The airpower zealots of the 20s and 30s are the fathers to the American Army’s new zealotry of Coin. This article by Mr Grant who often scribes for the current crowd of Coin experts misses the mark completely.

You mention elsewhere the domino-effect, first cited in Vietnam where there was more than one opponent and a less than respected central government. Wasn’t that a counterinsurgency?

The multiple tribes with Pashtuns being both the largest and most troublesome is why I don’t understand why Pashtunistan would not work. It gives Pashtuns the option to live under threat of external or Taliban attack, or move to a more reasonable Afghan rule of law. We could continue to support both countries in different ways.

This link illustrates multiple enemies we are fighting and is an excellent primer on Helmand Province and its recent history:

http://www.understandingwar.org/report/securing-helmand-understanding-and-responding-enemy

It shows that even with MRAPs and 7-tons, the Marines couldn’t really use them because the enemy was surrounding them with IEDs anytime they went someplace. Drive past…plant an IED to catch us on the return trip. So much for the advantages of cavalry mounted recon and patrolling without corresponding aerial surveillance. Marines or British Army restricted to foot cannot begin to cover a province that large with so few troops.

The example also showed numerous incidents where Marines took terrain with ample kinetic effects, and the Taliban came right back afterwards because we lacked the forces to be everywhere. The study correctly identifies the need to prioritize and avoid trying to clear unless we can hold. If a respectable ANA force cannot hope to secure an urban area WITHOUT us and our airpower, artillery and sustainment, we shouldn’t be there. Go in heavy with ANA and allies, throw up the HESCO green zone, and slowly phase out the allies and leave the ANA as we recruit and train them locally in Pashtun territories.

The Afghans build walls before they build houses according to Michael Yon and any aerial photo I’ve ever seen of the countryside. What difference does it make if it is a mud wall or Hesco. You are actually there and can confirm the real deal. Aren’t there walls in many places?

Couldn’t a leader with men like yours, train the Afghans and their leaders locally as infantry first, and then as combat engineers with trainers flown in and let them build the compounds and clear the roads. Sounds like an Afghan version of Habitat for Humanity.

With electricity facilitating satellite TV and cameras, we could control some of the message local Afghans were getting (without dropping leaflet boxes on kids heads), provide entertainment and education for children and adults, and monitor the streets with bulletproof camera spheres mounted on cell phone towers and windmills inside the green zone. We could also conduct remote translation, distance learning for children, remote medical advice and prescriptions to medics, and remote monitoring of money payments to avoid corruption.

Electricity providing air conditioning, or at least fans in the summer and heat in the winter, and microwave heating of meals would be a strong incentive to join and remain in the ANA in the dangerous southwest, where troops currently don’t want to go and will dessert to avoid.

Maybe some Afghans would not care for modern conveniences. Believe many others would be extremely happy campers and would connect such conveniences to the central government and the allies. It could be worth a trial effort in some areas.

Think of the cost of burning countless amounts of jet fuel overhead in both fighters and tankers and think of diverting that money to build up dispersed ANA compounds and more UAS. Put the A-10s and F-16s on ground Zulu alert at Bagram and Kandahar, ready for take-off in minutes. There is little need to be constantly patrolling the skies when we don’t want to drop bombs anyway.

The problem with the 3–24 is it makes a couple assumptions. First, it assumes the war is a single opponent vs another single opponent. Second, it assumes there is a central government and state apparatus to fight over. Neither conditions exist in Afghanistan. There are many tribes and factions who want their own tribe coming out ahead or just want to be left alone. Even the Taliban is not united under a single authority. The Baluchs, the Afghani Pashtuns, and the Pakistani Pashtuns each have their own spin on the war, even though they often fight for the same goals. Each province might as well be a different war. And as we’ve said ad naseum here, the Afghan national government is a myth. They have no influence, no control, and a fair chunk of the country doesn’t acknowledge its existence, let alone its supposed authority.

As far as nation building and construction, Afghans will not allow themselves to be cooped up behind walled compounds and enticed with modern day convieniences. They generally don’t want them and I doubt they’ll be willing to trade their freedom of movement for it. Byron called the Iraqi neighborhoods ghettos which I think is a bit of an extreme description for Iraq, but might be an accurate description if we try to wall off Afghan villages. Most of the Afghan people don’t live in a Baghdad-like suburbia. Concrete walls would look more like a prison to them.

