Home » Land » FCS Vehicle Kill Mulled; Savings Small for 2010

FCS Vehicle Kill Mulled; Savings Small for 2010

By Colin Clark Tuesday, March 24th, 2009 11:57 am
Posted in Land, Rumors

The Army and senior OSD leadership are debating whether to eliminate all but one of the eight FCS vehicles, a Hill source says. The sole surviving vehicle would be, not surprisingly, the Non Line of Sight Cannon.

But the plan being considered would save a relatively paltry $500 million in 2010. As the Hill source noted, the FCS network and software comprise “most” of the R and D money.

Also, an industry source pointed out that as the number of vehicles in the program shrinks, so does the viability of the network. “The development of the FCS network is linked to the development of FCS Manned Ground Vehicles. Each MGV acts as a node in the ground based aspect of the network. So cutting MGVs reduces the viability of the network,” the industry source said.

But because so much of the FCS program depends on economies of scale from building vehicles on a common chassis, the Army would be hard pressed to save a great deal. The Hill source noted that half of the research and development costs are for the chassis and you would still be developing and building the chassis, no matter how many vehicles you killed.

The Army wanted had a very different plan to restructure the Future Combat System in the out years, but the OSD said no to it because it saved almost nothing in the short term. Now the Army is wrestling with those notorious meanies at PA and E over the program’s very future.

Of course, building NLOS would help remove one very prominent irritant, from the Pentagon’s point of view. Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.) has prodded and pushed the Army for years to build NLOS and to build as many of them as possible. He wants to protect jobs at Fort Sill, the Army’s artillery center.

If the Army were to designate NLOS as the new service artillery piece to replace the aging Paladin system, that would probably mollify Inhofe.

The Hill source said the Army probably would continue with Spin Out One from FCS in the next budget. That includes network integration kits for Abrams, Bradleys and Humvees, of which computers and Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio are a large part. Also on the list are the Tactical and Urban Unattended Ground Sensors and NLOS.

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	Recon-Team March 24th, 2009 at 2:23 pm If we cancel all of the other FCS manned vehicles, we might as well cancel the NLOS-C and get a heavier and much more capable artillery system like the Crusader.
	mike March 24th, 2009 at 3:18 pm Never has such a program had so many negative reports written about in the history of the Pentagon. The GAO, CSIS, CBO, and several published papers by active and retired military field commanders, military news reporters, and defense analysts, etc., have all written about the program’s shortcomings. So why is the program still being funded? The experts say if it were deployed as advertised in Iraq or Afghanstan today it would be no more effective than what is there today, in fact it would be less effective. So what is the program being designed for? The Georgian Republic has a web site where they show a day to day sequence of the 2 week battle between them and Russia. Would FCS have won that war against the “enemy”? ? NOT!!! Can it be used to defend Taiwan, NOT!!! Air Power combined arms won the war in Bosnia. Air power is the success story in Iraq and Afghanistan and other hot spots. The ground soldier and a current in use radio using a currently used network is working well in the GWOT and hundreds of stories a month are verifying the sucessful efforts using current UAVs, Bomber and Jet aircraft, network ISR, and tthe network (DGS) being used is functioning wwell between the ground soldier with a rifle and a pilot who puts warheads on foreheads (see AAir Force Article. The original goal of General Shenieski (sp?) was a light deployable network of vehicles. The program is not that anymore. It exceeds the weight for one. One hopes that the OSD experts are combing thru the needs of the down range warfighters and see what is working out there and get rid of all the rest of the redundant programs, FCS is a bundle of redundant programs rolled into one. Everone subcontractor working on the program has a exact or simular program being funded by other porgrams for the same prodcuts. Lockheed is building remote vehicles using their own funds and selling them. The irobot was designed and fielded by the REF and was in existence before it came on baord with the FCS program. The Class IV is the same UAV that the Navy already has under contract, The Class I UAV is being developed under a DARPA contract long before it was moved over to the FCS porgram. If one looks at the vehicles, they are exceeded by the current force vehicles. The B-52 bomber has been around for 50 plus years and is still being used. What is wrong with keeping the best Tank in the world running and building more of them. Rember the Volkswagon beetle? It was designed before World War II and they are still be mass produced with slight changes in technlogy. The current thinking by Mr Gates and his team are on track to get us more bang for the buck, and so is the team at the OSD offices.
	Al March 24th, 2009 at 6:43 pm Mike i think has the right idea. The pentagon and in particular the army, always want a complete design overhaul on any new system. The problem is that starting from scratch drives up the cost and usually leaves contractors loopholes to slip in budget increases for the program. This isn’t a hit on contractors. Designing stuff costs money; redesigning stuff costs more money; starting from scratch can cost a LOT of money. Though I don’t really wish to single out a certain service. The Navy and AF have this same problem, I don’t understand why they can’t incrementally develop the systems. Look at the Marine Corps for example. All their helicopters, sans V-22, can trace direct lineage to Vietnam era systems. Several even further back. What is the result? Some great reliable helicopters that do the job. What happens when they try to design new systems? Huge overblown costs in the V-22, and the EFV. Granted the V-22 is finally getting the kinks worked out and is turning into a pretty kick-ass airframe, but it still took a lot of money, and the EFV is dead in the water (no pun intend). The fact is that designing things to be LIGHT is one of the hardest things in engineering. So if you want vehicles to be light and take anti-tank rounds they’re gonna cost a lot. Or they’re going to have to weigh a lot. This program has both problems. cut it.
	Kurt March 24th, 2009 at 7:03 pm There is a serious problem when people consider the concept of $500 million, (1/2 billion dollars) to be a “paltry sum”. if $500 million is a paltry sum, give me $100 million anytime.
	Cole March 24th, 2009 at 8:46 pm Never has such a program had so many negative reports written about in the history of the Pentagon.….So why is the program still being funded? ============================================= REPLY: Never have so many misconceptions been published with so little actual knowledge about the program. Smaller separate programs are a smaller monetary target. Other branches with larger monetary aspirations resent the Army asking for a reasonable share of the DoD procurment pie. Yet, given its sacrifices in current conflicts, there is clearly a need to give the Army some of the assymetric survivability and effectiveness enhancements that have made other services so immune to casualties. Oddly enough, the constant Army deployment strain is what drives the need for reset and force structure increases…which in turn threatens the ability to modernize. Conversely, others not deploying as frequently in harm’s way for 12 months, face less of a strain and rebuilding-need eating into service dollar modernization. Within the Army, large cross-branch programs step on everyone’s turf. Armor officer feel entitled to more armor than the other combined arms. When the Army created Stryker units as proof of principle that a networked lighter force could be effective, it received lots of bad press, as well, both inside and outside the Army. Change makes you a target. Yet Stryker is widely accepted as successful today. The sole caveat is that it incorporates deployment, network, and commonality successes but has little of the firepower and protection that FCS brings to bear. Recall the bad press the Bradley got when it first came to fruition. 6 man dismounted squad. Halon fire extinguishers, etc. Yet years later, it has become a recognized success. As for the GAO and CBO, when you show an accountant or a congressional watchdog agency a big target, the potential for big savings spring to mind…regardless of whether you have a clue about warfighter needs. =========================================== The experts say if it were deployed as advertised in Iraq or Afghanstan today it would be no more effective than what is there today, in fact it would be less effective. So what is the program being designed for? The Georgian Republic has a web site where they show a day to day sequence of the 2 week battle between them and Russia. Would FCS have won that war against the “enemy”? NOT!!! Can it be used to defend Taiwan, NOT!!! ============================================== REPLY: On the contrary, with adequate warnings and indications, a preemptive FCS deployment to Georgia, any other former Soviet satellite, or Taiwan could be quite effective as a deterrent in even combined arms battalion-size. It would demonstrate a willingness to protect that nation, with airpower backing it up. Lacking such early warning, a threatened neighboring country would certainly welcome our forces to prevent the same from happening to them. Without credible force on the ground, the willingness to acquiesce to aggression (foregoing use of airpower) is a strong possibility…and the adversary knows it. While politicians decide, the enemy accomplishes his objectives and goes to ground, making him impossible to target from the air around surrounding civilians and under canopy. The threat of credible offensive ground power drives the enemy from cover, which improves airpower capabilities to find targets. Airpower would not have nearly as successful in any of the current conflicts without ground forces to find and flush out the enemy. As for Iraq, the 173rd Airborne incursion into northern Iraq in March 2003 would have been far more effective as an FCS force. The movement of 4th ID out of Turkey may have been done in part by C-17 intratheater lift. During years in country, there would have been a reduced logistical and maintenance cost with vehicles using common parts and getting 3–4 mpg instead of 2 gallons per mile…perhaps eliminating the need for the 2003 “tactical pause” to resupply concern. Strong sensor capabilities would have turned movement to contact and meeting engagements into structured advance and self-synchronized movement using the COP to stay abreast and aware of the presence of other friendly and enemy forces. During the counterinsurgency that followed, cordon and search would have been enhanced by silent electric-drive mode to sneak up on the enemy. More IEDs would have been discovered prior to exploding under or beside vehicles. Securing heavy bridges would have been less of a need during the invasion. 2nd BCT, 3rd ID may have continued on the dikes it was traversing instead of being forced to turn around and backtrack due to soft soil under heavy vehicles. In Afghanistan where supply lines are threatened, an FCS force could support light infantry, and population/route security, while using far less fuel than a heavy force, and with and more offroad mobility and survivability than the Stryker force going there now to help. ——————————————- Air Power combined arms won the war in Bosnia. Air power is the success story in Iraq and Afghanistan and other hot spots. ——————————————- REPLY: Agenda revealed. You are correct that AH-64Ds and manned-unmanned teaming is a major success story in both theaters with far less of the collateral damage affecting other airpower. JTACs have been a wonderful success, but there is something almost obscene about a service believing it can fly Predators out of Nevada and still have awareness of ground commander needs in theater. Yet the unending desire for more Air Force funding continues. An aerial tanker programs that will eventually cost well in excess of $100 billion gets the green light. A rescue helicopter for personnel recovery continues despite ample other service assets to do that mission and few Air Force/Navy pilots going down…except the Army/Marines, which have no dedicated CSAR fleet. F-22 funding appears to continue despite zero contribution to either theater of conflict. A new bomber is desired even though no threat precludes current bombers and coming fighters from being effective in country. The F-35 will help, but certainly is not needed in the numbers requested. It would help ground forces more than the F-22, but the Air Force will never give up the white scarf mentality, despite the absence of white scarf opponents in any number or quality to speak of. But the airpower lobby remains strong…as Soldiers and Marines continue to die and get maimed…and get their programs and budgets slashed. ============================================= The ground soldier and a current in use radio using a currently used network is working well in the GWOT and hundreds of stories a month are verifying the sucessful efforts using current UAVs, Bomber and Jet aircraft, network ISR, and the network (DGS) being used is functioning well between the ground soldier with a rifle and a pilot who puts warheads on foreheads (see AAir Force Article. =========================================== REPLY: You think the current stovepiped Army Battle Command System is a success? It breeds branch inclusiveness instead of combined arms. Field Artillery does its AFATDS. Maneuver units use MCS. Intell units ASAS…and so on with little interface with each others battle command networks. They do not function well on the move. We accept wireless connectivity in the civilian sector, yet seem to believe that our Soldiers don’t deserve the same??? Link please on the Air Force article. More of the agenda is showing. Are you talking about distributed common ground system? Great system, but that is not a command and control network. ============================================ The original goal of General Shinseki was a light deployable network of vehicles. The program is not that anymore. It exceeds the weight for one. One hopes that the OSD experts are combing thru the needs of the down range warfighters and see what is working out there and get rid of all the rest of the redundant programs, FCS is a bundle of redundant programs rolled into one. Everone subcontractor working on the program has a exact or simular program being funded by other porgrams for the same products. Lockheed is building remote vehicles using their own funds and selling them. The irobot was designed and fielded by the REF and was in existence before it came on baord with the FCS program. The Class IV is the same UAV that the Navy already has under contract, The Class I UAV is being developed under a DARPA contract long before it was moved over to the FCS porgram. If one looks at the vehicles, they are exceeded by the current force vehicles. ============================================= REPLY: FCS manned ground vehicles do not exceed the weight for 3 per C-17 given the help of some of those low-hour KC-135Rs still out there. The C-17 is one the the great Air Force success stories, along with Reaper and Predator…if the service ever decides to join the other services in country to fly UAS in support of ground forces…and not just the JFACC and JFC. The A-10 continues yeoman’s work as do C-130s. And the latter can still assist in air deployment of other FCS BCT equipment and supplies while the big boys bring in the medium armor. But don’t get confused by the medium size. Manned ground vehicles will surpass the survivability of every heavy BCT piece of equipment except the Abrams…which burns 2 gallons per mile and transports one per C-17, instead of 3 mounted combat systems. Why let one fat boy ruin all potential for future Army survivability and relevance in contingency operations where getting there fast from stateside is a major part of the battle success. So you are essentialy saying that FCS made good choices in choosing systems for its unmanned requirements. BTW, the final Class I and Class IV UAS will bare little resemblance to the orginal equipment and will improve the products that other services procure. If these systems are good enough for other services, why are they suddenly evil and wasteful in the hands of Soldiers? ============================================= The B-52 bomber has been around for 50 plus years and is still being used. What is wrong with keeping the best Tank in the world running and building more of them. Remember the Volkswagon beetle? It was designed before World War II and they are still be mass produced with slight changes in technology. The current thinking by Mr Gates and his team are on track to get us more bang for the buck, and so is the team at the OSD offices. =============================================== Just as the B-52 continues in the presence of newer B-1 and B-2 aircraft, the M1A2 and Bradley Fighting vehicle will be a mainstay for MANY years to come…alongside more modern equipment that is easier to deploy. For a stateside-based Army, there is little other choice. FCS units buy time for sea-deployment of larger legacy and other FCS less-essential systems. FCS spin outs, improve the Abrams/Bradley force AND the infantry BCT. Bottom line, is the other services expect nothing but the best and newest equipment.…and get it every year, perhaps not in the numbers they would like…but when was the last major Air Force or Navy program cancelled??? Let the Army share some of the benefits that money has brought the other services in avoiding casualties. The Army and Marines are the forces bearing the brunt of recent past, present, and projectable future warfare and stability operations. Show some appreciation through more than a pat on the back.
	Armywonk March 24th, 2009 at 8:50 pm Who let the zoomie in? Seriously, the misguided attack on FCS is ridiculous. Take a look at F-22 if you want to see a program criticized by investigators…or the Bradley. What experts is Mike quoting about FCS effectiveness if deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan? I noticed he didn’t name any. The Georgia website? Come on! The idea that air power is the be all end all has been discredited so many times that I can’t believe that anybody takes it seriously anymore. The idea that current force vehicles exceed FCS manned ground vehicles is laughable. Consider the NLOS-C. As compared to Paladin, it requires less crew but can put more rounds down range with greater accuracy. Sounds like an improvement to me. Is FCS different than when it entered SDD? Of course it is. The Army is a learning organization and has applied lessons learned from ongoing operations to change the program for the better. Sounds like a good idea to me. Mike is right on 1 thing — the Abrams is the best tank in the world…for now. It has been nearly 30 years since it entered service. It is a maintenance and logistical drain on the Army…and it is vulnerable today to a variety of threats. The idea that we should never modernize but simply make product improvements is beyond me. It’s reckless.
	mike March 24th, 2009 at 10:53 pm Trying to protect wasteful redundant and non bebeficial programs by using child like verbiage is the wrong way to go about it. Search the web on what the experts say. Look at the Republic of Georgia website and see a very excellant protrayal of how that skirmish was fought day by day. Army Generals of the past always said that weapons off the ground are the best way to defeat the enemy. Factual facts bud. A aircraft can arrive at a target within minutes and how long does it take a vehicle to go over a mountain or thru a city? Is is better to launch off the ground or from the air. Air Force UAVs are the future coupled with boots on the ground who are unburdened with dozens of networked vehicles to worry about. If FCS was fielded years ago it might have been used in the GWOT or would it have been.…?
	Recon-Team March 25th, 2009 at 12:14 am Cole, I am curious if you are involved with FCS in any way? I would love the chance to talk with somebody with knowledge about the details of many FCS vehicles.
	Armywonk March 25th, 2009 at 6:51 am OK…here are some facts…80% of the operational needs statements coming out of theater are for FCS capabilities. Combat vets out at Fort Bliss who are testing and evaluating FCS capabilities say they need these capabilities right now — and I’m not talking about O-6s but E-4s and E-5s — the squad leaders whose teams are the first through the door. Cole provided a great rebuttal to Mike’s points…
	Ken March 25th, 2009 at 7:00 am This is one of the most insightful discussion threads I’ve ever seen posted on this website. However, can we dispense with the interservice rivalry and focus on the real issue–will FCS work for ME, so that I can find, fix, and kill the enemy? I appreciate Mike’s analysis, although I am skeptical of his “airpower fixes everything” approach, and I truly appreciate Cole’s detailed response. That is the best, most approachable, synopsis of the FCS concept that this dumb infantryman has ever read.
	StrykerRadar March 25th, 2009 at 11:02 am Mike, you are dead wrong on many aspects of FCS and current combat operations. How do I know? Personal knowledge of the NLOS-C system and 3 combat tours in Iraq. The FCS was born from an operational need, not dreamed up by a bunch of contractors. As stated, the NLOS-C provides something current artillery does not; true “shoot and scoot” capability, tactical internet and digital communication capability to all systems, battery/ servo main drive system, and capability to fire 6 rounds at a target all landing at the same time.
	Brian March 25th, 2009 at 11:34 am Good discussion for once. I would just add that in addition to being a hack, Cole is obviously caught up in the use of “stated capabilities” as evidence. You know someone is defending their program or clueless when they start throwing around “capabilities, requirements, interoperable, networked, air power”, etc. All of these are meaningless terms that mean whatever the person using them wants them to mean. You can have a requirement for anything you want…..doesn’t mean you need it. The supposed advantage of the NLOS-C is that it offers mobile precision guided fire to theatre. Great! Except that we’re not in a maneuver warfare scenario, and BTW a towed M-777A1 titanium howitzer offers a similar capability at a 2000% cost savings…..not to mention you can sling load it on a Chinook for carrying around to firebases and FOBs. Something you couldn’t do with an NLOS-C. Finally, how many different precision fires assets do we need? Let me count the ways……NLOS mortar, cannon, and launch system (the rockets in a box.) We’re blowing people out of mud huts and buildings, not reigning steel on armored columns. Not only is all of this redundant, how would we get it to the battlefield in the mountains when most of this crap can’t off-road or survive an RPG hit?? While Close Air Support (CAS) and artillery are often needed, they don’t need come from platinum coated platforms. Can you use a NLOS-C for a fire mission, or an F-22 to provide CAS? Sure, but it also happens to be the most convoluted and expensive way you could possible imagine to accomplish the mission. We don’t need super networked interoperable full spectrum uber high tech nonsense; we need rifles that don’t jam, radios that work, and armored vehicles that don’t flip over when you’re parking them. None of those things cost $B/unit, all of them exist today, and they don’t require logistics and contractor support budgets the size of most other countries defense budgets.
	Nate March 25th, 2009 at 12:14 pm Air power is not the end all be all. The Army needs to modernize, the Air Force gets kajillions of dollars on every whiz bang project from here to the moon, is it really so much to ask to let the army have some cash and modernize?
	Reid March 25th, 2009 at 12:48 pm NLOS-C should be kept if for no other reason than to demonstrate the effectiveness of band track/hybrid drive propulsion which could have huge implications for improving many of our armored vehicles. Having something that can fill the coverage gap between mortars and GMLRS is important and Paladin is getting old. So OK Keep NLOS-C, but as for the rest of it, c’mon. Everyone knows FCS was started during the cold war as an evolutionary “system of systems” to fight the Russians. Like many similar efforts the defense contractors continue to grasp at relevancy in a changed world to justify the expense. Meanwhile what we NEED is lighter body armor and more effective small arms. As for air power, lets shift some of that FCS money into armoring our helos to increase their survivability against RPG’s and 7.62x54R and buying Hughes MD530N to replace the ARH70.
	Mr Paladin March 25th, 2009 at 1:31 pm I loved the discussion and demonstrated lack of knowlege in these postings. The amount of misinformation in the general public is amazing. But, a few of the facts did come out. B52 Bombers, M1 Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles will all continue long after FCS dies, why? Because the Army can’t afford to replace them all, never will, especially in today’s financial climate. As for NLOS-C, it’s a great concept, but if fielded will be worthless in today’s fight. By the way the M109A6 Paladin demostrated in 1993 and 4 round simultaneous impact capability, and will still out range any NLOS-C vehicle.
	Armywonk March 25th, 2009 at 2:34 pm Mr. Paladin, The M109A6 Paladin is capable of firing up to four rounds per minute to ranges of 30 kilometers while NLOS-C can fire six rounds per minute and has an equivalent range, not too mention that NLOS-C requires less crew and is more accurate.
	DensityDuck March 25th, 2009 at 2:56 pm mike: oh, please. Far worse things have been written about V-22.
	Cole March 25th, 2009 at 8:06 pm Mr. Paladin, As your system accompanies its supported BCT, do you think there’s a chance Mr. Insurgent might pop out and launch a RPG at ya? That sure will be a big bang with all those rounds on board. Now in another theater, you launch rounds down range and get counterbattery top attack smart munitions in return or massed rocket fire. Uh oh. Brian, same scenario with counterbattery. You may be able to lift the M-777 with a Chinook, but not the truck that pulls it to shoot and scoot. Heck, they don’t need a smart counterbattery munition to take you and your truck out. You’re sitting still or didn’t get far by the time you hooked that puppy up to the truck. Brian, you need NLOS-mortar for responsive battalion fires and to avoid depleting BCT-support NLOS-Cannon rounds when not necessary. You need NLOS-Launch System for precision targeting at ranges beyond the NLOS-Cannon and Mortar. NLOS-Launch system is also a great early deployment system until the big boys arrive that can withstand an RPG and top attack, and move about the battlefield with the same mobility as the supported BCT. NLOS-Launch system missiles can also be placed inside a small combat outpost perimeter. When used with laser-designation capabilities of the Class I UAS, every company has a precision fires capability.
	Cole March 25th, 2009 at 8:24 pm Recon-team, I was associated with FCS for several years, but don’t post or discuss items that are not common knowledge via the media and Army public affairs websites. I have not been with FCS for 6 months. But I believe. I’ve done a year unaccompanied tour, and know its no fun, let alone in a combat zone…doing 3 or more them like so many are doing while other services with 4–6 month tours and less danger gets all the procurement and base construction bucks. At the motel I’m staying at, I watched an Air Force Colonel leave all his dishes on the table in the dining room after breakfast. He’s the sole military or civilian type that I’ve ever seen do something like that. That exemplifies the I’m-too-good-to-stoop-so-low mentality that too often is the Air Force…resulting in 4 month tours and flying UAS out of Nevada. It’s not right. Yet watch and see who gets all the budget cuts and who keeps the next-war-itis air systems.
	George March 25th, 2009 at 11:43 pm I can see the usefulness of a combat system vs. individual combat vehicles. It’s less expensive in the long run. It allows for greater system commonality, interoperability, reduction in training for troops, etc. Those things DO matter in the Pentagon and they matter in the field as well (Ever had your vehicle break down with no spare parts?). I’m a zoomie myself, but my best friend is an FA officer on a Paladin and I can attest to his trials and tribulations. They need a more effective system. I was just under the impression that the various Stryker based vehicles filled that role. Exactly how many full systems does the Army need? Anyway, the basic needs of Army combat vehicles are: Survivability, Lethality, and Reliability. Everything else is secondary. The FCS seems to meet those 3 parameters quite well under the current war fighting doctrine. Will it work if that changes? Say if we enter a conflict with N. Korea? I don’t know… It should, paired up with proper Air and Naval support.
	stonewall March 26th, 2009 at 10:29 am What would be wrong with Building a cannon that will fire intelligent ( Radar,or satellite guided) projectiles and have a power assist booster on the base to carry it to a known target at a greater distance (Kind of like a cruse missile). are would that be taking away from the Air force dropping bombs???.
	Texan March 26th, 2009 at 11:24 am Looks like the navy is winning. We need more submarines and aircraft carriers even though they barely have a mission. How about some more admirals commanding military forces? IMHO the admirals and marine generals should stick to nautical matters and leave military matters to the army.
	George March 26th, 2009 at 11:55 am There’s nothing wrong with it Stonewall. MLRS was designed for that specific purpose. Guided projectiles with boosters at the base are called MISSLES. They’ve been around in the Army for quite a while. Google it.
	Militor March 26th, 2009 at 1:32 pm Who are we suppose to use this thing against? The Army needs to drop this “Everything needs to fit on a C130 idea”. How cute, it fits on a C130. Do you think the Chinese mind if their 200mm guns fit on anything? And I am sure they can jam a wire or Satellite guided projectile in anything that goes bang. Big guns are going to be obsolete in the near future anyway. Flying bombs that are dropped from great altitudes or launched from the air or ground will hover, linger and think. It doesn’t mater the launch source. They will all do the same thing. Blow up stuff you need broken. C130 loads are suppose to be used for quick deployment. How do you use a medium caliber gun that is top secret for forward fire with a unsecured perimeter. This isn’t Viet-Nam anymore.
	StrykerRadar March 26th, 2009 at 1:34 pm Mr. Paladin, how is the NLOS-C worthless in today’s fight? Can it sit on a FOB and fire in support of troops? Yep. Can it fire GPS guided projoes? Yep, has that one cover also. Can it fire counter-btry in support of C-RAM? Yep, got that one also. The real question is this: Can the Paladin do what the NLOS-C does? Load at any elevation? Auto-load from the on-board magazine by the push of a button from the Section Chief? Shoot a Zone 4 msn without dropping the spades? Drive around the battlefield on just battery power alone? Can the Paladin send a computer generated PTM to the AFATDS at the PLT/ BTRY FDC, BN FDC, and BDE FECC level saying what’s wrong with it and what maintenance assets it needs? Bottom line: The NLOS-C and NLOS-M are most advanced parts of FCS that work.
	Militor March 26th, 2009 at 3:34 pm Your gonna need a few guys with tool belts just to keep that thing running. Dust, Mud, sand,ice. That is what sophisticated electronics like more than anything else. Not to mention shock. Yeah, electronics love to be pounded on. “Hey Fred can you go out and clean of the telemetry cosmos rectifier satellite mirror”. “No way Joe, I’m not going out their. We don’t even have a Machine Gun on this thing”. “They told us this was going to be a stand off weapon”. When ever you get a expensive target like this. The enemy wwill simply deploy a CORONET team. This is a two man team. A special little rocket that kills what ever you point it at. Including a M1 Abrams. The new sniper has a Coronet rocket. And they work. It would be very easy to ambush a NLOS gun. They are quite predictable where they need to be to work and fire. Just use a compass and a map. ” Hey Abdul”. “What Mohamed”. You wanna go hunt for some NLOS guns?” “Hah too easy”. “Mohamed! Have you even planted any IEDs’ today?” Quit being so lazy.
	pvtpyle March 27th, 2009 at 11:24 am For the first time I think this conversation is focused on mostly the right topics: should FCS exist in its current form, change into something else, or be cancelled. Let’s look at some facts and the current state of the program to allow folks to add to the debate. First, probably the most relevant question is: Will FCS capabilities actually help the Warfighter? The answer is yes. True, FCS started as a development program with a construct of “get there first but with great firepower” but current operations and a flexible acquisition strategy (not stovepiped—allowing for requirements changes based on lessons learned and Soldier feedback) have helped the Army focus FCS into a program that is relevant and does offer technological advantages to the Soldier. As reported, the Army made a decision to provide FCS equipment to Soldiers in the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams first and is looking at where FCS will fit into other BCTs. Not only is hardware being tested by Soldiers at Fort Bliss, Texas. The operational constructs of FCS have been proven on the battlefields of Iraq and soon to be in Afghanistan. Task Force Odin, very successful in OIF against IED threat, uses rudimentarily networked sensors to shooters allowing UAV and sensors data to be transported to the shooter (whether it be air or ground) cumulating in rapid precision fires. FCS takes this construct to the next level, allowing for instantaneous sensor data to be transported right down to the squad and platoon levels, providing information for those NCOs and platoon leaders to make better informed decisions. Picture a battlefield where a NCO in his HMMWV can have an instant view from his squad’s unmanned air vehicle or unmanned ground vehicle is looking at and then be able to make a decision based on that information. Now if it’s a situation where that NCO needs a bit of heavy fire power he could share that networked sensor data with supporting fires battalion (Non Line of Sight Cannon or Non Line of Sight Launch System) or even air cover (yes, FCS is testing with Joint Services) —all involved see the same picture/video and can talk (voice, chat, email) in real time about the situation. I would argue that any battletested veteran would see real benefit in this. Second, let’s talk acquisition strategy. No, its not perfect and yes, as reported, there have been cost increases (based mostly on requirements changes) and yes it is an expensive program—but no it is not the development of a single platform–it is a host of equipment and an entire network, so ultimately more Soldier are getting more equipment for the dollar. FCS has developed its technologies in an incremental approach, which has allowed for ready capabilities to be tested and evaluated by Soldiers at Fort Bliss. More importantly, it has allowed FCS managers a chance to adapt requirements based on lessons learned from current operations. According to reports, FCS has actually taken some lessons learned from MRAP survivability and added features to its manned ground vehicle fleet. This is a good thing. Wouldn’t a Soldier rather be in a safer vehicle? Arguably the FCS approach has allowed this acquisition program to be responsive to the constantly changing operational environment that the Army finds itself in today—and that will surely continue. Lastly and perhaps the most important point is: Does FCS realistically fit into modernization? Most Army combat vehicles were developed in the early 1970s but have been constantly upgraded ever since. Additionally, some of the Army’s communications network also spawned out of 1970s and 1980s technology. Frankly, our cell phones are more advanced than some capabilities that our Soldiers have today and many cars use more computer line s of code to operate than our most advanced combat vehicles. Would you choose to put your family in a 1980s mini-van with no airbags, no anti-lock brakes, limited computer aided steering and no OnStar or cell phone communications? My guess is no. So why would America settle for putting our sons and daughters in outdated combat vehicles that lack the most current technology? Yes, the vehicles in the fleet today will be around for years to come and the Abrams tank is the most survivable in the world but the Army simply cannot keep upgrading current force vehicles—eventually replacement factors into the equation, both monetarily and capability. Also one must understand that the FCS family of vehicles is not meant to be tank replacements they serve a variety of key battlefield functions and deliver the network to the Soldier. Additionally, reported lessons learned from OIF and OEF have indicated that Soldiers need robots with a clear life cycle management solution. While rapid equipping has worked well, combat veterans have repeatedly asked for a robotics solution that is part of an acquisition cycle—something that can trained on before deployment and sustained once deployed. As part of the Army’s new announced robotics strategy, FCS allows for managed robotics and has Soldiers on prototypes of these robots today working through the very issues that combat veterans have raised. Just food for thought……
	MKM March 27th, 2009 at 1:30 pm I know tanks are sexier to consider, but personally I think the money could be better spent on the soldiers. In yesterday’s nextbigfuture.com, they displayed a brand new, cutting edge, computerized battle helmet. It can not only detect the enemy within a certain radius, it can identify the type and caliber of weapons the enemy is carrying!
	Tyler April 6th, 2009 at 3:50 pm Generally I do not post on blogs, but I would like to say that this post really forced me to do so! really nice post.
	JCitizen April 18th, 2009 at 6:30 pm FCS needs to be redesigned from the ground up. The main reason? Fuel. We don’t have a realistic fuel picture for future logistics. If OPEC shuts us off this could be a very short action for sure! There is no doubt we need to be smart and continue to rethink our picture for future force infrastructure — I just think this program didn’t go far enough. Cancling any contract can sometimes cost more than simply finishing what we got and pulling the numbers short. Better to not have enough FCS vehicles that lose anymore of the taxpayers money. NLOS is critical because we need to reduce the number of personel it takes to operate an artillery unit. There is no need of the manpower when you are using automated system. In fact why don’t they fully automate it? Then there would be no need for armor in the first place. We could build them cheap and replace them from attrition faster than the enemy could destroy them, and it is a LOT easier to harden a light vehicle that has NO personel on board. Build it with modularization in mind and battle action would be cheaper to repair too!
	huang chu king May 18th, 2009 at 4:08 pm Better to invest the amount in the veterans and their health care instead of on the FCS MGV.
	Rhyno327 May 20th, 2009 at 2:41 pm NLOS-C vehicle? Light and mobile, fueled by batteries also, is quiet and can move after firing. Its lighter than the Paladin, and can be moved to theatre faster. Hope they keep it.