We have to take care of the current maintenance of personnel and equipment. I do not like seeing situations where we have to make do with what we have as we had to do in Vietnam ( I was ASA in country on the ground in 1970). We should not project any force in any way that can not be properly supported and maintained. This means rethinking everything including the amount that our friends and some so called friends need to bring to the table for mutual defense. We also need to play nice and try to get rid of some enemies, take care of our people with the proper healthcare and their dependents when they are qualified to receive it too. I am 100% permanently and totally disabled. I hope that doesn’t happen to any of you. However, if it does you will find out that the VA healthcare is a fraud and outright dangerous. But if you only have that and nothing else you will put that carrier into the healthcare and disability compensation and meet the current needs before talking about our future needs. People in my age group paid into social security and medicare. The government emptied the trust fund which would have accumulated interest if properly invested and there would be no shortage of money for the baby boomers. It is a federal crime for private corporations to do what the government did to us. I would start asking myself if we can’t properly take care of those who fight and have fought what will the situation be like when it is your turn. Let’s turn blackwater and specops loose on our individual enemies which cause us so much trouble and start fixing things at home in the meantime. Proud to have served as a professional, sad to see our constitution being pulled apart when I am no longer in the shape to fight for it again. James, Imee, and JD

the rest is sort of an added job load.

the most curious thing i worry about lately is the pirate situation off Somalia. if the Navy wants more carriers, or whatever, have them formulate a gameplan to protect (completely protect) world sea trade in the region and sell vessel insurance delivered by the US Navy in the naval insurance market to help offset the expenses.

i find nothing wrong with the US both projecting its values, protecting the high seas, and making money on the deal. that way, we’d have a lot less b___ about how much all this stuff costs.

also, and i’ve made this suggestion around various blogs lately, have the excess military (and God knows there are a lot of idle resources in the military) assigned to produce energy resources in those areas of the US which have been declared ‘offlimits’ by Congress and apply the net profits to paying for the Obama Medical Plans. …and the VA hospital system.

again, no reason the military can’t be a money maker just like everyone else.

I seem to recall that over the past 30 years we have been slowly reducing Carrier Task Force Groups. I believe that although they are very expensive, they are our best way to project strength worldwide. The Carrier Task Force Groups are the MEU’s are the backbone to our national security and we should never reduce the numbers. It takes days or weeks to get them into position when needed and sometimes more than one may be needed in certain situations.

My feelings are to increase not reduce our Carrier Group numbers. Increase the pay to our military service personnel and completely rebuild the Veterans Administration since it is in a horrendous condition.

The ground guys, 11B in the Army are at the bottom of the social ladder as one might say, even the 11C’s view themselves superior to the 11B’s.

As for air crews the 11B really don’t like them, especially Army helicopter crews, they work 9–5, don’t go out in bad weather, always have reason why they can’t hit the da** target, get a full night sleep every night, don’t worry about the rain, have hot chow on demand, know where the PX is, have clubs and snack bars and laundry service.

Even tankers have it vastly better then the 11B, because they have to stay with their vehicles they can’t do the most dangerous job of war the night ambush patrol, and if you can get fuel to them you can get hot chow and mail.

If you really want to experience what war is like go out for ten day, in the bush with the legs. A typical riffle platoon in Vietnam had over 200% casualties in the course of a 12 month period. A Cavalry Platoon was not far behind with about 150% casualties in 12 months.

The choppers put in in a DZ and will pick you up where ever you might end up. Your fire support is an artillery umbrella that is no longer valid when you run into some sh** and you have some idiot officer on the horn trying to determine where you are on his map that is different then yours. When he calls the fire mission there is about a 50% or better chance he will call it on you.

The weather is best ignored. When it rains you get wet, when the sun is beating down and you are busting the bush you keep going. When you take casualties you do you best to keep them alive. When the dust off comes in all to often with some body bags, contrary to popular thinking grunts don’t carry body bags with them, they wrapped the KIA in a poncho and the put the body in a body bag that is dumped out of the chopper and hopefully with some ammo and rats. Fill the bags and the chopper come back around and you toss you buddy into the hovering chopper like a bag of garbage.

Yes mark, the ground pounder, doggie, grunt, what ever you want to call thinks that everybody else is a slacker and he is right. You don’t see air crew volunteering for the Infantry, but offer a rifleman a door gunners job and he’s gone.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
11B Rifleman, Vietnam.

Additionally, the US Army started phasing out the use of the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) in 1981, and began using the U.S. Army Regimental System (USARS).

That said, you fellows remained possessed by some of wrongheaded notions such as: the “decisive engagement” in conventional war will be fought by the ground force, your evident infatuation with UAVs and the idea that all future conflict will follow the Iraq/Afghan model…ain’t so, state on state, conventional warfare will happen…if we allow our conventional capabilities to wither, we do so at our strategic peril.

The ISR, range, speed and lethality that the US Air Force possesses dictate that no ground force can survive as a viable offensive threat to the US or our ground forces (again, unless we gut the AF). So, the investment in airpower guarantees the success of the US ground forces in conventional war. If the USAF is allowed to atrophy to the point where some other nation’s air component could achieve localized or general air dominance; then, neither the US Army or USMC will venture upon that battlefield. The price tag for air dominance is expense, but get over it…the ground component cannot live without this investment.

As an aside, “irregular warfare” and some “hybrid fights” are less decisively served by the heavy killing power of air; consequently, it requires a heavy investment in ground force structure…I haven’t heard anyone advocating cutting our ground force guys short in their struggles in SWA. This is the USA/USMC’s case to make with “the suits”…the CINCs are ground guys…there are more Army & USMC flags near the SecDef & POTUS than AF..if you got a problem, look within your own ranks.

A word on UAVs…if you are in the least familiar with technology of how UAVs work, then, you should understand the limits of these platforms. UAVs will likely be very useful in a variety of scenarios but they are not the “in-expensive cure-all” that you gush over.

Finally, the “inside the Beltway TOA” arguments have changed only slightly since 1947. All Services make dodgy claims and the AF is no exception…but the thing that irritates airmen are the air power philistines (with not one hour of air combat time) that profess to simplify what is a very complex & dynamic military capability into a few banal bromides. It seems that every ground guy that finished boot camp or attended War College is an expert on the employment of air power?? Who knew fighting at 20 miles/minute with & against the most advanced technology in world was that simple?? Yet, I don’t hear airmen bloviate on the structure of infantry or armored forces…who could take them seriously.

Can the same be said of ground guys?

You continue to so a working knowledge od Army related term, but not their application.

Of course the Army tracks the linage and honors of Brigades. They track the Linage and Honors of every organization issued a guidon on up.
http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/lh.html

http://www.bctmod.army.mil/downloads/pdf/2009%2005%2008%20EIBCT%2009–9077.pdf

http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8726

http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12763

The first link shows the old FCS gear spin outs going to the early IBCT. You can also google Brigade Combat Team and look at the Wikipedia link for maneuver BCT wiring diagrams. Not sure they are still accurate but they look about right. There are a bunch of other BCT types as well: Fires Brigade, Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, Combat Aviation Brigade…yes you can always task organize.

I respectfully disagree with you on the BCT, I know of no defining TO&E for a BCT. It can be a flagged Unit waiting for a home to a robust Independent Headquarters Command with a mixed grouping of battalion unattached to a parent Division, operating under Corps Level Command or higher. To the best of my knowledge the Army doesn’t track the histories of BCT’s.

The unmanned revolution is very much alive and advancing at a smart pace in the ground combat arena. The pacBot is considered to be an indispensable by commanders in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It also is noted that both Lockheed and Boeing have a shopping list of small companies that hold patens for unmanned ground vehicles and systems. The iBot company who manufactures the pacBot is a prime target of the two industry giants. I doubt if the United States will make any more manned combat vehicle, Tanks, AAV’s, ACV’s, APC’s, ADA, etc in any large numbers.

I do agree with you Cole on the Air Force and the Navy. The unmanned system are their futures. Both services are capital heavy and currently have no major threats to deal with. For the Navy it’s piracy which is more of an institutional and dysfunctional chain of command problem then a tactical problem on the seas. The AF is just resisting a role of being the Army/Marines air lifter and taking the “hero” out of the loop.

On you conclusion about the Army Cole, I do agree, but sad to say that’s always been the fate of the ground pounder. Or as a sonnet by George Orwell that goes something like this:

You can sleep tonight,
because rugged men,
stand ready to fight.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

No smoke screens here Mark. But I am concerned with talk that the QDR might think along the lines you describe. There are rumblings that some might believe the Air Force and Navy can deal with bigger threats while the Army and Marines are irregular warfare forces.

That fails to recognize the absence of historical evidence that the air and sea components alone can win any major war. WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, the Balkans, OEF, OIF all indicate the need for effective ground forces to conduct warfare and counterinsurgency.

You are correct that defense budgets will be getting smaller, like it or not. The Air Force and Navy already project asymmetric advantages capable of dealing with any foe into the indefinite future. Therefore, we must address the sole component bearing the greatest warfighting, and counterinsurgency deployment burden…but getting the fewest resources except manpower.

The unmanned revolution is naturally suited to sea and airpower. Technology also can reduce manning of other systems (automatic co-pilot). Witness Littoral Combat Ship, UCAV, unmanned undersea and surface vessels, BAMS on the Navy side, and Predator/Reaper/MC-X, future bombers and fighters, and other future systems of the Air Force Flight Plan.

Open oceans and thousands of feet of altitude, time, and lateral separation simplify unmanned navigations and airspace/seaspace deconfliction. Land navigation on busy roads amidst civilians and over complex terrain is a far greater challenge for unmanned technology. The demands of counterinsurgency require human interaction, and securing of populations and infrastructure as rebuilding occurs…often due to overzealous airpower employment.

The Navy and Air Force provide superb capabilities to support stability operations, civil suppoort, as well as combat operations. But only the ground component has experienced numerous casualties in warfare and counterinsurgency. Some Air Force and EBO proponents would claim that we don’t need boots on the ground and that is the way to avoid ground casualties. History shows that is an impossible dream.

Given that impossible “Disney” fantasy…that bombing alone can realize long term international conflict resolution…we must return to historical evidence that the lnad component has inevitable respnsibilities in every conflict. Given the corresponding substantial land footprint, casualties will occur because most nations can reach out and touch our ground troops far easier than they can airmen and sailors.

Given that reality, the obligation of any nation is to do its utmost to safeguard the lives of servicemen most at risk. Countless billions have been spent chasing the last percentage of unfair fight advantage for air and sea services. When is it the Army’s turn?

Unless reset, manpower, and modernization occurs, Army forces will continue to be the nation’s minimum wage worker, expected to do all the work while “managers” in clean clothes and air-conditioned offices get all the benefits.

The Independence was decommisioned on 30 Sept 1998. She was mothballed, and basically stripped for parts. March 2004 she was stricken from Navy roles, and awaits being completely dismantled or donation as an artificial reef. The scavenging of her for parts has left her unsuitable for further life as a memorial or museum.

Bryon Skinner

You may want to actually read up some on the Brigade Combat Team modular design, because you are out of date. Try Wikipedia under: Transformation of the United States Army http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformation_of_the_United_States_Army , or Brigade Combat Team http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_combat_team ; or try GlobalSecurity.org

Additionally the 173rd is commanded by a Col., Colonel James H. Johnson currently (don’t go screaming “OPSEC” it’s from the Bde’s web site), and has never been commanded by a MG to my knowledge. It was commanded by a BG (along with other “Seperate” Bdes, but this designation no longer exists) during the Vietnam era, but hasn’t since it was reactivated on 12 June 2000 (I was there) as the 173rd Airborne Brigade (no “Seperate”)

I’m following this give and take with some sense of amusement. The BCT is nothing more then a temporary Headquarters structure to manage a grouping of battalions. The BCT has no definition as to size, number or type of battalions or anything, or even how many a Division can have, or even a set rank for it commander it can be from a LTC to a BG. Or in the case of the 173ed. Airborne a MG.

Th Army is not based on the BCT but according to the CARS 1957 Army reorganization, the Battalion will carry forward a units history.

As for the 82nd. Div. it is at this time undeployable by air as a drop unit of battalion size or larger, and most certainly would not be the unit of choice to go into Taiwan in the very unlikely case that the PRC would commit an act of aggression.

Comparing a ground action to a Naval engagement is the old apples and orange thing. It don’t mean nottin’.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Thanks to all that fell for the hopeychange stuff from the J Wright disciple…

Can somebody send my email some information about when the USS Independence CV-62 was
decommissioned. Thank you.

Sincerely Yours,
Craig Moritz USN AMHAN