Byron, just to set the record straight about Iraq, I was there when we started to wall off some of the neighborhoods. The “balkanization” as you call it was already started by the Mahdi Army. Most neighborhoods in Baghdad were religiously segregated by Iraqi on Iraqi violence by early 2007. The Sunnis screamed for protection from us. The walls combined with converting Sunni insurgents into neighborhood watchmen helped move things forward. We walled Sadr City to do the exact opposite — keep them in and restrict the flow of weapons out.

What ever manual applies, works for me, I was thinking more about stability then, the combat operations, although I do recognize that they must occur simultaneous and are not exclusive of each other.

The surge in Iraq after all the smoke and mirrors have been removed was nothing more then a troop build up and the goal was to kill as many of the “insurgents” as possible and then to proceed with the balkanization Baghdad into ethnic ghettos with 15 foot high barrier walls with a single way in and out.

The geography and culture of Afghanistan make an Iraqi surge impossible. The Taliban are not going to fall for being contained into a small area such as the Iraqi militants did, they are much better soldiers and a lot smarter then there Iraqi brothers and sisters. The fighting part in just plain old down and dirty Infantry.

I tried to explain in my last two post what I was referring to, these limited postings don’t provide space to start to explain the process I was referring to.

It is noted in the Armed Forces Press Service it was posted that a woman was assigned to serve in the Iraqi reconstruction program, Pat Riley a former WAC now working as a civilian for the Army Corp. of Engineers. The fact that the Armed Forces Press Service made note of what one would assume, is a routine appointment may indicate that someone if following our posts here and is getting the idea that what was, is not working. I wish Ms. Riley well in her assignment and hope the idea of a softer political and economic stability take hold.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Guess if all those Pashtun Pakistan territory madrassas are thriving, that it would be pretty hard to separate Afghans from their religion. First time I’ve ever heard anyone suggest that and seems like the ultimate example of the ugly american.

Don’t understand why if a surge worked in Iraq, it isn’t worth a try in Afghanistan, especially since Afghanistan is less urban and more dispersed and therefore needs more forces. But it might have to coincide with a money surge for simulataneous construction and localized training (instead of centralized near Kabul).

Maybe attempt to recruit local poorest Pashtuns and move their families into small green zones where schools, clinics, and small apartments with power and small appliances exist to safeguard relatives from the Taliban and provide an incentive to join the ANA and stay in the local area.

Maybe add windmills along with the solar panels and generators to provide the small “green zones” and outside area with power. That idea could attract Obamamites to the idea of learning lessons with clean energy sources. Then you would not need to safeguard electric lines over extended areas leading to smaller urban areas. You could also mount cameras on the tall windmills for surveillance.

Byron, it’s FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, although FM 3–0, Operations, also includes “Stability operations” as an equal with Offense, Defense, and Civil Support for Army forces. As much as I understand the ideas and intent, it just seems like an unbelievably difficult concept to put into practice, particularly for tough-guy warriors. Wired.com has a 24 minute preview of a PBS show that will air Oct 13 showing an impatient officer or NCO trying to talk to locals through a translator who is having his own problems understanding local dialects. They had moved in next to a Helmund market to try to safeguard it. Instead, everyone moved out of the area and they go to a distant market instead.

This is a hard, complex nation-restoring exercise to be sure. And it will require money now for construction and later to pay the ANA because the Afghan economy sure can’t afford it.

But delays in getting started certainly don’t lead to progress with others holding stopwatches ready to pull the plug. Abandonment of the area just emboldens extremists.

It’s gotta be tough to be General McChrystal and Secretary Gates right now. But don’t forget that a surge and long term process means even more strain on our overburdened Army, Marines, and other services.

What you say, the conventional wisdom is not and will not work. Karzai is a losing deal. I agree Afghanistan is a land, let dispense with the word country of which Afghanistan is in name only. You mention Tribes and list four, I’ve seen as many as thirteen listed. These tribe and they do not recognize any central authority.

The basic unit of governance in Afghanistan is the family, and extended family and quite different from what we have in the United States. I didn’t say that women were the formal heads of the family, in a Folk Culture males are, that said though women exert a lot of influence and control of family life and affairs. One item of repression are the Burgas which is seen as a sign of repression and is one of the first cultural item discarded when a woman is freed from a Taliban controlled environment.

You mention modern technology like solar panels, that really doesn’t mean anything when someone can walk into your house and kill you, and it’s perfectly alright.

The violence must be stopped before anything productive can take place. The way to stop the violence is to reduce the number of new Taliban, that has to happen in the family.

The COIN as expressed in the US Army Field Manual (FM-3–0, I think) simply will not work in Afghanistan. With out braking the hold that the invasive culture of Islam has at the family level that is imposed not by clerics buy by the Taliban, nothing will be solved and the US effort will be just another failed western adventure in Afghanistan and with in a generation we will be back for a third pass.

Islam is not a native religion to any of the tribes that make up Afghanistan, these tribes were around long before the 632 birth of Islam. The harsh principles of Islam and the Koran were adopted by oppressors who want to control the geography that was the cross roads between Asia and Europe.

The only way the US or anybody is going to succeed in Afghanistan is to break the hold Islam has on the repressors of the people. As long as the Talban can dispense it version of the Koran and radical Islam to the repressed people of Afghanistan, the are will; be a lawless frontier. Guns and air strikes will not break the Taliban, being rejected by the family will destroy them.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

General McChrystal advocates humility. So I humbly offer a few…some tongue in cheek, some semi-serious:

* Byron, women wearing head-to-toe Burqas and married off at young age are unlikely to be heads of family. You are unlikely to woo a Pashtun woman who would not speak to you because she would be stoned or have acid in her face if she did.

* Pashtunwali is a different slant on Islam. Counterinsurgency math is that airstrikes killing 2 Pashtun insurgents results in recruitment of 10 Pashtun relatives. Killing 10 civilians in airstrike collateral damage is likely to recruit 100 Pashtun insurgents…and attract a few Chechnyan foreign fighters as well. Recruiting the 40–50% of Taliban who are reconcilable is the sole answer to fight or deter Pashtuns with Pashtuns.

* We have little choice but to try to legitimize Karzai as “country” leader. He is the great dealmaker. Maybe we need some of his negotiating skills with the old warlords like Gen Rostum, Ismael Khan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyr, and the Haqqanis to establish ANA militias to speed up the process of pacifying economy-of-force areas so we can concentrate on the Pashtuns in Kandahar and Helmund. Pay warlords but pay them based on metrics of attack scarcity. If they spend money on militia to pacify…they get paid. Spend excess money on themselves and cronies, get less or none…unless it works.

* Too many foreign forces in Afghanistan make us look like an occupation force. Bad infidels bad. But airpower-only in Afghanistan — a “no-fly” repeat if you will — is unlikely to work against an enemy with no airpower…and it didn’t work in Iraq anyway.

* Endstate might be training the ANA to function almost completely without us. That means little airpower and little artillery. That means little ANA sustainment and little ownership of roads and thus inability to resupply a large dispersed ANA. It may mean choosing a few battlefields and staying locally in a few urban areas where locals and contractors with mercenary protection are paid to supply the ANA. Leave Tajik Soldiers in Tajik areas. Leave Pashtuns in Pashtun areas…that’s the tough one. Still believe that roads are the center-of-gravity.

* In theory, we should have clean hands and teach respect for democratic government. That’s not the real world in Afghanistan. No clue how to end government corruption…especially if we must count on warlords. Civilian surge won’t work. Another pipedream. Contractors running utilities? Read a Michael Yon article about Taliban controlling electricity in Helmund under the British noses. Maybe we build Solar panels inside FOBs to augment generators to power local towns. Make the locals come to the FOB to pay for everything and monitor the clerks for graft prevention.

* I’m surprised Joe Biden isn’t pushing Pashtunistan. It has worked in the Balkans so far. Let the Indians (the ones that count), Chinese, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hajaras dominate north of Hwy 1. Pashtunistan could be the no-man’s land buffer just waiting to get bombed after they screw up. If we can’t target Quetta…pay a warlord, Pakistani President, or ISI spy to do it.

While I respect you service and the time you spent in Afghanistan, I still must maintain a gentleman’s disagreement with you regarding Afghanistan. I do agree that the Taliban are exploiting Islam and using it’s harshness to repress the population but I can see where many Afghans will reject Islam if a doable alternative with personal security is offered to them.

It appears from former residences of Afghanistan who have relocated to the west that there is not a great affection for Islam among the people in general and in fact among those who have elevated their economic and social status there is a growing resentment to the harsh laws that are a major part of the Talibans version of Islam.

