Tanker Bid Goes Fixed Price, Kinda

Tanker Bid Goes Fixed Price, Kinda

UPDATED: Here Is the Draft RFP. Click Here for Pentagon Tanker Briefing

The Pentagon sent a very clear message to Boeing, Northrop Grumman and their affiliated companies in the Thursday briefings to Congress — play nice now that the draft Request for Proposal is due out Friday.

“…We will be expecting civility, objectivity, and a focus on the warfighter and the taxpayer from all parties,” says the briefing delivered by Deputy Defense Secretary Bill Lynn.

One phrase in the briefing will echo throughout the selection process: “KC-X should be ready to go to war on day 1.” Both companies will doubtless point to the aircraft they have sold over the last few years to international customers and say, “we’re ready!” The first planes are to be ready by 2015, with initial operating capability set for 2017.


The briefing also says there will be “a fixed price for both development of the winning design and follow-on production lots,” according to defense analyst and consultant Loren Thompson. We asked Thompson to decipher some of the fixed price language in the briefing. He said it also includes “incentive fees and other adjustments to reflect variability of the offerings with regard to life-cycle costs, construction costs and various operational features. In other words, it is fixed price, but with some flexility allowed for factors of interest to the government customer.” So it is fixed price, with goodies if you do a good job.

The briefing notes that the “warfighter requirements” are “unchanged” from the last competition. However, “this time we will be crystal clear about what we want and what the bidders need to do to win.” The department has added “capabilities that would provide additional value” but are not mandatory, it says. And the selection criteria are more “precise, less subjective.”

The number of planes remains the same — 179.

Congressional reaction was swift and, largely, predictable. Perhaps the most interesting comment came from Rep. Jack Murtha, chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, who wants the Pentagon to build double the number of planes per year called for in the latest proposal.

“The Committee believes that it is in the best interest of the taxpayer to build 36 aircraft per year, versus the 15 per year as planned by the latest proposal. This quantity will allow for a rapid retirement of the aging fleet, avoidance of billions of dollars in maintenance and modernization costs, and will provide our airmen with a safe and modern aircraft that is essential to current and future operations,” Murtha said in a statement. He also said he believed the Pentagon appeared to have done a better job of making the latest offer “both open and less subjective.”

One of the Washington delegation — keenly supportive of Boeing — noted the absence of any mention of “illegal trade subsidies was left out,” a clear reference to the World Trade Organization’s preliminary ruling finding.

“I will be looking specifically at how this RFP was constructed, how clearly it lays out what the Air Force wants, how requirements will be weighted, and why the consideration of I have observed the Pentagon’s decision-making process for long enough to know that details matter,” Sen. Patty Murray said in a statement.

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> why the consideration of I have observed

something missing?

lifecycle evaluation period extended from 25 to 40 years, but flight hours reduced from 750/year to 489/year

25 years * 750 hours/year = 18,750 hours
40 years * 489 hours/year = 19,560 hours

it looks like they’ve found a way to accomodate the requests for a longer lifecycle evaluation without actually changing the numbers a lot

> If one offeror’s TAP (Total Adjusted Price) is more than 1% lower than the other’s, that offeror will win the competition.

this eliminates the 777 and potentially offers a nice boost to the baseline 767

> let us suppose that the IFARA model indicates that one offeror is more effective in wartime, i.e., could satisfy the demands of the model scenario with fewer planes. Then their price will be adjusted downward to reflect the extra value the Department will obtain

this is absolutely HUGE for the KC-30

last time the IFARA scores were 1.35 for the 767AT and 1.62 for the KC-30, a 20% lead for the KC-30. That gap would be expected to widen even more against a base (non-AT) 767.

the KC-30 could conceivably knock 25% off its bid price right off the top

irtusk… point taken, and this brings us back to the fundamental dysfunction of the acquisition system. The AF refuses to make any hard decisions (on what it EXACTLY wants) and the builders don’t really care because they’re going to push what they already have; which is cute because since this is the case I don’t really understand the development costs and protracted delivery schedule.

The problem here is that there is no good answer, both teams (for all the propaganda) can make a good plane that is more than capable. In this one instance (and this is a rare situation) since time is such a major factor given the age of the fleet; the AF could issue an order for a limited production run of both airframes.

