The RAND Corp. has had a long history with military Aviation, in fact if I remember correctly when RAND go it’s start in the 1950’s it’s first customer was the USAF of course RANDS second was Nationalist China. A recent graduate of RAND, include the F-22’s cheerleader Rebecca Grant who owns a company called IRIS Consulting now and I’m sure is looking for a new client. From what I read about the Paris Ar Show she gave her ALL for the F-22. As for Army Aviation RAND was all over Vietnam and I hear that they are currently working with the Army on a fixed wing doctrine, and have a piece of the emerging UAW doctrine.

I’m sure that it won’t be long before we are locking it up over the incredibility stupid decision by who else but the Air Force to activate a new command on Friday, “Air Force Global Strike Command”. The name of this new command in and of itself I’m sure will be the cause of many nightmares for the leaders of the rest of the world. I know it’s nothing more then a consolidation of smaller commands into what was once the 8th. Air Force and to create more flag slot in the Air Force.

An historical note here Cole. The latest number of flag officers in the U.S. Military that I saw was about 1500 Admirals and Generals with a total Active/Reserve/National Guard force of about 2.5 million. The German military of WW II at the end of the war in 1945 had during the course of the war less the 565 Generals and only 53 Admirals, this was for a a military that totaled more then 8 million. Me thinks Cole this might be where the problems of the DoD start and where reform should start.

Back to topic. Your statements of doctrine are rather interesting on a little more though. It would appear to be in strong support to the Bush era policy of imposing on the rest of the world “American Democratic Market Capitalism” or the flip side of Lenin’s “Revolution of the Proletariat”. which of course in the west became the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat”

With Bush, we have “The Revolution of the Bourgeoisie” which of course will create a “Bourgeois State” that will be ran by a corrupted Parliament in support of a corrupt “Bourgeoisie Dictatorship”. This may sound silly but from outside the United States this is what many people are seeing. Under Bush Socialism became an American pejorative and even today is the hate word of those who oppose any action by a Federal Government, three months ago it was use by these same folks who opposed the GM/Chrysler deal.

From the statement you posted, I know you are just the messenger here, it would appear that the doctrine of the U.S. Defense Department is to support and advance a Political Doctrine one to the rest of the world.

One note her Cole, I avoided the using of the word Fascist, what I’m talking about is not Fascism either in the current context of American Conservatives or the forms of Government that the United States is promoting and supporting around the world.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Daughter is only a few weeks into Med School and seems to be doing fine. She has many foreign classmates…her school is one of the most integrated in the U.S. to include several Pakistanis in her study group. It’s that kind of U.S.-foreign interface that will help overcome radical Islam, or at least keep it out of America. Don’t know how we save ourselves from those like HSimpson.

Not sure RAND has anything to do with Army Aviation. As always, my opinions are my own and unrelated to my company or the Army. But the great thing about the internet, is that even peons can research and present informed opinions and sometimes it gives those in power something to think about.

Thanks to you and others for helping to keep the exchanges at a higher level. It’s a welcome relief from the all too frequent political insults. That kind of criticism won’t help the military one iota and instead will probably make things worse.

First off I hope the “Doc to be” is settling at Med School OK.

I glad you are working with Marine general Mattis, perhaps, no absolutely the best General be it Army or Marine to come out of Iraq. It is an injustice that he is not the Commandant of the Marines instead of General Conway.

Yes Cole what you say is what we have as doctrine and is in in the manuals. As a civilian I have not seen all of FM3-0 COIN or FM7-0 “Training for Full Spectrum Operations” I sure, but what I have seen is flawed and it’s relief to know that General Mattis is doing the reviewing. Electronic manuals on CD’s and wireless manuals WiKi are both steps in the right direction.

The major problem is a DoD budget that is creeping up into the $ trillion dollar range if not already there when the current costs of Iraq and Afghanistan are included. Until we win some wars and start reducing cost the old legacy “Cold War Programs” have to go. And two of them are the 82nd. Airborne Division and some of the Marine Expeditionary forces capabilities.