There is a front page article in todays LA Times, I’ve been told it was to be in Sundays edition but was moved up to today, that is very relevant to this topic, to anyone interested in this you might go over and read it.

The US has a long history of using top down politics in trying to gain influence in a country, re back to Vietnam. This approach is not working in Afghanistan, it really never did any place else either, where you really don’t have a country in the modern western sense. The structure seems to be the traditional Folk society of in order: Families, Villages, Clans, Tribes and geographic identifications with shifting alliances. who have no concept or loyalty to a central Government. This can be used to the United States advantage.

Move to a bottom up approach which will require a culture change within the Pentagon, who has assumed for better or worse the roles normally played by the State Department in the current wars.

The use of female officers at the village level is only a single piece of the puzzle, development money must be given directly to the end recipients, not to an agency who is suppose to hand it down. Officers who have the authority to do thing have to talk with family heads, village leader and the “big men” of the Clan not to bureaucrats who will only line their own pockets.

The really big quest as Rollie Evens and Robert Novak use to ask, are BG McMasters and the Pentagon up to the task?

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Collateral damage is by far the worst thing that could happen during COIN operations and needs to be avoided at all cost. You cannot win the hearts and minds of people that you are killing.

We want them to have a strong, central, federal governmnet which would ideally control and/or stop the spread of extremism/terrorism. However the Afghan culture is based on tribes, sometimes warring with each other and sometimes allied with one another. Historically they have never had a strong central government and the USA in all likelihood is not going to be able to change that now. And as long as they have no strong central government, with the counter-terrorism agencies that would go along with that, then they are not going to be able to stop the insurgency from taking root out in the tribal areas.

Which is why I don’t think that the ‘raiding’ method is all that bad. Of course it won’t be 100% effective, but hopefully we can make these guys afraid to come out of their caves for fear that a rocket/missile/bomb will come down and end their life in a quick instant. In effect, keep them concentrated on hiding and surviving instead of running insurgent training camps and plotting up new ways to attack us. Just my 2 cents.

“Islam is in fact a foreign religion and its attraction to the majority of people in Afghanistan is doubtful.”

In two tours in uniform and a stint in the private world I’ve dealt with Afghan citizens from every level and all walks of life. In each and every case their dedication to Islam, while not the “kill the infidel” of the TB, is inherent in every aspect of their lives. As a culture we’ll never understand the Afghan paradigm; best to leave that to those special gentlemen sitting in the compounds with the local leaders, that’s who will make the difference after all.

After rereading the story, I can see where your reading may in fact be correct, but I still can’t see it, I hope you are right and I’m wrong.

The missing point here is that Afghanistan is not an Islamic culture, like us Islam is a late comer to the scene. Islam has been adopted by many but not all of the “big men” as an effective means of exercising control over the population. What Afghanistan is, is a collection of very similar Folk Cultures that are quite different form the monotheism of the desert religions that came on to the scene much later.

Islam is in fact a foreign religion and its attraction to the majority of people in Afghanistan is doubtful.

One way in which the United States could exploit this, is the role of women. In most if not all Folk Cultures although on the surface give the impression of being a male dominated parochial society, when in fact many if not most Folk Cultures have strong matriarchal traditions. This could be a foot hold for the more feminist tolerant western cultures to make inroads.

One suggest would be to place young female officers into reasonably secure villages in charge of male soldiers as well as being an ambassador of woman’s rights. If the local girls and women has role models they might transfer that to their own life goals. Women have many ways to make their feelings felt some unspoken and others very vocal.

One case in point of this working is with the eradication of Native Americans west of the Mississippi after 1865. It wasn’t the hand full of soldiers (5K most at any one time) but the Native American woman who saw a better life in the modern culture of the Europeans then what she had on the plains in a stone age culture. Native American women could see in the few European females who settled in the west the life they wanted, and left the Villages and tribes and mated (married if you like) with European men who could provide that way of life.

The native American birth fell to the point where in a generation more were dying then being born. A hundred years later the Native American population still hasn’t recovered.

This could happen in Afghanistan, the women who have left Afghanistan and moved to the west, have adopted to western culture very quickly including abandoning Islam. The calculus is very simple no women, no next generation of Taliban.

This is soft counterinsurgency.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner