General Mattis is rejecting the concept that information and precision weapons can solve all problems alone. Precise information and precision weapons are wonderful, but only in support of skilled fighters at the front, not in substitute for them.

Isn’t he still pushing the V-22 Osprey, and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle?

He’s right about not depending too much on C4I, but that isn;t the only way for the military to hamstring itself and swing “too far in its embrace of high-technology.”

I guess that is the reason you are a Navybratt. Gen Mattis is one of the most highly respected, distinquished Warriors in the Military and Marine Corps today. He is spot on with technology cannot be the answer to every fight. Perfect example in the Marine Times recently they spoke how our younger troops are not able to Land Nav with a compass as we have become so dependent on GPS. I prefer a compass and a map as I was trained back in the day with that. I have no issue with Tech as I work in the Tech Field. I just know when are network goes down at work, we are pretty much at a standstill. We have to be able to fight in every aspect of war — conventional, irregular, gureilla, Assymetical, it doesn’t matter what you call it. You better be able to fight in it.

As far as your comments about Gen Mattis, I am sure he would very quickly put you in your place.

I am grateful and stand with my Marine General. How many battles have you fought in Navybratt or led Marines?

Coachmarine!

Nobody in JFCOM is advocating losing a tech advantage, just being able to see clearly in
a brain rattled urban conflict. How does a squad leader approach solving a tactical advantage of the enemy with the available assets at his or her discretion, in the most effective way? Do they know all the assets available in a Joint OPS scenario?

There is a direction that is needed in what Gen. Mattis has to say. If I can take 15 troops and have a higher mission success ratio than those at battalion strength, then my 15 troops are a force multiplier and are doing something that needs to be taught to the battalion.

If my 15 troops use strategy advantages with integrated high tech weapons and subconsciously us timely movements to gain a victory, then they are more effective. Again gentlemen, speed and effectiveness.

Is Gen Mattis still reacting to JFCOM trying to field concepts without developing the technical underpending, then these remarks seem fair. However; JFCOM’s failure does not discredit the concepts.…merely the JFCOM attempt at taking a concept to a fielded capability.

Perhaps I am missreading the General…maybe he doesn’t want to go back to M1s, F86s, Fletcher Class DDs, Diesel subs and Ike jackets…these weapons are obsolete but it won’t cost us as much money when our opponents kick our butt. In days gone by, the military was always accused of “preparing to fight the last war”…transformation was nothing more than an attempt at looking forward vice being prepared to fight the last war. So, I guess the “flavor of the week” is to cast aside our primary war fighting advantage..high tech weapon systems…So, what happens if we show up to a future fight with low tech and bravado and the other guys are in Sixth Generation airplanes with directed energy weapons.…guess JFCOM will figure out how to avoid the Six Gen threat and fake out the DE with irregular warfare guile?? Wonder why we never thought of this approach before??

I think all Mattis et al are saying is, we can’t offload our brains into some box and expect good decisions to come out. We gotta think.

Tech can be a powerful tool, but can also get in the way of understanding what’s actually going on in the here-and-now.

He’s not talking at all about turning the whole force into foot soldiers, so I’m not sure why you’re suggesting that.

Capabilities vs Effects, simply put…

Capabilities: We can do whatever we want!

Effects: That didn’t work like we thought it would…

Seriously, we can blow away terrorists anywhere/ anytime, but if blowing away terrorists doesn’t achieve the political goal, i.e. “No more training camps”, what good is it?

Both Generals seem to be saying EBO air attacks work fine for targeting fixed systems like power grids, road and railway networks, and airfields. But they work less well in influencing many other operational variables they claims to succeed at:

• political (you killed an opponent that I deceptively reported to be Taliban)
• military (you couldn’t kill my troops that were dispersed/hidden/intermingled with population, but you did kill my decoys)
• economic (you killed my poppies)
• social (you killed my brother)
• infrastructure (you killed my power, so now I’ll sabotage rebuilding and kill your guarding ground troops)
• information (you killed my imaginary kids)

But not sure rejecting technology, F-35 bomb trucks, or decentralization to the point of discomfort is the answer. The main opponents able to target us for talking too much on the radio are China and Russia. So are we rejecting technology designed to let us beat near peers easier and communicate with small units over much shorter distances?

Meanwhile, the Joint force seems to embrace much larger techno-targets requiring centralized technology/communications allowing us to plan/target from distant CAOCs, AWACS, JSTARS, carrier battle groups, and Marine LPDs/LHAs.

The same near peers who cause minor problem by temporarily jamming our local comms (before we target their jammers), is the near peer who may knock out the GPS needed for EBO GPS-guided bombs, attack Japan/Guam airfields and our carriers with guided missiles, or sink our carriers (and Marine ones too) with diesel-electric subs and 200 knot torpedoes.

But let’s assume we could put a squad-sized infantry element outside every Afghan or future opponent town to safeguard the village and rebuilding efforts. Wouldn’t that unit be extremely vulnerable to Taliban massing if only light infantry? It would be nice to be able to call for air support with those comms you don’t want them to use!! Wouldn’t mounted or dismounted elements be extremely vulnerable to IEDs without jammers and ambush without organic UAS? Wouldn’t distant squads be very hard to resupply and their equipment hard to fix when broken?

Wouldn’t those troops be extremely uncomfortable for a year in the boonies (forgot, its only 6 months for Marines) and more likely to leave the Army/Marines due to poor morale?

Haven’t many similar current elements received Silver Stars and Purple Hearts for being heroic out of desperation, wounded, and nearly overrun? How does this tiny 11-man unit function 24 hours a day, man a perimeter and conduct day/night operations?

While I understand mission orders and encouragement of subordinate initiative, you can only do so much of that with a squad-sized regular Army/Marine unit. So is the appropriate element to allow more initiative platoon level? Company level? Battalion level?

With each subsequent level, the experience of the leader is far greater (assumes platoon sergeant watches out for platoon leader). It’s easier to envision extensive initiative and capability for self-protection, and 24 hr operations at company and battalion level…especially if they have some well-armored, mobile, and well-armed vehicles!

Couldn’t access to techno systems like Blue Force Tracker, Land Warrior, and the COP allow subordinate leaders to take more initiative, self-synchronize, and understand better where their (and other) small subordinate units are located as they fire and move?

Wouldn’t systems like Class I UAV, Raven, unmanned ground vehicles, and unattended sensors help them find the enemy and understand the situation for themselves?

Could a box of rockets in their combat outpost target forces detected by the unmanned systems and mounted/dismounted OPs/patrols?

Wouldn’t a well-armored vehicle protect that small unit better against artillery, small arms, many IEDs, and “mm-sized” cannons. Could a hybrid-electric vehicle reduce fuel consumption and supply power needs better than a EFV’s thousand+ horsepower?

Won’t organic outstanding sensors/processors and commo equipment at lower echelons mean less reliance on higher HQ intell that is a day late/dollar short? You can cut through the fog of war and conduct day/night/all weather ops a lot easier with organic sensors and security forces.

Won’t multi-band JTRS radios allow small unit leaders to choose an alternate group of frequencies if jammed…and get the heck out of dodge in their well armored vehicle if there is inbound artillery?

Doesn’t all this require technology, and larger units able to provide sustainment and withstand massed attacks?

Tech should absolutely be used where it works, but this idea that tech “can lift the fog of war” is wrong. War is chaos. A bigger picture of chaos, is only going to show more chaos. An improperly used network can amplify garbage instead of truth.

You want real time control? Let the people on the scene make the decisions. Give your leaders the idea, and let them do it. Provide guidance and support. To the extent that networks and technology enable that, great. But if you trust your people, even if they go off the grid, they’ll still be making good decisions.

Use all those brains out there.

Much better just to give everyone a knife–it’s extremely reliable, requires almost no training, and allows clear identification of targets.

We should abandon these foolish, money-wasting guns! They’re technological nightmares, wedded to an old “transformational” notion of warfare! Go back to plain, simple, honest, proven-effective KNIVES!

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I’ll be interested to see how Matthis plans to fight a “globally networked terrorist enemy” without a centralised command structure.

I’ll have to read your article in JFQ, but (and this comment isn’t necessarily directed at you) I never understand how some tech fans (and I’m one of them) can feel that if we are excellent at the 3 block war, we are less than excellent at the Big war with a peer competitor?

If you look at all the variables and different approaches that an enemy in a 3 block war throws at you, and you can still excel, how would you NOT excel in a conventional war that is less complex?

Look at terrain for example, big war advocates tend to use terrain models that favor long distances and easy tracking and ID’ing of targets. Try that in an urban battlefield mixed in with combatants and reduced line of sight and your precision targeting problem becomes exponentially higher.

I do believe that EBO is a way to think beyond the way that many have turned select sections of Clausewitz into dogma that preaches if you want to win, “beat the army, then occupy the country.”

The modern offspring of that rule has become embodied in the 3-block war, which is now the new American Way of War. We need to be great at the 3-block war, but should not preclude other military options that include technology and standoff.