Comments on: ‘Diffused War’ Model For Afghanistan? http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/12/diffused-war-model-for-afghanistan/ Online Defense and Acquisition Journal Fri, 19 Mar 2010 00:23:52 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: rolandhttp://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/12/diffused-war-model-for-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-16264 roland Fri, 13 Nov 2009 15:47:54 +0000 http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11266#comment-16264 When and if the troops encounter a terrorist group, immidiately call in air support. That will hopefully solve that problem. When and if the troops encounter a terrorist group, immidiately call in air support. That will hopefully solve that problem.

]]> By: Colehttp://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/12/diffused-war-model-for-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-16217 Cole Fri, 13 Nov 2009 00:38:26 +0000 http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11266#comment-16217 Gaza and Sadr City were already small, dense walled-in areas of operation with few attacks originating from them other than indirect fire. In contrast, Afghanistan is an area the size of Texas with a heavily dispersed population hiding hybrid fighters. The bad guys strike from anywhere, massing forces against our small units, and then disappear into the hills or the local population. In addition, the Sadr City coalition was a BCT-sized task force,,,not a small element. True, it had heavy forces, but also Stryker and light forces plus all the other ISR assets mentioned not normally associated with small units. Suspect the Israeli ground unit was also fairly large. Both units were easily resupplied. That differs from some proposed concepts of small company-size elements wandering about the battlefield without clear means of sustainment. In Afghanistan, company-size elements and units supplying them have little idea where the enemy is, and tend to get ambushed or blown up. Protecting smaller Afghan populations in counterinsurgency seems to start by staying close to them to simplify WHERE you resupply and limiting bad guy access as they improve the local area...as opposed to fencing in the bad guys to protect friendlies as in the cited Sadr City and Gaza examples. Gaza and Sadr City were already small, dense walled-in areas of operation with few attacks originating from them other than indirect fire. In contrast, Afghanistan is an area the size of Texas with a heavily dispersed population hiding hybrid fighters. The bad guys strike from anywhere, massing forces against our small units, and then disappear into the hills or the local population.

In addition, the Sadr City coalition was a BCT-sized task force„,not a small element. True, it had heavy forces, but also Stryker and light forces plus all the other ISR assets mentioned not normally associated with small units. Suspect the Israeli ground unit was also fairly large. Both units were easily resupplied. That differs from some proposed concepts of small company-size elements wandering about the battlefield without clear means of sustainment. In Afghanistan, company-size elements and units supplying them have little idea where the enemy is, and tend to get ambushed or blown up. Protecting smaller Afghan populations in counterinsurgency seems to start by staying close to them to simplify WHERE you resupply and limiting bad guy access as they improve the local area…as opposed to fencing in the bad guys to protect friendlies as in the cited Sadr City and Gaza examples.

]]> By: CharlesHoustonhttp://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/12/diffused-war-model-for-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-16199 CharlesHouston Thu, 12 Nov 2009 20:37:43 +0000 http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11266#comment-16199 One difference between the Gaza operation and any ideal future operation - we have to cut off resupply of the enemy. MOUT uses a lot of ammo and once they run out - they are irritants not opponents. In Gaza, resupply was not cut off (as I understand it) but in Sadr City I think we did mostly cut off resupply. In Afghanistan, if the Pakistanis keep pounding their side of the border, and we keep pounding our side - the bad guys will run out of everything and fade away. Charles Phillips LtCol, USAF Retired One difference between the Gaza operation and any ideal future operation — we have to cut off resupply of the enemy. MOUT uses a lot of ammo and once they run out — they are irritants not opponents. In Gaza, resupply was not cut off (as I understand it) but in Sadr City I think we did mostly cut off resupply.
In Afghanistan, if the Pakistanis keep pounding their side of the border, and we keep pounding our side — the bad guys will run out of everything and fade away.
Charles Phillips
LtCol, USAF Retired

]]>