You made some good points, which is why I was disappointed with the evasions elsewhere. You said the Russians couldn’t afford advanced fighters. I pointed out that they’re an major energy exporting country. All in a Peak Oil world, where the Russian government owns a lot of the oil. I also pointed out their ability to produce current fighters comparable to similar American planes for about half as much.

You would have been much smarter to just gracefully admit that you were wrong on those points. Instead of calling your basic honesty into question.

The points re: the PAK-FA are similar patent nonsense. All planning for future contingencies occurs without proof. That’s why it’s, you know, the future? Yet that future must nevertheless be considered. Especially after India’s current SU-30MKIs performed so very well and won awards at the recent Red Flag exercise in the USA. Not to mention the British experience with them at Indra Dhanush. Arrogant dismissal is a poor substitute for informed discussion.

With that said, your point regarding the joint force is a worthwhile one. Mixed squadrons with different aircraft types might be a useful way forward, especially you start hanging longer-range missiles with 2-way datalinks on lower-end fighters, and letting the F-22 be the bird dog. The F-22 is an asset that needs to be maximized even if we do buy more, and the USAF seems to still be trying to figure out exactly how.

The question we’re discussing is what that mix should be. Arguing for more F-22s in it does not necessarily mean that the rest has to remain as is. It just means an opinion that the slots it fills are less substitutable than others. In particular by the F-35, which this FY 2010 budget has very explicitly turned into an either/or proposition.

As I’ve noted above, however, the best answer may even be “nether”. Especially if the Pacific is set to become the most critical theater. (Jason, Gates’ statement seemed pretty clear re: the 2018 bomber — got an URL for that article?)

As for the RAND study, Cole, that’s publicly available. Nothing secret about it, very visible on the web. I’ve seen it too. The F-35s made little difference to the scenario (slide 52). As for:

“…I was shocked at how few aircraft of the total postulated would be airborne at any time. This is less attributable to insufficient aircraft overall or in theater. It was the result of aircraft at risk from missile attack while on the ground. ”

Actually, the problem was the number of support aircraft required to keep fighters forward-deployed in the air from distant bases. The Navy was pushed off by SU-30 family planes with long range anti-ship missiles (slide 8). Throw in new Chinese ballistic missiles that can target carriers at extended range, and it gets worse. All with Navy no tanker aircraft to support them (thanks for retiring the S-3s…), other than inadequate F/A-18E/F buddy refueling.

RAND was arguing, correctly I think, that limited numbers of very superior aircraft and over-reliance on missile capabilities may not lead to a rosy result in real combat — especially if other factors combine to make the imbalance worse. I think that’s a real issue to consider for F-22s without additional support.

My deeper question is whether the F-35 amounts to that kind of support, given its capabilities and costs. Even as the kind of work done by an Apache helicopter can, increasingly, also be done by fixed-wing UAVs that carry similar optics at much, much less than $100 million a pop.

In other words, I see the F-22’s rationale remaining robust, but the F-35’s fraying at both ends. And a need for a different kind of low-end force than the USAF is currently contemplating, in order to handle both domestic air sovereignty patrols and manned missions in lower-intensity situations. UAVs are not a full solution, either; other changes will also be needed.

Joining an intelligent, informed discussion on that level would be more welcome than the seemingly partisan replies we got.

I was talking about investment strategies…you are talking O&M…Your references to fighter mx are due in part to cutting personnel (without cutting iron — we did this after DS) and increasing ops tempo and cutting O&M funds…this is not new…I ran a three shift mx F15 operation 15 years ago…we euphemistically called the third shift a servicing shift.
Demand should never outstrip supply…OpsTempo should be informed by force structure and O&M funding…but, the suits seldom get it or see things this way.

Any fighter aircraft maintainer can tell you that working a high-ops tempo at 13–14 hours a day, is the norm at home station. And working 7 days a week, with numerous back-to-back 16-hour shifts is not an exception either. One of the ex-F-22 maintainers told me he did that for three years straight, as an F-15 maintainer I did it for three months straight so it really made me feel bad thinking I had it bad then. That’s not even being deployed to the AOR, that’s at home station. These aircraft are aging, and require intensive maintenance. New aircraft are finicky and need to get the bugs sorted out (a historically natural process with any new technology), and are also maintenance intensive.

I’m not saying that we’re exposed to the same amount of danger or hardship as our brothers and sister ground pounders or jar heads (they have my utmost respect and appreciation), but we don’t exactly have cake jobs that most people assume about the AF either (that would be the desk jockeys in finance, etc).

As you may have guessed, I am “inside the wire’ but you would not guess my real force structure ideas…we need to get past the “turd bowl” our leaders gave us in Iraq, we need to figure out something for Afghanistan/Pak etc..and invest prudently to deal with these problems.…but past that (and we will eventually get past Af/Pak)…WHY do I need a huge Army? What would the $$ spent on all those folks do for the US?? Couldn’t the AF be smaller? Is the AF buying the right force structure? We need to think past Labor Day weekend in force procurement and how we arrange our securtiy.
That said…I wish you well with your jousting with windmills that, in 20 yrs, will be OBE.

Can’t find a single reference where I specifically stated “not enough AF officer casualties” or “sacrificing pilot lives.” Do believe that the F-22 vs. F-35 quantity argument comes down to perspective of whether the short air-to-air and counter-SAM effort (which would reduce AF officer casualties) is more critical than the long war and air-to-ground (which would reduce far higher ground force casualties). Guess I believe that F-35 pilots would still outclass their opposition and the current undefeated air-to-air record would remain intact.

The “have your cake and eat it to” argument of many F-22s and lots of F-35s is simply not affordable. The high-low mix concept originated by the F-15/F-16 is sound. But the new balance of assets should reflect new and projectable threats…not Cold War threats.

As for “why would the JFC want more bodies in theater that he must feed, house and protect??” I offer this observation. Where does it stop especially if more UAS are fielded? Who is next to stay at home? Is Global Strike from the U.S. necessary when assets closer to the threat (Navy and forward deployed) could accomplish the same objective?

With hundreds of thousands in theater, what additional burden would be added having a few UAS pilots in theater where they could better coordinate tactical support for Soldiers/Marines/Airmen? Could they not be part of that 10 AEF deployment cycle? Would that facilitate cueing support and airspace deconfliction with Army UAS operators already there?

Since WWII when risk, casualties, and “for the duration” deployment burdens were more equal on land/air/sea, there has been an undeniable shift that has not bode well for the ground services. All servicemembers are paid equally by pay grade. They do not share an equal deployment burden.

While 12–15 months may be far too high as the Army example, it is a reflection of the force structure available. If you show me a service with 4/5/6 month deployments (allowing payment of TDY)facilitated by 10 AEFs worth of force structure, I would submit that service has excessive servicemembers/assets in proportion to other services.

Shouldn’t Congress and the QDR make an effort to better equalize the deployment burden at a common level for all services? Would that make some services more effective in the second half of their tour due to better familiarity with the theater’s unit’s, terrain, and threats? Would other services be more effective by being less burned out and more likely to stay in the service?

Is 8 months across the board for all services about right? That would require longer AEF tours and more frequent deployment of ground assets or more stay-behind Army/Marine equipment that new units fall onto. But that’s part of fair apportionment of funding and deployment for all services.

It is my personal belief that Cold War threats characterized by equal potential risk across the components, have been replaced by reduced air/naval threats, while very real ground threats remain. Funding and force structure shifts that recognize this shift have been slow in coming.

As of late, it appears that the Congress controls the TOA, not the SECDEF or service chiefs. For whatever reason, to include better lobbying efforts and think tank defenders, the air component has been able to make a better PR and jobs case to Congress for retaining airpower funding.

It also seems as if most Army bases are in cheaper Red state locations whereas Navy, Marine, and Air Force bases and manufacturing are often in Blue or a broad cross section of states. This is problematic, of course, because the real estate costs and additional pay required for servicemembers and defense contractors on the left coast(s) tends to be higher. Even DoD efforts to move a carrier to Jacksonville to better disperse the carrier force (and in a cheaper location) are failing due to politics.

As for my “ancient history” reference, I was referring to example cited where North Africa airpower and a British Air Field Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder led to the idea of central control, decentralized execution (see page 29 of Air Force Doctrine 1). That doctrine document also states:

“Thus, a COMAFFOR (commmander air forces) acting as a JFACC (joint force air component commander) exercises OPCON (operational control)of Air Force forces and TACON (tactical control) of any Navy, Army, and Marine aviation assets made available to the JFACC (i.e., those forces not retained for their own Service’s organic operations).”

The “stifling” may come down to what assets are controlled by the JFACC through the CAOC and which are retained by the Services, and can be counted on for direct and general support. The USAF often argues it should have more control over other service airpower to include UAS. However, other services seem to do just fine exercising centralized control and decentralized execution of air assets at Army division and Marine Expeditionary level. So why should the JFACC have more control of those air assets?

That only leads to situations like OIF where only a single Army Hunter UAV supported the ground advance on Baghdad because all the USAF Predators were out looking for and not finding SCUDS.

Since we were talking ancient history, it was a Prussian Field Marshal Von Moltke that stated more or less, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.” So why would we count on an air targeting and air ISR plan created two days ago in the CAOC? Aren’t warfighters closest to the fight best informed on the tactical targets and ISR requirements?

No white whales for me. I’m comfortable on land and air…but easily get seasick and would continuously bang my head and get claustrophobic on Navy ships. Don’t know how my nephew who is a nuke sub sailor does it. Given the deployment/risk probabilities, I’m encouraging my daughter to become an Air Force doctor now that she is entering Med School…but gotta find a tactful way to tell her not to be a flight surgeon…that finger biz.

AF should not continue develop C2? The operational & strategic effects created by air power should be kept static or discarded? In favor of what? WWII attrition warfare? Can you spell Luddite?

AF UAS pilots should be in theatre? OK..couple of questions…Are the UAS pilots effective from their current location? Would they be more effective if in the AOR? If so HOW?.…if not, why would the JFC want more bodies in theater that he must feed, house and protect??

Nice try on linking some RAND study on PRC/TW and Gen Corley…I’d bet $$ that Gen Corley is much more influenced by NAISC, Nellis and the IC that some FFRDC…want to bet??

All your blather on TW/PRC displays a profound lack of understanding of the real issues.

The entire “sacrificing fighter pilot lives” was nonsenical and I am embarrased for you.

You AF assertions are equally silly.
The SECDEF made the call on the F22. Suspect he makes calls on Army TOA…NOT THE CSAF…so if the Army has a TOA problem, I suggest you try barking up the right tree.
The AF is “stifling” ground ops in Iraq & Afghanistan?? YGBSM. Who is in command in Iraq? ARMY! Who is in commnand in Afghanistan? ARMY! Who is the COCOM/CC? ARMY! So, Army GOs with command authority over the JFACC are standing by and allowing ground ops to be “stifled”?? I think not…more likely, you are simply clueless.

The whole “not enough AF officer casualties”? Do you have any idea how strange and silly that sounds.
As does your assertion that we should ignore other strategic threats and focus the entire DOD budget on “the Army problem”. You remarks on one AF officer salary = 4 enlisted, retirement costs, etc and your vague restructuring notion.…LOL..I would love to hear how Cole would re-design the AF..DOD…we need a good laugh.

The SecDef is “rebalancing” DOD assets…right or wrong…not the AF. Your complaint is not with the AF…but with the SecDef.

Should we do as Cole advocates and bet most of our bank roll on “the Long War”..short change all other strategic investments.…have the AF listen to guys with comical notions of air warfare and scrap the high end weapons that are our strategic trump cards in favor of some vague notions the “social injustice” of AF officers not suffering and dying in “proper numbers “?? What are those numbers?
Cole, the F22 & the AF have become your “white whale”..LOL…you need to get a life.

However, in the years since, both the Marines and Army have figured out how to employ decentralized planning and execution of organic or supporting airpower, at least down to division and sometimes brigade (& Marine equivalent)level. Aviators in both ground services also realize that there is no shame in being an enabling force supporting ground/naval forces and the tactical and operational level of war.

It is encouraging that the Joint Force Command Marine Commander is against EBO and for individual leader initiative. But while much of the initiative-concern has focused on small ground units, what about joint level? What about the C2 System and platform/facility vulnerability and loss of initiative that results:

- running the air war and joint aerial ISR (with too much data to analyze) exclusively from a distant central CAOC and AWACS

- using 2 days of centralized planning (with too many strategic, operational, tactical targets to analyze) prior to executing an out of date joint targeting and ISR plan.

No, the USAF should never be the servant of the ground component, but neither should it insist on centralized control of all airpower and UAS flying above the coordinating altitude. That stifles ground commander initiative to employ airpower and aerial ISR at the time and place of tactical commander choosing based on local TIMELY combat information and commander’s critical information requirements.

Nor should the USAF expand its troubling tendency to believe that warfare, at least their part of it, can be fought from a distance. Concepts like Global Strike and centralized UAS control from stateside are troubling and seemingly growing.

I strongly doubt any Marine or Army officer would condone having one portion of its force (largely officer)fighting from the U.S. while other parts of the force (largely enlisted) are exposed to danger and away from momma/kids in a war zone turning wrenches and getting Predators ready for take-off and recovery.

Are we accepting the notion that aerial fighting can be done strictly from afar and on a “visitor” basis so that by the time they figure out the theater they go home? Should Airmen deploy less frequently than Soldiers because they are provided the force structure and adequate expensive lethal systems to allow it in 10 AEFs?

Meanwhile, C-17 and other transport pilots are landing forward every day, airmen are offloading and maintaining forward and protecting forward airfields in more primitive and dangerous conditions. Of course, Soldiers and Marines are in the field constantly and often spend 7 months to a year deployed followed by a year at home in a never-ending cycle.

Do I know diddly compared to the ACC commander. Obviously not and wholly irrelevant. But note he chose his words carefully. Do we know of any credible INDEPENDENT study to see if 187 F-22s IS OR IS NOT ENOUGH, especially if adjustments were made such as in numbers of AEFs or in numbers of pilots per F-22?

Do you seriously believe any Airman, or contractor/lobbyist paid by the USAF (cough cough RAND), would conduct a study that DID NOT favor more F-22s?

Finally got to see the RAND study that postulated that Chinese airpower could overwhelm our small F-22 force and get to our AWACS/tankers. Well no kidding given the assumptions used. I can’t go into excessive detail because it was FOUO but let’s just say that study:

- used puny numbers of the overall quantity of F-22s in theater flying a CAP at any given time. There was no provision for a ZULU alert force of F-22s if radar showed trouble

- Naval Aegis/Standard missiles were assumed away as were Taiwan Navy efforts

- Taiwanese Patriot missiles and airpower were not played

- Japanese airpower and Patriots were not played even though the Chinese were attacking Japanese airfields…huh??

- Naval/Marine fighter airpower was not played at all!!

- When USAF F-35s WERE added, the combined F-22/F-35 force fared much better, essentially wiping out nearly every advanced Chinese fighter in one sortie of several hours. Gee that was short air supremacy war.

- There were F-35/F-22 losses when assumptions were made that Russian/Chinese made air-to-air missiles against our STEALTH fighters had a similar probability of kill compared to our missiles against their NON-STEALTH fighters. Without divulging the Pks involved, it was a ludicrously inaccurate comparison

Finally, part of the study impled that we should be shocked that the USAF might actually lose a few aircraft and pilots. Never mind that no Soviet fighter ever shot down an F-15/16. Never mind that ejection seats work while thousands of ground Soldiers/Marines (and Airman/Sailors taking their place on the ground) have died unable to eject from an IED or enemy bullets.

We can’t risk FIGHTER PILOT lives or aircraft! The horror! They might have to use their SERE training and live in the outback like their infantry brethren for a few days.

Finally the study strangely brought out the obvious point that short range ground-base fighters are extremely vulnerable because their AIRFIELDS are very vulnerable. Oddly enough, it was the assumption that Naval/Patriot/Allied missiles and Naval/Marine/Allied airpower would NOT be involved that risked aircraft on the ground…and led to fewer available in the air.

I was shocked at how few aircraft of the total postulated would be airborne at any time. This is less attributable to insufficient aircraft overall or in theater. It was the result of aircraft at risk from missile attack while on the ground. It is also attributable to horrible F-22 mission capable rates in the 60% range, lots of hours of wrench-turning per hour of flight, and crew endurance limits.

Bottom line, is the USAF appears to want us to provide them a blank check because they don’t fly enough aircraft each hour of the day (or can’t due to maintenance/crew endurance/ distance from target) to be effective against the threat. It’s bad enough to pay $140–180 million (lately $234 million in 2010) for a fighter. It sucks to have that expensive fighter sitting on the ground being blown up by submunitions or wasting crew endurance flying en route from Guam or topping off on a tanker.

The latter argument alone (too many aircraft on the ground) should be enough to convince the USAF to train more than 1.25 pilots to share the same F-22 to keep the darn thing in the air in those rarest/shortest of surge air supremacy wars. Won’t get enough peacetime flight hours per pilot that way? Should have been a transport pilot…now off to the simulator you go.

Spend a billion or two on great motion simulators to include simulated g-forces and you would surpass live training using simulated threats in a variety of aerial force-on-force scenarios (against other live pilots)and counter-SAM flying/bombing exercises against ACTUAL SIMULATED THREAT TERRAIN.

Has anyone studied losses of fighters and fighter pilots caused by training for air-to-air in peacetime vs. actual combat air-to-air losses? Seems like several times a year you lose a pilot and costly aircraft in dogfighting mid-airs. As mentioned we have never lost an F-15/16 pilot in actual combat air-to-air.

Obviously more pilots and aircraft have been lost against SAMs during wartime. Simulators would accurately duplicate that environment and allow better training to attack enemy airfields/TBM to preclude air-to-air and TBM losses. Practice hitting THEIR aircraft and TBM on the ground before they can hit ours!
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Mark said: “The notion that every dollar appropriated to the AF is taken away from the Army is equally sophmoric.“
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Yet despite clear evidence that the air component does NOT bear the brunt of fighting, casualties, and deployment in conflicts of the past 45 years, aerial component exquisite systems are continuously funded at progressively greater cost levels…while feeling entitled to near-equal fighter numbers at the higher price/tech level.

Meanwhile those exposed to the greatest risks and deployments are perpetually underfunded/undet-teched and left with 75% solutions. To think that funding for airpower does not detract from groundpower is the height of naivete.

Congress, the QDR, and Joint Force must consider what air/naval/land systems cost the most to procure, operate snd support, and man/woman…to include rank/cost of that force structure. Those systems that cost the most, require the most officers as a percentage of the component, and contribute primarily to the short war and unlikely scenarios must be weighed against those that contribute the most to the long war and most likely scenarios.

When four young ground Soldiers cost about the same as one USAF aviator in salary and that discrepancy grows when training and retirement costs are added, it becomes clear where we need to shift military force structure when faced with dwindling resources and greater civil expenses.

Your problem is more fundamental…you want to roll the clock back to 1918 when the air/land military relationship had the air forces tethered to the ground commander like flying artillery. Infantry officers would decide how the air forces would be employed regardless of how technically unskilled or ignorant. Sorry but history proved that the air guys were right.

The notion that every dollar appropriated to the AF is taken away from the Army is equally sophmoric.

MY POINT on F22 is not about whether we should buy 183 or 191 or 260 F22s…When Gen John Corley (ACC/CC) says we are taking on too much risk with a lower F22 buy, that is his expert military opiniion and it should be respected. Gen Corley is sober and intellectual officer who happens to be well schooled in air combat. There is much more to this discussion that you know. Regardless of your DOD contractor position, I’d bet the farm that you are not as well informed or schooled on this subject as John Corley?
It’s Mr. Gates job to make the call on money & rrisk. SECDEF has made his call. Congress will make their call. The Congress and the American people are not likely to side with your “it’s all about the Army” view…the world is a complicated place and your 1918 version of defense does nothing for our problems in Iran, TW/China, Pakistan, or Russia.
I haven’t heard any serious person in the AF or Navy advocate for a weak Army.…or try instruct the Army on what the Army TOA should be…why do you insist on this “Army uber alles” business”..the AF should only buy aircraft (F35) that support the Army…but I forget, you & Barney have the accurate crystal balls.

Then what did that 106 billion go to, that passed this week? I thought that was the war supplemental for this year? Maybe I am mistaken and need to do more through research. If so, I was wrong.