The AF won’t buy enough transport to make the 82nd. a viable option in a hurry up deployment and the stand off amphibious operation capability of the marines is just to expensive.

The 82nd. has since 03 been serving as a rather typical Light Infantry Division and it’s HQ’s has fallen into the rotation with all the other Army Divisions as HQ’s units with what ever brigades are in theater or replacements that come along, be them Army or Marine. The Airborne mission is at best an after though, but the American tax payer is still paying for that unused capacity with the 82nd when the money could be used for other things.

The MV-22, a key component of the over the horizon mission has shown itself to have been over sold, as a replacement for the CH-46 and the HC-53 air frames it is not, the EFV even if bought at the outrageous price of $10,000,000.00 per vehicle would still a decade or MORE away from be an operational vehicle. These options are not satisfactory in light of our current operation tempos in war zones.

In short Cole the current operational doctrine besides being unaffordable is steeped in Cold War rhetoric. The job of the DoD is to defend the homeland from foreign attack and to WIN wars, not to win the hearts and minds of the world, that’s what the State Department is supposed to do.

What happened to RAND did the AF finally fire them and replace them with CSC?

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Byron said: “Right now Cole I don’t see any doctrinal justification for additions to the U.S. Armored forces, elimination of certain platforms such as MRAP’s might in fact be in order.”

“You remember what a doctrine is don’t you Cole, a justification of need for a specific system or platform and how it supports current national security goals. It’s something that the generals have forgot to do for the last thirty or so years.“
==============================
Do I remember what doctrine is? I always recall doctrine Byron, because CSC contract teams wrote/write it for the Aviation Center since 2001…myself included from 2001–2003 before transitioning to FCS training that also involved collective task writing. Without disclosing our current project it continues to involve doctrine and training, and others continue to work on the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization training effort.

Also noting your last sentence, General Petraeus was integrally involved in COIN doctrine and LTG Caldwell revised FM 3–0, Operations. Other doctrine is evolving into the new Wiki format to allow more frequent updates and fewer field manuals with the rest becoming Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures.

Marine General Mattis at Joint Forces Command also noted errors in Joint doctrine and directed elimination of references to effects-based operations. As far as I know, all the CINCs and battlefield commander’s know and attempt to embrace COIN and other joint doctrine.

As for your specific claim that current doctrine doesn’t justify new material, organizations, and doctrinal ideas surrounding greater expeditionary capability, let me refer you to FM 3–0, Operations. I’ve taken the liberty of capitalizing key points:

1–69. Several attributes of the land environment affect the application of landpower. These include–

* The requirement to deploy and employ Army forces rapidly.
* The requirement for Army forces to operate for protracted periods.
* The nature of close combat.
* Uncertainty, chance, friction, and complexity.
———————————
1–71. Expeditionary capability is the ability to PROMPTLY DEPLOY COMBINED ARMS FORCES WORLDWIDE INTO ANY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATE EFFECTIVELY UPON ARRIVAL. Expeditionary operations require the ability to deploy quickly with little notice, shape conditions in the operational area, and operate immediately on arrival. Uncertainty as to the operational area, the possibility of a very austere environment, and the need to match forces to available lift drive expeditionary capabilities.

