Main battle tanks of today are the result of “survival of the fittest.” More than 90 years of research, development, and operational use have shown what works and what does not. Modern main battle tanks all share common characteristics of low profile, heavy armor, high firepower, and tracked propulsion because these are the characteristics shared by survivable combat-effective ancestors.

The article does not state that the FCS is inadequate for open battlefield expeditionary force deployment. In the third paragraph, the article explicitly states:

“The fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan has revealed the vulnerability of lightly armored vehicles to simple and often crude, yet readily available and highly lethal weapons such as the IED and RPG.”

The article is clearly stating that the FCS vehicle designs are inadequate for cheap, readily available, reliable, and lethal anti-armor weapons such as IEDs and RPGs in the limited lines of approach typical of urban and suburban settings. Settings for which the FCS vehicles are simply unsuited.

People who understood armored warfare said so a decade ago. Here we have their vindication — Donald Rumsfeld’s concepts of transforming armored warfare stand clearly refuted.

Stand off armor, like slat armor, secukrity fence or even chicken wire, works against RPGs-it’s a pain, but it works. And it’s cheap.

IEDs, there is no point in developing much of anything-V shaped hulls will just make them change their tactics and they’ll be blowing up whatever we come up with.

A counter IED stratagy is what we really need. Like, better intel, target teh IED makers, booby trap “lost” munitions for them to find, that sort of thing,

Quite the opposite. I am VERY much get that the vast majority of the vehicles in the FCS family ARE NOT intended to replace tanks. That is ONE of the main reasons why a FCS unit would not be THAT much more strategically mobile (transportable) than a “traditional” heavy forces unit. The only MAJOR weight reduction for the FCS MGV vs the “traditional” heavy unit vehicle each replaces in in the MCS vs Abrams & that is only 60 vehicles out of >320 tracked vehicles in a signle Brigade not to mention all the trucks & other equipment that make up a Brigade.

And of course not EVRRY vehicle needs to be armored to the level of a MBT. BUT every vehicle SHOULD be armored against the threats is most likely to be engaged by.

Do airborne forces make sense today with S-300 and other radar missiles that could easily shoot down planes carrying paratroopers attempting forcible entry? Do we drop paratroopers or V-22 transported Marines or deploy LAVs/Strykers to take on an armored force?

Yet, without ground forces securing airheads SOMEWHERE near a contested international border or in friendly portions of endangered nations…who is next to be invaded? Will the President have the will to order air attacks or will he acquiesce to aggression ala Chamberlain.

With and adjusted FCS, we could have air-deployed ground forces into southern Georgia to draw a line in the sand as the Russians invaded northern Georgia..just as Russians air-deployed into Serbia to make their point. If indications and warnings pointed to a possible invasion of Taiwan, we could deploy FCS forces by air to the east side of the mountain range dividing the country as part of a deployment “exercise.”

With no ground forces able to deploy by air, Turkey could easily deny us access to the Black Sea to deploy ground forces by sea to Georgia, or the Ukraine. China could invade and control Taiwan to such an extent that sea deployment or shore invasion would be nearly impossible or costly in lives. Airpower alone would be insufficient because the enemy would simply go to ground or hug civilians.

Joint forces require a credible air, ground, and sea component. Light Army and Marine forces aren’t sufficient as a deterrent or warfighting force against many threats. There is often insufficient time to wait a month to 3 months for sea deployment of the FIRST substantial armored forces.

A force like FCS, adjusted perhaps to allow a larger tank, is the sole option that makes an Army a true expeditionary force force future warfare or counterinsurgency operations. The concept is sound. Delay as necessary to allow technology to catch up, adjust weight requirements, and make trade-offs to facilitate execution.

The bad guys better not have any 120mm mortars,

If you are so far away from the threat why send the ground force?

What are the costs benefits and risks? Any thing is possible, but does it make any sense?

The KC 10’s carry the kind of loads and ranges and they have not been called on.

“And such a remote place would have value to the common defense?“
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Sorry for late response. I’m on vacation now.

C-130J, KC-130s, C-17 w/ center wing tanks, and even KC-45s could airland fuel and ammo at remote locations. You want locations remote enough to airland sufficient force for a credible defense and perhaps other airpower such as the F-35 VSTOL and AH-64D. Once that defense is on the ground, you can always airdrop other supplies GPS parafoils, employ LAPES, and use helicopter transport of 500 gallon drums and cargo nets with ammunition.

The ground force then becomes a magnet or tripwire so that if attacked by forces crossing an international border or into friendly parts of attacked nations (Kurd-example), or attacks from out of hiding, our airpower and long-range NLOS fires, and 120mm mid-range tank munitions can decimate the enemy.

Earlier, we saw that if you fielded all tank-sized vehicles at current 2 gal per mile fuel consumption rates of the Abrams, that the force would require 6 times the fuel of an FCS-size force. You then are forced to supply with nothing but sea-transport which leaves you in the predicament we face in Afgahistan with long, unsecure ground supply routes.

So then you end up with combat arms Soldiers who never die because we went so far out of the way to safeguard them that only the “loggies” (and more of them) are still in danger.

Is that the route we want to go? If Apache pilots have the cajones to fly around with little to no armor near the front lines, why shouldn’t armor Soldiers share some of the common risk of other combined arms brothers driving around with less armor.

Get active defense right and you potentially lay big dividends for many types of forces. But you need lots of electricity and enhanced sensors to do active defense right, and normal powerplants don’t get it done.

70 tons on an Abrams does not assure total safety to IEDs and as far as I know, our own top attack Hellfire and Javelin would kill any Abrams any day. So do we need a 90 ton future tanks and similar armor on every other vehicle? There is a point of diminishing returns, and logistical nightmare. Do we have the manpower to have 6 times as many fuel trucks driving around?

FCS vehicles reduce crew size and reduce logistical tale. That is part of the prescription for better survivability because there are fewer targets running around resupplying front line forces, and the area the enemy has to hit to kill combat arms Soldiers is greatly reduced. Why would Strykers be the answer when they have even far less armor. A Soldier I worked with was a casualty officer for a Stryker driver who burned to death due to a magnesium fire.

If we need a larger tank, go for it up to a point. But then make trade-offs in other armored vehicles. There is little reason to have a 30 ton evacuation vehicle, mortar vehicle, or scout vehicle. Make them smaller so tanks can be larger. This kind of trade-off will leave a future Army force with the flexibility to both air and sea-deploy to be truly expeditionary in nature.

If we do cancel these vehicles however, which is looking likely we should continue development of active defense systems which could be used on current vehicles even.

“Why is not fielding updated versions of those vehicles not a good idea?”

Should have been “Why is not fielding updated versions of those vehicles a good idea?”

What you don’t seem to get is that the vast majority of the vehicles in the FCS family ARE NOT intended to replace tanks. NLOS-C, NLOS-M, FCS-ICV, FCS-MEV, FCS-C2; none of those are intended to replace tanks in the battlefield. FCS designs would actually be a step up in protection for the vehicles currently used in those roles. Why is not fielding updated versions of those vehicles not a good idea?

That brings me back to the part where you have the same people complaining that the MRAP is too heavy and the FCS family too light.

You SHOULD have PLENTY of reason to doubt him IF he did indeed say 85 tons. ESPECIALLY since the heaviest Abrams during Desert Storm [the M1A1(HA)] weighed ‘only’ 68.5 tons.

Sure the US could use a ‘tank’ lighter than the Abrams. Just don’t fool yourself into thinking that anything less than 55–60 tons is going to be as survivable as an Abrams.

MRAP is a ‘bank vault’ replacing HMMWVs, FCS MCS is a ‘light tank’ replacing Abrams…

The key to military history is logistics, the allies had it, the nazis did not. For whatever reason, tank vice better tank; horses versus trucks.….

Market Garden failed because of a mix of force and logistics. Much of the initial combat load was lost at the far end. Resistance was stiffer.…

You can have access to the Saudi oil fields, but you don’t have the refined product where needed what good is the vehicle nor the relations with the Saudis?

In Spring 1944 the Germans depended on oats to fuel their transports, they spent too much money on super weapons and did not buy trucks. Maybe short oil helped that decision.

Where would an FCS objective brigade get fuel, bullets and blood at the end of an airbridge where the airlifters need refueled in and out?

And such a remote place would have value to the common defense?

In any event, 85 tons, 90 or 70, these are massive vehicles. So massive that they create huge logistics problems and degrade the road network as they operate. Maybe fielding a vehicle class that does not have those problems would be a good idea.

On a side note, I am finding it increasingly ironic that so many of the people who post on these forums bashing the 19 ton MRAP as being too heavy are now bashing the FCS concept as being too light. Does anyone else find that funny?

But we’ve all seen movies where the German supertanks are running out of fuel at Ardennes and send commandos to try and seize our oil supplies…so I wondered if it was true? Yes, the Germans had Oil Commandoes and German Technical Brigades. They were quite successful in France early in the war, and lack of oil may have been a goal for many invasions and Blitzkrieg in general.

Germany knew it needed to overpower the enemy before running out of fuel…kind of like the Russians could do to the Ukraine or the Chinese could do to Taiwan, before we could deploy adequate force by sea.

Brief research turned up several good sources, and recommend everyone google “Blood for Oil: The quest for Fuel in WWII.” In it you will find interesting quotes such as Field Marshal Rommel saying “The battle is fought and decided by the quartermaster before the shooting begins.” and speaking of North Africa in June 1941, “We knew our moves would be decided more by the petrol gauge than tactical requirements.”

It and other sources indicate that lack of oil was a major reason for German losses in North Africa due to a stronger British Navy and great distances that would run German armor out of gas. Often the trucks following armor would not have sufficient fuel to return for more.

The same occurred in the battle for Austria when halfway through, both armor columns ran out of gas. The invasion of Poland caused a Panzer division to run out due to a shortage of trucks. As a result Germany was only able to seize 30% of Poland oilfields while Stalin seize the other 70%. Similar Stalin shenanigans in Romania may have been part of the reason Hitler invaded Russia. Romanian oil was a mainstay to Germany, and Stalin had negotiated for it to be his.

Even back then, Panzer divisions burned 1,000 gallons per mile and with 70–80% of its supply capability being equestrian, it could not keep up. Operation Barbossa was halted by both the winter and the horsedrawn supply lines. Even supply trucks could not handle the German winter or match German tracked mobility. German trains could not use Russian rails due to a different gauge.

Lack of fuel and production capability meant that only 52 of 322 German divisions were armored or motorized. Quantity DID have a quality of its own back then when nations actually HAD quantity. Of course, just as airpower overwhelmed German armor in WWII, today we have AH-64D firing over the shoulder to outrange tanks, and A-10s/future F-35s that would crush the little armor our foes do have…even if was superior to ours, which it would not be even in FCS form.

In fact with all the talk about Shermans, I note this quote from MG Maurice Rose saying “projectiles fired by our 75mm and 76mm guns bounced off the front plate of the Mark V tanks at ranges of about 600 yards.”

That doesn’t sound like we had too little armor…it sounds like we had too little a GUN compared to their 88mm (no such problem with the FCS 120mm). Indeed, Dave’s own study shows the Panzer Tiger I had 100mm thick armor compared to our 36.5 ton M4 Sherman’s 81mm thick armor and yet the stopping power at distances cited was very similar. Would our Red Ball express have kept up if we had tanks sized-similarly to the Germans?

In every attempt to use history against new technology, I always turn to how the battle would be fought ENTIRELY differently today with newer systems. We still would have had overwhelming air superiority and what little capability the Germans had to produce synthetic oil would have been entirely eliminated by air attacks…leading to more situations where trucks were pulled by mules, and even V-2 rockets were pulled into position that way.

We could have flown FCS units to Russia and the Phillipines to assist our allies. We could have leaped around the Hedgerows, perhaps succeeding at Market Garden as well with FCS augmentation of airborne units. Instead of just defending a tiny portion of coastline adjacent to Britain, the Germans would have been worrying about every potential area where we could airland forces. Our NLOS-launch system would have decimated German Tigers, and unmanned aircraft would have located German defenses in the Hedgerows, allowing Excalibur 155mm, small diameter bomb, and GPS MLRS and ATACMS to annihilate the enemy.

As much as historians attempt to employ hindsight and project false lessons learned into future systems…it just don’t work that way. The same Israeli armor that did poorly in Lebanon did extraordinarily well in Gaza, when it employed combined arms tactics and close air support instead of “effects-based operation” air attacks. Failures of Russian armor and airpower in Afghanistan are as much an indictment of the Russian army and our ability to supply the Northern alliance with the right weapons to defeat them.

Finally, FCS is not a medium force. When it transitioned to 27 tons, it became nearly as heavy OR HEAVIER and BETTER PROTECTED than every modular heavy brigade system it would replace EXCEPT the tank. So, the bottom line is, you can attribute much of the failure of FCS to sell itself properly, as inadequate emphasis on this fact, and too much emphasis on the network and software…where Boeing was probably making most of its money.

The problem with the FCS is that certain aspect of the technology aren’t just right yet, while other don’t go far enough. The problem is in wanting a vehicle to do everything, when that’s just not possible. With a very high value (or very very low level of expendibility) we place on troops it really is no surprise that the emphasis of future vehicles has swung back in the direction of heavier armor. FCS no longer lives up to the goals of Government, while it had some good features going for it they are no longer in alignment. If we purchased FCS we’d be looking for a replacement within years of fielding it. I think there are better alternatives available.

In essence he is stating that there are two major problems with the FCS program that relate to America’s WWII experience with the Sherman tank.

The first is in relation to logistics. There is an old saying goes something like, “amateurs study tactics and experts study logistics.” This relates the idea that a fighting force can be exceptional on the battlefield, but if you cannot get it there then it is worthless. Sort of like the Greek phalanxes. They were excellent fighting formations with proven ability; however, it took Phillip of Macedon to figure out how to take them on the road. Something that his son, Alexander, did with exceptional skill.

While logistics plays a part in every vehicle design Dr. Johnson asserts that the designers of the Sherman tank thought more about our own ability to move the tank to, and around, the battlefield than what would happen once it was engaged in battle. He then relates this to the FCS by stating that the designers are thinking more about the system’s ability to deploy on a C130 rather than what will happen once it closes with the enemy.

His second point is on battlefield philosophy. During WWII it was believed that tanks didn’t fight tanks. Tanks were there to take out fortifications, machine guns, etc. in support of infantry assaults. It was the job of the tank destroyer to take out enemy armor. Hence, the Sherman was not equipped with the necessary firepower to destroy tanks. Additionally, the notion that tanks didn’t fight tanks dictated that it didn’t need heavy armor. This naturally played into the logistics angle. He then relates this to FCS by stating that the idea that protection can be achieved through information superiority and active systems is a misconception equivalent to tanks not fighting tanks.

That’s my two cents.