Intel Overload How-To

Intel Overload How-To

Speaking to a Washington, D.C. audience last month, CENTCOM chief Gen. David Petraeus described a 2008 battle in Baghdad where U.S. troops decimated Shiite militia fighters, highlighting it as exemplary of a “new” way to fight irregular foes. One of the keys to that “new” approach? A vast network of electronic eyes on aerial drones and manned aircraft that scan the battlefield and then feed intelligence directly to small units operating against an elusive and distributed enemy. Petraeus said the U.S. was trying to replicate that same approach in Afghanistan.

Out in the high, hot, dusty Mojave deserts at China Lake, Ca, Joint Forces Command is trying to replicate Afghanistan, and use that test laboratory to help build the persistent surveillance and intelligence gathering architecture Petraeus wants to speed to his troops engaged in a bloody fight against an adaptive Taliban insurgency.

In a series of exercises and simulations, JFCom is trying to figure out how to coordinate the vast amounts of data collected by satellites, drones and manned aircraft and package it in such a way that it’s actually useful to troops on the ground. Much of the effort is on the “exploitation” side, filtering out useful information from the clutter so as to provide small unit commanders “actionable” intelligence.

“Right now we’re faced with the problem that we cannot possibly exploit all of the data that’s being collected,” said John Kittle, project manager for “Empire Challenge 2009,” the name given to the exercises involving some 1,000 military and civilian personnel in the U.S. and Europe. “That problem is only going to get worse as new platforms come on station.”

Role players out in the China Lake deserts are setting ambushes, sniper attacks, emplacing IEDs, car bombs and shoot-and-scoot mortar attacks, all in an effort to provide the same “signature” of the real attacks that take place against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Drones such as the Air Force’s Scan Eagle, others from the U.K. and Australia, and larger aircraft like the RC-135, circle overhead and track the moves of simulated insurgents, then transmit those images to analysts sat in Suffolk, Va., and German and French analysts in Europe. Via live chat, analysts try and sift out the useful intelligence and in turn send that “mission critical ISR data” to commanders on the ground, Kittle said, speaking to reporters last week via phone from China Lake.

“What we’re really trying to focus on is getting that ISR out to the tactical edge,” Kittle said, “trying to improve on what the dismounted units are getting.” He said the ultimate goal is to provide a small patrol with as much imagery and actionable intelligence as a fully wired brigade command post.

While much of the JFCom exercise aims to resolve the information overload challenge, some new technologies are being tested out at China Lake. Kittle said a new high definition video sensor ball, intended for the Predator but currently mounted on a King Air, is being tested with the hopes of providing vastly improved video quality, and an encryptable data stream.

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I admit this is really scary, 1984 comes to reality. I really can not see how any insurgency will be able to adopt to this technology other than limit themselves to to an occasional indoor assassination.
I said in another post on another thread which was removed a short time ago that the US may not be the most evil force in the world but it is the strongest force for evil. That no doubt was more than some people could take even though I have many reasons for believing that.
Many conservatives like to throw around the phrase that power corrupts and absolute power corrupt absolutely. Do they think that they are immune from such temptations? Of course real conservatives like real men and women would never accept an empire in place of a republic.
Turnips for sale, potatoes and carrots too.

Of course to the defenders of the status quo this technology comes just in time. So many Americans think that everything in America is hunky dory any change, let alone a radical change, would be a bad thing.

Joint Forces Command is on target with filtering the recon info to a condensed and timely format for the squad and fire team leaders.

I just do not understand why we could not get to this point much earlier in the game. Transformation probably meant something else under Rumsfeld like creating a big vacuum cleaner of bandwidth with netcentric priority, but for what effectiveness level?

Integration of condensed info into helmet visor
displays rather than voice or concurrent with limited voice comms would probably be the best way to go.

My priority would be to get to a flanking position as soon as possible, if I had the up to the minute intel and the situation allowed me to have the ability to move people earlier than I would have been able to without the accurate intel. Blocking moves, etc. can be had, if you know the Modus Oper. of that particular enemy cell.

