Boots Plus Planes, Beat Hybrid Foes

Boots Plus Planes, Beat Hybrid Foes

In the QDR strategic review underway, “hybrid war” is one of the conceptual drivers. In future wars, hybrid opponents will come equipped with precision guided weaponry, advanced cyberwar capabilities and will fight in distributed networks of small units and cells akin to guerrillas so as not to present targets for overwhelming U.S. firepower.

The hybrid war archetype, Hezbollah, equipped with loads of precision missiles and skillfully using urban and complex terrain, fought the Israeli Defense Force to a standstill in 2006. After that miserable experience, the IDF set about correcting its deficiencies and the subsequent 2008 war in Gaza against Hamas was, according to analysts, a showcase of lessons learned and adjustments made.

I spoke recently with RAND analyst and historian David Johnson, who has spent the past two years leading research teams to Israel to examine IDF training and operational adaptation in the wake of the 2006 war, to get his take on that war and changes in the way the Gaza campaign was fought.

Johnson said the IDF went into the 2006 Lebanon war with a clouded view of future warfare due to three reasons: first, the 1999 Kosovo war spurred the mistaken belief that wars could be fought and decided at stand-off range with precision air power; second, the Palestinian intifada compelled the IDF to focus on stopping terrorist attacks inside Israel, which they largely did, very effectively; and third, the end of Hussein’s regime in Iraq and a lessening of threats from Syria led to a belief that a major ground campaign was not in Israel’s future and that ground forces should shift to a low intensity conflict focus.

Significant cuts were made in funding for IDF ground forces that negatively impacted training and logistical readiness, particularly in the heavy armored units; there was little training in combined arms fire and maneuver. Air Force forward air controllers were removed from ground brigades. Counterterror operations in the West Bank and Gaza were highly centralized affairs, with the active involvement of Israeli leaders at the highest levels, which over the years had a stifling effect on small unit initiative. Israel also lacks a professional NCO corps that can maintain and pass along institutional knowledge and learning.

In Lebanon, the IDF faced an opponent with a combat mindset very different from Palestinian terrorists. Hezbollah fought as small, tactically competent units, augmented with lots of firepower, fighting sometimes from fortified positions, but also skillfully using the terrain to maneuver and close with Israeli ground forces. Conversely, the IDF had lost the fire and maneuver skills that are so vital in a high intensity like conflict: there was little close air support and even IDF artillery mostly fired on pre-planned targets.

After Lebanon, and a thorough self assessment, the IDF underwent a transformation. Big money was spent on training and equipping the ground forces. Training shifted from preparing for low intensity conflict to combined arms training for high intensity conflict in a “back to basics” approach. Forward air controllers were returned to the ground units. While Israeli armor suffered from Hezbollah’s vast inventory of anti-tank guided missiles, the IDF concluded that heavy armor was still the best protection against increasingly well armed opponents.

The 2008 Gaza operation was intended largely to restore the credibility of the IDF as a deterrent, he says, so there was enormous pressure to perform at a high level. Not surprisingly, the Israelis used their best units, including the heavy Golani brigade and elite parachute units, backed by lots of artillery, attack helicopters and bombers.

Gaza showed the IDF believes heavy forces have a big role to play in urbanized hybrid wars. The IDF sent four brigades into Gaza, one was parachute infantry, the rest were heavy armor. Heavy armor provides an “intimidation factor,” as well as the ability to conduct protected fire and maneuver on a battlefield populated by enemy snipers, IEDs and RPG armed hunter-killer teams. Combat engineers paved the way for ground incursions with attack helicopters, aerial drones and jet bombers providing direct support. Importantly, tactical decision making was pushed down to commanders on the ground.

The most significant realization among IDF leaders in the wake of Lebanon, Johnson said, was that hybrid wars cannot be decided with stand-off precision firepower. Putting troops on the ground, backed by close air support, is absolutely necessary. Interestingly, he said there isn’t a huge desire on the part of IDF officers to re-do Lebanon as they don’t want to taint the Gaza success.

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We should link this story and the “Two War Strategy Dead” story. In the Two War story we are told that the days of stand off precision firepower (and special ops folks directing them) are here. Fire and maneuver are outmoded ideas.
I have read that the Israelis were not able (or willing?) to use maneuver enough to bypass strong points and come at them from behind — certainly they could have improved tactics in Lebanon and in Gaza.

The nature of counter-insurgency in an urban environment is completely different than the standard large scale set piece battle planning and execution of the 1st Gulf War.
The ability of a stabilization force to obtain real time intelligence as to the strength, location, intent and probable escape routes will be the next great challenge to forces like the IDF and US troops in Iraq & AfPak.
Protecting infrastructure and keeping collateral damage to a minimum when it comes to civilian casualties will continue to be the two
greatest risk factors involved in this form of
counter-insurgency in the Mid-East for the foreseeable future.

But this is a classic case of why one war in one place between unique opponents DOES NOT translate to a lesson learned that we need ALL tank-sized armored vehicles.

Israel never needs to deploy ground forces. We do to ANYWHERE we fight. Israel does not need to maintain long logistics lines of communication. We do to ANYWHERE we fight.

Finally, Hezbollah is by far the most extreme terrorist enemy we might encounter…hence the Israeli reluctance to tackle them again with there restored combined arms prowess.

Unfortunately, Hezbollah is unlikely to be equally reluctant and will choose the time and place of their next provocation to start such a war with defenses well-emplaced. This time, with attack helicopters, CAS and well positioned artillery strikes, Israel will be far more successful.

Cole,

You make an excellent point, and one that Mr. Johnson emphasizes as well. It makes a big difference in what force you buy if your armor only has to drive maybe 100 miles versus armor that must be shipped thousands of miles overseas. The Army faced the same problem in WW2 and ended up with the Sherman as they needed a shippable tank. Germans did not, of course, and could go with the heavies.

The question I’m trying to get an answer to is if the battlefield, as we know, will be populated with ever more effective IEDs and heavier and more precise ATGMs, and Merkavas, or equivalent, at least give you greater crew survivability, even if its a mobility kill. Doesn’t that force you into a much heavier design?

I’m just not a believer that technology, APS, will be the savior some hope it will be. From talking to radar specialists about the difficulties in picking out targets to the many ways to counter such a device I have many doubts. Plus the Army doesn’t talk about APS much anymore.

So where does that leave us on next-gen combat vehicle? My own thoughts are we need to get away from the idea of building something to take on MBTs. We have those, they’re called Abrams. Also, we don’t need to cram 10 guys into our APCs. A fire team of 4 or 5 is plenty to provide foot manuever and vehicle overwatch. The protection and survability issue though I can’t quite figure out.

Your comments are, as always, insightful and appreciated,

Greg

What at great point that needs to be emphasize…

Clearly the commenters did not read this article. “Israel doesn’t need to deploy ground forces ?” I must have been hallucinating, I thought that is what they ended up doing in Lebanon and what they did in Gaza. Only an American — and an armchair strategist at that –would confuse “deploying ground forces” with “intercontinental strategic lift of ground forces”. And this whopper — “Fire and maneuver are outmoded ideas” — but this article says that what the Israelis forgot how to do, and went back and fixed — was the ability to conduct fire and maneuver at small unit level. Garsh — I wonder where they got that idea ? Sure wasn’t from the failed attempt by their Air Force to utilize precision strike to good effect…what will they think of next ?

Noch einmal — auf Deutsch — “die beste ausgebildete Infantrie fliegt durch die schnellste Transportmittel in eine operative Sackgasse hinein”.

What the article says is that the Israelis got away from the basics — what works and doesn’t work in close combat — and worked to emphasize combined arms cooperation. They didn’t indulge in theological debates on whether there is or is not a role for main battle tanks or heavy forces or medium forces or sorta light forces. They figured out that tanks and infantry work best when they work together. The stupidity of people who think that five man fire teams are the optimal squad size, ’cause that is all you can get inside a Bradley !! On the other hand, the light infantry bigots just dispense with IFVs altogether — better now ?? No other country in the world thinks this way about ground combat. I rejoice that the Israelis rediscovered the principles of war, even if they did it the hard way — by failing in a major operation.

Bill R, I’m assuming you aren’t American and use “deploy” differently than we do. I’ve driven all over Israel, have flown off its coast, the Gaza Strip, and inside/outside its southeast border with Egypt in a U.S. Army Huey. I’ve been good-naturedly buzzed by Israeli F-16s returning home from the Red Sea while we were sling loading supplies to an island.

I guarantee you there is no comparison between what you consider deployment to the Gaza and Lebanon border and what U.S. forces must do…even if we were to go whacky and attack Mexico or Canada.

Agree with some of your points, but light and sorta light (Stryker/LAV) infantry certainly has its place. Even a lighter 4-man fire team vehicle might have its place (did you note the man mentioning that was the article’s author) if two vehicles are transporting a squad. More firepower/less risk if hit. Believe you can get 6 dismounts in a Bradley, plus driver, gunner, VC.

Now shall we discuss the finer points of bonnets and defense vs defence? How about battle handoff vs handover? ;)

Greg, good points and GREAT article as always.

In my peon opinion and that of true experts, the battle between munition and passive armor will always have the munition emerging victorious. We can’t make the top and bottom of a tank/IFV as armored as the front and sides. 200,000 lb tanks/IFVs? What does that buy you besides 3 gallons per mile and inability to cross a bridge or traverse soft soil?

The answer must be a lighter mix of passsive armor and active defense. 80,000 lbs is plenty to work with IMHO with Bradley add-on armor in the 73K lb region. They will work out the issues of “how.” Isn’t that someone’s main point in commercials? :)

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