have the added benefit of excellent long-range sensors to see the firing insurgents and return heavy fire while under armor. The new Strykers have cameras mounted all around the vehicle which should a future standard for all.

Wanat also proves the need for organic smaller UAS and small unmanned ground vehicles and unattended sensors. The latter two can be used as on Observation Post (OP) for the manned OP. In other words, a SUGV and unattended ground sensors placed around the perimeter and forward of manned OPs would provide early warning and allow early use of Claymore mines and machine gun fire, not to mention cueing the overmatching armored vehicle to open fire.

Continuous use of a small aerostat or cued use of small UAS would provide wider perimeter coverage and targeting for distant artillery and NLOS-Launch system rockets-in-a-box that are not hampered by weather. If you read about VUIT-2 already fielded in Apaches, UAS video can be picked up in the cockpit of inbound Quick Reaction Force Apaches to provide early understanding of the threat and friendly situation at altitudes below fast movers to stay under the weather.

Warfighting tools for the high-end of hybrid and major conflict also nicely tie into counterinsurgency and the concept of secure-hold-build…with emphasis on the secure and hold to support building. Unless the population feels prtected, the counterinsurgeny cannot progress to winning hearts and minds. Unless roads can be patrolled more safely, the enemy owns the roads.

Nothing says protection better than an armored vehicle with great sensors and firepower, and networked access to more firepower. Such weapons when task-organized with light forces can substitute for light infantry allowing small elements to be spread more thinly while still assuring credible protection and deterrence.

Current difficulties in supplying our forces in Afghanistan also illustrate our need for more fuel efficient combat vehicles. It’s far easier to support an FCS vehicle getting 3–4 mpg than a M1 tank using 2 gallons per mile.…or fighter aircraft using 2500 gallons every few hours.

Unfortunately, modern U.S. history has shown that U.S. politics and foreign policy mean that the U.S. will continue to embark on counter insurgency(Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan)and peace keeping roles that will bring it into contact with hybrid threats(Somalia)now and in the foreseeable future.

Petraeus will no doubt put many people skilled in counter insurgency in positions of influence,which will help with a America’s next inevitable counter insurgency. I’m not sure that translates into making U.S. forces capable in a 4th Generation context.