It’s still going to be a major credit, but a lot less than the $30+ billion difference from that early study.

But was interested to see the MPLCC (or whatever it is) figures were nearly identical initially before the MILCON stuff was protested. So maybe the fuel consumption is far closer than Boeing thinks. Don’t know.

but that’s not what they’re doing

i wish someone could explain their methodology on fuel costs because i’m very interested

Using that and the less favorable 1.79/1.9 IFARA scores gives NG/EADS only a $1.8239 billion credit instead of the much higher $5.25 billion cited earlier.

Remember the “independent” Boeing-commissioned study that had fuel prices at 130+ per barrel? Using their figures of 1722 gal/hr for B767 and 2139 gal/hr for A330 reduces the fuel difference credit to $7.3 billion…still the largest credit by far of all of them.

Found another link that claimed a $2 billion price difference in military construction. Because that was a GAO protested item, you can be sure Boeing has a good idea of the actual amount.

Bottom line, because Boeing knows how low NG/EAD bid last time, and knows it has around $9.3 billion in fuel and MILCON credits compared to NG/EADS lowly $1.83 IFARA credit, it gives Boeing around $7 billion to overcharge on its old B767 tanker price and still win.

That is why it is important IShoot. When you know the dollar amounts from last year’s fiasco and can set prices accordingly, it’s no longer a fair competition.

Quite the opposite. It was so well establish that changes to the CMARPS model were BS (but HAD to be done in order for the KC-30 to obtain a score) that the KC-X Source Selection Team had to include “evaluated insights and observations” as part of IFARA in order to assure Boeing that the well establish invalidity/inaccuracy of the altered data CMARPS model would be counter balanced with reality.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA378299&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

“CMARPS is the current tool used by AMC to determine when, where and how much air refuelling is required for mission aircraft.”

which shows that the validity of the IFARA score was so well established they didn’t even bother to challenge it.

boeing protested over 100 points and they thought any challenge to IFARA was even less likely to succeed than those 100

boeing was throwing everything they could think of at the award to see what would stick

and yet they accepted ifara

that should tell you something

but of course it won’t because you refuse to accept the truth like the USAF, the GAO and even Boeing have

What equipment is it you are refering to?

***

irtusk,

CMARPS is used for EVALUATION PURPOSES ONLY, not for actual mission planning.

The problem with CMARPS is not unrealistic mission scenerios. It is that the data used to simulate airfield operational capabilities were altered from reality so that the KC-30 could even complete the eveluation missions in order to get an IFARA score.

Did you even bother to read the GAO passage you posted? The answer is in there.
“
…Boeing complains that the Air Force unreasonably concluded that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft was superior to Boeing’s under this factor based ONLY upon the fleet effectiveness value and WITHOUT considering evaluated major insights and observations…
…Our review of the record discloses that the SSAC and SSA DID CONSIDER the agency’s evaluated insights and observations in their evaluation of the firms’ proposals under this factor, AND THEREFORE find no basis to object to the agency’s evaluation.
“
The protest point (& ruling) was NOT on the validity/accuracy of the CMARPS model but rather concerning “evaluated insights and observations”. Boeing felt (& protested) that the required “evaluated insights and observations” were not considered, the GAO found that they were.

however we do know the total acquisition cost of the KC-30 was lower

> CMARPS is the program used in the IFARA. Which is used for evaluation/selection purposes only

and IFARA (used for evaluation) is generated by CMARPS, which is what the AF uses to determine how to use their tankers

which is what i said

what exactly do you have a problem with?

the USAF uses CMARPS to plan real-world operations. CMARPS is used to generate the IFARA score based on actual scenarios.

any talk of IFARA not representing reality isn’t going to fly

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4484

————–

Q Secretary, on the IFARA, you mentioned that the bidders will, you know, be able to look at the model. Will they know the specific scenarios that their planes are competing in?

MR. CARTER: Yes, they will. These will be classified. But there will be — they will — so these will not be public because these are our war plans. But they are real TPFDDs, that is, real deployment plans, real air tasking orders, that is real elements of real war plans, real homeland security plans.

So they are classified. But the offerers will have access to that information.

Q Do you think they’ll come back at some point and say, well, we think this scenario doesn’t favor us, because of whatever reason, and therefore you guys are subjective, and we lost on that point.

MR. CARTER: Well, the scenarios are what they are. The world is what it is.

> you need to reread a lot more of the GOA ruling to understand what that nine word phrase refers to & is in context of

here’s the whole section just for you
—————-
Boeing also challenges the Air Force’s evaluation of the firms’ proposals under the IFARA evaluation factor. Boeing complains that the Air Force unreasonably concluded that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft was superior to Boeing’s under this factor based only upon the fleet effectiveness value and without considering evaluated major insights and observations, which Boeing asserts favored its proposal. See Boeing’s Comments at 146. Our review of the record discloses that the SSAC and SSA did consider the agency’s evaluated insights and observations in their evaluation of the firms’ proposals under this factor, and therefore find no basis to object to the agency’s evaluation.
———————-

the GAO finds no problem using the IFARA scores

also this little tidbit
——————–
Additionally, Northrop Grumman’s KC-30’s superior aerial refueling capability enables it to execute the IFARA scenario described in the RFP with [Deleted] fewer aircraft than Boeing’s KC-767 — an efficiency of significant value to the Government
——————–

so, in other words, air refuelling capability is NOT determined solely by booms in the air

> What’s to keep either side from submitting an unrealistic bid

they have to document all their costs and assumptions and then SSA evaluates whether they did a credible job

But it is only the contract for the 1st 68 for which that amounts were given. The quoted amounts for the 1st 68 tankers DOES NOT translate to the same per unit cost for the remaining 111. The cost of the 1st 68 INCLUDES the majority of the developement & start-up costs while the cost of the remaining 111 includes comparatively little developement & start-up costs.

CMARPS is the program used in the IFARA. Which is used for evaluation/selection purposes only. It is NOT used to actually determine how to use the tankers.

Typical irtusk disengenousness, you need to reread a lot more of the GOA ruling to understand what that nine word phrase refers to & is in context of…

when the contract is for a fixed amount (179 for instance), the flyaway of the last few planes is IRRELEVANT. they could be free for all the difference it makes

what matters is the total acquisition cost

> The 1.79 & 1.90 are the number used in the selection. The 1.35 & 1.62 are numbers from an earlier run of the program.

agreed

> No the IFARA is NOT what the AF uses to determine how to use their tankers. The USAF already knows how to use its tankers.

fine, they use CMARPS, happy now?

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/KCX031908.xml&headline=USAF%20On%20The%20KC-X%20Defensive%20A%20Year%20Ago

“It [CMARPS] helps operators assess how many tankers are required for a variety of missions, where they can be based and how many receivers — fighters and intelligence aircraft, for example — can be serviced by the available refuelers.”

> You need to reread the GAO ruling.

you mean this part of it?

“find no basis to object to the agency’s evaluation”

So you don’t understand the difference between total acquisition cost (much of which is ammorized in the 1st few years of production) & flyaway cost.

The 1.79 & 1.90 are the number used in the selection. The 1.35 & 1.62 are numbers from an earlier run of the program.

No the IFARA is NOT what the AF uses to determine how to use their tankers. The USAF already knows how to use its tankers. You need to reread the GAO ruling.

And once again you demonstrate you have no clue about real worl US AR operations.

***

Cole,

I said NOTHING about using the ‘base’ KC-767 vs the KC-767AT. I pointed out the reality that higher initial cost of the KC-767AT is due to just that HIGHER INITIAL COST (due mostly to higher SDD cost) but that after the 1st buy of 68 the cost of the KC-767AT would be considerably lower (as would the KC-30 but the difference would be greater for the KC-767AT).

