House Grills Experts Over AfPak Strategy

House Grills Experts Over AfPak Strategy

”Never before have we asked so much, of so few, for so long.” That is how retired Army Gen. Jack Keane wrapped up his prepared remarks before the House Armed Services Committee today, a fitting reminder of the costs of eight years of war made before lawmakers and the public, most of whom have never served in combat, let alone in the current conflicts.

But the hearing wasn’t about the valor of our troops or the sacrifices their families have made. It focused on what we should do next to fix Afghanistan and Pakistan and lessen any threat to U.S. interests resulting from those conflicts.

The bulk of the debate could be summed up along these lines:

* Back Gen. McChrystal and don’t give up. Send more troops, fast. That was Keane, former Army vice chief of staff.

* Failure would have a high cost. So, on balance, Stephen Biddle, an expert on the region at the Council on Foreign Relations, favors counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. He said the judgment here is, “between accepting greater casualties and sacrifices in the nearer term to reduce some probability of higher casualties and sacrifices in the longer term.”

* Stick with what we’ve got. Sending more troops isn’t worth it. That is Paul Pillar, a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. A successful counterinsurgency in Afghanistan “still would leave ample room for a terrorist haven inside Afghanistan should a group seek to establish one,” he said.

The usual policy issues were raised: Karzai’s weak and, at least temporarily, illegitimate government; drugs and corruption; Pakistani Taliban versus Afghani Taliban and their respective links to al Qaeda; the relative importance of Pakistan as opposed to Afghanistan;the state of the Afghan security forces and how best to expand them; how much of a threat to the U.S. would the Taliban pose if they took over Afghanistan.

Biddle told the panel that “the Taliban are clearly not a direct threat to us. They are not going to launch missiles at the U.S.,” though they might “create indirect” threats to the country.

Keane noted that the cost ratio between U.S. and Afghan troops is about 25–1, so that as the U.S. builds up the Afghan National Police and the army ”there will be a net savings for us” over time. “We have to get those numbers up to where they make a difference,” said Keane, adding that “we’ve got to stop wringing our hands about the fact they are illiterate and it’s hard to find leaders” among the Afghan recruits since “we are not building an image of a western military force.”

Many of the lawmakers’ questions and statement reflected their political biases. In a clear swipe at Vice President Biden’s camp in favor of limiting our exposure in Afghanistan by using drones and Special Operations troops to harass and kill the enemy, the House panel’s top Republican, Rep. Buck McKeon, said proponents of this approach included “few if any who are military experts.”

McKeon added that he was “worried that we’re going to see ‘new’ analysis that justifies a more limited war strategy on the basis that we can now tolerate Mullah Omar’s Taliban in Afghanistan.”

In short, no silver bullets were offered. The decisions remain to be made and the troops will bear the burden.

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I can name two military experts in favor of something like Biden’s approach right off the top of my head: Col. Patrick Lang and Col. Doug Macgregor. I’m sure they’re crushed to hear what Buck McKeon thinks of their opinions. Maybe if the good Representative would spend some time learning the issues instead of scoring political points, he’d be a little more circumspect.

I think the limited exposure posture is flawed, this has been proven by past experiances. The Taliban with their decentralized leadership and ability to replace said leaders will out pace our willingness to maintain a meaningful presence. Given the options of tha sort of campaign and full out withdrawl, I’d take the withdraw, at least then we can say we cut our loss. Do it right or not at all.

What past experiences? Please cite some. 

Afghanistan is not really a nation, and the Karzai government is thoroughly corrupt. That pretty much drives a stake through the heart of a COIN campaign before it starts. Our original goal was to cripple al Qaeda, and we should center the strategy on that foremost.

COIN starts in the villages NOT in the capital. (aka all politics are local). IF our troops can help the people of Afghanistan AND destroy the terrorists along the trails to Pakistan, there is some possibliity of success

Yes, the Afghan government is corrupt like almost every developing nation, but when have we made a concerted attempt to root out corruption? The Bush Administration didn’t, and the Obama Administration has made scant attempts. Moreover, while the failed Afgan elections controversy rages in the UN, the Administration is currently AWOL;sheltered in their White House cloister, as if time suddenly stopped for a month so they could deliberate. 

Afghanistan has traditionally had a weak central government, so while we should continue to work on improving Afghan governance and accountability, we should also focus on locals securing their own territory until the government is eventually strong enough to do so. This would serve as a warning to the the central government if it chooses to continue on its current trajectory. Furthermore, it would also provide us with a back up plan if the central government ultimately fails to deliver. The Green Berets are already doing this in some provinces, and we should expand on it.

Find and target Osama Bin Ladin, Al-Sawari and Omar, elect the right –favored leader in Afghanistan, mine the copper mine in Afghanistan for Afghanistan development, secure or create a number of bunkers around Afghanistan borders, Scout and mop out terrorist all over Afghanistan, then go home. Secure and straighten homeland security, borders and freeze or cut Muslim and Arab immigration.

Do you recall Obama acusing Bush of taking his eye off the ball — namely, taking out Osama Bin Laden? Obama then pledged that he would kill or capture Osama Bin Laden. One more hollow promise.

Here, here_ particularly, since Buck’s expertise in military strategy appears to be squiring six kids and consequently 30 grand children. Yikes!!

The initial objective of banishing al Qaeda to the trash heap of history has pretty much been accomplished. Al Qaeda is cooking their meals over donkey dung in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban poses no strategic threat to the U.S. whatsoever. So, why are we still there? The current administration has no clear answer to that simple but critical question. If the answer is nation-building, then we need to take a lesson from history: no foreign invader has ever conquered or even altered Afghanistan, starting with Alexander the Great in 330 BC and continuing through the Arab muslims, the Mongols, the Brits, the Soviets and now us. Presidential egos are involved here, but the American people will soon tire of the American deaths to protect a corrupt regime in a God-forsaken country rife with centuries-old tribal rivalries, and demand withdrawal. There is actually no valid reason to stay; let the Afghans determine their own destiny. We should declare victory and withdraw.

Tell the Afghanistan Taliban, we want Mullah Omar and Bin Laden and the rest of the Arabs. Kick Karzai out of Afghanistan by force and charge Karzai’s brother with drug trafficking charges. The Pashtuns don’t like him either. Cut aid to Pakistan for playing both sides. Let the locals kill the Taliban again as before and send the message we will start paying them to fight and kill the Taliban… brother against brother

Biddle’s comment reference the Taliban not being a direct threat to the US was myopic, short-sighted and a slap in the face to the coalition of the willing, especially the regional partners. Think second– and third-order effects if our will tires under general populous pressure and the Taliban assume governance yet again.

What about China that has mines there and making money with our troops dying. I fought in Veitnam and it did not make any differance how long we stayed there. I think that it is time China takes care of there own.

puling out mean great succes bacouse taliban willnot fight it self so we should save our resorces

i’m reading this post and those who believe that the Taliban are no direct threat, at this point to the US does not understand this situation whatsoever. Briefly, and i welcome the comments. The fact that we would seed power, leave afghanistan or re-focus our efforts to AQ will be look at in their eyes as a victory. This is all they require to keep the fight going and broadening it more then it is now. Make no mistake this will play into there hands and degrade our creditability as a military power for the long-term. Remember all they have to do is endure, not win!

I guess I’m confused. I thought a standing president had four years to “make good” on a promise, unless of course a timeline was proclaimed within that promise, before it was deemed “hollow”.

–The Taliban did not attack us, the nut-job Arabs they were hosting did. 

–At this point what credibility do we have as a military power? I don’t mean this rhetorically, spell it out. Recall also the same argument (we’ll look weak, we’ll lose our juju, the barbarians will be at the gates) was made against our quitting Vietnam. We shook it off with the Reagan buildup, the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. 

