Read the Navy Proceedings article, thanks. But it seems to indicate that “Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles” are up there with PAK FA in terms of lots of talk and little evidence of real tech.

Had to research the F/A-18E/F too, and read the Australia clan’s assessment of it vs. the Su-30. Seems like that with 400NM normal radius and 650NM with aux tanks (liked the IRST built into the center tank) that CVBGs could stand off quite a distance and aerial refuel only twice, once inbound and once outbound. Kein problem.

F/A-18E/F carry lots of AMRAAMs, have AESA radar, IRST, towed radar decoys, and lower radar cross section than the Flankers. Despite the Australia clan bad-mouthing, they could do pretty well with our EA-18G jamming of their less capable radars.

Obviously the Flankers would be about the only thing that could kill F/A-18s, not the more numerous J-8s/H-6 they would be vectored against. But F-22s would handle many of the Flankers before they got too close, and bomb others on the ground.

Why can’t the F-22s and F/A-18s team together to let the less stealthy aircraft stand-off and be a missile launcher/carrier?

Our AEGIS is highly capable. Short-range air defenses are pretty effective against cruise and anti-ship missiles. The article mentioned that China might not have the C4ISR to coordinate a massive saturation attack against a distance CVBG. Given their copycat rep, its unclear they have the sensor tech or satellites to find and hit a carrier in open seas.

I’ve read somewhere that half of China’s AMD is old SA-2 based and their integrated AMD comms are internet-based. I thought it was no coincidence that their internet underwater lines were cut a few years back, and that coincidink could always happen again.

The diesel-electric subs could be effective in the hide mode close to home but wouldn’t be nearly as good in blue water. Heck I’ve read that Taiwan may have graphite-bomb capability. Point is, as you mention, we have less-publicized capabilities too. And if you were the Chinese looking at the threat they face, you would be a whole lot more nervous than we should be.

The Marine/Army assault was on Taiwan, not the mainland. The study said the PLAN will have only 100 amphibious ships by 2020ish that can carry a max of 31,000 troops. Don’t think that too many of those ships would successfully make the crossing and 250,000 ROC Army troops would be waiting for those that did.

In a modification of General McPeak’s point, the Army desperately WOULD need USAF, Navy, Marine F-35 air cover for AIR-TO-GROUND while making that assault on Taiwan. But note that is air-to-ground, because PLAAF air-to-ground would already have been destroyed by an entire counter-air team from all four services.

Only the combat power of AF forces, when dispersed and operated out of hardened bases (includes US IADS) can deal with a threat like the PRC…in Europe during the 1980s, the USAF was fully prepared to hunker down and fight the Russians come hell,WMD,SPETSNAZ or high water…we know how to survive to operate…or at least, we did.

The Navy cannot generate enough combat power to roll back the PLAF & 2nd Artillery.…in a PRC/TW fight, the Army and Marine Corps do not get onto to court until the heavy lifting is done (of course this fight will never happen because the PRC would never fight the US…say some folks in town but if the “conventional wisdom” is proved wrong…god forbid)..you cannot win this fight without big AF airpower.
In your comments on Gen McPeak’s article..“argument ignores highly capable Army and Navy air defenses and counter TBM”…Then your next paragraph on a Marine/Army assault on few PRC troops…you meant that as a joke…right?
You analysis on the air fight is well done for a guy that is not a professional airman and in possession of a multitude of key facts…but a good posting nevertheless.

Much to their credit, RAND had numerous variables showing where improvements help the most…Guam being one of them. But other major variables such as exchange ratios were left constantly low, there was no play of greater missile numbers fired per sortie, and as mentioned, the same ratios were used whether up against an Su-30/Su-27 or J-8/H-6 bomber.

There is no way, even operating out of Guam, that F-22 sorties would be only 20 a day with upwards of 120 available and our tanker fleet. Yet when you use that lower 20 figure, there is still more than enough airpower to handle the PLAAF.

With the second example I offered, ALL PLAAF fighter/bombers would be gone after 3 days…even in the F/A-18E/F scenario. I also mistakenly left out 60 ROCAF sorties on day one and 8 F/A-18E/F from their example. A 10:1 exchange ratio against old aircraft is completely reasonable for an F/A-18E/F and F-15C with AMRAAM (especially with EA-18G support)as is a 60:1 for the F-22 against 4–4.5 generation aircraft.

