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A Smarter Army Mod Plan?

By Colin Clark Monday, September 21st, 2009 4:55 pm
Posted in Land, Policy

UPDATED: Click Here for Chiarelli’s Modernization Briefing

The Army seems to be making more detailed and rational noises about what kind of modernization effort it will pursue after the cancellation of FCS, according to a congressional aide and a detailed read of a briefing by Gen. Peter Chiarelli, Army vice chief of staff.

A congressional aide familiar with Chiarelli’s briefing said it contained more promising efforts than had been apparent so far. In particular the service’s decision to push development of the son of FCS out several years attracted praise from this aide. According to the vice chief’s charts, design review would not occur earlier than early fiscal 2012, with prototype deliveries expected in fiscal 2015. The Army had been speaking of production in five to seven years. Now it’s talking about a seven to nine year effort.

The biggest strategic challenge — which many observers wondered if the Army understood earlier — is “balance modernization vs. personnel costs,” as slide seven says in Chiarelli’s 10 Sept. presentation at an Institute for Land Warfare breakfast. The key parameters for the program’s requirements are to improve survivability and to give the Army a “decisive advantage” over any enemy. The “most critical component” of any such modernization effort is the network — not the platform. The new three-pronged approach will include capability packages for brigade combat teams, the network and, lastly, the vehicle strategy.

As we first reported, the Army will pursue the capability packages in two year chunks. They will first immediately “incorporate” MRAP into the force and get rid of the M113. Then they will reset and shed Bradleys. After that, around 2017 they get to the Ground Combat Vehicle, successor to the FCS Manned Ground Vehicle. While pursuing all this, the Army will also improve the Stryker, Abrams tanks and the Paladin force.

As the new vehicle is designed and built, the Army will bear in mind that “technology is changing too fast to allow us to field equipment in traditional 10–15 year cycles.” So basically the new system will not come out until the end of a second Obama administration (should there be one), giving the Army plenty of wriggle room between now and then.

But the Army’s nascent plan raises some basic questions.

With a force primarily dependent on legacy systems — which now includes MRAPs — where is the deployable force that can range across the battlefield at speed and with lethality? Or has the Army decided deployability simply must be superseded by survivability? As Chiarelli notes, “We’re not saying this vehicle has to fit in a C-130.” But the US has learned time and again that its toughest regular troops — the 82nd Airborne and the 101st — may be able to get to a fight quickly and be relatively well armed, but they don’t have much to fight from once they get there.

How do the Marines fit in all of this?

Where does the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle fit in this plan? Do the MRAPs replace this promising vehicle?

Chiarelli answers some of these issues in a section titled “Countering Our Critics.” (Buzz readers will recognize most of the criticisms as they come from some of our stories.) He says the service will “field what’s available, affordable and technologically feasible…” and will build a “versatile platform capable of operating in different complex terrain environments.”

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	TB September 21st, 2009 at 7:29 pm Will this briefing become available? “The “most critical component” of any such modernization effort is the network — not the platform. That is the most troubling statement in the story. Nevermind that on the ground we want a vehicle that isn’t a gas guzzling maintenance hog that’s too big and heavy to go places. The whiz-bang network is what’s more important?! There the army goes again thinking perfect intel is an achievable goal and is more important than good tactics.
	Zach September 21st, 2009 at 7:32 pm “technology is changing too fast to allow us to field equipment in traditional 10–15 year cycles.” So make the equipment and especially the vehicles modular, where you can easily replace old technology with new without needing a new platform. If say the Abrams and Bardley was like this, we probably wouldn’t be talking about a new ground vehicle for another 10–20 years. If we could easily put newer armor/engines and other equipment (aka network) in with ease. I might be over simplifying it, but someone once said the best solution is the simplest one (or something like that).
	Chockblock September 22nd, 2009 at 1:00 am We need more airlift. Congress has to realize that the vehicles need to ride in USAF planes not contractor/chartered aircraft. No matter what system, the Army wants it to be as small as possible, then starts adding equipment, roles and missions until the axles break. Witness the uparmored HMMWV. More C-5’s C-17 and admitting that the stryker needs lots of help when facing a real army.
	Curt September 22nd, 2009 at 3:03 am TB, Actually the statement makes perfect sense. All of the aspects of the vehicle side you talk about are important, even critical, but are easy compared to the network. You probably won’t make any dramatic improvements in vehicles. No wonder armor that stops anything and weighs nothing, no 100mpg engines that run on water, or anything else. This isn’t 1918, armored vehicle technology is relatively mature and it is unlikely that the vehicle itself will give you a decisive advantage. But the network, not just the radios but the intellectual part of it, is something that you can get right and make a decisive change (at least for awhile). Just blue force tracking, increased responsiveness for fires, better logistics and maintenance visibility, better maps, and yes, information sharing of the correct information (that is the intellectual part of the equation) is extremely valuable. And of course you have to figure out how much redundancy to have, how will you operate without a network, what is the right amout of training at each level, the right mix of on and off vehicle sensors, tactics against various opposition, etc. Compared to that challenge, the vehicle is relatively easy. That is not to belittle the challenge, it is going to be tough to get the vehicle part right.
	MC September 22nd, 2009 at 6:23 am TB…I agree with you,and strongly disagree with curt. The Army is being to Dependant on technology that can be defeated by simple, and other technical means. What happens when commanders lose track of blue forces after a RPG strike on the command vehicle or facility, or a EMP either from a nuke blast or a massive blast of electricity? What will forces do then blinded, and unable to communicate? Nothing beats hard core training. Nothing beats simple vehicles, proven yet effective. And nothing beats common sense, which the Army is clearly lacking when they want to base hope on the stryker,and MRAP and do away with legacy systems such as the bradley.
	peckmi September 22nd, 2009 at 10:32 am GEN Shinseki had it right in 1999. Buy off the shelf, train to identify doctrinal gaps and technology gaps, force a final soltion through the bully pulpit as CSA. The Army doesn’t have that kind of leadership today, so the timidity toward an intuitive solution (GCV?) gives way to study upon study. Technology is OK, but an 80% solution that has trained and ready soldiers will win on any battlefield.
	pennst98 September 22nd, 2009 at 10:37 am Colin, great job with the last few questions! Color me skeptical buy Smart, modernization, and Army are three words that shouldn’t appear next to one another until someone actually does something smart.…. The problem here is that the Army views technology not as a tool, but as a panacea. Don’t fix your abysmal level of interpreters and HUMINT assets……just build the dogcrap out of SIGINT and OPINT assets. Forget that the enemy looks like anyone else you’d see, or that most of their communication is personal/written; we can counter that with C4ISR magic! (POOF!) When the history of the war is written it will be a tragedy. Not because we didn’t fight valiantly, heroically; our men and women have shown their mettle. It won’t be because we didn’t bring enough firepower; we brought 1000000X the firepower of the enemy from the air, ground, and sea. No, this will be a tragedy because we liberated a people only to so mismanage affairs so damn badly that they ran back to their oppressors. This will be a tragedy because we never saw beyond the military aspects of applied violence, that this was a war of ideas. Last but not least this will be a tragedy because if anyone was in a better position to see the forest for the trees it was this particular group of Generals; almost all of whose first combat service was in Vietnam. Where are all the good generals dead, in the heart of in the head…..
	DensityDuck September 22nd, 2009 at 12:01 pm peckmi: I’m sure the Army would be happy to buy COTS, but the DoD won’t let them. If it ain’t Milspec then it ain’t allowable. Remember the whole Dragon Skin debacle?
	Byron Skinner September 22nd, 2009 at 3:10 pm Good Morning Folks, Over all I don’t find much to disagree with Sec. Gates here. I agree with the putting personal and networking ahead of changing armor and buying new heavy platforms. The only differences that I can come up with is getting rid of the M-113’s. This is a matured platform in the A3 configuration that has many uses for support, services and communications operations. The US owns over 20K M-113’s has an in place service and support programs. It makes sense to use the M-113 for the purposes that it is best suited for. The Bradley’s are a matured technology that has out lived it usefulness on the modern battle field. All the over weight Bradley’s can bring to the fight is it’s 25mm Bushmaster I, and the TOW missile as direct fire support for the Infantry. These capacities could be put into the Stryker platform with perhaps up grading the 25mm gun to a 50mm Bushmaster III cannon and changing the TOW to the TOW-W anti tank missile and adding it to the Stryker Fire Support Vehicle. It is noted that 105mm, Fire Support Stryker has more then a few bugs in it. Using a smaller cal. main gun and adding the TOW-W will give the Stryker Fire Support Vehicle more utility to the Infantry in the types of engagements we are seeing in the war on terror. ALLONS, Byron Skinner
	Daniel September 22nd, 2009 at 3:17 pm the Bradley has outlived its usefulness and the m 113 has not? ahahahahh i guess you missed the first part of Iraqi freedom, the gulf war and every time a heavy force was needed to roll over something. do you have any idea what your talking about? lemme guess up armoured “gavins” are the future of the force?
	Rick September 22nd, 2009 at 4:01 pm The artical says they will be ‘getting rid’ of the M113. That does not sound like they think it is more useful than a Bradley.
	peckmi September 22nd, 2009 at 4:36 pm Check out the Stryker on steroids at AUSA next month. 30mm RWS, 55k GVW capacity and a sensor on a stick. Maybe this will fill some gaps
	ReconTeam September 22nd, 2009 at 7:29 pm Peckmi that is exactly what I was envisioning when I pictured a “2nd Generation” Stryker to accompany new heavier vehicles to eventually replace the Abrams, Bradley, and Paladin. Those deployable sensor mast things (which I think you are referring to), take up space on the inside of the vehicle. So they would probably just be for the dedicated reconnaissance variant of the Stryker. Please don’t tell me somebody called the M113 the G*v!n here?
	tipover September 22nd, 2009 at 7:35 pm Byron, the M-113 would not be a good support vehicle except in some specific cases. And most are old and worn out. As was the case in the late ‘70s when I drove the M-577. they were tired back them let alone now.
	Cole September 22nd, 2009 at 10:39 pm The Stryker upgrades sound good peckmi, and sounds like it becomes the default air deployable force. Was impressed by the slides. It does not specify what Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is replacing. But with the systems going away and others being upgraded, you can guess that GCV replaces Infantry carriers, scout vehicles, and C2 vehicles in heavy BCTs. Are we really going to keep the Paladin forever? Moving toward more guided MLRS in a smaller rocket size at some point? It will be interesting to see how they integrate MRAP. As I said in the other post, perhaps they could create a 3rd battalion for light and heavy BCTs that would have both MRAPs and Strykers. That would provide an air deployable early entry force for heavy BCTs (put the MRAPs on ships) and greater firepower/protection for early entry light BCTs.
	Cole September 22nd, 2009 at 11:08 pm Pennst98 confirming low IQ: “Last but not least this will be a tragedy because if anyone was in a better position to see the forest for the trees it was this particular group of Generals; almost all of whose first combat service was in Vietnam.“ ======================================== Hmmm, considering that Generals Petraeus, Odierno, and McChrystal graduated from West Point in 1976, they must have completed their Vietnam short tours in the summers between 7th and 8th grade. General Chiarelli just missed the tail end graduating from Seattle College in September 1972, but was probably in the Armor Officer Basic Course when the war essentially was over. Here’s a hint. Even though all those Generals are older, wiser, and more accomplished than you or the rest of us, doesn’t mean they lived through D-Day or the Great Depression.
	elgatoso September 22nd, 2009 at 11:26 pm ReconTeam: We have not technology to replace the Abrams,we can complement or improve or refurbish but not replace the Abrams,to replace the Abrams you need a technology leap(new types of propulsion ‚new types of armor,new type of guns).The Abrams is the last MBT.
	peckmi September 23rd, 2009 at 9:29 am ReconTeam: 30mm RWS is a turret that does not intrude into the squad space, however, I’ve seen the pics and the mast takes up one soldier seat in the back. Overall, it might be something that works on a scout unit, maybe in the new Battlefield Surviellence Brigade (BfSB) or as in early interim GCV?
	MTN_TROOP September 23rd, 2009 at 11:02 am Up armored Gamma-Goats the IFV of the future!!
	peckmi September 23rd, 2009 at 11:20 am One other thing, maybe the Army should adopt the USMC model and have a Stryker battlefield mobility unit in the ARNG that could deploy with an IBCT in certain mission profiles. Kind of a combat taxi service. Provides protected mobility, but doesn’t bump the active Army endstrength limits.
	Byron Skinner September 23rd, 2009 at 2:21 pm Good Morning Folks, tipover; I don’t disagree with you and I think that is what I said. The days of the M-113 as a APC or “Battlefield Taxi” as it was sold as in the late 1950’s and as an AFV what it became in Vietnam are long over. My rational is simple we own a lot of M-113’s, the last were made in the early 1970’s bit many have low hours on them and have spent most of there careers in depots, their number is in the thousands still, the M-113 is a very adaptable, being nothing more then a box on tracks. An example is the combination of the M-577 and the M-113 that has been the mobile company and battalion command post for generations. The carrying capacity and adaptability of both vehicles makes this an ideal combination. Since there isn’t a variant of Stryker yet to replace this vehicle configuration it doesn’t make a lot of sense to scrape it. The M-113 and the M-2/M-3 Bradley’s are both evolutionary mature systems that have run out of ways to be modified for future missions. That said it appears that the core of the Army’s Divisions will be the three 1st’s, 3ID and 4ID and it appears that it will be years before these conventional units will be weened from heavy armor so all the heavy stuff we have now will still be around in the future as we know it. ALLONS, Byron Skinner
	peckmi September 23rd, 2009 at 9:37 pm Byron, the biggest thing the M-113 family is lacking is mine and blast protection, the things that are killing most of our soldiers. Little ground clearance and flat unreinforcable belly. The same with Bradley. At least Strykers have the speed to make command detonation iffy and a height management system to provide a greater distance from the blast. The Stryker has a command variant that the Army is considering to host the WIN-T in the Infantry BCT’s. There is little left of the Div or Corps HQ’s, they are deployable C2 HQ’s with area responsibility, but not direct combat formation (BCT’s) C2 responsibility.
	Rhyno327 September 24th, 2009 at 9:42 am I don’t like the idea of dumping the Bradley. It still is a potent weapon and is useful in heavy brgds. Why get rid of something that works?
	FormerDirtDart September 24th, 2009 at 12:14 pm Rhyno327, They are not planning on “dumping” the Bradley tomorrow. But, transitioning away, or “divesting,” from it begining around 2018. Cole, Page 16 of the briefing document states that a large number or MRAPs will be integrated into MTOEs for sustainment and medical brigades (route clearence, convoy security, medical evacuation, etc.) in other words, Service and Support, and Combat Service and Support. They also seem to be talking specifically about the MRAP ATVs (M-ATV)which are just now entering production. I think it is likely that a very large number of the primarily road bound MRAPs currently in service in Iraqi will be staying in Iraq as our forces withdraw
	Cole September 24th, 2009 at 7:48 pm FormerDirtDart. I had seen the slides, but read what they say: ============================ * Incorporate into the Army —Efficient use of limited assets to benefit the entire Army (MRAP); will need to align to ARFORGEN cycle ============================ That implies not using them for prepositioning as believe was one original intent, because they would be integrated during a Reset portion of ARFORGEN following a BCT deployment The briefing goes on to say: ================================= * MRAP (80% at 11,635) ATV’s incorporated into the calculus * Making sure every Soldier has a protected seat * Becomes committed BCT-specific capability sets; –3,700 will be integrated into MTOEs for sustainment and medical brigades (route clearance, convoy security, medical evacuation, etc.) ================================= Believe the 80% refers to the Army’s percentage of the 15,000 total MRAPS…or around 12,000 already produced that belong to the Army. Think the M-ATVs are being fielded differently than the MRAPs since there will be far fewer than the 11,635 MRAP cited. “Making sure every Soldier has a protected seat.” Does that mean non-combat arms or everyone? FMTV replacement? Didn’t they just order more? They won’t replace HEMTT and its PLS capability. As peckmi suggests, you could conceivably have a separate 3rd maneuver battalion in heavy and light BCTs that had nothing but MRAPs (and maybe Stryker) and drivers/gunners to keep the manpower down, yet providing an alternative to Bradley/Abrams deployment for counterinsurgencies and initial air movement of lighter tailored task forces. Remember, we moved half the MRAPs into Iraq by air…admittedly over time. If only 3700 are integrated for sustainment, convoys, and ambulances, that leaves 8,000 more that must be used. Divide 40 active BCTs by 8,000 and that is still 200 MRAPs per active BCT, or around 100 per BCT if split equally with active and reserve BCTs. Sure seems like they would be a natural in the National Guard because the height/weight would help a lot in flood conditions. If all that isn’t enough to confuse you, read this Congressional Research Service paper: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22707.pdf
	Daniel September 24th, 2009 at 9:21 pm the vehicle that lacks mobility (hence the m-atv) should be the basis for a maneuver battalion. do you see the flaw in your logic? look at some of the vehicles for the British light protected patrol vehicle they weigh in around 7.5 tons not the 20 ton behemoth the mrap is. the mrap is a niche vehicle, it does one thing, get blown up and not get everyone killed, its very good at this and should be kept in numbers to do exactly this when METTC dictates their use but they are not something you should base a permanent structure around as they are not a flexible system. the rg 35 might work in this role but the real legacy of the mrap is that blast resistant features will be incorporated into all vehicles.
	Cole September 24th, 2009 at 10:35 pm Daniel, I hear you, but as you probably know both heavy and light BCTs once had 3 maneuver battalions instead of two. There has been talk about returning to 3 battalions…but that would require lots of extra personnel and equipment if we retained 45 BCTs. Believe I read recently that there was talk of going from 18 to 12 heavy BCTs to get back that 3rd battalion per BCT (18 BCT x 2 Bns vs 12 BCT x 3 Bns = 36 Bns). But what if instead you had a 3rd battalion, and each of 4 companies had 30 MRAPs for a total of 120 with drivers only. That yields more than enough vehicles for the Soldiers of the other two battalions to fall onto. The personnel bill is only 120 driver Soldiers plus a small HHC and some extra Brigade Support Battalion troops. Multiply 233 Soldiers by 30 heavy and light BCTs and you might need an extra 7,000 Soldiers…not easy but Sec Gates wanted them in active BCTs. Everything you said is true for offensive operations. But if you are conducting stability operations or an initial defense of points of entry, you might show up in theater with nothing but MRAPs against light threats. If you are an early entry heavy or light BCT air-deployed battalion against a MODERATE threat, you could end up in a mix of MRAPs, GCV infantry vehicles for heavy or M-ATV for light BCTs, and a few tanks. Use MRAPs to move to dismounted positions around an airfield perimeter. Some MRAPs overwatch along with GCVs/tanks and act as a QRF. Not a lot of mobility required. Other MRAPs resupply the dismounts when 463L pallets come out the back of USAF C-17s and KC-X. You actually could form an offensive 3rd battalion by spreading sea-deployed heavy equipment and MRAPs between all 3 battalions. The bottom line, is that with 7,000 more active Soldiers, you would have double, and even triple the options for 45 BCTs to deploy, fight, sustain, and stabilize with by air, land, and sea within the ARFORGEN cycle.
	Daniel September 24th, 2009 at 11:28 pm im not saying that mraps are useless im saying that they are not a feasible permanent battalion structure. they would excellent for use when their attributes come into play. using oif as an example, if we had mraps prior to the conflict, they would have been great if deployed on oif II as a follow on force but not part of the permanent brigade structure but in an ad hoc basis. this third battalion you want will be of only limited use so instead a better use of personnel and equipment is using mraps on an ad hoc basis as needed and conducting familiarity training on them. your 3rd battalion idea just seems unnecessary, an mrap is not hard to fall onto, in iraq they just showed up one day. example your heavy bct would primarily train on their toe but also conduct familiarization training with mraps. light would do the same, this allows a full spectrum capability of offense and then holding operations. on the airfield security unless an ied is placed on the perimeter of the road an mrap is no more suited than any other vehicle. my issue with mraps is they are as unsuited to conventional warfare as they are to counter insurgency. they have their place they do it well but are not a jack of all trades. unless they come up with other variants of the m-atv and the jltv is not pursued then a great tragedy has occurred. our lightest vehicle cannot be a 14 ton m-atv. check out force protection europes ocelot and supacats entry into the british light protected patrol vehicle (im not trying to plug products), hopefully jltv will come out in simialar concpt form to these vehicles. thats what should be our light vehicle a 7.5 ton armoured v hull off road vehicle. And i think it would be very smart to move back to 3 battallions. ide like to see 13 man squads and 6 man teams also but i dont think anyone important shares my centement.
	Daniel September 24th, 2009 at 11:31 pm also your third battalion sounds alot like an trans company not what would be an infantry battalion. i did misread that you were talking about a landing on an airfield so disregard that portion i thought you meant a static position.
	Cole September 25th, 2009 at 12:32 am You have a point that it could be a giant transportation company in the brigade support battalion. But if you trained in a near perpetual state of task organization and habitual relationship, and retain like-vehicles in parent battalions for maintenance, you retain the 3rd maneuver battalion capability. The drivers are primarily there to maintain, but learn to drive tactically as part of their habitual force. Can you picture an axis of advance with an MRAP-heavy battalion w/ minimal infantry advancing on roads with a few tanks for protection to escort other BCT sustainment trucks, while most infantry GCVs and tanks would be in the two battalions on either side of the road moving cross country with primarily tracked vehicles. What about a battalion setting up multiple combat outposts using both MRAPs, GCV, and tanks to form a perimeter, and other MRAPs used to patrol roads to save fuel, while a few tracks patrolled cross country. Think about. The Army must find suitable roles for 8,000 MRAPs beyond the sustainment, ambulance, and convoy roles for 3700 MRAPs. Engineer M113s are one probable replacemnt. But what else? Mortar M113s? C2 in place of M577, etc? I hope not. If you put 120 MRAPs in each of 30 BCTs as a third battalion, that takes care of 3,600 MRAPs. Add the reserve component BCTs and you cover them all.
	Daniel September 25th, 2009 at 3:19 am “Can you picture an axis of advance with an MRAP-heavy battalion w/ minimal infantry advancing on roads with a few tanks for protection to escort other BCT sustainment trucks, while most infantry GCVs and tanks would be in the two battalions on either side of the road moving cross country with primarily tracked vehicles” the issue i have with this is that the mrap doesn’t exactly have a small silhouette. also being a not so mobile your really getting into a predictable situation of where your going to be. it would all depend on what threat level they are entering. imagine if atgm’s are present, all advantages of the mrap disappear and only its short coming remain. think of this issue with your bridge structure, its asymmetrical. you can do major operations with two battalions and your third “battalion” is simply a bunch of trucks and drives, its a support element. if you added it as a trans company or support company or something of that nature it would work, in reality they should be kept for use where they make sense not forced to fit in the wrong shape hole. this is the same issue of making the hummvee and armoured car/troop carrier just with a different vehicle. i would keep large amount of mraps with the various units in order to convert light and heavy bcts into motorized infantry bcts if necessary i.e. if deployed to ied prevalent environment. i mean would this requirement be daft enough to require the army to attack north korea with a spearhead of mraps?
	Cole September 27th, 2009 at 4:13 pm Daniel, many good points. Also believe you gotta consider that a third MRAP maneuver battalion with 233 Soldiers would be half the Soldiers of a normal combined arms battalion. If 30 BCT MTOEs had smaller third MRAP battalions requiring just 7,000 total Soldiers, the Army gives up just 2 BCTs to pay the bill (43 instead of 45 active BCTs). If instead they add fully-manned MRAP or combined arms 3rd battalions per BCT, it would require at least 14,000 more Soldiers, which would mean at least 4 fewer BCTs (41 instead of 45 active BCTs) in the ARFORGEN rotation. Second, just because you had 120 MRAPs wouldn’t require deployment of that many initially. In normal stability or smaller operations, you might deploy with nothing but 120 MRAPs and very few tanks and Bradleys for troops of all battalions to employ. In other conflicts, you might go Bradley/Abrams-heavy with relatively few MRAPs. Imagine a BCT deployment force tailored as follows: Air-deployed battalion: 2 MRAP companies with 30 total MRAP (10 C-17) 1 Tank company with 10 M1A3 (10 C-17) 1 Infantry company with 14 GCV (7 C-17) Selective trucks, artillery, C2V, mortars, ambulances, etc. (22 C-17s for 50 C-17s total for battalion) ———————————————- Sea-deployed battalion: 2 Infantry companies with 28 GCV 1 Tank company with 10 M1A3 1 MRAP company with 15 MRAPs ———————————————- Sea-deployed battalion: 2 Tank companies with 20 M1A3 1 Infantry company with 14 GCV 1 MRAP company with 15 MRAPs This implies task-organization of equipment and personnel from two combined arms battalions and the MRAP battalion across three total maneuver battalion headquarters. Infantry from sea-deploying GCV might be part of the air-deploying battalion until their equipment arrived by sea. Alternately, a forcible entry light infantry force might fall onto the MRAPs to provide them initial protection and ground mobility. The remaining 60 MRAPs from the MRAP battalion would sea-deploy late in TPFDL for transition stability operations. Finally, consider the advantages of training the MRAP operators to be unmanned vehicle operators. Since they would never dismount with infantry, they could operate unmanned aircraft and ground vehicles when the MRAP is conducting stationary overwatch. If half the MRAPs deployed initially, the drivers of sea-deploying MRAPs could be full-time gunners and/or moving MRAP operators of unmanned aircraft or ground vehicles. Unmanned ground vehicles and larger air vehicles currently require vehicles and trailers to haul them around. MRAPs would be natural candidates to tow all the BCT’s UAS and UGV on trailers or in the bed. FCS “Mules” could be modified to act like forklifts to load and offload MRAP supplies and UGV/UAS from the high MRAP bed. Bottom line, if the Army must integrate so many MRAPs, there are plenty of smart ways the Army can do it without giving up other future fighting GCV and other systems.
	Daniel September 27th, 2009 at 5:48 pm i dont know how to say this, an mrap plus a driver is not a squad. 120 mraps plus drivers is not a battalion, this is not a third battalion this is a trans asset. are your “mrap companies” carrying infantry? or just your one driver?. hell a better idea would be to have 1 mrap for every gcv and then deploy whichever vehicle in whatever mix works for the situation. the problem with making dedicated mrap units is that they are not in the least bit flexible.
	Cole September 27th, 2009 at 7:45 pm Think flexibility. Look at the two battalion TFs that are sea deploying. There are 3 Infantry companies there. Obviously it takes a while to get their equipment to port and then to theater. Some of those infantry can air deploy with the MRAPs, while others prepare their GCVs for sea deployment. Other infantry will already be in theater with the airborne, air assault, or light infantry BCTs. Now you have early deploying vehicles that save C-17 sorties, are less threatening to most of the local population; withstand small arms,IEDs, and mortars/artillery; use less fuel early in the conflict…and fuel is scarce initially. Believe you can load those trucks up with lots of 5 gallon or larger cans and ammunition as well, and make lots of trips to get more fuel/ammo from the airfield being protected that is the initial source of supply. Think of putting lots of unmanned equipment with those MRAPs. That avoids having to train already overburdened infantry and armor troops on the same equipment. It gets that equipment around the battlefield because space in GCVs and M1A3 is/will be at a premium and you don’t necessarily want to rob an rifleman from a squad to operate a UAS/UGV, As for the number of personnel in the unit, aviation and armor companies, and FA batteries are relatively small compared to infantry companies. But as mentioned, you have lots of flexibility to add infantry to those MRAPs as required, and lots of flexibility to use them for sustainment to preserve sorties for other essential early equipment. They also have turreted weapons that can provide firepower overwatch for lighter dismounts even if only two guys are habitually associated with one MRAP as the rest sea deploy. Those UAS and UGV are also extraordinatry combat enablers whose utility has barely been explored.
	Daniel September 28th, 2009 at 2:24 am im not debating your concept, but its not a line battalion its a trans attachment. light infantry battalions have 4 companies, their is a d co vehicle company btw, they usually get utilized as a line company however. so you don’t have 3 battalion in your structure you have two battalions with 4 companies and your mrap support element company, it however is not an infantry company. im not necessary debating your force structure but your terminology, personally i dont think its necessary to have a dedicated unit for the mraps simply train on them every now and again and if the mission calls for them use them if it doesn’t don’t.