Exclusive Army Mod Plan Details

Exclusive Army Mod Plan Details

The view from the top of the Army: the new Ground Combat Vehicle must be survivable, nimble and quick in urban areas, and be modular so it can be improved over time.

Survivability is the top requirement, but the urban requirement looms large. “We have never worried about mobility in an urban area before,” so Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Chiarelli told reporters Wednesday afternoon at the annual show of the Association of the US Army.

The Army’s focus is on an Infantry Fighting Vehicle — a term Chiarelli insisted be used in place of troop carrier — not on a fleet of vehicles, though the service may develop variants based on the IFV.


When I asked Chiarelli about the balance between survivability, mobility and lethality, he said he thinks “what people forget is that survivability is essential to the offensive nature of war.”

Overall, Chiarelli said the Army’s new modernization plan was an on track and was briefed Wednesday to the Defense Acquisition Board. “We are very comfortable where we are,” he said, declining to elaborate later on.

The view from near the top of the Army: the service must field a vehicle ready to connect to a robust network able to feed information to the squad level. And it must get feedback from industry as to what is producible right away so that the service can field vehicles within the five– to seven-year window set by Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey.

That feedback will roll in after the Army holds its industry day on Oct. 16 and then releases draft specifications and basic requirements for the IFV on Nov. 23–25. The final RFP should be issued in the second quarter of fiscal 2010 and the contract award made in the fourth quarter of that year.

The view from what used to be the program office for FCS is they want a modular approach from industry, especially regarding armor. To help give all possible competitors “an idea of the state of the art” the Army will share all non-proprietary data from the MGV program, Col. Bryan McVeigh, project manager of Manned Systems Integration, told me at AUSA.

The Army must meet the “aggressive” schedule of fielding in five to seven years. That means that prime contractors must present the Army with Technical Readiness Levels of “six and above,” McVeigh said. “Six is the exception; seven is the rule because we just don’t have time.” TRL 6 means the technology is just about ready for prime time. TRL 7 means technology has been tested on a prototype in an operational environment and is basically ready to go into production.

Critics repeatedly chastised the FCS program for pushing the technological envelope too far and too fast and the Army clearly knows it must avoid requirements creep and massive technological innovation.

Competitors for the GCV must give the Army an “open architecture” and ensure that the ability to make major improvements is “built into the platform,” McVeigh said.

While he would not address the key issues of weight or tracked vs. wheeled, McVeigh said industry should take a “modular approach” in designing their IFVs so that over the years armor can be taken off and replaced, along with other systems that need improvements as the battlefield changes and urgent operational needs come in.

That may well mean a vehicle that has a basic blast resistance level built in and can then be bolstered with armor kits in the field. That would help reduce the weight of the basic vehicle and give the Army a more flexible platform that could be used, for example, by both the National Guard at home and the active force in the field.

The larger Army modernization effort — above and beyond the GCV platform — will include capability packages every two years, broken into one year increments, according to Army briefing charts. The first package for fiscal 2011–2012 boasts four “urgent requirements: persistent surveillance; advanced precision mortar initiative, Ground Soldier System (what used to be Land Warrior) and Human Terrain Teams.”

One thing that will leap out at the cognoscenti is that these requirements include personnel. Paul Mehney, spokesman for the Army modernization efforts, said that persistent surveillance will include troops performing perimeter surveillance and the like, as well as UAS. The Human Terrain Teams, while still evolving, are essentially personnel used for stability operations and in Advisory and Assistance Brigades.

The briefing charts say that future capability packages will include: “more capable Unmanned Air vehicles (greater range, loiter and payload capability); larger Unmanned Ground Vehicles; Improvements to the network (more information and imagery at lower levels.)

Mehney said those ground vehicles would perform missions including countermine, armed reconnaissance and “maybe” transport.

Loren Thompson, defense analyst at the Lexington Institute and a defense consultant, was wary of the new effort, blaming Defense Secretary Robert Gates for killing a program that should not have been killed.

“We are going to waste a lot of money resetting this vehicle. Maybe a year down the road we will get to the point where we were when Secretary Gates made this decision. I do see this hurting the warfighter over the long run,” he said. “This is the kind of outcome you get when you have a handful of people in a room making decisions about things on which they are not experts.”

He said the Army “is doing its best to rescue a program it was happy with, while paying attention to the direction they’ve been given.”

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“We are going to waste a lot of money resetting this vehicle.” will not be because FCS was killed, but becauuse the the GCV capability document is a re-hash of FCS’s inability to recognize that some capabilities are mutually exclusive. Without “zero-weight solutions”, survivability will always impact other capabilities such as weight, transpotability, speed, turning radius, stability, cargo capacity, etc. No one wants to sign their name on a capability trade-off that will appear to risk lives. No amount of networking can really mitigate an IED blast.

So which tech advances that were planned for FCS have been abandoned? I’ve often read that FCS was a technological overreach, but I’m still not clear exactly why.

For FCS, they wanted survivability, mobility, a previously unheard of max weight, and a bleeding edge network capability. As Deja Vu said, some of those are mutually exclusive, and the army wanted to mitigate that with unproven expensive technologies. The price for those technologies kept going up and some of those issues (like trying to defy the laws of physics) could not be fixed.

This program is still the FCS disaster. They literally changed the names on some buildings and resolicited parts of the program contracts. But in the end it’s still FCS. The same government agencies that mismanaged this program for the beginning are at the helm. Sub contractors may change but the faulty decision making, ill defined requirements, infatuation with the perfect technology that will make up for the poor requirements definitions, and the lack of ability to do adequate contractor oversight still exist. The end result will be the same. Over cost, behind schedule and reduced capabilities.

But son of FCS sounds exactly the same — except they’ve eased up on the weight reqs. And every time Gates speaks he says they are keeping the bleeding edge network, that the network is the most important priority.

I was just wondering what the specific techs that fell short were. Some super lightweight alloy or ceramic that couldn’t be manufactured reliably? Was the hope that active protection systems could replace some heavy armor?

The article implies that there were some specific techs at TRL < 6 that would have been nice to include in FCS, but just didn’t mature in time. Presumably there’s some chart somewhere that lists them and, if it’s not classified, I’d like to see it.

Good Evening Folks,

I think this post is a bit premature and Colin could have waited until something is on the table. Right now it only guessing on our parts as to what the ground forces want/need.

One suggestion would be for the Pentagon to closely look at what the Chinese PLA is doing with it’s Type 03, 05, 07, 09 Combat vehicles. It would appear that the PLA have gone more with maneuverability and speed then armored protection in their vehicles. The PLA also have vastly increased the firepower of each variant.

I think that the Army is be delusional in thinking that they can build a vehicle that would offer reasonable protection against IED’s, EFP’s and RPG’s since the insurgent have shown that these weapons are still in an evolutionary process and they can create and of the three to defeat anything we can build. In Iraq the insurgents have already show an PRG round that can pass through an M1A1 Abrams Tank and EFP’s/IED’s that can lift up and Abrams and flip it 180 degrees, the half to third weight of an Abrams weight vehicle being proposed here will not present much of a challenge to bomb makers.

A better way to keep soldiers safe would be training in speed and maneuver and by using the vehicles firepower to confront the enemy. Over head ISR and real time imaging to the vehicles would also add a layer of protection to the crews and Soldiers and Marines.

In short the laws of physics have caught up with the military.

ALLONS,
BYron Skinner

There is, of course, nothing “exclusive” here, as usual. And nothing new that has not been reported elsewhere.

But: There are several errors, so maybe that’s the exclusive part.

FGT,

Would love to hear details from you.

Byron,

These are the early details of just what the Army thinks it needs, from the Army. The detailed requirements are not out yet and won’t be for a while but this reveals the outlines of what the Army will brief to industry next week. The service clearly wants some feedback from both industry and its own people.

Dear Pentagon, please hire me. If one can claim 8 years into a cocaine fueld technology bing that ends in disaster that “THE MODERNIZATION IS ON TRACK”.….I want in. If that isn’t job security what is??

I mean these guys should be barred from abusing english, what modernization?! The Pentagon is partying like it’s 1999. (LITERALLY) After figuring out Tanks are too heavy and our support vehicles are too light the solution is to IGNORE EVERYTHING and build a heavy tank/IFV to fight the Russians!

THE ARMORED TANK IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE ARMORED TANK!

speed doesn’t save your life when you get hit by an ied, but you ll just say something like “maneuver” around it. how do you confront an ied with the vehicles firepower shoot the road your whole trip?

yes the Abrams, Apache, f 15, f 16 , Bradley, Humvee all those things that were made to fight the Russians somehow seem to be effective when they re fighting someone else too. i take it you haven’t been within a thousand miles of an ied have you?

Good Morning Colin,

Sorry if I ruffled your feathers a bit Colin, yes I realize that this is the start of a process and attempted to respond accordingly. But after eight years of Cheney/Rumsfeld/Rice/Bush it’s had to get use to rational decision making in the DoD.

My reference to China and the PLA is based on the assumption that they will be facing the eradication of terrorists both domestically and in bordering countries. I don’t think the United States is ready to form a PAP or to put the resources like China has of the PLAN in coastal or coastline defenses, either would be considered excesses by out traditions.

The PLA is developing, granted a small, but never the less lethal quick reaction arm of the PLA and the PLAAF. By US standards they are still in the 1970’s as far as C4ISR is concerned and with on Il-76’s (there are 34 more Il-76’s and Il-78’s or order from Russia but the order is on hold) in the PLAAF they are not going to be much of a threat out side of the region but the development of their “Light Armor” has some very interesting features, like multiple weapons adapted to the same platform and limited amphibious capabilities, like river crossing.

The US seems to be favoring large dedicated platforms such as Stryker, Bradley and Abrams that have little or no flexibility in weapon systems.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Byron,

My feathers take much more pressure to get ruffled! Wanted to make sure all was clear in my piece. Cheers.

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