All this leads to the fact that we have to have the autonomy of motion allowed under decentralized command structures, operators willing to risk action for the advantage move in a tactical situation.

This could be an opportunity where life could emmulate art in that filtering the data to give cues and maps similar to first person shooter games could be a big advantage from a training battle standpoint. the biggest difference would be getting the surveillance to be able to filter out foes from innocents.

This could be an opportunity where life could emmulate art in that filtering the data to give cues and maps similar to first person shooter games could be a big advantage from a training battle standpoint. the biggest difference would be getting the surveillance to be able to filter out foes from innocents.
P.S. — Sorry, forgot to tell you great post!

Hey guys am all for more info on the battle field. I really want to know what around the next street corner and have option to run offence with a killer defense if I need it. The big problem to me with the operator on the video end and the guy on the ground trusting someone he does not know judgment. I don’t thank we are ever going to find a magic pill to say or the fix all to fixes. To address the filter problem it can never be solved really in non convention warfare, know if the bad guy would wear uniform it be a different soldier. Also we are started talking about how much money these NEW toys cost? Don‘t get me wrong am 110% for them and hope we figure out how to put this Toy in play on the battlefield. But we must not forget it still takes boots on ground and those boots need to understand and know how to use the basic of fighting before we bring in more toys.

One of the potential problems with this much info downloaded to an operator, can be demonstrated in the new F-18 pilot helmet display. It becomes difficult to maintain situational awareness and as the pilots call it, you can be a “tumbleweed” rolling along not networked, since you are lost in the info.

The problem with Intel as is with most data collection, it is always time late, i.e., it is always in the past. Trying to forecast the future from past data has always been the reserve of soothsayers and witches. In combat, as in the stock market, by the time you enough data to solve the problem, the problem has already passed. The danger with data download is simply what was stated earlier — data overload. If you are operating inside the “reaction loop” of the opposition then you can outmanuever, outgun, and out-stratigize him to the point where he becomes ineffective as a fighting force. With too much data, you become burdened with “analyzing” the problem rather than “executing” the winning move, i.e., you are outside the “reaction loop” of the opponent. Let’s figure what data the guy on the field needs and limit him that — the technology end will solve itself once we know what is required.

JFCOM is working a good concept that gets bogged down with too many ideas trying to deal with too many problems at the same time. Were they to take ‘one bite of the elephant’ at a time, this problem could be worked. As it is now, this, along with many Fleet Battle Experiments and other military Lab fantasies, will never get the job done.

JFCOM is a command with no troops in search of a mission. Like the proliferation of commands (and general officers) that has occurred since the 90’s — this is just another example of a General with a staff and a big budget trying to “be involved”. The problem isn’t the volume of intel — its the bureacracy that collects and analyzes it being 17 layers of bureacracy removed from anyone who could possible use it. We’ve got 16 Intelligence Agencies and way too many Army, Corps, Division, Expeditionary, Task Force, and Joint Commands all climbing over each other to prove their worth and get that next star. We’ve only got a 10 division Army and our tooth to tail ratio is rapidly approaching 1:40 (more if you toss in the number of civilian agencies at work in Afgahnistan and Iraq). There are more General Officers on active duty today than were in all of World War II — its freakin’ obvious what the real problem is — WE ARE IN OUR OWN WAY! Flatten the organization — eliminate half of the flag officer slots and all the sudden — everything will begin to get so much easier to accomplish and manage. When the business world realized that electronic communication and information systems revolutionized the way they could do business — they eliminated swathes of middle management and flattened their organizations and freed up lower level managers — the boom in productivity and business growth over the last 20–30 years that was the result is unparrelled in history. Funny how the military and government in the same time — with the same technology at its disposal actually ADDED middle manager — reduced the power of lower level leaders and increased the bureacracy at a rate almost directly parrallel to the productivity gains that were occurring in the private sector thus creating a situation where productivity in government/military DECREASED proportionately at the same rate. The problem isn’t the amount of information — The problem is too many cooks in the kitchen.

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