Obviously the few nearby vulnerable airbases hurt the USAF case for more land-based F-22s and help the long-range bomber, carrier-based, and stealthy cruise missile case. The lack of shelters and the inability to fully protect against a saturation missile attack means you would certainly never want to put lots of fighters anywhere nearby…and you say Guam isn’t safe either. So what is the case for more F-22s with no place to put them?

In constrast, the naval F/A-18E/F (and future F-35 fleet would have) come out much better in their study. Even if you had to move the carriers 750 miles from Taiwan, with tanker support, those aircraft would be up to task. More than two carriers is also an option later in the war.

As mentioned, with just 20 F-22 and 88 F-35 sorties per day, you have more than enough for the PLAAF…and we will have thousands of F-35s available to create a triad of fighter basing, and support for ground attack. The quantity AND quality are there. The ability to plink PRC Army amongst Taiwan civilians is also there with the F-35s EO/IR to establish positive ID.

Saw General McPeak’s article. With all due respect, it’s the same stereotypical argument about no ground forces being subject to air attack thanks to the USAF. That argument ignores highly capable Army and Navy air defenses and counter TBM that in the real world, protect the USAF airbases far more than the USAF exclusively protects ground forces.

In this scenario with all PLAAF aircraft gone in just 3 days, somehow suspect the Marines/Army would be more than safe mounting an airborne/air assault/ambibious attack on the few Chinese troops on Taiwan who were not sunk by the U.S. Navy and Taiwan troops. But with a blockade in place to choke off China’s oil supplies…no need to hurry that attack.

Out of curiosity, can anyone explain why more U.S. sorties per day hurt rather than helped in the “green” study results? 20 per base per day was shown as superior to 60 per base per day?

Don’t forget that an attack on Kadena would be considered an attack on Japan, effectively pulling them into the war.

In this unlikely conflict between China and the US, I doubt China would want yet another military power to deal with. While Japan lacks any sort of offensive capability, the JMSDF and JASDAF would provide a tangible boost the US and involved allies. Don’t forget that the JMSDF is well-regarded given the scope of their mission, and the JASDAF is highly compatible with the USAF.

Rippy, Excellent point!
Anybody read Gen Tony McPeak’s recent WSJ editorial?

Let’s hope a PRC/TW fight doesn’t happen…oops, there we go again, using hope as a plan!!

Sounds like we should sell Taiwan more Patriots. Enough so China doesn’t have a reliable knock-out punch.

All the jingoist We-Cannot-Lose rhetoric aside, the one battle tested axiom of warfare is that quantity overwhelms quality. The rare occasions when quality has managed to overcome quantity have only occurred when the qualitative advantage was extremely great and the side with the quantitative advantage folded quickly.

US power projection is based on the presumption that we have an qualitative advantage so vast that any conflict will be over before an enemy can bring its full resources to bear.

The reality behind this presumption is eroding rapidly as our adversaries are improving their capabilities while we are paying more attention to the budget than to our standing as “Sole Superpower.”

Day 1: 88 F-35 x 2 kills = 176 kills to 5 losses
Day 2: 83 F-35 x 2 kills = 166 kills to 5 losses
Day 3: 78 F-35 x 2 kills = 156 kills to 5 losses
Day 4: 73 F-35 x 2 kills = 146 kills to 4 losses
Total F-35 over 4 days = 644 kills to 19 losses
33.9:1 exchange ratio

And wait until we get more F-35s, UCAV, stealthier cruise and loitering missiles, better ballistic missile/air defense, and possible long range conventional missiles of our own, and newer tankers that can top off each other to stay on station longer. They get better…we get phenomenal.

Our ISR and political-economic indications would have us placing all our F-22s farther away in Guam and elsewhere. But let’s accept their 20 F-22 sorties a day so the rest that aren’t broke can bomb the Chinese mainland at night and escort B-2s.

I’ve got no need to know Mark, but even in the unclassified world you can make some pretty good guesses. Here’s what it probably should look like staying restricted to an unrealistically low 4 days of fighting and 20 F-22 sorties per day, 88 F/A-18E/F day-one sorties, and 40 Taiwan Air Force day-one sorties as RAND seemed to imply.

But indulge me, and add AWACs to the fight so they along with F-22s can distinguish between the old H-6 bombers and J-8s (Mig-21) and the new fighters. The F/A-18E/F then get vectored to the old stuff to improve their exchange ratio. The 20 F-22s per day get the tough stuff, and others not on air-to-air duties get vectored to attack the Chinese airfields that AWACS quickly identifies as having the modern aircraft. Aegis can probably tell the F-22s where the short range ballistic missiles were launched from.

