<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" > <channel><title>Comments on: Afghan Strategy Marks Soft Power Shift</title> <atom:link href="http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/</link> <description>Online Defense and Acquisition Journal</description> <lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2012 17:15:05 +0000</lastBuildDate> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator> <item><title>By: John Grant</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/#comment-6955</link> <dc:creator>John Grant</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2009 23:11:15 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=5292#comment-6955</guid> <description>Call it &quot;soft power&quot; or call it whatever the latest PC buzzword may be, the fact remains we&#039;re still a &quot;foreign&quot; intervening military force in what amounts to &quot;Pashtunistan,&quot; a place known as the &quot;graveyard of empires&quot; for good reason. In Viet Nam, we also knew better than the European colonial occupiers that couldn&#039;t sustain their occupation. Those driving the military-industrial machine that Eisenhower warned the nation of need to do more re-thinking on this.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Call it “soft power” or call it whatever the latest PC buzzword may be, the fact remains we’re still a “foreign” intervening military force in what amounts to “Pashtunistan,” a place known as the “graveyard of empires” for good reason. In Viet Nam, we also knew better than the European colonial occupiers that couldn’t sustain their occupation. Those driving the military-industrial machine that Eisenhower warned the nation of need to do more re-thinking on this.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: anthony</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/#comment-6727</link> <dc:creator>anthony</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2009 12:56:25 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=5292#comment-6727</guid> <description>The main concern seems corruption.That has to rooted out as drugs those two are the thorn in eyes of many.Once they can live together wich must be soon they can fight allong side helping their country.Afgan is a empty place lots to built and it wont take months years  afew generations before they are used to westernized. from freeways to gas stations to airports etc lots have to be done..LETS HOPE THEY WAKE UP!</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The main concern seems corruption.That has to rooted out as drugs those two are the thorn in eyes of many.Once they can live together wich must be soon they can fight allong side helping their country.Afgan is a empty place lots to built and it wont take months years  afew generations before they are used to westernized. from freeways to gas stations to airports etc lots have to be done..LETS HOPE THEY WAKE UP!</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Steven</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/#comment-6711</link> <dc:creator>Steven</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2009 11:32:10 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=5292#comment-6711</guid> <description>I worked in Afghanistan with the locals for several years.  Their chief concern were getting thru the Afghan police who were right outside the gate waiting for them without  getting rob by them on payday. I do agree with training the Afghan security force better.  However, these were the same NATO trained Afghan security forces that are committing the crimes.  Most of the Afghans I worked with love our presents there and to my surprise had a lot in common with we Americans, e.g   work, family community and God.   I feel with proper support and education the Afghan people would run the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I worked in Afghanistan with the locals for several years.  Their chief concern were getting thru the Afghan police who were right outside the gate waiting for them without  getting rob by them on payday. I do agree with training the Afghan security force better.  However, these were the same NATO trained Afghan security forces that are committing the crimes.  Most of the Afghans I worked with love our presents there and to my surprise had a lot in common with we Americans, e.g   work, family community and God.   I feel with proper support and education the Afghan people would run the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Ken White</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/#comment-6636</link> <dc:creator>Ken White</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2009 02:25:29 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=5292#comment-6636</guid> <description>&#039;Kinetics&#039; and &#039;hard&#039; or &#039;soft&#039; power are sort of inane terms. Force, Military and Diplomacy worked well as terms for years.Regardless, the &quot;tea leaves&quot; being read have been laying about for a long time. DoD has been in the forefront by default, not by design.  State consistently got emasculated (pun intended) by a series of Congresses who would rather support big buck programs for DoD than provide money for the proper conduct of Foreign Affairs.  The Senate in particular is not very supportive of any foreign involvement.So what is now happening is no more than an overdue cyclical swing.  Been building for some time so this isn&#039;t really news.  