Yes the KC-767AT carries a virtually identical fuel payload as the KC-135R BUT being a more efficient aircraft it can transfer ~25,000 lbs more fuel at a given range (or transfer the same amount of fuel at ~500nm greater range). The KC-767AT also gains an advantage from being able to do so from a 7000′ runway where as the ‘benchmark’ values for the KC-135R are from a 10,000′ runway.

If we adjust the Boeing bid for 179 B767 down as pfcem suggests, leaving the A330 bid essentially the same, it does make a major difference:

68 A330 @ $12 billion + 111 A330 @ 19.5 billion = $31.5 billion for 179 a/c = $176.0 million each a/c

68 B767 @ $14 billion ($1B less) + 111 B767 @ 22.5 billion ($2B less)= $36.5 billion for 179 a/c = $203.9 million each a/c

The difference in overall price drops from $7.9 billion with earlier figures to just $5 billion. That leaves Boeing’s fuel saving still providing a $2.9 billion ($7.9B fuel-$5B buy)overall advantage over NG/EADS.

pfcem mentioned the higher IFARA scores. But considering that the 767 carries virtually a fuel payload virtually identical to the KC-135R, find it difficult to believe it would have an IFARA score as high as 1.79 with 1.0 being the KC-135R baseline, or that it would be so close to the A330 at 1.90. The lower IFARA values for both aircraft and larger gap are probably more accurate:

1 x 1.35 B767/1.62 A330 x 179 x $176 million each = $26,253,333,333 IFARA cost for A330

1 x 1.35 B767/1.35 B767 x 179 x $203.9 million each = $36,498,100,000 IFARA cost for B767

That difference, IF computed as earlier is now only $10.2 billion in IFARA cost. However, if you look at the 767 IFARA cost, it is identical to its overall price to buy 179 aircraft. So essentially, believe the IFARA loser gets no price credit and the winner gets one, but it is only a credit off its own price, not the difference with the IFARA loser.

If true, then the difference between the price for 179 A330’s @ $31.5 billion, and the IFARA price of $26.25 billion would be just a $5.25 billion credit in NG/EADS favor…not $10.2 billion. So if the total adjusted price formula is:

Bid price for 179 aircraft and associated support MINUS fuel price credit for one bidder MINUS IFARA price credit for one bidder MINUS military construction credit for one bidder = Total adjusted bids for each bidder

If that is how it is calculated than the revised guesstimate figures would be:

Boeing: $36.5 billion for 179 aircraft — $7.9 billion fuel credit – 0 IFARA credit = $28.6 billion – likely construction price credit of ??? billion

NG/EADS: $31.5 billion for 179 aircraft – 0 fuel credit — $5.25 IFARA credit – 0 construction credit = $26.25 total adjusted price

If that is the correct process and guesstimate values are pretty accurate (a lot of ifs), then NG/EADS would have approximately a $2.35 billion advantage. But that’s before knowing how much the Boeing military construction advantage will be. Because 1% of NG/EADS $26.25 billion is $262.5 million, then construction cost DIFFERENCE would need to exceed the sum of $2.35 billion + $262.5 million to avoid a runoff based on non-mandatory requirements.

So with lots of debateable variables and unknowns, still not sure how you avoid:

* Boeing claiming that the fuel prices or inflation rates are too low, or either questioning the other’s fuel consumption value

* NG/EADS saying that when both carry identical typically-lower fuel loads that A330 fuel burn rates are far lower than at max gross weight. If 80% of the time the burn rate is lower for both aircraft carrying smaller loads, then the overall difference between aircraft would be lower, as well

* Both questioning the Excel spreadsheet showing where you enter a fuel burn rate in gallons per hour. There is no indication what profile creates that fuel burn rate. Is it representative? Why not more than one profile considering mission percentages at higher (10%)vs. lower (90%) take-off weights

* NG/EADS citing that often seven A330s with 1,680,000 lbs of fuel could handle identical missions of eight 767s carrying 1,600,000 lbs. The resultant fuel expenditure should be multiplied by less than 179 a/c as Rick points out. IFARA may cover some of it, but still seems that fuel burn should also be adjusted as should military construction for 7 vs. 8 aircraft at one base

That last point shows that construction costs are another area open to protest?

