The news-grabber foul-ups (the Tanker, Thundervision scandal, Druyun’s greed and corruption, the President’s helo) are the tip of the iceberg. The entire structure is too cumbersome and a true muddle.

That is why as many efforts as possible are stuffed into the Big Safari program — it’s simple and it works!

Everytime there is a major mess-up we get another plan to write and have approved, another report to put together and have reviewed. We have to hire highly paid MITRE people to figure out how to thread our way through the new acquisition maze.

A pet rock of mine: the System Engineering Plan and it’s review / approval process (up through the Air Staff) has resulted in the entire program beng concluded and the system fielded BEFORE the plan get approvel (if ever). It is a sad joke, but where I work, there are 4 layers of Chief Engineers (Squadron, Group, Wing, and Product Center) all reviewing plans — but my program doesn’t havv a qualified engineer to writi it in the first place!! :-(

Real change is needed — NOT another layer of “acquisition excellence”!

Well maybe you think so but I saw her as just another product of the system, which was and is broken, and won’t be fixed by platitudes or good intentions or the SecAF looking in on it regularly or talking to senior commanders about how it’s going. Who’s going to say, “not very well Sir and here’s why?”

There are “how tos” for each of the goals or to remedy the identified causes of failures and readers here mention good ones from time to time. In fact over time they’ve all been covered by my reading. People have written good books on the subject. Don’t lean heavily on acquisition reform studies written in the past as consider how little impact they’ve had.

Bring in a truly independent think tank or group and let them research and assemble the most repeated ideas from all sources on how to fix the system at every level and throw out crap like “hold the contractor’s feet to the fire.” Yes, we know, but how?

Then match each goal with the leading causes and identify the actions that are most likely to eliminate the causes. Put these into effect and advertise them widely. Develop metrics for each that will be used to rate the progress or the effectiveness of the action. If the metrics aren’t met, discontinue the action.

One role for leadership will be to ensure the best and most often suggested actions will be attempted. If it involves shifting organizational responsibilities or acquisition roles, relocating people or using non-traditional sources for tasks (technical assessments), provided it’s not cost prohibitive, then it must be done.

Where leadership can play a bigger hand will be to keep personal opinions of established acquisition managers out of the selection of action fray. Overcome opposition with the Dr. Phil approach and ask them, “how’s that been working for you?”

There are greater hurdles of course but this would be a start. The current start simply wont work without these basic ingredients being clearly established. Then, once again, pick up the Hitch and McKean book and read it. No, I’m not either of these distinguished gentlemen

For years now, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that successful commercial firms use a “knowledge-based” product development process to introduce new products. Although DOD acquisition policy embraces this concept, requiring that technologies be demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to program initiation, the Department continues to fall short of this goal. Last Spring, the GAO reviewed 72 of DOD’s 95 major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and reported that 64 of the 72 fell short of the required level of product knowledge. According to the GAO, 164 of the 356 critical technologies on these programs failed to meet even the minimum requirements for technological maturity.

Section 103 of the recently signed Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act address the problem for MDAPs by making it the responsibility of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to periodically review and assess the maturity of critical technologies used within [new] MDAPs. The DDR&E’s assessment would serve as a basis for determining whether a program is ready to enter the acquisition process or not. The Act is ambiguous, however, as to how it will be applied to current programs, and does nothing to address the issue with programs other than those classified as an MDAP.

Recently, an update to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process has been published (CJCSI 3170.01G) that better scopes and streamlines the process for capabilities and requirements development for the services, but a critical gap remains within the process with regard to the information provided to political and military leadership necessary to make informed decisions that are based on realistic recommendations.

At a time when we are all striving to be good stewards of the limited money provided by Congress, major weapon programs continue to cost more, take longer to complete and deliver fewer quantities and less capability than originally planned. The need for a REQUIRED independent objective assessment of technological maturity and risk provided to political and military leadership would be a major step forward in the Defense Acquisition Process.

Airbase, the Air Force can have all the aircraft when they learn to do Close Air Support like the Marines and Navy.

Oh, by the way, when the Air Force starts seabasing from an aircraft carrier, LHD/A, and LPH then we will see what happens to their accident rate. ;)

Mack McKinney — SHACK

I sure wish someone in DoD would pick up and read Hitch and McKean’s bible written in 1960 and follow it beyond implementing PPBE half-heartedly at that.

GO AIR FORCE!!

You are an IDIOT. Air Force needs to be in charge of ALL aircraft. Marines and Army crash too many aircraft. Espically Helicoptors!