1–72. Expeditionary capabilities assure friends, allies, and foes that the Nation is able and willing to deploy the right combination of Army forces to the right place at the right time. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and force projection—from anywhere in the world—all contribute to expeditionary capabilities. Expeditionary capabilities enable the Army to respond rapidly under conditions of uncertainty to areas with complex and austere operational environments with the ability to fight not only on arrival but also through successive operations. FAST DEPLOYING AND EXPANSIBLE Army forces provide the means to introduce OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT land forces into a crisis on short
notice, providing preemptive options to DETER, SHAPE, FIGHT AND WIN IF DETERRENCE FAILS, AND TO SUSTAIN THESE OPTIONS FOR THE DURATION necessary to achieve success. Providing joint force commanders with expeditionary capability requires forces organized and equipped to be modular, versatile, and rapidly deployable with agile institutions capable of supporting them. Rapidly deployed expeditionary force packages provide immediate options for seizing or retaining the operational initiative. With their modular capabilities, these forces can be SWIFTLY DEPLOYED, EMPLOYED, and SUSTAINED FOR EXTENDED OPERATIONS WITHOUT AN UNWIELDY FOOTPRINT. THESE FORCES ARE TAILORED FOR THE INITIAL PHASE OF OPERATIONS, EASILY TASK-ORGANIZED, and HIGHLY SELF-SUFFICIENT. Army installations worldwide serve as support platforms for force projection, providing capabilities and information on demand.

That said, I believe considering that we have a fully deployed military, amphibious assault will probably be cut in lieu of more pressing needs on the group.

Daniel Russ
Civilianmilitaryintelligencegroup.com

I’m not sure of what you are saying, as usual, I guess. I seldom agree with Mc Caffrey but his estimate of 600 C-17’s for an air lift capacity of a battalion in one life is the number be used as a benchmark for this kind of activity.

On the topic of basing in countries that are near or in fact the targets themselves of a future conflict(s) I don’t think that is a sound policy. First off you telling the enemy where you are and are giving them targets.

The U.S. will have military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan for generations to come and logistic bases that’s a given, One of the future problems in the middle east will be a remilitarized Iraq who almost certainly will want to fill the regional power vacuum in the area. Taiwan and South Korea can protect themselves and any larger American presence in these countries would be a destabilizing factor.

Right now Cole I don’t see any doctrinal justification for additions to the U.S. Armored forces, elimination of certain platforms such as MRAP’s might in fact be in order.

You remember what a doctrine is don’t you Cole, a justification of need for a specific system or platform and how it supports current national security goals. In’s something that the generals have forgot to do for the last thirty or so years.

As I said in my last post here the Marines over the horizon amphibious capacity is in serious need of being reviewed. It’s very expensive to maintain and seem to have a very limited value and if that need came up other less expensive options would be open to national security planners.

The last issue is cost, at the current $10 million per unit for a ground armored vehicle is to much over kill, price gouging by the defense industry. If domestic manufactures can’t give the DoD a fair price on these foreign companies might be able to do better.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Lets late a look at WHAT capability the Unitaed States is squandering at the behest of these “task force commanders”, their narrow one sighted view, and the fools willing to back them up.

Airlift.…wow, even with the stratigic reserve airlift fleet to back up the airfarce it is clearly not enough to get a sizeable force on the ground any type of conflict we seem to think we may fight when we are going to a all conus based force. 200 c-17’s? Are you stupid, as Forrest Gump used to say. 100 C5M galaxies? Are you stupid as Forrest Gump used to say. What these idiot commanders and the fools of the think tanks won’t tell you is that 1/4–1/2 will not be ready due to maintenance issues. Not to mention the shortage of pilots to fly these things. And thats not to mention the size of birgade formations and the equipment our soldiers use to go to war.

And lets talk about the permissions needed to over fly non-hostile countries, and countries not really thrilled about uncle sams view on the war we are going to fight in their back yeard. And lets talk about the possibility of sea lanes becoming so unusable in a given region…anything from major storms, to forgien naval constraints concerning the basing of equipment for a major us military action in their neighers back yard. Now you will get a sense of how stupid military planners really are.

Face it…unless we get rid of the Obamaizationof our defense department and the futures picture of a gtted and weak united states military, our soldiers do not stand any chance of winning a war, whether they be the much over hyped marines corps, or the army its self.

We are the sole nation on earth with the air mobility asset numbers to realize battalion-sized air mechanization. And as LTC Marconi and his men discovered at Objective Peach, an armored U.S. battalion can be a powerful tool when outnumbered. In northern Iraq, even 10 Bradleys and Abrams must have consoled the 173rd Airborne…and was probaby its combat power equivalent.

If you don’t make a heavy battalion task force reasonably air deployable…you write off the Army to a future of irrelevance and inadequate deterrence when months of sea deployment are involved to get the first substantial forces into theater. Has anyone considered lately how an Army airborne force would fare against S-300/400 or any lesser modern mobile SAMs? That’s right up there with the relevance of an amphibious assault.

If the Army isn’t careful, everything to deter major wars will involve sea/air systems while the the Army sets itself up for lots of long counterinsurgencies that overstress its force structure because they couldn’t get there firstest with the mostest to deter said wars in the first place.

Think about it. If you are a U.S. President looking at warnings and indications, you probably are practicing wishful thinking: they wouldn’t dare because of our air/seapower. If it turns out that they WOULD dare, you must decide whether to get said air and seapower involved and risk a major confrontation that might turn nuclear…or just shake your fist and pass another U.N. sanction.

Or instead, Byron, maybe you could have landed 40–80 C-17s in west Ukraine, southern Georgia or South Korea, west Pakistan/Afghanistan, or east Taiwan BEFORE they would dare. “The Pentagon announced a major deployment exercise today to XXXXXX to participate in joint counter-terrorism exercises with the XXXXX Army.”

Prepositioning was fine in Europe when that was the obvious threat with 9 Army brigade equivalents already there, more in POMCUS, and major ground forces in Korea, too. Now the threat could be many places and a heavy task force could be a heck of a deterrent…except most all that deterrent will be stateside.

As long as we have some forward-deployed forces in Germany/Italy, rapid C-17/C-5 sortie re-generation over shorter distances to the middle east or the horn of Africa remains an option. Perhaps Diego Garcia or some other mid-east host could also be home to ships prepositioning trucks and less expensive gear.

But when future GCVs may easily cost $10 million each, you must consider the likelihood that prepositioning of new BCT heavy armored equipment would not be cost effective at multiple locations in the Pacific to cover the middle east and east Asia.

The other thing to consider is that with an M1 tank’s rear engine, we don’t have the option to convert it into an Infantry carrier. Given the 2 gallon per mile fuel consumption (that might be 1 gallon per mile with a diesel), it would be monumentally daft to create a family of tank-sized vehicles that still remain vulnerable to IEDs and top attack that hybrid threats will employ.

That plan was considered and rejected in the early 90’s Armored System Modernization Plan before we knew about $13-going-on-$30 gas, IEDs and V-hulls, and long wars at billions a month, AND yesteryear, we were only planning to buy 120 C-17s under SECDEF Cheney. But top attack and mines were already a threat back then, and remain so in the future countering any more-armor-is-the-answer thinking that would result in 180,000 lb behemoths.

As the amphib capability dies on the vine we’ll have to eventually ask the question — what is the purpose of the Marines. Without amphib they are just a small (albeit bad-ass) 2nd Army.

Task fore is moving in the right directions. Task force 120 is correct in down playing deployability, assumed by air, with only 220 C-17’s and 126 C-5M’s in the Air Force inventory there is not enough lift to move battalions into a theatre at the rate the DoD planned. Deployability in future conflicts must include pre-positioning of sealift instead of just air lift from CONUS.

The MRAP appears at this time to be an Iraq specific vehicle and of little use in planning for a future Army/Marine Ground Force. The best use for the MRAP is to use them in Iraq and to encourage the emerging Iraqi Army to build some formation around them.

Finding common Infantry Fighting Vehicles for both the Army and Marines makes sense. The Marines LAV-25 is on it’s last legs and needs replacement. A look at the Russian BMP’s and BTR’s might provide some answers to common service problems, such as the amphibious ability to cross rivers and other inland water obstacles, the need for greater fire power in a IFV and low cost construction.

The need of an over the horizon amphibious landing of a Marine Amphibious Expeditionary Group should be reconsidered. What should be questioned is how robust might a would be enemies coastal defenses be after the preparatory pre invasion visit by Spec. Op’s and air strikes, be.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner