Randy Powers
chopper69@aol.com

Now if someone whould step up for real leaders like Lieutenant Colonel Yingling I might again have hope for my service…

And you’re right, the uber-network is pretty much useless against this kind of enemy and is not a replacement for leadership and brainpower. Colonel John Boyd said you build a good military with people, ideas, and equipment — in that order.

The General is almost too kind to the fanatics who evangelize the almost religious belief in informational superiority which flys in the face of all known and current operational expereince. How can an all seeing, all knowing network help us out defeating an enemy who doesn’t really coordinate and plan?? Do you need $50 Billion dollars worth of tech to tell you they’re going to try to destabilize reconstruction, and take pot-shots at troops??

I recall a story from a year or two ago when a Colonel from the FCS office came to Ft Leavenworth. He spent an hour extolling the virtues of FCS and after some dissension from the audience, told the assembled Majors something like “If your uniform says US ARMY on it, you will support this program.” One of the Majors stood up, saluted, and said “Yawol mein Fuhrer.”

Great points and spot on analysis of FCS problems. Thanks much for constantly pushing the conversation on these issues!

Greg

The FCS O&O Plan was packed with questionable concepts raising anyone’s eyebrows with a military background. We peons were told “you gotta believe.” BG McMaster’s efforts coupled with Fort Bliss activities may continue fixing FCS problem concepts.

Seems like many of the primary FCS problems included:

* Elimination of combat engineer assets from the BCT
* Reliance on point and click fires which won’t happen due to positive ID and ROE requirements
* Excessive text communications automated reports, and dissemination of ISR video/still photos through the overwhelmed network — plus TSAT and MGV nodes are now gone and JTRS has problems
* Beefed up and rank-heavy BCT and battalion staffs to handle planning. Example: a LTC BCT S-2 was essentially going to perform Operations Officer functions for ISR taskings instead of just making tasking recommendations
* Software was going to perform all manner of automated decision-making for planning

On the plus side, FCS doesn’t get sufficient credit for having ample organic ISR capability. No need to rely exclusively on ISR-push to lower echelons. FCS could fight for information and gather it from squad through BCT level with assets including:

• Radar and IR sensors on ground vehicles and in artillery units for counter-fire
• Organic UAS and unmanned ground vehicles
• Unattended sensors that mitigate Wanat-type surprise attacks
• BCT RSTA squadron manned-unmanned teaming (before the ARH was killed)
• Reconnaissance Troop in every Combined Arms Battalion with highly capable Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicles
• Additional information through the organic Brigade Intelligence and Communication Company through the Distributed Common Ground System-Army

But reliance on UAS/UGV to find ALL mines, and sensors to find small threat RPG teams was flawed. I still believe if active protection works as advertised on some future ground combat vehicles, that RPG teams will be less of a threat, except as artillery against dismounts. But it certainly seems as though the IED/mine threat is here to stay.

Recommend reading BG McMaster’s 2003 War College paper…especially portions questioning the preeminence of precision fires based on an all-knowing network. The enemy has a vote and an aversion to detection and predictability. BG McMaster had a good analysis of our 11 week bombing of the Serbs, showing it was not as successful as advertised at detecting and hitting military targets…but got plenty of decoys.

But given successes of TF ODIN, forensic backtracking, and change detection, we can’t write off higher ISR capabilities as non-contributing. A cavalry mentality of temporarily fighting for information is guilty of failing to provide 24/7 coverage. The enemy can hide and blend in with civilians until your patrol/reconnaissance force leaves, and then plant his next few IEDs and intimidate the population.

Here is a controversial statement from his paper: “Abandon the idea that lightness, ease of deployment, and reduced logistical infrastructure are virtues in and of themselves.” Given that oil is disappearing, growing more costly as worldwide demand increases, and logistical sustainment leads to casualties, you could argue there is value in reduced logistical infrastructure. More fuel trucks means more targeted convoys. Lightness benefits both ease of deployment AND logistics.

Unfortunately, the IED threat means our ground force will get heavier in both secondary vehicles and in all combat vehicles except Abrams. But do we need as many heavy BCT vehicles as we have had in the past. It also seems like creation of early air-deployed heavy/light/Stryker TFs to effectively reduce both air sorties and logistics burdens would not dull the heavy point of the spear leading any defense/QRF counterattack.

BG McMaster may be hitting the nail on the head saying that sometimes it’s better to forego sustainment efficiency for greater effectiveness. Centralization of all sustainment is deemed efficient, but less effective than organic sustainment. With that in mind, couldn’t we adapt Sec of Defense Gates ideas and convert some MRAP into fuel and ammo vehicles organic at battalion and even company level to have a larger unit basic load on wheels. That may be essential if we stick with Abrams and transition to new heavier ground combat vehicles?

If FCS vehicles were too light and we must have a new M1E1 or retain the M1A2, perhaps a smaller 10-tank company and a single tank company per combined arms battalion should be considered. Believe that current conflicts and future full spectrum threats show that FCS got it right by downplaying tanks relative to infantry.

Reference abandoning ease of deployment, it’s true that sea deployment and prepositioning are the mainstay of Army deployment. But sea deployment will always be slow. At $3 billion for 300 ground combat vehicles, and perhaps $6 billion for all BCT equipment, prepositioning options are limited. But admittedly it’s a cheaper option than more airlift. Diego Garcia anyone…where conceivably you could have both air and sealift equipment basing?

While Gen McCaffrey and BG McMaster recommend buying more airlift, it’s pretty clear the USAF and DoD will not buy 600 C-17s just so we can stay heavy. Yet TF Hawk required over 500 sorties according to BG McMaster’s paper, most likely because they kept piling more and more on. Heck another 400 C-17s would cost $100 billion and still wouldn’t deploy more than a few heavy battalion TF in a few days. However we showed we could move 300 Strykers to Afghanistan.

The USAF is certainly willing to pony up over $100 billion for 500 more aerial tankers. If we end up with a 777 tanker, will it really be that much cheaper to operate and buy than more C-17s that conceivably could be modified to do either airlift or aerial refueling? Build something smaller and fuel efficient, and lease commericial capability for peacetime aerial refueling, but reduce it too and land the darn planes more often.

You will note from the bullets below that area security is one subject of the concept. Whatever area security strategy we come up with in Afghanistan must be based on what the Afghan Army can do after we leave. I highly doubt they will ever have enough force to provide 24/7 area security for all of Afghanistan AND sustain that force over dirt roads riddled with IEDs.

Can’t we have more persistent surveillance from aerostats or cameras/FLIRs on newly built power pole lines along route 1 and other PAVED roads with nearby Afghan combat outposts to monitor the video? We already have 24 hour UAS capability and we need more of it, organic at division (MQ-1C) and BCT (Fire Scout) level, and cheaper UAS versions (Scan Eagle?) the Afghans can operate.

Not sure you can ever win hearts and minds of extremists. Regular Afghans who you do win over still gotta make a living and are lost again if you can’t protect them 24/7 by living and sustaining with them and building their economic, utility, agricultural, and transportation infrastructure. We can do that. Not sure the Afghan army could if we leave too soon before construction is done.

BG McMaster is one of the Army leaders with a proven record in both combat and counterinsurgency. Perhaps he can assist Generals Petraeus and McChrystal in ending this mess so the Army can move on and take a well-earned break.

Here are some of the bullets the Capstone Concept addresses that may lead to conversation:

• Conducting operations under the condition of transparency
• Conducting operations with partners and among diverse populations
• Overcoming anti-access in the context of a Joint operations
• Conducting and sustaining operations from and across extended distances
• Fighting for information (physical reconnaissance and human intelligence)
• Employing the manpower, mobility, firepower and protection to close with the enemy
• Conducting area security operations over large areas (including population security and precision fires to limit collateral damage)
• Developing partner capabilities (for example, security force assistance)
• Protecting the network and routinely fighting in degraded mode
• Overcoming hybrid threats/complex web defenses in complex urban terrain
• Ensuring tactical mobility in complex terrain and overcoming enemy countermobility efforts
• Reshaping logistics and the demand side of sustainment to ensure operations without pause and freedom of movement in non-contiguous areas of operations

General McMaster is one of a very few Army Generals that deserve to wear the uniform. His work “Dereliction of Duty” is must reading for anyone in or out of uniform who is involved with or has an interest in military affairs.

The general flaw in McMasters thinking is that he sometimes ignores the role of the non uniformed military in the decision making process. General McMasters sometime can only see trees and not the forest.

The simple fact and military folly is that you can’t plan for the next war until it happens. At best pre-planning is good mental exercise for those who will be the tactical and strategic leaders of the next conflict and at worse it locks up their thinking to what had been war gamed and trained for.

Our next foe is not stupid, he is watching us now and what we are planning for, he is learning what to be afraid of, and where the holes are in our tactics and strategies for the next war.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner