ReconTeam — Good read on the MRAP’s. Being in industry I’ve been around them and your assessment is accurate. I’m hoping for the troops sake the M-ATV shows some promise. The only thing I’ll add is that the RG-31/33 are completely overpriced to the point of being fraudulent, and that doesn’t include the 500K-1M dollars worth of “communications” gear they stuff in. I know some of this stuff (won’t say for opsec) aren’t radios, but COME ON!

We need some audit teams to do a price check on isle 4.

We also did buy a few thousand RG-31 and RG-33 vehicles, which are produced by the South Africans. I know the USMC bought some Israeli Golans too.

Some of the MRAP designs are based heavily around trucks manufacturing by these companies. While we can built MRAPs much quicker this way, there are design problems soldiers have pointed out. Ideally after these wars we should sell and put into storage many of the less than ideal designs.

I understand your passion but your anger/distrust is misplaced. The generals do not make the rules OR choose what they go into battle with. Those decisions are made by civilian leadership & pencil pushers at the Pentagon. IF the generals made the rules & chose what they went into battle with, we would have had twice as many troops in Iraq & Afghanistan AND after we kicked but we would have been “peace keeping” with M1117 Guardian armored security vehicles rather than HMMWVs.

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Byron Skinner,

Thanks for the kinds words. I don’t think anybody is arguing that we need MORE armor. But the ‘decision’ has been made that we are to have a “transformational” medium force. Key to the “transformation” is new ‘medium’ AFVs (more than HMMWVs & other utility vehicles of Light Infantry but less than the Abrams/Bradley of Armored forces). Accepting that said “transformation” is to take place there are two primary points of question/discussion. What ‘weight’ are these “transformational” medium vehicles to be (20 tons, 30 tons, 40 tons MAX GVW) & what is to be the new heavy/medium/light forces structure (how many heavy units, how many medium units, how many light units).

I was cut off, I guess the editors again don’t want to hear what I have to say, oh well that’s life. I know who pays the bills.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Since I’m not really in the on going discussion here about what is need since I’m of the opinion that currently we have more then enough armor to cover any future contingencies that any expenditures at this time on armor would be a foolish allocation of dwindling funds.

I must say that pfcem has done his homework on armored forces, perhaps better then those who are trying to get their hands on the $86 billion that was taken out of play with the cancelations of the FTC, and that’s really all that this is about getting that money back in the budget. This argument has nothing to do with the men and women currently fight Americas war and making life and their jobs wasier

Look, when you realize you screwed up or brought the wrong kit (and that will happen)……you improvise until you can get the right stuff into theater. Unfortunately we’ve been winging it for damn near a decade brother! (count it…..8 years!) In that time we’ve done what? Strapped too much armor on the HMMWV until it became a golf cart?! (only after pretending for 3 years it wasn’t necessary) Managed to produce a marvel of innovaction the MRAP! Only that vehicles was produced in the 1970’s/80’s by the the South African/Rhodesian armies to combat anti-vehicle/tank mines. (and we’d been using them since the 1990’s for EOD) Only our were around 20000X the cost! Then we went and completely rebuilt the Stryker so that it could survive 7.62mm Bullet hits. Who saw that as a threat? (true story, go look at the MEXAS I debacle……had to strip the whole thing down)

I’m sorry that I’m so outraged that the greatest military industrial complex ever conceived on the planet seems more focused on future wars than the one its fighting! Almost ANYTHING you can claim as an advance or response worth noting was done so AT THE OBJECTION OF OUR SENIOR GENERALS. I remind you all that body armor, up-armored HMMWVs and Support Trucks, squad radios, and most recently the MRAP were only instituted after embarrassing the Services on TV. Most were NO BRAINERS and cut the casualty figures damn near in half after we delievered them. (at which point the Pentagon patted itself on the back to say what a bangup job they were doing for Joe…)

Even when we implement somethign we need like the MRAP; we get boned on maintenance and support. It’s so bad now that the Marine Corps parked theirs in Kuwait and said “no thanks!” The vehicles are poorly built and are shaking apart. They can’t go down city roads, and flip over every time the top heavy beasts lean more than a few degrees to the right or left. (That’s why OshKosh is building their M-ATV)

What is the alternative? Go look at KMV’s Dingo, F2, and other vehicles which are highly engineered for this type of work. If you want immediate high rate production we could have called OTT in South Africa for their vehicles, and we’d have gotten them much, much, much cheaper…..

Well I’m getting long in my response so I’ll leave it here. I’m writing a book on all this, hopefully I’ll get it finished between work and everything else I have going on. The point I am trying to make is that we seem to have lost our ability to plan, design, lead, and execute militarily; and if we can’t do that what else does the rest matter? If it’s your contention that this is textbook strategy, planning and execution then you and I have very differing ideas on what success and competence are and I don’t know what else to say.…

Cole, I’m not trying to take you to the dark side or believe I’m completely right, but take some time to think about what I’ve said. Catch you later, getting ready for a much deserved vacation…..

No personal attacks there, right?

Please describe your superior alternatives for military design/procurement. Up-armored HMMWVs, MRAPs, Bradley improvements, Tank Urban Survival Kit, new trucks, Stryker fielding, Lakota, Patriot and THAAD improvements, UH-60M, CH-47F, and Apache Block II,and Hellfire upgrades, Shadow UAS, MLRS and Excalibur GPS munitions, and supervision of FCS under Boeing/SAIC lead sounds like LTG Yankovac was rather busy.

ARH should have survived. But a former Navy Undersecretary chose to kill the Army’s:
* low-cost-per-flying-hour
* $12–14 million flyaway cost
* daily-flown in combat as opposed to late arriving or never served
* underpowered posing a safety hazard
* old, worn out OH-58D replacement

Meanwhile, the six-time more expensive V-22 built in part by the same screwing up Bell Helicopter (IMHO), costing $11 grand per flying and hour gets continued reprieves and other Marine contracts. EFV is extremely vulnerable to IEDs and has more troops aboard yet that was an excuse for killing MGV.

True FCS had/has other problems but fixing those areas and Army-wide fielding of other succesful spin outs is still part of the answer. Heavier V-hull ground combat vehicles, and current vehicle upgrades embracing some FCS technology will fix the rest.

So far, I’ve only heard you advocate reviving dead leaders and returning to WWII, Korea, and Vietnam level old technologies that resulted in enormous casualties. So half a million dead is better than current casualties? Would you have us fire bomb or napalm the Taliban like the good old days? Carpet bombing anyone?
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pennst98:“If you listen to half their “ideas” you would think they’d gotten all of their knowledge of war fighting from watching Hogan’s Heroes.“
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reply: You’re confusing the reruns that you and your party school classmates were watching while General Yakovac, Petraeus, Odierno, McChrystal, and McMaster were at the school just ranked number 1 by Forbes.
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pennst98 said:“However once you stop promoting based on merit the whole system falls apart. Pretty soon no one is making decision based on what is good for the Army, they’re doing what is best for themselves. This is exacerbated in the military because of the rigid adherence to rank. Pretty soon everything becomes the Wizard of Oz meets the Pentagon. PAY NO ATTENTION TO THE MAN BEHIND THE 4 STARS!!
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reply: Yeah, your right, the system that chose Generals Yakovac, Petraeus, Odierno, McChrystal, and McMaster (and 3 out of 4 WWII ones mentioned earlier)must really be screwed up.

I’m confused though. Were those Generals solely looking after themselves when they stayed deployed in combat for years on end while their wives and children missed them at home?
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pennst98:“Never before in our history has America had such a professional, experienced, capable, and dedicated Military. These men and women aren’t conscripts. These men and women are professionals that serve, and continue to serve despite GLARING displays of incompetence and mismanagement by those that command them.“
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reply: I agree they are great. So are their leaders. Cite specifics and how you would have done it better.
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pennst98 said:“I mean do you think we’re going backward in Afghanistan because we have OUTSTANDING strategic minds and leadership?“
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reply: Did the surge in Iraq not work? Is it worth trying in Afghanistan? Did you read General McChrystal new strategy? Are Army generals responsible for receiving insufficient forces and rebuilding funds in Afghanistan? Were Generals responsible when we abandoned the Afghanis following the defeat of the Soviets there? Are Generals responsible for the warlords, corruption, poppies, ISI, Durand line, and lack of willingness to progress technologically or in human rights?
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pennst98:“For my experience and money I’d rather have Marshall, Patton, Bradley, and McArthur and go into battle with gear from Vietnam than go into battle with laser guns and hovercraft under these morons. WE DON’T NEED MORE TECHNOLOGY, WE NEED TO REMEMBER HOW TO FIGHT A WAR.“
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Funny, I thought it was a counterinsurgency the last few years, not a war.

