Tactical and strategic military effectiveness have many dimensions, just as does National power. High on any list of important factors, however, is the ability to quickly recognize when our strategies or tactics aren’t working. I have personally witnessed multiple systemic failures in this area, during a 40-year career in military systems acquisition both as a military officer and a senior systems engineer.

Perhaps no failure has been quite so consequential as that of the US Intelligence Community to recognize (much less anticipate or influence) changes in world political and religious affairs. Such problems have long been recognized by Community insiders. In 1998, I supported a “Colloquium for the Twenty-First Century” that examined the reasons for such failure. At the top of the list was an unwillingness of US political decision makers to ask appropriate questions or to allow intelligence analysts to ask them without career-crippling penalties. With 911, we experienced the natural outcomes of that failure. It remains to be seen whether our current crop of politicians will learn anything from that experience.

We have met the enemy… and he is US!

Watts proposes a solution that addresses only the first aspect of the problem. If America is really short of people capable of the hard reasoning necessary to create grand strategy, then it cannot identify the individuals because they do not exist. If they do exist is sufficient numbers then identifying them is the key task. This group of 8 to 10 (7 would be too few and 11 just over the top) would do the hard thinking needed to create successful grand strategy if, and only if, the President decides to consider their advise.

The real key to America’s strategic decline then is the attitude of the President. If the chief executive does not appreciate the contributions that such a group can provide, we run the risk of simply creating a pencil-ready jobs program for self-promoting geniuses who have the gravitas to convince the hiring authority that they are competent strategic thinkers.

Look at the education going on at the National War College or at Yale with their Grand Strategy Program to see what is being done
http://sec.online.wsj.com/article/SB122973925559323583.html?mod=article-outset-box

I do agree, though, that for all Eisenhower’s dire warnings about the “military-industrial complex”, we really do need close coordination between those who build the weapons and those who use them. Our best and most effective defense systems (of ALL types, not just bombs and guns and jets) were done when the user selected an individual contractor and worked directly with them to ensure success.

Not only that, but like I said, it’s necessary to think in terms of SYSTEMS. We are no longer in a situation where you can just say “this is a good gun, if we buy twice as many then our army will be twice as strong”. You need to buy the guns AND the sensors AND the tasking systems AND the radios AND the transport AND the logistical support, and you need to do it all at the same time. Single combat is no longer acceptable, because we CAN do better.

Compare that with today and the numbers are few and far betweeen. Perhaps one might say that it’s a reflection that WW2 was a massive force on force war, yet that is a misunderstanding that strategists would only appear in a major conventional war. That kind of thinking actually PROVES that we don’t have strategists in our upper echelons of the military.

Why should the fact that we are always prepared for a WW3 conventional battle prevent our generals from being able to use our troops and equipment in a brilliant fashion regardless of the enemy or terrain? I think the answer lies not just the military industial complex, but the inability of our general officers to go beyond force on force tactical and operational thinking.

So what if the Brits do that. Since 1944, their “strategy” has been mostly to follow the lead of the U.S. Given that U.S. strategy led to the implosion of the world’s most powerful military state without firing a shot or setting foot on Soviet soil, I’d say somebody knew a little about strategy.

I wonder what the cerebral cortex activity of Washington, Grant, Eisenhower and Patton were at a young age.

It’s interesting that this article was adorned with a picture of Clausewitz. Clausewitz was the last to support the idea that wars are won by strategic planning. He argued the role of intangibles and the requirement for the military genius to see through the fog and friction of war to determine what needed to be done to achieve victory. It takes more than a good cerebral cortex measurement at age 20 to create the Grants and Pattons that demonstrated this ability in battle. It does take training, education and experience and lots of it.

Finally, one of this nation’s strategic tenets is to forward democracy. The reasoning being that democracies are less likely to generate instability and war. The Bush administration rid the world of two of the most oppressive and blood-thirsty governments in modern history and replaced them with either a democracy or stable interim government headed towards democracy. I would say he did more to support the nation’s long-term strategy than his predecessor who did comparatively little to replace hostile tyranny with democracy. Those that argue the Bush administration did not understand or have a coherent national security strategy either don’t understand the concept or are hopelessly biased.

These soldiers and Marines are valuable human resources, but are often treated as disposable. This is not a good recruitment strategy for the best and brightest. They actually have the brain power to see through the BS. Also, these people are not always “typical”, and the military tends to shun any deviation from the norm.

It would take a sea change in attitude, in order to get these cognitive thinkers to join en masse — and enough intelligent military recruiting personnel to recognize and go after them. According to the “word on the street”, these people are currently being turned away for seemingly silly reasons.

The Air Force said that to execute their strategic operational plan for the future they needed a minimum of 381 F-22’s, they are not going to get them. Another example is the strategic implications of “Conventional Prompt Global Strike”. The capability offers key strategic advantages but geopolitically it may be a non-starter. FCS is another example along with the nuclear deterrent mission. Gen. Kevin Chilton has laid out a broad strategic rationale for the continued presence and modernization of the triad, again the politicians are saying no.

An NFL offensive co-ordinator can have the most dynamic playbook (strategy) but without the players (capabilities) it typically won’t result in victory.

Although the process of creating broad strategic plans and policies is monumentally complicated, I imagine having to deal with politicians and budgets would be very frustrating.