I’m sorry, but you have it exactly backwards. The insurgents we are fighting now have no ability to jam our networks. The Chinese, Neo-Russians, etc are the ones who have the ability to disrupt our commo and they are exactly the people the General is worried about.

How could the Geramns have possibly fought Russian patisans during WW2, or the urban warfare in Stalingrad?

Or the British and the Boer’s, before anyone even had a radio?

A lot of this small unit stuff isn’t hat hard, or that complicated, that you can’t just come up with a plan and then let subordinates run with it. Sure, communication is great asset, but computer nets, in general, also make for a lot of micromanaging and so much data collection that no one even looks at most of it, anymore.

2. America’s soldiers have been at their best when they made decision on their own. With out interference from the rear.

“The most important element of overcoming the German opponent was the intelligence of America’s front line officers and troops and their ability to make sound decisions on the spot.”

Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the Wa…(Paperback)
by Michael D. Doubler

This is on an open source so I will limit myself to asking, Have we looked at who is *really* funding the Jihadis? If so, why aren’t we striking them directly and making it public? (The message being that banking against the US makes for a VERY short career) No funds means no fight unless of course it’s a Cold War-style proxy battle all over again in which case there’s very, very little that we can do about the flow of cash.

We need to be able to have an agile force — which is what the ASWG is supposed to be doing — while having the capability to fight conventional large-scale conflicts.

The Army needs leadership that understands the spectrum of operations and Congress needs to ensure that it gets appropriate funding to do so.

They’re saying over-dependence on anything, is a bad thing. If my enemy’s brain dropped out every time his comms went down, that would be something I would try like hell to exploit.

Givens: “reading/exploiting/corrupting” the information that powers warfare is not new and is an on-going fight (duh, Japanese navy code & Midway), comms & ops security in not new (ULTRA??), training, planning & anticipating for failed systems/comms AIN’T new (ask any guy that sat nuke alert in SAC or the CAF from 1955 to 1989…we had plan A, B, C, and D…to include operating with one motor and Whiskey compass), centralized planning, de-centralized execution is doctrine in some Services.….SO, before you all raise your Luddite/Mattis banners and cast technology, EBO & netcentric warfare to the dust bin of history, it might be worth thinking about a non-EBO/NCW, medium tech US force fighting a high tech, EBO/NCW threat. Did Adm Cebrowski advocate ignoring operational art, doctrine & common sense? The assumption was that EBO/NCW & tech would aid/enhance operational art…not supercede it.

Of course, some conspiracy advocates might say that hybrid/irregular warfare theories could be a “fig leaf” for a massive retraction of US military power to support a fundamental shift in the US position in the world…who knows?

Tech has brought us a long long way from Dresden or D-day or Iwo Jima, yes, but I think it’s given us unrealistic ideas about what “precise” violence can achieve.

Now, you do have a point that reliability and assurance are key aspects of military infosystems that haven’t really been investigated yet. But that’s not to say that technology is bad evil useless addictive junk.