–One of al Qaeda’s goals was to suck the US into a fight in Afghanistan and bleed us, just like the war against the USSR. Seems like they get their wish whether we try to reform Afghanistan or quit. We do not have to play into their strategy, we have that choice. Al Qaeda developed credibility and power in the Middle East by appearing to be correct about our hegemonic intentions there. Rather than contending for control of Afghanistan, if we simply focus on crushing AQ, seems to me we’ll damage their credibility at the same time we’re physically destroying them. The key is to not appear to be what they say we are.

In the beginning when our orders were to go get them with ectream predjudise, it was working. That is until the generals, press and politicians started showing up and we had to back off. The issue is that WIN THIER HEARTS AND MINDS has only worked once in history and that was under general McArthur, it didnt work durin Korea, Nam, and it wont work here. People are not as stupid as many of our politicians believe, They know that if they can get the US to engage them that they will benefit from it because of all the money we poru into thier countries trying to buy thier love. That is the real resononing behind why the more we draw back the more they attack — they do not attack and destroy the new roads, facilities, and power plants we built for them, they continue to attack in the areas they want developed. (yeah they do attack our base camps but to no real affect, and its not because they are not capable of inducing more damage either, they dont want to). If we had gone in, crippled them and left it would have sent a bigger and better dont mess with the USA message, but we made the same mistake again (hearts and minds). We will never be able to get them all no matter what, if you take out the leaders they will just replace them as we do and keep going. You have to make them fear the concequences of engaging us and we suck at making that point due to a weak government getting involved from long distance in matters they have no ideal about. As for not being a threat you could not be more wrong, one man with decent training can cause major damge to our infrastructure with little resources at his disposal. I know I could do it so it stands to reason others can as well. Congress needs to give the Gen what he wants and stay out of it until he tells him its over period.

This is really a simple fix the only problem is we don’t have anyone in our government wtih the ball’s to do it!

Listen to the Special Operation Forces and the troops doing the fighting. Provide maximum air support with full involvement of Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine resources.

its is not over until the fat obama sings

This is starting to sound like wishful thinking on capital hill. “Maybe, if we sit around teh camp fire a sing a song, things will get better.” Nothing short of a major draft, backed by general consciption, is going to even have a chance of working, and only then, if there is an intelligent plan guiding it. I predict, however, a “Gordon of Khartoum” or Soviets at Herat catastrophe will decide the issue before anyone in Washington does. “the Taliban are clearly not a direct threat to us” is a ridiculous statement, while we’ve got troops in country, and what the hell does he think all this airport security is about? Are we supposed to just live like this? ANd the cost ratio of 25 to 1: does that include Halibourton and al the rest of the contractors? The Taliban isn’t going to beat us: we are going to lose, all by ourselves.

Make this thing our military and politicians want to call a war a real war and start a draft or mandatory government service and you will see just how many milliseconds these overseas adventures last

All the ones that want to fight then go over there and fight instead of sitting in front of your TV. We need the drift and then the war will be over, with everone rich or poor. Were is bushes kids fighting

Hunt for all Al-quida leaders and go home afterwards.

Despite teh 25 to 1 cost ratio, we’re running this war on the cheap, poitically, by avoiding a draft. And a shortage of manpowr is our major problem with winning. Most politcians, and especially Obama, would rather spend money than call a draft. So, we have all these “force multipliers”. Even with a draft, we lost Viet Nam. However, neither the NVA nor even the KGB were up to 911. I believe bin Laden did want us to invade Afgahnistan so he could bleed us to doeath like he did the USSR. But teh 120,000 man Soviet Army were figuring it out, right about when Charlie Wilson worked his Stinger deal. 140,000 men with some genuine counter-guerilla brains and no Halibourton contractors could do it on a 1980–1990 cost/technology basis. Howver, if we don’t want to pay the price required, then we proably ought o get out of th shop_and get our troops out, too-nothing worse than having your butt hagging out there in an under manned post.

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