It may be more expensive, however that is ok given that time and extrememly high cost of keeping the old fleet in the air. (one of the AF legitimate gripes) As the planes are delivered and put into service begin a stringent evaluations of performance and cost metrics. (ACTUAL maintenance and $$/mile/gal delivered) If they’re both good, continue with a 50/50 fleet……if a clear winner emerges then the road ahead is obvious. With both companies receiving immediate contracts you ensure 2x the production and little chance of a protest. You also get to see who can deliver…

the draft RFP is out

https://​www​.fbo​.gov/​i​n​d​e​x​?​s​=​o​p​p​o​r​t​u​n​i​t​y​&​a​m​p​;​m​o​d​e​=​f​o​r​m​&​a​m​p​;​i​d​=​7​1​3​b​c​6​e​8​7​f​1​a​7​6​d​b​2​c​2​b​2​0​a​4​b​e​e​1​e​8​a​5​&​a​m​p​;​t​a​b​=​c​o​r​e​&​a​m​p​;​_​c​v​i​e​w=0

use this link to download all the documents in a zip

https://​www​.fbo​.gov/​u​t​i​l​s​/​d​Z​i​p​?​b​a​s​e​=​7​1​3​b​c​6​e​8​7​f​1​a​7​6​d​b​2​c​2​b​2​0​a​4​b​e​e​1​e​8​a​5​&​a​m​p​;​c​l​a​s​s​=​d​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​_​p​a​c​k​a​g​e​&​a​m​p​;​i​d​=​e​a​f​0​7​5​5​f​d​5​6​0​c​a​c​1​1​2​3​2​6​0​d​4​c​2​d​1​e​e88

Good Afternoon Folks,

The up side to all this is that the Pentagon did as was suggested on the sites such as DT and buzz and take another look at this mess.

Revisions to original bids. Number of units has decreased for 800 to 373 to replace 500 KC-135 and KC-10’s. This reflects the down sizing of the number of Air Force and Navy air frames.

The buy rate after the first batch of 64 will be at a rate of 15 aircraft a year to 179 where the program will be reviewed. This stretched out buy, perhaps more expensive to the tax payer will let the AF adjust its needs. With UAV’s coming on line the need for tankers might not even be at the 373 level in 15 tears.

The only suggestion that appears not to have caught on is going into the used market. The original procurement of used Boeing 707’s for the KC-135’s, which proved to be a great deal for the tax payer should have been a model for this deal. There is no lack of low hour 767’s and A-330’s sitting out in the desert. But agin with the current economic recession the jobs factor certainly came into play.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

> The original procurement of used Boeing 707’s for the KC-135’s

KC-135s are not 707s and were procured new

Good comments irtusk.

Heh Byron. Might need to reread some of the articles. Believe as this one states, KC-X is for 179 aircraft, and so are KC-Y and KC-Z for a total closer to 537 aircraft if all are bought.

The requirements numbers you cite are not for the number of aircraft, but rather for the criteria evaluated. From a Graham Warwick blog at Defense News at Aviation Week, titled “Decoding the KC-X Draft RFP”:

“Instead of the 808 requirements in the last KC-X competition, only 37 of which were mandatory, this time round there are 373 mandatory requirements and 93 non-mandatory, “above threshold” or “trade space” requirements. The bidders have to meet all 373 mandatory requirements to qualify — it’s a pass/fail test.”

But as many have pointed out, unless the adjusted dollar amounts of each bid are within 1% of one another, the “above threshold” capabilities won’t even be considered.

Last time, believe Boeing bid something like $15 billion for the first 68 aircraft and NG/EADS bid $12 billion. This time if NG/EADS bid $12 billion, Boeing’s adjusted bid would need to be within $120 million plus or minus for the “above threshold” items to be considered. Of course Boeing knows how much NG/EADS bid originally, as well…

I’m curious how they will estimate fuel costs (dollar amount per gallon and inflation rate) and construction costs. Should NG/EAD be penalized, for instance, if forced to live with Hawaii construction rates that have raised Guam contruction costs to $10 billion? How much of that will be attributed to KC-X versus other aircraft for runways/ramps, etc.

But overall, it seems the USAF/DoD has thought this out pretty well. My give-a-hoot quotient is much lower this time, as suspect that with Democrats in charge and beholden to unions, the handwriting is on the wall, regardless of the numerical outcome from the competition.

> I’m curious how they will estimate fuel costs (dollar amount per gallon and inflation rate)

the details are in Sect L, Atch 3, fuel cost tab

but i can’t understand them

if someone could interpret, that would be great

It won’t let me download it and not sure I want their software. But looking at the slides in Colin’s original link, on page 14 it gives the following formula with my assumed present value of fuel at $3 per gallon:

Convert $3 per gallon to $/pound by dividing $3 by 6.7 lbs/gal = $.45 per pound (45 cents). FWIW, assumed that A330 burns 15,000 lbs/hour and 767 burns 12,000 lbs/hour.

(15,000 lbs per hour — 12,000 lbs per hour) x 40 years x 179 a/c x 489 hrs/year x $.45/pound = $4,726,674,000 or $4.73 billion

Have no clue if I did that correctly, but presumably if close and Boeing’s bid was higher, they could subtract $4.73 billion? Likewise they could subtract the difference in construction costs, since their smaller plane would cause less new building. NG/EADS would probably be subracting based on the IFARA model. I’m sure both sides have done the math by now.

> It won’t let me download it and not sure I want their software

can you download the zip from the link i posted?

as far as the ‘software’, it’s a microsoft excel file, you can get a viewer here:

http://​www​.microsoft​.com/​d​o​w​n​l​o​a​d​s​/​d​e​t​a​i​l​s​.​a​s​p​x​?​F​a​m​i​l​y​I​D​=​1​c​d​6​a​c​f​9​-​c​e​0​6​-​4​e​1​c​-​8​d​c​f​-​f​3​3​f​6​6​9​d​b​c​3​a​&​a​m​p​;​d​i​s​p​l​a​y​l​a​n​g​=en

> my assumed present value of fuel at $3 per gallon

it starts out at $2.54 but then does stuff with inflation and current year dollars and who knows what

> but presumably if close and Boeing’s bid was higher, they could subtract $4.73 billion?

they would subtract the $4.73 billion regardless, not just if it’s close

> NG/EADS would probably be subracting based on the IFARA model.

undoubtedly

Strange, I have excel so it should have opened.

Meant, if my fuel burn rates and other assumptions were close. Obviously, the dollar per pound part is screwed up if it isn’t in constant dollars.

Guess, my give a hoot factor is higher than I thought. ;)

Cole: I said the same thing last time round except it went something more like “Boeing’s to loose.” The Boeing pols are working disproportionally hard to secure this contract: Powerpols, labor unions, big O and his posse congress, the shthole economy, jobs = no such thing as ‘crystal clear’ I’m. hoping to see more aerospace in right to work states.

> Strange, I have excel so it should have opened.

if you have excel 2000, xp or 2003 (ie not 2007) you will need to install the compatibility pack

http://​www​.microsoft​.com/​d​o​w​n​l​o​a​d​s​/​d​e​t​a​i​l​s​.​a​s​p​x​?​f​a​m​i​l​y​i​d​=​9​4​1​b​3​4​7​0​-​3​a​e​9​-​4​a​e​e​-​8​f​4​3​-​c​6​b​b​7​4​c​d​1​4​6​6​&​a​m​p​;​d​i​s​p​l​a​y​l​a​n​g​=en

(be sure to read the note about installing security patches first)

Good Evening Cole,

Since the numbers are yours, refigure them how ever you wish, I used them only to illustrate a point that you apparently don’t disagree with, good enough for me.

It looks like the AF this time, the third time me thinks, did their homework in regard to the actual projected future needs to the military for tankers. That should have happened the first time around.

Now all this is in the hands of congress and Boeing has shown it is world class in pushing money to the politicians to get what it wants and I see for the article you wrote the our old friend Congressman John Murta has already had a contribution from, well who ever, he wants to jack up the annual production for 15–36 planes.

I can say all that I like about Congressman Murtha but I must give him credit for making gross corruption in Congress quite transparent, he really doesn’t care who knows that he is for sale only that he gets his first and last.

I would still like to see the AF shop the used market, there is some real bargains to be had, but that’s DOA in a Congress that wants to show the defense industry that they really do care. If I recall it was in a Washington Post article earlier in the month that reported on the amount of monet spent by lobbyist so far this year, lobbying by defense contractors for the first half of the years is down 17.2% or about $9.2 million that to members of congress is lost “personal income”.

There is not much to debate here since all parties have come to argument already. The only drama appears to be will Northrop Grumman out spend Boeing in buying Congress.

ALLONS,
Byron
“Stewart’s Platoon”

irtusk,

As you know from elsewhere I have not gotten through the whole RFP yet & will refrain from commenting on it until I do BUT…

Your comment concerning IFARA benefitting the KC-30 is only true is once again alternate reality data is utilize in the program. IF it reverts back to real world data the KC-30 is DOA. But assuming for the sake of competition they once again use alternate reality data the question then becomes whether the KC-30 IFARA advantage is enough to make up for the KC-767 (AT or other) fuel burn & MILCOM advantage…

Byron Skinner after the Washington Post’s article on the F-22, I would not trust that liberal rag with anything defense related. The same sort of yellow journalists attacked the Abrams with so much nonsense back when it was in prototype stage, you would think it was made of gasoline soaked cardboard.

The mainstream media is never very accurate when it comes to military equipment.

Actually pretty much all the media is. With the exception of some fine sites like this.

Heh Bryon, you mentioned a article about KC-X and Congressman Murtha and seemed to imply it was associated with me. That is August Cole at the Wall Street Journal, not me.

Got the link to open, thanks irtusk. Looks like at year 2035 the fuel price is $5 a gallon exactly which is the midway point of the 40 years. So this dumb guy’s (can’t use excel)guesstimate using $5 as a mean yields a $7.88 billion savings for the 767 using their formula.

However, that amount is for the entire 179 aircraft buy, so they shouldn’t be subtracting it from the bid for the first 68 aircraft. If IFARA gives A330 a similar dollar advantage (who knows how they calculate that) then it leaves military construction as the factor sealing A330s fate.

But that construction also supports some future KC-Y and KC-Z aircraft as well, so KC-X shouldn’t get the exclusive blame for other program aircraft, or construction that must occur anyway due to age of airfields. ramps and runways.

Good Morning Cole,

Sorry to hear that you are not August Cole, he appears from the limited amount of his work that I’ve seen to be a rather good writer on military affairs. In fact along with Julian Barnes of the L.A. Times, Mr. Cole might be the best in print right now writing on the military.

I think you are trying to say that the cost accounting regarding fuel is bogus at. Since oil is a comedy and the price can very widely in a very short period of time using it’s projected future price as a weapons platform is dubious at best.

Another consideration on fuel prices, I don’t recall the price of oil ever being a real consideration with the military, they just pay it. Over the 40 expected life of 179 airframes $7.88 billion is not really a big deal.

As for future KC-Y’s and KC-Z’s, I would think that it premature to even place them on the table. Lets get through this mess first.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Cole,

The KC-X contract is for 179 (4 SDD + 175 production) aircraft not 68. Don’t confuse incremental funding with the total number of aircraft.

The construction cost has nothing to do with what ‘must occure due to age’ but what must occur for the KC-X to operate effectively.

Heh Byron/pfcem,

Actually, if the price of gas in 2035 is only $5, that won’t be too bad at all. NG/EADS certainly can’t complain about that fuel price. Another way to guesstimate the lifetime fuel cost is to calculate it for each aircraft individually, like this:

15,000 lbs/hour x 40 years x 179 a/c x 489 hrs/year x $.75 per pound of fuel = $39,388,950,000 lifetime fuel expense

12,000 lbs/hour x 40 years x 179 a/c x 489 hrs/year x $.75 per pound of fuel = $31,511,160,000 lifetime fuel expense

That is a $7,877,790,000 difference

But looking at what each builder bid last time, yields some interesting numbers if they bid close to the same amount this time:

68 A330 @ $12 billion + 111 A330 @ 19.6 billion (extrapolated from 68 a/c price) = $31.6 billion for 179 a/c = $176.4 million each a/c

68 B767 @ $15 billion + 111 B767 @ 24.5 billion (extrapolated from 68 a/c price) = $39.5 billion for 179 a/c = $220.7 million each a/c

That would be a pretty substantial difference in both price per aircraft and in overall price with a $7.9 billion difference. That is nearly identical to the fuel savings for Boeing but this time in NG/EADS favor.

An IFARA calculation guesstimate using the formulas provided:

1 x 1.35 B767/1.62 A330 x 179 x $176.4 million each = $26,313,000,000 IFARA cost for A330

1 x 1.35 B767/1.35 B767 x 179 x $220.7 million each = $39,505,300,000 IFARA cost for B767

That difference is nearly $13.2 billion in IFARA cost, which shifts the total adjusted price in NG/EADS favor. The only factor remaining is military construction at the bases where KC-X will be located. Unless the DIFFERENCE in base construction costs is more than around $13.1 billion, NG/EADS could still win this thing if Boeing bids similarly to its original amount for the first 68 aircraft last year.

Did I do that right pfcem/irtusk?

> Did I do that right pfcem/irtusk?

no idea, but some points to consider: Boeing’s bid price will undoubtedly be less this time since they don’t have to create a new model

also i’m getting contradictory information on what the ifara scores were

http://​www​.irconnect​.com/​n​o​c​/​p​r​e​s​s​/​p​a​g​e​s​/​n​e​w​s​_​r​e​l​e​a​s​e​s​.​h​t​m​l​?​d​=​1​3​6​532

Boeing: 1.35
NG/EADS: 1.62

http://​www​.boeing​.com/​i​d​s​/​g​l​o​b​a​l​t​a​n​k​e​r​/​f​i​l​e​s​/​K​C​-​7​6​7​_​1​0​0​D​a​y​P​r​o​t​e​s​t​B​r​i​e​f​i​n​g​.​ppt (slide 4)

Boeing IFARA 1.79
NG/EADS IFARA 1.90

of course the 767 offered will have a lower ifara score too, so it’s all really hard to say

Seems to me that Cole is doing exactly what Boeing did with the first round — calculating the A330 vs B767 fuel cost without factoring in the use of fewer 330’s to do the job.

> calculating the A330 vs B767 fuel cost without factoring in the use of fewer 330’s to do the job.

that’s included in the IFARA section

Cole,

Not quite.

The higher initial cost of the KC-767AT is due to it being a less developed tanker than the KC-30 (aka the KC-767AT has less in common with currently flying KC-767s than the NG/EADS bid KC-30 has in common with currently flying KC-30s/A330MRTTs). The higher initial cost of the KC-767AT DOES NOT translate to higher ‘flyaway’ cost of the KC-767AT itself after a few years of production. Thus the later 111 KC-767ATs would be proportionately less expensive, possibly even less expensive than the later 111 KC-30s.

I like (not) how you used the earlier more favorable to KC-30 IFARA scores too…

Also don’t forget that the IFARA scores are complete BS to begin with since they do not represent reality. Using real world data the KC-30 wasn’t even able to compete the evaluation missions in order to obtain an IFARA score.

***

irtusk,

That is because they ran the program a number of times & with even the SAME data the program will not result in the exact same score every time. The variation between the two sets of scores you reference is a bit outside the ‘normal’ realm of variation, however, & appears to me to be due to FURTHER alteration of the model data to improve the KC-30’s (to make it look better than the KC-135R). But the FURTHER alterations improved the KC-767AT’s score as well, proportionally more than it did the KC-30…

***

Rick,

In reality for the VAST MAJORITY of missions it takes the same number of tankers whether they be 767 or A330 because THE critical factor is the number of receivers which must be refueled in a given timeframe (& thus the number of tankers) & NOT how much fuel capacity each individual can transfer.

Historical per sortie average.
Operation Desert Storm: 47,500 lbs
Operation Allied Force: 48,700 lbs
Operation Enduring Freedom: 75,400 lbs
Operation Iraqi Freedom: 60,800 lbs

And even if improved mission planning were to DOUBLE those averages, the KC-767 has more than enough fuel transfer capacity to get the job done.

> Thus the later 111 KC-767ATs would be proportionately less expensive, possibly even less expensive than the later 111 KC-30s

the total acquisition cost of the KC-30 was less than the total acquisition cost of the KC-767AT

> That is because they ran the program a number of times & with even the SAME data the program will not result in the exact same score every time

no, those are supposed to be the numbers from the competition, they would only use one number to determine the winner

each plane was assigned ONE number

the question is what number was it?

> appears to me to be due to FURTHER alteration of the model data to improve the KC-30’s

no, it looks like someone is trying to run their own ‘estimation’ instead of using the official number from the competition to make themselves look better

> Also don’t forget that the IFARA scores are complete BS to begin with since they do not represent reality

and yet IFARA is what the AF uses to determine how to use their tankers

Boeing tried to claim that it wasn’t realistic in it’s protest, but the GAO REJECTED these claims

thus you have both the AF and the GAO upholding IFARA as valid

> In reality for the VAST MAJORITY

good thing we size for the WORST CASE and not the average case

> THE critical factor is the number of receivers which must be refueled in a given timeframe (& thus the number of tankers) & NOT how much fuel capacity each individual can transfer

more fuel = more time on station = less time in transit = fewer tankers needed

Heh gents,

If we adjust the Boeing bid for 179 B767 down as pfcem suggests, leaving the A330 bid essentially the same, it does make a major difference:

68 A330 @ $12 billion + 111 A330 @ 19.5 billion = $31.5 billion for 179 a/c = $176.0 million each a/c

68 B767 @ $14 billion ($1B less) + 111 B767 @ 22.5 billion ($2B less)= $36.5 billion for 179 a/c = $203.9 million each a/c

The difference in overall price drops from $7.9 billion with earlier figures to just $5 billion. That leaves Boeing’s fuel saving still providing a $2.9 billion ($7.9B fuel-$5B buy)overall advantage over NG/EADS.

pfcem mentioned the higher IFARA scores. But considering that the 767 carries virtually a fuel payload virtually identical to the KC-135R, find it difficult to believe it would have an IFARA score as high as 1.79 with 1.0 being the KC-135R baseline, or that it would be so close to the A330 at 1.90. The lower IFARA values for both aircraft and larger gap are probably more accurate:

1 x 1.35 B767/1.62 A330 x 179 x $176 million each = $26,253,333,333 IFARA cost for A330

1 x 1.35 B767/1.35 B767 x 179 x $203.9 million each = $36,498,100,000 IFARA cost for B767

That difference, IF computed as earlier is now only $10.2 billion in IFARA cost. However, if you look at the 767 IFARA cost, it is identical to its overall price to buy 179 aircraft. So essentially, believe the IFARA loser gets no price credit and the winner gets one, but it is only a credit off its own price, not the difference with the IFARA loser.

If true, then the difference between the price for 179 A330’s @ $31.5 billion, and the IFARA price of $26.25 billion would be just a $5.25 billion credit in NG/EADS favor…not $10.2 billion. So if the total adjusted price formula is:

Bid price for 179 aircraft and associated support MINUS fuel price credit for one bidder MINUS IFARA price credit for one bidder MINUS military construction credit for one bidder = Total adjusted bids for each bidder

If that is how it is calculated than the revised guesstimate figures would be:

Boeing: $36.5 billion for 179 aircraft — $7.9 billion fuel credit – 0 IFARA credit = $28.6 billion – likely construction price credit of ??? billion

NG/EADS: $31.5 billion for 179 aircraft – 0 fuel credit — $5.25 IFARA credit – 0 construction credit = $26.25 total adjusted price

If that is the correct process and guesstimate values are pretty accurate (a lot of ifs), then NG/EADS would have approximately a $2.35 billion advantage. But that’s before knowing how much the Boeing military construction advantage will be. Because 1% of NG/EADS $26.25 billion is $262.5 million, then construction cost DIFFERENCE would need to exceed the sum of $2.35 billion + $262.5 million to avoid a runoff based on non-mandatory requirements.

So with lots of debateable variables and unknowns, still not sure how you avoid:

* Boeing claiming that the fuel prices or inflation rates are too low, or either questioning the other’s fuel consumption value

* NG/EADS saying that when both carry identical typically-lower fuel loads that A330 fuel burn rates are far lower than at max gross weight. If 80% of the time the burn rate is lower for both aircraft carrying smaller loads, then the overall difference between aircraft would be lower, as well

* Both questioning the Excel spreadsheet showing where you enter a fuel burn rate in gallons per hour. There is no indication what profile creates that fuel burn rate. Is it representative? Why not more than one profile considering mission percentages at higher (10%)vs. lower (90%) take-off weights

* NG/EADS citing that often seven A330s with 1,680,000 lbs of fuel could handle identical missions of eight 767s carrying 1,600,000 lbs. The resultant fuel expenditure should be multiplied by less than 179 a/c as Rick points out. IFARA may cover some of it, but still seems that fuel burn should also be adjusted as should military construction for 7 vs. 8 aircraft at one base

That last point shows that construction costs are another area open to protest?

* Were runway/ramp/hangar upgrades overdue anyway?
* If the same airfield will also host future KC-Y and KC-Z, why is KC-X paying the whole bill? * If other aircraft types also use the airfield like Guam, how do you attribute a given amount to tankers only?

We already see Boeing citing different IFARA values than NG/EADS. Which is correct? Does IFARA consider fewer pilots and pilot training expense required for fewer aircraft?

In the end, still don’t know how DoD avoids a split buy. There are too many fuel, IFARA, and construction variables here that are not sufficiently set in stone. They are open to interpretation and manipulation. The biggest problem to me, is that Boeing now clearly knows how low NG/EAD can bid.

WTO may be a factor, but shouldn’t the U.S. REJOICE at an opportunity to get both cheaper aerial refueling tankers AND new jobs on Europe’s dime. A split buy would create a whole new aerospace industrial base in the south using European tax dollars to keep overall price competition intact to save U.S. tax dollars for future KC-Y/KC-Z buys.

irtusk,

So you don’t understand the difference between total acquisition cost (much of which is ammorized in the 1st few years of production) & flyaway cost.

The 1.79 & 1.90 are the number used in the selection. The 1.35 & 1.62 are numbers from an earlier run of the program.

No the IFARA is NOT what the AF uses to determine how to use their tankers. The USAF already knows how to use its tankers. You need to reread the GAO ruling.

And once again you demonstrate you have no clue about real worl US AR operations.

***

Cole,

I said NOTHING about using the ‘base’ KC-767 vs the KC-767AT. I pointed out the reality that higher initial cost of the KC-767AT is due to just that HIGHER INITIAL COST (due mostly to higher SDD cost) but that after the 1st buy of 68 the cost of the KC-767AT would be considerably lower (as would the KC-30 but the difference would be greater for the KC-767AT).

Yes the KC-767AT carries a virtually identical fuel payload as the KC-135R BUT being a more efficient aircraft it can transfer ~25,000 lbs more fuel at a given range (or transfer the same amount of fuel at ~500nm greater range). The KC-767AT also gains an advantage from being able to do so from a 7000′ runway where as the ‘benchmark’ values for the KC-135R are from a 10,000′ runway.

> So you don’t understand the difference between total acquisition cost (much of which is ammorized in the 1st few years of production) & flyaway cost.

when the contract is for a fixed amount (179 for instance), the flyaway of the last few planes is IRRELEVANT. they could be free for all the difference it makes

what matters is the total acquisition cost

> The 1.79 & 1.90 are the number used in the selection. The 1.35 & 1.62 are numbers from an earlier run of the program.

agreed

> No the IFARA is NOT what the AF uses to determine how to use their tankers. The USAF already knows how to use its tankers.

fine, they use CMARPS, happy now?

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/KCX031908.xml&headline=USAF%20On%20The%20KC-X%20Defensive%20A%20Year%20Ago

“It [CMARPS] helps operators assess how many tankers are required for a variety of missions, where they can be based and how many receivers — fighters and intelligence aircraft, for example — can be serviced by the available refuelers.”

> You need to reread the GAO ruling.

you mean this part of it?

“find no basis to object to the agency’s evaluation”

irtusk,

But it is only the contract for the 1st 68 for which that amounts were given. The quoted amounts for the 1st 68 tankers DOES NOT translate to the same per unit cost for the remaining 111. The cost of the 1st 68 INCLUDES the majority of the developement & start-up costs while the cost of the remaining 111 includes comparatively little developement & start-up costs.

CMARPS is the program used in the IFARA. Which is used for evaluation/selection purposes only. It is NOT used to actually determine how to use the tankers.

Typical irtusk disengenousness, you need to reread a lot more of the GOA ruling to understand what that nine word phrase refers to & is in context of…

I’m still reading through the whole thing as well, but I have yet to see anything in it holding the winner to their bid price. What’s to keep either side from submitting an unrealistic bid only to have the price balloon once enough momentum has been gathered to make it impossible to cancel it?

Building with both teams here and BA is still only giving us computer sims. pfcem or anyone else care to defend why they aren’t giving us any hardware to work with for developing equipment for tanker like NG has been for months?

> The quoted amounts for the 1st 68 tankers DOES NOT translate to the same per unit cost for the remaining 111

however we do know the total acquisition cost of the KC-30 was lower

> CMARPS is the program used in the IFARA. Which is used for evaluation/selection purposes only

and IFARA (used for evaluation) is generated by CMARPS, which is what the AF uses to determine how to use their tankers

which is what i said

what exactly do you have a problem with?

the USAF uses CMARPS to plan real-world operations. CMARPS is used to generate the IFARA score based on actual scenarios.

any talk of IFARA not representing reality isn’t going to fly

http://​www​.defenselink​.mil/​t​r​a​n​s​c​r​i​p​t​s​/​t​r​a​n​s​c​r​i​p​t​.​a​s​p​x​?​t​r​a​n​s​c​r​i​p​t​i​d​=​4​484

————–

Q Secretary, on the IFARA, you mentioned that the bidders will, you know, be able to look at the model. Will they know the specific scenarios that their planes are competing in?

MR. CARTER: Yes, they will. These will be classified. But there will be — they will — so these will not be public because these are our war plans. But they are real TPFDDs, that is, real deployment plans, real air tasking orders, that is real elements of real war plans, real homeland security plans.

So they are classified. But the offerers will have access to that information.

Q Do you think they’ll come back at some point and say, well, we think this scenario doesn’t favor us, because of whatever reason, and therefore you guys are subjective, and we lost on that point.

MR. CARTER: Well, the scenarios are what they are. The world is what it is.

> you need to reread a lot more of the GOA ruling to understand what that nine word phrase refers to & is in context of

here’s the whole section just for you
—————-
Boeing also challenges the Air Force’s evaluation of the firms’ proposals under the IFARA evaluation factor. Boeing complains that the Air Force unreasonably concluded that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft was superior to Boeing’s under this factor based only upon the fleet effectiveness value and without considering evaluated major insights and observations, which Boeing asserts favored its proposal. See Boeing’s Comments at 146. Our review of the record discloses that the SSAC and SSA did consider the agency’s evaluated insights and observations in their evaluation of the firms’ proposals under this factor, and therefore find no basis to object to the agency’s evaluation.
———————-

the GAO finds no problem using the IFARA scores

also this little tidbit
——————–
Additionally, Northrop Grumman’s KC-30’s superior aerial refueling capability enables it to execute the IFARA scenario described in the RFP with [Deleted] fewer aircraft than Boeing’s KC-767 — an efficiency of significant value to the Government
——————–

so, in other words, air refuelling capability is NOT determined solely by booms in the air

> What’s to keep either side from submitting an unrealistic bid

they have to document all their costs and assumptions and then SSA evaluates whether they did a credible job

Maybey I’m taking a simpleton view here, but what is the purpose of baseing your scores on estimates. The only thing you can be sure of is that you will be wrong. We aren’t trying to reinvent the wheel here. We are talking about taking existing platforms and sticking a boom on the back. Come up with two airframes, fly them head to head, chose which one you like the best based on concrete experience. Then FREEZE the specs,(barring any serious defect) and build your planes. Build them quickly and cheaply(relatively speaking). Dont let some engineer who is educated beyond his intelligence fiddle with something to gain .001% efficiency when it will slow the procurement down and raise the cost per bird by millions of dollars. This is no different than refinancing your house every time the interest rate changes a quarter point to save a few dollars a month when the closing costs are $2000 everytime. Red tape has completley brought procurement to its knees in every military project. In the old days you could design a new aircraft and have it into service in just a couple years. Was it perfect, usually not, but it was good enough(although the gutlass cutlass does come to mind, LOL). I know that I’m rambling, but I just needed to vent.

LockMartSkunk,

What equipment is it you are refering to?

***

irtusk,

CMARPS is used for EVALUATION PURPOSES ONLY, not for actual mission planning.

The problem with CMARPS is not unrealistic mission scenerios. It is that the data used to simulate airfield operational capabilities were altered from reality so that the KC-30 could even complete the eveluation missions in order to get an IFARA score.

Did you even bother to read the GAO passage you posted? The answer is in there.

…Boeing complains that the Air Force unreasonably concluded that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft was superior to Boeing’s under this factor based ONLY upon the fleet effectiveness value and WITHOUT considering evaluated major insights and observations…
…Our review of the record discloses that the SSAC and SSA DID CONSIDER the agency’s evaluated insights and observations in their evaluation of the firms’ proposals under this factor, AND THEREFORE find no basis to object to the agency’s evaluation.

The protest point (& ruling) was NOT on the validity/accuracy of the CMARPS model but rather concerning “evaluated insights and observations”. Boeing felt (& protested) that the required “evaluated insights and observations” were not considered, the GAO found that they were.

> The protest point (& ruling) was NOT on the validity/accuracy of the CMARPS model

which shows that the validity of the IFARA score was so well established they didn’t even bother to challenge it.

boeing protested over 100 points and they thought any challenge to IFARA was even less likely to succeed than those 100

boeing was throwing everything they could think of at the award to see what would stick

and yet they accepted ifara

that should tell you something

but of course it won’t because you refuse to accept the truth like the USAF, the GAO and even Boeing have

> CMARPS is used for EVALUATION PURPOSES ONLY, not for actual mission planning.

http://​www​.dtic​.mil/​c​g​i​-​b​i​n​/​G​e​t​T​R​D​o​c​?​A​D​=​A​D​A​3​7​8​2​9​9​&​a​m​p​;​L​o​c​a​t​i​o​n​=​U​2​&​a​m​p​;​d​o​c​=​G​e​t​T​R​D​o​c​.​pdf

“CMARPS is the current tool used by AMC to determine when, where and how much air refuelling is required for mission aircraft.”

irtusk,

Quite the opposite. It was so well establish that changes to the CMARPS model were BS (but HAD to be done in order for the KC-30 to obtain a score) that the KC-X Source Selection Team had to include “evaluated insights and observations” as part of IFARA in order to assure Boeing that the well establish invalidity/inaccuracy of the altered data CMARPS model would be counter balanced with reality.

if it was as flawed you imply, it would never be allowed in the evaluation to begin with

Bad news irtusk. When you posted the link to the DoD news site, the clear slides showed that the IFARA formula was 1 MINUS (low score/high score) instead of 1 times it as it appeared on Colin’s less clear slide copy.

Using that and the less favorable 1.79/1.9 IFARA scores gives NG/EADS only a $1.8239 billion credit instead of the much higher $5.25 billion cited earlier.

Remember the “independent” Boeing-commissioned study that had fuel prices at 130+ per barrel? Using their figures of 1722 gal/hr for B767 and 2139 gal/hr for A330 reduces the fuel difference credit to $7.3 billion…still the largest credit by far of all of them.

Found another link that claimed a $2 billion price difference in military construction. Because that was a GAO protested item, you can be sure Boeing has a good idea of the actual amount.

Bottom line, because Boeing knows how low NG/EAD bid last time, and knows it has around $9.3 billion in fuel and MILCON credits compared to NG/EADS lowly $1.83 IFARA credit, it gives Boeing around $7 billion to overcharge on its old B767 tanker price and still win.

That is why it is important IShoot. When you know the dollar amounts from last year’s fiasco and can set prices accordingly, it’s no longer a fair competition.

> Remember the “independent” Boeing-commissioned study that had fuel prices at 130+ per barrel?

but that’s not what they’re doing

i wish someone could explain their methodology on fuel costs because i’m very interested

Only used their study for the gallon per hour figures. Still used $5/gallon as a guesstimate based on the 2035 midway point on the spreadsheet. But forgot that it is only the midway point mean of the earliest 2015-built aircraft. The later built aircraft fuel prices will be higher.

It’s still going to be a major credit, but a lot less than the $30+ billion difference from that early study.

But was interested to see the MPLCC (or whatever it is) figures were nearly identical initially before the MILCON stuff was protested. So maybe the fuel consumption is far closer than Boeing thinks. Don’t know.

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