There is no doubt we need to be smart and continue to rethink our picture for future force infrastructure — I just think this program didn’t go far enough.

Cancling any contract can sometimes cost more than simply finishing what we got and pulling the numbers short. Better to not have enough FCS vehicles that lose anymore of the taxpayers money. NLOS is critical because we need to reduce the number of personel it takes to operate an artillery unit. There is no need of the manpower when you are using automated system.

In fact why don’t they fully automate it? Then there would be no need for armor in the first place. We could build them cheap and replace them from attrition faster than the enemy could destroy them, and it is a LOT easier to harden a light vehicle that has NO personel on board. Build it with modularization in mind and battle action would be cheaper to repair too!

First, probably the most relevant question is: Will FCS capabilities actually help the Warfighter? The answer is yes. True, FCS started as a development program with a construct of “get there first but with great firepower” but current operations and a flexible acquisition strategy (not stovepiped—allowing for requirements changes based on lessons learned and Soldier feedback) have helped the Army focus FCS into a program that is relevant and does offer technological advantages to the Soldier. As reported, the Army made a decision to provide FCS equipment to Soldiers in the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams first and is looking at where FCS will fit into other BCTs.

Not only is hardware being tested by Soldiers at Fort Bliss, Texas. The operational constructs of FCS have been proven on the battlefields of Iraq and soon to be in Afghanistan. Task Force Odin, very successful in OIF against IED threat, uses rudimentarily networked sensors to shooters allowing UAV and sensors data to be transported to the shooter (whether it be air or ground) cumulating in rapid precision fires. FCS takes this construct to the next level, allowing for instantaneous sensor data to be transported right down to the squad and platoon levels, providing information for those NCOs and platoon leaders to make better informed decisions. Picture a battlefield where a NCO in his HMMWV can have an instant view from his squad’s unmanned air vehicle or unmanned ground vehicle is looking at and then be able to make a decision based on that information. Now if it’s a situation where that NCO needs a bit of heavy fire power he could share that networked sensor data with supporting fires battalion (Non Line of Sight Cannon or Non Line of Sight Launch System) or even air cover (yes, FCS is testing with Joint Services) —all involved see the same picture/video and can talk (voice, chat, email) in real time about the situation. I would argue that any battletested veteran would see real benefit in this.

Second, let’s talk acquisition strategy. No, its not perfect and yes, as reported, there have been cost increases (based mostly on requirements changes) and yes it is an expensive program—but no it is not the development of a single platform–it is a host of equipment and an entire network, so ultimately more Soldier are getting more equipment for the dollar. FCS has developed its technologies in an incremental approach, which has allowed for ready capabilities to be tested and evaluated by Soldiers at Fort Bliss. More importantly, it has allowed FCS managers a chance to adapt requirements based on lessons learned from current operations. According to reports, FCS has actually taken some lessons learned from MRAP survivability and added features to its manned ground vehicle fleet. This is a good thing. Wouldn’t a Soldier rather be in a safer vehicle? Arguably the FCS approach has allowed this acquisition program to be responsive to the constantly changing operational environment that the Army finds itself in today—and that will surely continue.

Lastly and perhaps the most important point is: Does FCS realistically fit into modernization? Most Army combat vehicles were developed in the early 1970s but have been constantly upgraded ever since. Additionally, some of the Army’s communications network also spawned out of 1970s and 1980s technology. Frankly, our cell phones are more advanced than some capabilities that our Soldiers have today and many cars use more computer line s of code to operate than our most advanced combat vehicles. Would you choose to put your family in a 1980s mini-van with no airbags, no anti-lock brakes, limited computer aided steering and no OnStar or cell phone communications? My guess is no. So why would America settle for putting our sons and daughters in outdated combat vehicles that lack the most current technology? Yes, the vehicles in the fleet today will be around for years to come and the Abrams tank is the most survivable in the world but the Army simply cannot keep upgrading current force vehicles—eventually replacement factors into the equation, both monetarily and capability. Also one must understand that the FCS family of vehicles is not meant to be tank replacements they serve a variety of key battlefield functions and deliver the network to the Soldier. Additionally, reported lessons learned from OIF and OEF have indicated that Soldiers need robots with a clear life cycle management solution. While rapid equipping has worked well, combat veterans have repeatedly asked for a robotics solution that is part of an acquisition cycle—something that can trained on before deployment and sustained once deployed. As part of the Army’s new announced robotics strategy, FCS allows for managed robotics and has Soldiers on prototypes of these robots today working through the very issues that combat veterans have raised.

Just food for thought……

The real question is this: Can the Paladin do what the NLOS-C does? Load at any elevation? Auto-load from the on-board magazine by the push of a button from the Section Chief? Shoot a Zone 4 msn without dropping the spades? Drive around the battlefield on just battery power alone? Can the Paladin send a computer generated PTM to the AFATDS at the PLT/ BTRY FDC, BN FDC, and BDE FECC level saying what’s wrong with it and what maintenance assets it needs?

Bottom line: The NLOS-C and NLOS-M are most advanced parts of FCS that work.

How about some more admirals commanding military forces?

IMHO the admirals and marine generals should stick to nautical matters and leave military matters to the army.

I’m a zoomie myself, but my best friend is an FA officer on a Paladin and I can attest to his trials and tribulations. They need a more effective system. I was just under the impression that the various Stryker based vehicles filled that role. Exactly how many full systems does the Army need?

Anyway, the basic needs of Army combat vehicles are: Survivability, Lethality, and Reliability. Everything else is secondary. The FCS seems to meet those 3 parameters quite well under the current war fighting doctrine. Will it work if that changes? Say if we enter a conflict with N. Korea? I don’t know… It should, paired up with proper Air and Naval support.

I have not been with FCS for 6 months. But I believe. I’ve done a year unaccompanied tour, and know its no fun, let alone in a combat zone…doing 3 or more them like so many are doing while other services with 4–6 month tours and less danger gets all the procurement and base construction bucks.

At the motel I’m staying at, I watched an Air Force Colonel leave all his dishes on the table in the dining room after breakfast. He’s the sole military or civilian type that I’ve ever seen do something like that. That exemplifies the I’m-too-good-to-stoop-so-low mentality that too often is the Air Force…resulting in 4 month tours and flying UAS out of Nevada.

It’s not right. Yet watch and see who gets all the budget cuts and who keeps the next-war-itis air systems.

As your system accompanies its supported BCT, do you think there’s a chance Mr. Insurgent might pop out and launch a RPG at ya? That sure will be a big bang with all those rounds on board.

Now in another theater, you launch rounds down range and get counterbattery top attack smart munitions in return or massed rocket fire. Uh oh.

Brian, same scenario with counterbattery. You may be able to lift the M-777 with a Chinook, but not the truck that pulls it to shoot and scoot. Heck, they don’t need a smart counterbattery munition to take you and your truck out. You’re sitting still or didn’t get far by the time you hooked that puppy up to the truck.

Brian, you need NLOS-mortar for responsive battalion fires and to avoid depleting BCT-support NLOS-Cannon rounds when not necessary. You need NLOS-Launch System for precision targeting at ranges beyond the NLOS-Cannon and Mortar. NLOS-Launch system is also a great early deployment system until the big boys arrive that can withstand an RPG and top attack, and move about the battlefield with the same mobility as the supported BCT.

NLOS-Launch system missiles can also be placed inside a small combat outpost perimeter. When used with laser-designation capabilities of the Class I UAS, every company has a precision fires capability.

The M109A6 Paladin is capable of firing up to four rounds per minute to ranges of 30 kilometers while NLOS-C can fire six rounds per minute and has an equivalent range, not too mention that NLOS-C requires less crew and is more accurate.