* Were runway/ramp/hangar upgrades overdue anyway?
* If the same airfield will also host future KC-Y and KC-Z, why is KC-X paying the whole bill? * If other aircraft types also use the airfield like Guam, how do you attribute a given amount to tankers only?

We already see Boeing citing different IFARA values than NG/EADS. Which is correct? Does IFARA consider fewer pilots and pilot training expense required for fewer aircraft?

In the end, still don’t know how DoD avoids a split buy. There are too many fuel, IFARA, and construction variables here that are not sufficiently set in stone. They are open to interpretation and manipulation. The biggest problem to me, is that Boeing now clearly knows how low NG/EAD can bid.

WTO may be a factor, but shouldn’t the U.S. REJOICE at an opportunity to get both cheaper aerial refueling tankers AND new jobs on Europe’s dime. A split buy would create a whole new aerospace industrial base in the south using European tax dollars to keep overall price competition intact to save U.S. tax dollars for future KC-Y/KC-Z buys.

the total acquisition cost of the KC-30 was less than the total acquisition cost of the KC-767AT

> That is because they ran the program a number of times & with even the SAME data the program will not result in the exact same score every time

no, those are supposed to be the numbers from the competition, they would only use one number to determine the winner

each plane was assigned ONE number

the question is what number was it?

> appears to me to be due to FURTHER alteration of the model data to improve the KC-30’s

no, it looks like someone is trying to run their own ‘estimation’ instead of using the official number from the competition to make themselves look better

> Also don’t forget that the IFARA scores are complete BS to begin with since they do not represent reality

and yet IFARA is what the AF uses to determine how to use their tankers

Boeing tried to claim that it wasn’t realistic in it’s protest, but the GAO REJECTED these claims

thus you have both the AF and the GAO upholding IFARA as valid

> In reality for the VAST MAJORITY

good thing we size for the WORST CASE and not the average case

> THE critical factor is the number of receivers which must be refueled in a given timeframe (& thus the number of tankers) & NOT how much fuel capacity each individual can transfer

more fuel = more time on station = less time in transit = fewer tankers needed

Not quite.

The higher initial cost of the KC-767AT is due to it being a less developed tanker than the KC-30 (aka the KC-767AT has less in common with currently flying KC-767s than the NG/EADS bid KC-30 has in common with currently flying KC-30s/A330MRTTs). The higher initial cost of the KC-767AT DOES NOT translate to higher ‘flyaway’ cost of the KC-767AT itself after a few years of production. Thus the later 111 KC-767ATs would be proportionately less expensive, possibly even less expensive than the later 111 KC-30s.

I like (not) how you used the earlier more favorable to KC-30 IFARA scores too…

Also don’t forget that the IFARA scores are complete BS to begin with since they do not represent reality. Using real world data the KC-30 wasn’t even able to compete the evaluation missions in order to obtain an IFARA score.

***

irtusk,

That is because they ran the program a number of times & with even the SAME data the program will not result in the exact same score every time. The variation between the two sets of scores you reference is a bit outside the ‘normal’ realm of variation, however, & appears to me to be due to FURTHER alteration of the model data to improve the KC-30’s (to make it look better than the KC-135R). But the FURTHER alterations improved the KC-767AT’s score as well, proportionally more than it did the KC-30…

***

Rick,

In reality for the VAST MAJORITY of missions it takes the same number of tankers whether they be 767 or A330 because THE critical factor is the number of receivers which must be refueled in a given timeframe (& thus the number of tankers) & NOT how much fuel capacity each individual can transfer.

Historical per sortie average.
Operation Desert Storm: 47,500 lbs
Operation Allied Force: 48,700 lbs
Operation Enduring Freedom: 75,400 lbs
Operation Iraqi Freedom: 60,800 lbs

And even if improved mission planning were to DOUBLE those averages, the KC-767 has more than enough fuel transfer capacity to get the job done.

that’s included in the IFARA section