Not least because Gates and Rice testified last year that it was long overdue.Agree with the need to bring back both the USIA and US Aid -- preferably as separate agencies and not part of State.  Chopping them was not one of Maddy&#039;s or Clinton&#039;s brighter moves. Jesse Helms did not help but EO13118 was not smart...The blurb on the front page refers to fixing the mess in Afghanistan.  It&#039;s no more a mess than any US nation building program has ever been at this stage. I also doubt current moves are going to &#039;fix&#039; it as I note there is still no definition of exactly what would constitute &#039;fixing&#039; it.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>‘Kinetics’ and ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ power are sort of inane terms. Force, Military and Diplomacy worked well as terms for years.</p><p>Regardless, the “tea leaves” being read have been laying about for a long time. DoD has been in the forefront by default, not by design.  State consistently got emasculated (pun intended) by a series of Congresses who would rather support big buck programs for DoD than provide money for the proper conduct of Foreign Affairs.  The Senate in particular is not very supportive of any foreign involvement.</p><p>So what is now happening is no more than an overdue cyclical swing.  Been building for some time so this isn’t really news.  Not least because Gates and Rice testified last year that it was long overdue.</p><p>Agree with the need to bring back both the USIA and US Aid — preferably as separate agencies and not part of State.  Chopping them was not one of Maddy’s or Clinton’s brighter moves. Jesse Helms did not help but EO13118 was not smart…</p><p>The blurb on the front page refers to fixing the mess in Afghanistan.  It’s no more a mess than any US nation building program has ever been at this stage. I also doubt current moves are going to ‘fix’ it as I note there is still no definition of exactly what would constitute ‘fixing’ it.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Chief Houston</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/#comment-6518</link> <dc:creator>Chief Houston</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2009 15:13:51 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=5292#comment-6518</guid> <description>Silver Fox, What do you think is the best suggestion for a replacement conceptually in lieu of informational security concerns? Recent history shows the need for &quot;informational dominance.&quot;Russia and China are playing Cold War again, or never stopped for that matter. I think it is a vital asset to use situationally.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Silver Fox,<br /> What do you think is the best suggestion for a replacement conceptually in lieu of informational security concerns? Recent history shows the need for “informational dominance.”</p><p>Russia and China are playing Cold War again, or never stopped for that matter. I think it is a vital asset to use situationally.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Silver Fox</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/#comment-6500</link> <dc:creator>Silver Fox</dc:creator> <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 14:45:32 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=5292#comment-6500</guid> <description>It&#039;s sounds wonderful that more effort and funding will be afforded the State Department, however one crucial piece still missing in our national power toolkit is information dominance. We are still missing the ability to provide information to developing countries, emerging nations and countries not necessarily our allies.  We need a replacement for the USIA.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It’s sounds wonderful that more effort and funding will be afforded the State Department, however one crucial piece still missing in our national power toolkit is information dominance. We are still missing the ability to provide information to developing countries, emerging nations and countries not necessarily our allies.  We need a replacement for the USIA.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Chief Houston</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/27/afghan-strategy-begins-soft-power-shift/#comment-6491</link> <dc:creator>Chief Houston</dc:creator> <pubDate>Sun, 29 Mar 2009 17:24:38 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=5292#comment-6491</guid> <description>Kinetically speaking cost allocation should not be trimmed for soft intervention since all components are necessary for joint perfect battalion motives. Soft power is essential as long as it is targetted and effective with mutual hard power actions. Think defensive half court press with offensive fast breaks.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Kinetically speaking cost allocation should not be trimmed for soft intervention since all components are necessary for joint perfect battalion motives. Soft power is essential as long as it is targetted and effective with mutual hard power actions. Think defensive<br /> half court press with offensive fast breaks.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> </channel> </rss>
<!-- Performance optimized by W3 Total Cache. Learn more: http://www.w3-edge.com/wordpress-plugins/

Minified using apc
Page Caching using apc (User agent is rejected)
Database Caching 1/5 queries in 0.005 seconds using apc
Object Caching 673/674 objects using apc
Content Delivery Network via images.dodbuzz.com

Served from: dodbuzz.com @ 2012-02-09 12:44:18 -->