Here’s a revised estimate, tossing out the green/yellow/red bar graphs that weren’t too clear and throwing in perhaps some more realistic exchange ratios given the aircraft being engaged. All allied aircraft fire at least 2 AMRAAM per threat fighter to assure a kill with a pessimistic .5 Pk each missile.

Day 1: 40 Taiwan AF x 1 kill = 40 kills to 20 losses
Day 2: 20 Taiwan AF x 1 kill = 20 kills to 10 losses
Day 3: 10 Taiwan AF x 1 kill = 10 kills to 5 losses
Day 4: 5 Taiwan AF x 1 kill = 5 kills to 2 losses
Total over 4 days = 75 kills to 37 losses or 2:1 exchange ratio against J-8s, etc.

Day 1: 20 F-22 sorties x 3 kills = 60 kills to 1 loss
Day 2: 20 F-22 sorties x 3 kills = 60 kills to 1 loss
Day 3: 20 F-22 sorties x 3 kills = 60 kills to 1 loss
Day 4: 20 F-22 sorties x 3 kills = 60 kills to 1 loss
Total F-22 over 4 days = 240 kills to 4 losses
60:1 exchange ratio against mostly Su-30s/J-11/J-10. This assumes that with 187 F-22s you can find 20 per day for air-to-air with remainder attacking mainland at night and escorting B-2.

Day 1: 88 F/A-18E/F x 2 kills = 176 kills to 17 losses
Day 2: 71 F/A-18E/F x 2 kills = 142 kills to 14 losses
Day 3: 57 F/A-18E/F x 2 kills = 114 kills to 11 losses
Day 4: 46 F/A-18E/F x 2 kills = 92 kills to 9 losses
Total F/A-18E/F over 4 days = 524 kills to 51 losses or 10.3:1 exchange ratio against J-8s/H-6 and 20% of the tougher aircraft.

or a few years later:

Day 1: 88 F-35 x 2 kills = 176 kills to 4 losses
Day 2: 84 F-35 x 2 kills = 168 kills to 4 losses
Day 3: 80 F-35 x 2 kills = 160 kills to 4 losses
Day 4: 76 F-35 x 2 kills = 152 kills to 3 losses
Total F-35 over 4 days = 656 kills to 19 losses
34.5:1 exchange ratio

And we have yet to add the highly irritated Japanese Air Force after China starts lobbing missiles its way…or Japanese Patriots trained up by Chockblock…or our Aegis…or the 70 Chinese aircraft that Taiwan SAMs shot down on day-one alone…or depleted Chinese sorties due tour airfield targeting.

Don’t these numbers add up to significantly more than the cited 798 PLAAF sortie inventory…in just four days? Not saying our losses are acceptable, but hopefully the Chinese are smart enough to figure out it would be a whole lot tougher than RAND is predicting and this war never occurs.

And why would the PRC attack Taiwan. The more anti-PRC President has been replaced and the PRC-friendly KMT has a majority in the legislature. And then there’s this factoid from RAND’s own study that would have the PRC stupidly killing the golden goose:

“China had replaced the United States as Taiwan’s number one export market by late 2001. Cross-strait two-way trade rose from an estimated $950 million in 1986—the last year before Taiwan lifted the ban on its citizens traveling to the PRC—to more than $98 billion by the end of 2008, the latter figure being equal to 20 percent of Taiwan’s total trade (Bureau of Foreign Trade, 2009)”

China goes nuts over Taiwan whenever they motion towrads independance. THose who think this is all smoke and mirrors: I am active duty 14E (Patriot, US ARMY). China spent billion learning how to KILL patriot and AEGIS.

Taiwan does anything to upset the status quo and China will drop the hammer. We need to be ready.

Right now a patriot unit is in Okinawa for just such an emergency (1–1 ADA)

I hope RAND didn’t say that. Iwakuni is actually on the Japanese main island of Honshu and is about 500 nm from Okinawa.

Lose one, win two. Is old and the classic. Read Changshao battle between Qi & Li.

W. Xiangsui

Perhaps the low F-22 sortie count was due to SRBMs cutting the runways at Kadena. Maybe they factored in repair time and wreckage removal.