But since you want to talk about war, please peruse comments from a November 2005 article: “Lt. Gen. Joseph L. Yakovac said that when he entered the service in the early 1970s, the soldier was a “cheap instrument of war” outfitted at roughly $2,000 per soldier. “It was a very simplistic Army,” he said.

Review Vietnam casualty levels. Then tell us that low spending level per Soldier described by LTG Yakovac are the answer coupled with bullet and bomb-proof leadership. I enlisted as a combat engineer in January 1975 and it wasn’t a pretty sight. I recall working on M113s back then a decade after their introduction and yet many troops are still riding around in those thin skinned, weakly armed vehicles that are IED bait.

Review the most recent Michael Yon articles where effective British Soldiers and leadership fail to compensate for insufficient spending on helicopters, sufficient troops, and technology to find IED in British sectors of Helmand province. Do you want that to be our Army, too?

Forgive me, I was responding to Cole & therefor my comments were in the context of ‘discussions’ we have had in the past (note for example his comment ‘family of vehicles for infantry carriers, howitzers, reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles, and C2V in the 80,000 lbs range’ — the 1st I recal him using such a large number since he is so big on the supposed transportability & fuel savings of significantly lighter vehicles).

For the beneift of you & others who may not have read or recall such previous discussions I will elaborate. [Cole, forgive me for ‘speaking for you’ here. Feel free to eloborat/correct your point of view.] Despite our many differemces of opinion, as others have noted, we actually agree to some extent with reguards to ‘light’, ‘medium’ heavy’ combat vehicles.

My ‘transformational’ army combat vehicles…

‘light combat vehicles’: 20 tons (40,000 lbs) MAXIMUM gross vehicle/combat weight — as in no vehicle exceeds 20 tons. Family of M113A4 Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light-like tracked vehicles. Family of Stryker-like 8x8 wheelled vehicles. ‘Base’ vehicle the (tracked/wheeled) family is based on being 16 ton APC/ICV with optional 4 ton (20 ton total) armor packages.

‘medium combat vehicles’: 40 tons (80,000 lbs) MAXIMUM gross vehicle/combat weight — as in no vehicle exceeds 40 tons. Family of CV90/FCS-like tracked vehilcs. ‘Base’ vehicle the family is based on being 32 ton IFV (less ARMED vehicles being a bit lighter) with optional 4 ton (36 ton total) & 8 ton (40 ton total) armor packages. Includes a 32 ton NLOS-C like 40 cal 155mm SPH.

‘heavy combat vehicles’: NOT identical but very similar/much commonality chassis. A 40 ton 56 cal 155mm SPH (basically Crusader) & a otherwise identical 40 cal 8″ SPH. A 48 ton ‘base’ Heavy IFV with optional 4 ton (52 ton total) & 8 ton (56 ton total) armor packages. A 60 ton MBT (56 cal 120mm main gun, or if/when needed 48 cal 140mm main gun). Plus a related but a bit smaller 40 ton ‘base’ MEDIUM tank (48 cal 120mm main gun) with optional 4 ton (44 ton total) & 8 ton (48 ton total) armor packages.

Starting from a ‘light’ unit, all vehicles being (wheeled or tracked or even mix & match) ‘light combat vehicles’. ‘Medium’ units substituting ‘medium combat vehicles’ in combat roles but still utilizing ‘light combat vehicles’ more utility/less direct combat oriented roles with upgraded armor packages applied as applicable. ‘Heavy/Medium’ units substituting ‘heavy’ SPH & 40 ton MEDIUM tank. ‘Heavy/Heavy’ units substituting 60 ton MBT & (some but not all) ‘heavy’ IFVs.

I realize that in terms of TOE this is rather complicated. With three tanks (32 ton IFV based ‘light’ tank + 40 ton MEDIUM tank + 60 ton MBT), two IFVs (32 ton ‘standard’ + 48 ton ‘heavy’) & two 155mm SPH (32 ton 40 cal ‘medium’ + 40 ton 56 cal ‘heavy’) but with the commonality within each family (& even across families) of vehicles, logistics/maintenance really isn’t. With the three ‘weight’ classes of vehicles & the optional armor packages within the families you have ‘light’ units of no more than 20 tons, ‘medium’ units of no more than 32 tons (which can be upped to 40 tons), ‘medium/heavy’ units of no more than 40 tons (which can be upped to 48 tons) & ‘heavy/heavy’ units of no more than 60 tons (with in fact only the MBT weighing 60 tons, a small number of 48 ton ‘heavy’ IFVs [vs a larger number of 32 ton ‘medium’ IFVs], 40 ton 56 cal 155mm [& 40 cal 8″] SPH & everything else being basically the same as a 32 ton ‘medium’ unit).

And last but not least, even though I realize it would be hellishly expensive, given the realities of ‘hybrid warfare’ where even traditionally ‘safe’ zones can become combat zones I would extend the familty of 16/20 ton Stryker-like 8x8 wheelled vehicles to include 12 ton (max GVW) 6x6 & 8 ton (max GVW) 4x4 ‘utility’ vehicles (much like the 8x8/6x6/4x4 Piranha family) & do away with the HMMWV/jeep all together as well has have as many other utility vehicles (trucks) be based on the MRAP concept as possible.

One final note. Weight assume/include the use of a significant degree of advanced light weight materials to reduce weight 10–20%. For example the 40 ton 56 cal ‘heavy’ SPH using “traditional” materials/construction would weigh ~48 tons & the 60 ton MBT would weigh 66 tons (with slightly smaller size & more weight efficient design such that it having greater armor protection than the ~70 ton M1A2 SEP).

The problem as I see with Generals and Admirals, while in uniform they are incapable of making decisions regarding weapons and systems, Doctrine, tactical and strategic decision and have to farm them out to private consulting firms like the Cohen group. The Cohen group works both sides of the political isle, it is funded and support at least in part by the defense industry and vigorously support their interests, that’s OK and thats what the Cohen group is paid for.

But in my opinion the Cohen Group, Cato, Hertiage etc. cross the line when they hire retired flag officers to promote the products of the defense industry both to the politicians and the media as being necessary an vital for our national defense.

Lt. General Yakovac while in uniform and on the tax payers payroll was the Army Acquisitions Chief and his record is nothing to be proud of from the problems with body armor, running out of ammunition, up armored HUMVEES for the troops in Iraq, etc. I could go on but I think I made my point. He was a failure and he cost lives of American soldiers.

No Lt. General Yakovac is selling his military services to whom ever wants to but them and is now an expert on what the Army needs, this is the same guy who couldn’t even get the right boots to the troops in Iraq or Afghanistan or see that in combat troops use up ammo at a voracious rate and permitted the U.S. ammo supply get to the point where the Army had to contract with foreign manufactures who provided ammo that was of questionable quality. Is this the type of general who should be providing the expertise to rebuild the Army? Not!

During the Rumsfeld era 39% of the decisions regard the military including advice on the actual going to war had the involvement of these private think tanks like The Cohen Group. The record speaks for it self. t is noted that the prime architects of the American Fiasco’s in Iraq and Afghanistan Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith when the left the Pentagon peddled their services to the highest bidders.

Sec. of Defense Gates has publicly stated that he intends to cut back on this contracting out of the Acquisition and Planning to something below 26%, I think it should be zero %. What these former uniforms and ranking civilian high officials is do can’t help but bring o question in reasonable American of where their own personal divided loyalties lay.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

1st and foremost I don’t feel attacking a man’s ideas is the same as an ad homonym (personal) attack. While I used humor I didn’t disrespect him personally; I attacked an institutional practice of hiring people who aren’t up to the job. If you listen to half their “ideas” you would think they’d gotten all of their knowledge of war fighting from watching Hogan’s Heroes. I could forgive them being promoted beyond their talent, but what I can’t forgive is their promotion of ideas that have long been discredited. (after all isn’t that the job of Republicans and Democrats)

Rank isn’t in itself a problem, hierarchy is a natural progression of human organization. However once you stop promoting based on merit the whole system falls apart. Pretty soon no one is making decision based on what is good for the Army, they’re doing what is best for themselves. This is exacerbated in the military because of the rigid adherence to rank. Pretty soon everything becomes the Wizard of Oz meets the Pentagon. PAY NOT ATTENTION TO THE MAN BEHIND THE 4 STARS!!

Never before in our history has America had such a professional, experienced, capable, and dedicated Military. These men and women aren’t conscripts. These men and women are professionals that serve, and continue to serve despite GLARING displays of incompetence and mismanagement by those that command them.
I mean do you think we’re going backward in Afghanistan because we have OUTSTANDING strategic minds and leadership? Or is it like your posts which indicated our need for FCS-like interoperable full spectrum non-line-sight superiority Wunderwaffen?

For my experience and money I’d rather have Marshall, Patton, Bradley, and McArthur and go into battle with gear from Vietnam than go into battle with laser guns and hovercraft under these morons. WE DON’T NEED MORE TECHNOLOGY, WE NEED TO REMEMBER HOW TO FIGHT A WAR.

Who said anything about needing 8 different drivetrains and mechanics trained for each different type? All I said is that showhorning ALL AFV types into a common chassis results in inferior AFVs to separate dedicated chassis (ESPECIALLY whn you are shoehorning them into a smaller/lighter chassis). I don’t think we should replace US combat aircraft (USAF, USN & USMC + reserves & national guard) with the F-35. It is all good to replace the F-16 with the F-35A, the F/A-18A-D with the F-35C & the AV-8B with the F-35B but don’t fool yourself into think it is a good idea to replace the F-15 (C & E), B-52, B-1, B-2 et cetera (ALL combat aircraft) with F-35s.

The Stryker is a PRIME example of the limited combat effectiveness of light AFVs. The Stryker is a GREAT ‘battlefield taxi’ for giving light infantry some AFV mobility & firepower but is ain’t no replacement for the Abrams & Bradley in high-intensity warfare.

Stop the BS of tankers recklessness in plunging into battle and expecting their infantry, field artillery/mortar, engineer, ambulance, scout, and aviation brothers in arms to plunge into the same kill sacks they bypass and are immune to. They do so such thing. And by the way, I think we SHOULD have some ‘heavy IFVs’ with near MBT armor for those situation when you MUST have infantry fighting right up along side the MBTs ve enemy heavy forces.

Stop the BS that there will never be another war where significant numbers of enemy tanks could be encountered. Not to mention that tanks are good for a LOT more than just taking out enemy tanks.

I don’t like the ‘new’ two armored + two infantry combat teams. Before we had a smaller number of three armored + 1 infantry units & a larger number of one armored + three infantry units. So when you needed a lot of heavy armor, you had it (with basically just supporting infantry) & when you didn’t need a lot of armor but still needed some armor you had units which were primarily infantry (with basically just supporting armor) PLUS you still had the non-aromr units as well.

I TOTALLY agree with the idea of a family of ‘medium combat vehicles’ (which could even include a ‘medium tank’ for those areas where a 60+ ton MBT is not warranted/applicable). BUT you should still have/need ‘heavy combat vehicles’ (MBT, Heavy IFV & SPH) & a ‘light combat vehicles’ (ala Stryker) — not to mention non-combat utility vehicles (HMMWV, trucks et cetera). And you can have degrees of commonality without a ‘one size fits all’ chassis.

i would say that question would be answered by what brigades these would be fielded in. obviously not light, we just bought the strykers so i would advise against replacing them, so that leaves the heavy bcts. as they would be replacing brads and abrams i would say that we should go with the 50+ type. stryker as i understood it was supposed to be the just for the hell of it rapidly deploy able force.

heavy chassis (mbt howitzer ect)

medium chassis (ifv motor carrier maybe assault gun ect)

use common components where realistic the chassis dont have to be identical just use some of the common components,

take a good look at the german puma and swede cv90 and go from there.

mine protection and fuel consumption should be key benchmarks. if the future vision requires a new network and some high speed platinum plated hybrid flux capacitor engine, build those first and then the vehicle so you arnt waiting for a hypothetical lighter armor all knowing network invincibility active protective system and 5000 mpg engine.

Dead on. The problem with think tanks is that they are populated with people paid to disseminate particular point of view as opposed to actually thinking. They are disguised as academics. But there is no academia there at all, just lobbyists essentially who remember how to write a term paper. I also think lobbyists are part of the problem with military procurement. They have 24/7 access to the legislators and their staffs. That gives them more say so in national defense matters than someone who who has seen war for what it is, and knows what it’s like to be shot at.

Daniel Russ
Civilianmilitaryintelligencegroup.cm

Personally, I believe our next infantry carrier vehicle should have a similar level of protection to our next MBT. If we go for a 40 ton MBT (supplemented by some upgraded Abrams), than I would like to see an IFV with the same level of armor.