Comments on: Gates Prods Army On MRAPs

By: MRAP Alum

MRAP Alum — Tue, 20 Oct 2009 15:21:46 +0000

Problem is that MARCORSYSCOM was ill-equipped to manage the program. Army had to step in and show them how it is done. SYSCOM has no wheeled vehicle R&D capability save NSWC Carderock, the Army has TARDEC. The only reason SYSCOM was placed in charge was because of their initial purchase of FP MRAPs. Leadership of MRAP should have transferred, but DoN was busy playing a turf game.

By: Mountain Fox 8

Mountain Fox 8 — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 10:56:49 +0000

One has to consider what the threats are. We are either fighting well organized armies with advanced anti-armor capability, in which case we should be able to anticipate the threats and avoid deploying under-armored assets against the threat; or we are fighting loosely organized popular forces which use crude but effective “home-brewed” weapons, against which MRAP technology has proven to be quite survivable.

Since the world now has some 200 different nations and most do not possess an order of battle that would stand against a 20th century American traditional force structure, I think it is a safe contention that we will need MRAP type systems in the future and so we need to integrate them into the MTOE and write doctrine to support their deployment.

That notwithstanding, we are also going to need to anticipate the need for some conventional capability against larger, more robust land armies. That said, I personally saw an M1 Abrams ripped in half in Iraq by a device created by the “unsophisticated” insurgents, so it might be high time that we simply reconsider the use of MBTs in modern force on force engagements.

Just a thought.

MF8

By: michael white

michael white — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 10:07:42 +0000

The MRAP is not completely theatre specific. It can be easily reconfigured to other uses in other climates and areas such as jungles and almost any environment save for very cold places without some additional heating capabilities.

By: Biggans

Biggans — Wed, 07 Oct 2009 03:22:51 +0000

I believe that the Army should keep up to four complete divisional sets of MRAPs for overseas contingency operations considering the stability operations performed simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. These assets could be rotated for use amongst deployed brigades for stability operations, as well and maintained in theatre CENTCOM theatre stockage when no longer required. The remaining MRAPs not filling the four divisional sets could then be used as aid to other countries, or be candidates for foreign military sales. Reducing the number of OEMs will decrease longer term logistical support costs. The criteria I’d recommend to DoD would be: 1) consider the current durability of the six existing MRAP OEMs, 2) consider which OEMs offer vehicles that are suitable for the greatest variety of terrain, 3) and determine best cost for the government by competing a logistical support contract for each OEM.
The views expressed in this post are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the DoD, or the U.S. Government. Major Jeff Biggans, student ILE CGSC, Ft. Gordon, GA.

By: WarScientist

WarScientist — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 08:42:22 +0000

As long as planting IED’s is a cheap, easy and (relatively) safe way of attacking coalition & NATO forces, there will continue to be a need for MRAP’s.

Depending on which middle-eastern country is next on the list for “liberation” im pretty sure IED’s are going to continue being a major threat for next few decades to come.

By: Zach

Zach — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 00:36:41 +0000

What ever happened to the JLTV? Are MRAPs taking their place? Or are MRAPs just a “fad”?

By: work in MRAP myself

work in MRAP myself — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 22:32:19 +0000

the Army was suppose to takeover the program in January 2009 and “didn’t”.

By: Workin in MRAP

Workin in MRAP — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 18:45:09 +0000

Defense Secretary Gates NEEDS to weed out MARCORSYSCOM out of the MRAP program management arena. While the MRAP vehicle program is now, for all practical purposes, an Army program, especially since the inital “Iraq” variants are out of production. The bulk of the planning and execution of the of the variant program management as well as the M-ATV contract work is coming out of the Army. When the President wants Acquisition Reform, well, let’s start here. Why is the MRAP program a “joint program” with the actual Program Manager as well as most of the decision making authority resting with the Marine Corps? Doesn’t make sense to me. Bureaurocracy plus

By: Colonial-Marine

Colonial-Marine — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 18:27:43 +0000

Gates should not be forcing the Army to use MRAPs in role’s they are not well suited for. Then again he shouldn’t have forced the USAF to substitute F-22s with F-35s either.

By: Byron Skinner

Byron Skinner — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 17:25:52 +0000

Good Morning Folks,

I don’t think the Army should be built around the MRAP’s or even subordinate maneuver units. These platforms are theater specific.

Realizing that there is a significant investment in the MRAP’s by both the Army and Navy (Marines) they were never standardized into a single variant. They were and still are being manufactured by several vendors who are utilizing property parts, this would create a logistics and field maintenance nightmare.

That said though I doubt if Afghanistan will be the last visit by the U.S. military to this part of the world and I can see a future need for this type of vehicle. In light of that I think the two or three most successful types should be kept and used and placed in dedicated National Guard formations where the institutional knowledge along with the hardware can be preserved and a training doctrine can be developed.

The rest of the MRAP’s should be used for foreign military transfer program to Iraq and Afghanistan and other mid eastern countries where their uniqueness could be employed. What’s left, to the recycling bin.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner