It’s Official: FCS Cancelled

strider June 24th, 2009 at 11:10 am

yeah I agree zach, I think the vehicle at least needs to be in the 40 ton range to have enough armor to be able to survive in today’s battlefield. As for N-LOS C it makes the most sense to take the tech from that vehicle and integrate it into whatever new common chasis is used to retain commonality.

strider June 24th, 2009 at 11:46 pm

I think that the Stryker program, with spin out tech upgrades, can step into FCS’s shoes right now. The Stryker is more deployable, already developed, and easily upgradable. It can be deployed much like the canceled AGS would have: deploy with light base armor package, then upgrade to heavier packages as need/time allows. 3 to 4 can be lifted by a C-17, and it is also transportable by C-130. It fulfills the requirements of a light armored vehicle in line with the FCS role.

The new vehicle program should focus on providing a replacement for the Abrams and Bradley, vehicles that do not need to be replaced right away. The new vehicle needs to be the high intensity combat vehicle, the one that can take the punches, survive, and punch back. If they could get it to 40 tons (aka 2 per C-17) with optional modular add on armor packages that would make it more survivable (and heavy), that would be sucess in my eyes. The Stryker sacrifices some survivabiltiy and firepower to be faster and more deployable. This fits with its role as a highly deployable vehicle that speciallizes in low intesity combat ops. Its counterpart should sacrifive some deployablitiy for more survivabiltiy and firepower, the better to sustain high intensity ops. We need both capabilities

As for the long development, much of the technology in terms of the network has already been developed, the effort needs to be spent in improved armor schemes and a new survivable chasis.

Gordon Loudon June 25th, 2009 at 8:06 am

This is not about that is good for the military — rather it is t just free up money for Obama’s social policies

strider June 25th, 2009 at 11:01 am

Glen,

Just one thing I’m not clear on and that is how you clasify desert storm as a conflict in which heavy forces were not required in there traditional roll. That war was the epitimy of heavy forces warfare, with thousands of tanks and thousands of other vehicles.

That being said, (that’s just a minor confusion)

I totally agree with your opinion that we will need heavy forces in the future, as I said in my earlier post. the new vehicle we will be making needs to focus on being able to replace and improve upon the capabilities of the current Abrams/Bradley force down the road. Since these vehicles are not obsolete yet I think we can afford to upgrade the current force with the FCS network technology as it becomes available, as well as the other spin outs that will be entering the force, and then spend a little more time on the future vehicle concentrating on making it the next step in heavy vehicle technology. In other words, what new technologies can be used to improve armor, engine systems, and main armaments etc. That way we can have a viable high intensity force well into the future.

The most important thing we must realize is that we need BOTH capabilities. The deployable stryker brigade and light infantry brigades have there role, and the heavy brigade has its role. We have to keep a sufficient balance of both force types.

mike June 27th, 2009 at 12:21 pm

The FCS program name is dead IN NAME ONLY and the MGVs in the ADM but not the contract and the program. They live on with a new name a bigger office and THE COSTS AND RISKS FOR THE REMAINING EFFORTS ARE OUT OF CONTROL. The Army is hanging on with Boeing and SAIC and plotting the way around the so called cancelation. NOTHING HAS BEEN CANCELED AND THE JOINT ARMY BOEING AND SAIC contract LIVEs ON AND ON.

Jason June 27th, 2009 at 12:44 pm

sorry Mike

armamentsoldier June 28th, 2009 at 11:00 pm

Watcher44 June 24th, 2009 at 1:38 pm 

“The Army has a history of cancelling things after spending billions on development, because there might be better things up ahead. Unfortunately when you keep doing that over and over, you never get anything upgraded. Remember the Crusader? DIVADS? Comanche? And now FCS. Whatever new thing the Army starts now will take as long as FCS has taken and, since its design parameters will surely be even more demanding, it will be heavier, less “airliftable” and less affordable. So when it’s been through the development mill for 6 or 8 or 10 years, it’s going to look “troubled” too, and it will be cancelled in favor of yet another thing. Meanwhile the Army will be putting whatever advanced technologies it can fit onto existing chassis (that don’t have the size, power, electrical capacity or cooling to handle the new gear) and they’ll run the force literally into the ground. Why the Army has rolled over to Gates on this is beyond me. When a USAF program is attacked, there’s immediate and strong and sustained push-back. Contrast F-22 with FCS and ask yourself, why does the Army have no backbone?”

What the Army have is a history of cancelling junk that cost a lot of money and ain’t worth the money it cost to produce it, the rest of the services can learn a lesson from that. The MLRS is much better and can put more metal on the target for less. Besides, all this thing is another artillery piece, any tech added on to that is useless, even the old 109 or 155 can do the same thing. He–, if it were me, I would bring back the 110 before I spend money on this thing. Hehehehe!!!

Rabbit June 29th, 2009 at 1:08 pm

I have an idea that I bet no one has thought of before. With the money that we save on this program and that we save by buying fewer f-22s the US should build a ground based laser that could be used to blind Russian and Chinese satellites that are used to provide an early warning of a US ICBM launch. In the moments after their early warning system is knocked out we would have a window of opportunity to launch a first strike. Why I bet no one has thought of that. Why even the US military would not be so reckless as to build one of these lasers now would they?

MAJ Aaron Gorrie July 19th, 2009 at 10:36 pm

**The vies expressed in this entry are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or the position of the US Government, Department of Defense, or the Department of the Army.**

Jeff,

I could not agree with you more. Secretary Gates is correct for canceling the ground vehicle portion of FCS for all of the reasons you mentioned. 

We must not forget that the ground vehicle is only one part of FCS. The spin out technologies and the FCS network are vital to meeting the overall end state of allowing the Army to use advanced offensive, defensive, and communications/information systems to outsmart and out maneuver enemy forces on the battlefield.

As you stated previously “Canceling the manned ground portion will allow for a reallocation of funds that can be used to better equip our Soldiers with equipment and training that is relevant to the fight we are currently engaged in today.” 

One of the immediate advantages of the cuts to the vehicle portion is the further investment and accelerated fielding of the spin out technologies. With this accelerated timetable of fielding not only will these capabilities be in the hands of soldiers faster than previously planned, the technologies will be fielded to all of the brigade combat teams, not just a small portion of brigade combat team. Thus, allowing all units to take advantage of already invested funds and move one-step closer to outsmarting and maneuvering the enemy.

The second benefit to the cutting the vehicle portion funding, as I see it, is the continued investment in the FCS network itself. Although this mite be a blinding flash of the obvious, but without a central network that connects spin out technologies back to command posts and individual soldiers information will not be distributed to the masses to allow for great understanding of the battlefield. If there is one portion of FCS that the Army must do correctly, it is the proper construction and implementation of the network. I truly hope with the canceling of the vehicle portion that there will be a larger and more focused investment in making the FCS network run properly and effectively.

As I see it, there is a great deal of goodness with the cancellation of the vehicle portion. My only concern with FCS, or ABCTM, is that the lessons learned from the first transformation of the Army, i.e. modularity, are not lost when the Army transforms itself with FCS/ABCTM.

Like modularity, the implementation of FCS/ABCTM will change the Army as we know it. The capabilities that are brought to bear on our enemies will be enormous and could dramatically change the way the Army conducts business on the battlefield. The Army will become more lethal, flexible, and more adaptable than before. However, if the Army does not field these new systems and capabilities properly we will be learning on the fly. As a Commander who transformed a legacy unit to a modular force the challenges were, at times, overwhelming. I hope that the concepts of drive by fieldings and phrases such as “don’t worry if you don’t understand the system….a Field Service Rep (FSR) will be in theater to teach you” will not come back again. I have a lot of bad memories of these type of “teaching/training techniques.” The bottom line is they do not work. I hope that those responsible for fielding and implementing these systems understand that not only do the individual operators need to be trained on these systems/technologies, but the leaders, planners, and most importantly the maintainers of these systems must understand all facets in order to implement and use them to there fullest capacity. 

The bottom line is that a new piece of technology is only as good as the instruction given to those that operate it, those that benefit from it, those that must plan for it, and those that must maintain it. A total training package is required and dropping a widget off on a commanders desk and telling him/her to sign for it will never work unless everyone connected to the system understands its value or it will left on a shelf in the supply room collecting dust.

Cole July 26th, 2009 at 11:01 pm

Gentleman,

Especially interested in the feedback from the last 3 officers.

Out of curiosity, what about the manned ground vehicles didn’t you like, and how much did you actually know about them and the associated force structure of the FCS BCT? What would your vision of the revised ground combat vehicle and heavy BCT look like?

Out of curiosity, are you Armor officers, since they frequently did not like the lack of Mounted Combat System armor…all the other branch vehicles were better protected than their predecessors and the ICV had more dismounted infantry. 

Where do you see the Army evolving since most units will be garrisoned stateside instead of forward deployed? Is total sea deployment of heavy forces sufficient, even if it makes the Army largely irrelevant for all but a few scenarios? Is air deployment of Strykers and medium/light infantry forces sufficient? 

Do you envision all tank-sized vehicles and how would you sustain them at 2 gallons per mile? Wouldn’t they still be vulnerable to IEDs and top attack, and too large for many 3rd world roads/bridges as in Afghanistan? More HETS!! 

How do you envision integrating MRAP and M-ATV into the future force? 

CPT McKnight, curious about a couple of statements that may or may not have basis in fact: “FCS program was hideously mismanaged program that cost taxpayer’s millions.” And referring to the manned ground vehicle portion: “DoD latest estimate of that cost has increased to $130 billion.”

MAJ Gorrie, get the feeling you know the most about the old FCS and completely agree about the need for training on these systems. Not sure what will happen to the embedded training that was a KPP of the MGV. Will that carry over into the GCV?

MAJ Wood, how do you reconcile these two statements. Early in the paragraph you say:

“The LIGHTER and MORE AGILE force structure under this initiative places our Soldiers at an unnecessary risk.”

and then near the end of the paragraph:

“The engagements of today are not from kilometers away but from face to face engagements with the local populace. These engagements require our Soldiers to be LIGHTER and MORE AGILE, not bogged down by the heavy equipment of yesterday.”

This seems highly indicative of much of the Army-wide uncertainty of where the future heavy force is heading. Some argue that close in engagements favor more armor OR active protection…which are opposite approaches to the same problem. But some question whether active protection will work (or endangers dismounts/civilians) while all tank-sized vehicles have little usefulness in full spectrum conflict, are a deployment and logistics nightmare, are incompatible with lots of terrain, and are still vulnerable to IED/mines and top attack and future ATGM. 

Finally, do you foresee wheeled or tracked vehicles?