im not necessary debating your force structure but your terminology, personally i dont think its necessary to have a dedicated unit for the mraps simply train on them every now and again and if the mission calls for them use them if it doesn’t don’t.

Look at the two battalion TFs that are sea deploying. There are 3 Infantry companies there. Obviously it takes a while to get their equipment to port and then to theater. Some of those infantry can air deploy with the MRAPs, while others prepare their GCVs for sea deployment. Other infantry will already be in theater with the airborne, air assault, or light infantry BCTs.

Now you have early deploying vehicles that save C-17 sorties, are less threatening to most of the local population; withstand small arms,IEDs, and mortars/artillery; use less fuel early in the conflict…and fuel is scarce initially. Believe you can load those trucks up with lots of 5 gallon or larger cans and ammunition as well, and make lots of trips to get more fuel/ammo from the airfield being protected that is the initial source of supply.

Think of putting lots of unmanned equipment with those MRAPs. That avoids having to train already overburdened infantry and armor troops on the same equipment. It gets that equipment around the battlefield because space in GCVs and M1A3 is/will be at a premium and you don’t necessarily want to rob an rifleman from a squad to operate a UAS/UGV,

As for the number of personnel in the unit, aviation and armor companies, and FA batteries are relatively small compared to infantry companies. But as mentioned, you have lots of flexibility to add infantry to those MRAPs as required, and lots of flexibility to use them for sustainment to preserve sorties for other essential early equipment.

They also have turreted weapons that can provide firepower overwatch for lighter dismounts even if only two guys are habitually associated with one MRAP as the rest sea deploy. Those UAS and UGV are also extraordinatry combat enablers whose utility has barely been explored.

are your “mrap companies” carrying infantry? or just your one driver?. hell a better idea would be to have 1 mrap for every gcv and then deploy whichever vehicle in whatever mix works for the situation. the problem with making dedicated mrap units is that they are not in the least bit flexible.

Also believe you gotta consider that a third MRAP maneuver battalion with 233 Soldiers would be half the Soldiers of a normal combined arms battalion. If 30 BCT MTOEs had smaller third MRAP battalions requiring just 7,000 total Soldiers, the Army gives up just 2 BCTs to pay the bill (43 instead of 45 active BCTs). If instead they add fully-manned MRAP or combined arms 3rd battalions per BCT, it would require at least 14,000 more Soldiers, which would mean at least 4 fewer BCTs (41 instead of 45 active BCTs) in the ARFORGEN rotation.

Second, just because you had 120 MRAPs wouldn’t require deployment of that many initially. In normal stability or smaller operations, you might deploy with nothing but 120 MRAPs and very few tanks and Bradleys for troops of all battalions to employ. In other conflicts, you might go Bradley/Abrams-heavy with relatively few MRAPs.

Imagine a BCT deployment force tailored as follows:

Air-deployed battalion:
2 MRAP companies with 30 total MRAP (10 C-17)
1 Tank company with 10 M1A3 (10 C-17)
1 Infantry company with 14 GCV (7 C-17)
Selective trucks, artillery, C2V, mortars, ambulances, etc. (22 C-17s for 50 C-17s total for battalion)
———————————————-
Sea-deployed battalion:
2 Infantry companies with 28 GCV
1 Tank company with 10 M1A3
1 MRAP company with 15 MRAPs
———————————————-
Sea-deployed battalion:
2 Tank companies with 20 M1A3
1 Infantry company with 14 GCV
1 MRAP company with 15 MRAPs

This implies task-organization of equipment and personnel from two combined arms battalions and the MRAP battalion across three total maneuver battalion headquarters. Infantry from sea-deploying GCV might be part of the air-deploying battalion until their equipment arrived by sea. Alternately, a forcible entry light infantry force might fall onto the MRAPs to provide them initial protection and ground mobility. The remaining 60 MRAPs from the MRAP battalion would sea-deploy late in TPFDL for transition stability operations.

Finally, consider the advantages of training the MRAP operators to be unmanned vehicle operators. Since they would never dismount with infantry, they could operate unmanned aircraft and ground vehicles when the MRAP is conducting stationary overwatch. If half the MRAPs deployed initially, the drivers of sea-deploying MRAPs could be full-time gunners and/or moving MRAP operators of unmanned aircraft or ground vehicles.

Unmanned ground vehicles and larger air vehicles currently require vehicles and trailers to haul them around. MRAPs would be natural candidates to tow all the BCT’s UAS and UGV on trailers or in the bed. FCS “Mules” could be modified to act like forklifts to load and offload MRAP supplies and UGV/UAS from the high MRAP bed.

Bottom line, if the Army must integrate so many MRAPs, there are plenty of smart ways the Army can do it without giving up other future fighting GCV and other systems.

the issue i have with this is that the mrap doesn’t exactly have a small silhouette. also being a not so mobile your really getting into a predictable situation of where your going to be. it would all depend on what threat level they are entering. imagine if atgm’s are present, all advantages of the mrap disappear and only its short coming remain.

think of this issue with your bridge structure, its asymmetrical. you can do major operations with two battalions and your third “battalion” is simply a bunch of trucks and drives, its a support element.

if you added it as a trans company or support company or something of that nature it would work, in reality they should be kept for use where they make sense not forced to fit in the wrong shape hole. this is the same issue of making the hummvee and armoured car/troop carrier just with a different vehicle.

i would keep large amount of mraps with the various units in order to convert light and heavy bcts into motorized infantry bcts if necessary i.e. if deployed to ied prevalent environment.

i mean would this requirement be daft enough to require the army to attack north korea with a spearhead of mraps?

But if you trained in a near perpetual state of task organization and habitual relationship, and retain like-vehicles in parent battalions for maintenance, you retain the 3rd maneuver battalion capability. The drivers are primarily there to maintain, but learn to drive tactically as part of their habitual force.

Can you picture an axis of advance with an MRAP-heavy battalion w/ minimal infantry advancing on roads with a few tanks for protection to escort other BCT sustainment trucks, while most infantry GCVs and tanks would be in the two battalions on either side of the road moving cross country with primarily tracked vehicles.

What about a battalion setting up multiple combat outposts using both MRAPs, GCV, and tanks to form a perimeter, and other MRAPs used to patrol roads to save fuel, while a few tracks patrolled cross country.

Think about. The Army must find suitable roles for 8,000 MRAPs beyond the sustainment, ambulance, and convoy roles for 3700 MRAPs. Engineer M113s are one probable replacemnt. But what else? Mortar M113s? C2 in place of M577, etc? I hope not. If you put 120 MRAPs in each of 30 BCTs as a third battalion, that takes care of 3,600 MRAPs. Add the reserve component BCTs and you cover them all.

i did misread that you were talking about a landing on an airfield so disregard that portion i thought you meant a static position.

using oif as an example, if we had mraps prior to the conflict, they would have been great if deployed on oif II as a follow on force but not part of the permanent brigade structure but in an ad hoc basis. this third battalion you want will be of only limited use so instead a better use of personnel and equipment is using mraps on an ad hoc basis as needed and conducting familiarity training on them. your 3rd battalion idea just seems unnecessary, an mrap is not hard to fall onto, in iraq they just showed up one day.

example your heavy bct would primarily train on their toe but also conduct familiarization training with mraps. light would do the same, this allows a full spectrum capability of offense and then holding operations.

on the airfield security unless an ied is placed on the perimeter of the road an mrap is no more suited than any other vehicle.

my issue with mraps is they are as unsuited to conventional warfare as they are to counter insurgency. they have their place they do it well but are not a jack of all trades.

unless they come up with other variants of the m-atv and the jltv is not pursued then a great tragedy has occurred. our lightest vehicle cannot be a 14 ton m-atv. check out force protection europes ocelot and supacats entry into the british light protected patrol vehicle (im not trying to plug products), hopefully jltv will come out in simialar concpt form to these vehicles. thats what should be our light vehicle a 7.5 ton armoured v hull off road vehicle.

And i think it would be very smart to move back to 3 battallions. ide like to see 13 man squads and 6 man teams also but i dont think anyone important shares my centement.

Believe I read recently that there was talk of going from 18 to 12 heavy BCTs to get back that 3rd battalion per BCT (18 BCT x 2 Bns vs 12 BCT x 3 Bns = 36 Bns). But what if instead you had a 3rd battalion, and each of 4 companies had 30 MRAPs for a total of 120 with drivers only. That yields more than enough vehicles for the Soldiers of the other two battalions to fall onto.

The personnel bill is only 120 driver Soldiers plus a small HHC and some extra Brigade Support Battalion troops. Multiply 233 Soldiers by 30 heavy and light BCTs and you might need an extra 7,000 Soldiers…not easy but Sec Gates wanted them in active BCTs.

Everything you said is true for offensive operations. But if you are conducting stability operations or an initial defense of points of entry, you might show up in theater with nothing but MRAPs against light threats.

If you are an early entry heavy or light BCT air-deployed battalion against a MODERATE threat, you could end up in a mix of MRAPs, GCV infantry vehicles for heavy or M-ATV for light BCTs, and a few tanks.

Use MRAPs to move to dismounted positions around an airfield perimeter. Some MRAPs overwatch along with GCVs/tanks and act as a QRF. Not a lot of mobility required. Other MRAPs resupply the dismounts when 463L pallets come out the back of USAF C-17s and KC-X.

You actually could form an offensive 3rd battalion by spreading sea-deployed heavy equipment and MRAPs between all 3 battalions.

The bottom line, is that with 7,000 more active Soldiers, you would have double, and even triple the options for 45 BCTs to deploy, fight, sustain, and stabilize with by air, land, and sea within the ARFORGEN cycle.

I had seen the slides, but read what they say:
============================
* Incorporate into the Army
—Efficient use of limited assets to benefit the entire Army (MRAP); will need to align to ARFORGEN cycle
============================
That implies not using them for prepositioning as believe was one original intent, because they would be integrated during a Reset portion of ARFORGEN following a BCT deployment

The briefing goes on to say:
=================================
* MRAP (80% at 11,635) ATV’s incorporated into the calculus
* Making sure every Soldier has a protected seat
* Becomes committed BCT-specific capability sets; –3,700 will be integrated into MTOEs for sustainment and medical brigades (route clearance, convoy security, medical evacuation, etc.)
=================================
Believe the 80% refers to the Army’s percentage of the 15,000 total MRAPS…or around 12,000 already produced that belong to the Army. Think the M-ATVs are being fielded differently than the MRAPs since there will be far fewer than the 11,635 MRAP cited.

“Making sure every Soldier has a protected seat.” Does that mean non-combat arms or everyone? FMTV replacement? Didn’t they just order more? They won’t replace HEMTT and its PLS capability.

As peckmi suggests, you could conceivably have a separate 3rd maneuver battalion in heavy and light BCTs that had nothing but MRAPs (and maybe Stryker) and drivers/gunners to keep the manpower down, yet providing an alternative to Bradley/Abrams deployment for counterinsurgencies and initial air movement of lighter tailored task forces. Remember, we moved half the MRAPs into Iraq by air…admittedly over time.

If only 3700 are integrated for sustainment, convoys, and ambulances, that leaves 8,000 more that must be used. Divide 40 active BCTs by 8,000 and that is still 200 MRAPs per active BCT, or around 100 per BCT if split equally with active and reserve BCTs.

Sure seems like they would be a natural in the National Guard because the height/weight would help a lot in flood conditions.

If all that isn’t enough to confuse you, read this Congressional Research Service paper:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22707.pdf

Cole,
Page 16 of the briefing document states that a large number or MRAPs will be integrated into MTOEs for sustainment and medical brigades (route clearence, convoy security, medical evacuation, etc.) in other words, Service and Support, and Combat Service and Support. They also seem to be talking specifically about the MRAP ATVs (M-ATV)which are just now entering production.
I think it is likely that a very large number of the primarily road bound MRAPs currently in service in Iraqi will be staying in Iraq as our forces withdraw

tipover; I don’t disagree with you and I think that is what I said. The days of the M-113 as a APC or
“Battlefield Taxi” as it was sold as in the late 1950’s and as an AFV what it became in Vietnam are long over.

My rational is simple we own a lot of M-113’s, the last were made in the early 1970’s bit many have low hours on them and have spent most of there careers in depots, their number is in the thousands still, the M-113 is a very adaptable, being nothing more then a box on tracks.

An example is the combination of the M-577 and the M-113 that has been the mobile company and battalion command post for generations. The carrying capacity and adaptability of both vehicles makes this an ideal combination. Since there isn’t a variant of Stryker yet to replace this vehicle configuration it doesn’t make a lot of sense to scrape it.

The M-113 and the M-2/M-3 Bradley’s are both evolutionary mature systems that have run out of ways to be modified for future missions. That said it appears that the core of the Army’s Divisions will be the three 1st’s, 3ID and 4ID and it appears that it will be years before these conventional units will be weened from heavy armor so all the heavy stuff we have now will still be around in the future as we know it.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Hmmm, considering that Generals Petraeus, Odierno, and McChrystal graduated from West Point in 1976, they must have completed their Vietnam short tours in the summers between 7th and 8th grade.

General Chiarelli just missed the tail end graduating from Seattle College in September 1972, but was probably in the Armor Officer Basic Course when the war essentially was over.

Here’s a hint. Even though all those Generals are older, wiser, and more accomplished than you or the rest of us, doesn’t mean they lived through D-Day or the Great Depression.