Your link to that opinion peace does not even come close to detailing all the cuts in the 2010 defense bugdet.

Yes disingenuous (because you know there are major cuts in the defense budget & the only reason it ‘appears’ to have grown is because of the inclusion of a major portion of war spending being INCLUDED IN THE BASE BUDGET rather than in separate supplimental appropriations) or ignorant (because you have fallen hook line & sinker for Obama’s scam to cut defense but fool those you aren’t paying attention that his budget INCLUDES A MAJOR PORTION OF WAS SPENDING IN THE BASE BUDGET rather than in separate supplimental appropriations).

http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm2501.cfm

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Navy_Laser_Success_Key_In_UAV_Research_And_Development_999.html

A lot closer to service then most people think.

I have a rail-gun article I will post later.

Are you a Republican? If so, I’m sad to see people like you in my party. You give all of us a bad name. Do you want to see the cuts? Here:
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN2529969020090625

7 More F-22’s, 1.2 Billion in Missile Defense cuts. The multi-kill BMD needs to be killed. It’s cost over-runs and lack of a complete working system that is waaaaay past it’s complete date. Kill the program.

Also, they are TRANSFERRING funds to AEGIS, a WORKING system. What a concept. Next, billions of dollars went into Direct-Energy weapons production (read the detailed docs online for a list — they are there), and R/D for future direct-energy weapons (such as the free electron lasers). Laser weapons are 10x more effective then BMD missiles, and billions cheaper. Also, the production of the Rail-Gun system, that they are now prototyping on one of the US destroyers.
The Navy predicts the Rail-Gun will be in service about 2015. Can also be used as Missile Defense, much cheaper, and more effective then the canceled systems cut by Gates.

Jesus Christ, read the f’n list man, the programs they canceled (except for the F-22) need to be cut. It’s not as bad as you are making it out to be. Do some research on the wasteful programs over the past 2 decades. We have lost BILLIONS on programs that never went into service. Why in the hell can Russia get more bang for their buck, then the US? Simple, the US Military have been spending coin on programs with NO results!

Me, Ignorant? If being fiscally conservative makes me ignorant, then color me ignorant. At least the Military wasn’t gutted, like blow-job Bill.

Are really that disingenuous or just that ignorant?

Sure the 2010 defense budget ‘looks’ bigger but it includes much of the war spending were as in the 2009 & previous budgets war spending was in separate appropriations bills.

I actually voted for our first year Democratic Congressman last year, Bobby Bright, because I figured the Democrats were going to be in charge so it would probably be better to have a local Democratic Congressman looking after Ft Rucker and the Army. I was partially right and he did end up on the House Armed Services Committee. But, Maxwell AFB is in Montgomery where he used to be mayor, so guess he kind of looks after them more. My wife did enjoy hosting his wife reading to her Rucker daycare class last Friday.

So Congressman Bright, if you have any aides out there “google newsing” your name each day, how about taking care of the Army as well as you appear to be favoring the USAF. The Army requires a top notch UAS capability in both theaters of conflict that doesn’t run off everytime something perceived to be more important occurs. After all, the Army is bearing the brunt of fighting/deploying in this war…and all recent wars for that matter.

And Mark, considering we easily handled Iraq twice and Serbia once since 1991 WITHOUT ANY F-22s, and without losing a single F-15/F-16 in air-to-air combat, by little violin is playing for you and yours as you forecast new found competence and manufacturing prowess/reliability in Russian aircraft and air defenses. Everyone thought the MiG-25 was ten foot tall too, and seems like I’ve been hearing about the PAK FA since the 90s.

It was very irritating to learn that one proposed defense budget cut (theoretically paying for the F-22) involves the Army MQ-1C UAS budget for 2010 which is proposed to be cut in half…reducing it by $173 million.

This is the Army/Joint future version of Predator that will eventually carry up to 4 Hellfire missiles. It has automated take-off and landing by enlisted and warrant officer operators deployed in theater where they can directly coordinate/plan with supported commanders and fully understand the tactical situation.

The White House also came out against these Congressional UAS cuts for that critical reconnaissance surveillance target acquisition system supporting Soldiers fighting in combat.…while F-22s have yet to support either war.