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> <channel><title>Comments on: IW Needs Armor, Firepower</title> <atom:link href="http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/</link> <description>Online Defense and Acquisition Journal</description> <lastBuildDate>Mon, 15 Mar 2010 06:17:44 +0000</lastBuildDate> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2</generator> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <item><title>By: SkysoldierRecon</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16456</link> <dc:creator>SkysoldierRecon</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 19:47:10 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16456</guid> <description>well, BUSH-no, CHENEY took the Iraq detour..thats why we are still in a bucket o&#039;..WTF!!!! </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>well, BUSH-no, CHENEY took the Iraq detour..thats why we are still in a bucket o’..WTF!!!!</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Barry</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16470</link> <dc:creator>Barry</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 18:02:07 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16470</guid> <description>If we don&#039;t go in to win any way we can then why go at all. The need for a decision is here and now and not down the road. They seem to think our men don&#039;t need anything to win this and will not use what they have avaliable to them. Why not go for the win and not another Vietnam as they are doing so far. We do not need more of out troops diying for nothing and not give them the backing to finish this up and get out. The time for our fighting men is now and in the present and we have what is needed to get the job done and we can get it done if they would get off there butts and do something now because it is now that it is needed not tomorrow, it is now. If they need a tank give it to em and if they some type of aircraft give it to em and not think you don&#039;t want the machines to get hurt they were built to make our men safe so keep them as safe as we can. Let them win and give them the ways and means to do so now because it is now they need it not after it is over. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If we don’t go in to win any way we can then why go at all. The need for a decision is here and now and not down the road. They seem to think our men don’t need anything to win this and will not use what they have avaliable to them. Why not go for the win and not another Vietnam as they are doing so far. We do not need more of out troops diying for nothing and not give them the backing to finish this up and get out. The time for our fighting men is now and in the present and we have what is needed to get the job done and we can get it done if they would get off there butts and do something now because it is now that it is needed not tomorrow, it is now. If they need a tank give it to em and if they some type of aircraft give it to em and not think you don’t want the machines to get hurt they were built to make our men safe so keep them as safe as we can. Let them win and give them the ways and means to do so now because it is now they need it not after it is over.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: JP MCCRORY</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16469</link> <dc:creator>JP MCCRORY</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 17:54:30 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16469</guid> <description>when light infantry advances on foot or in wheeled vehicles they habittually conduct movements to defense.Why? When American light infantry is armed with automatic weapons and the enemy has automatic weapons, any resistance encountered is stiff because conditions of symmetry prevail. When these conditions emerge, the light infantry turns to the most powerful weapon in its inventory- the radio,because it allows them to call for help from the air force,the navy, and the artillery. When heavy Armor arrives on the scene the battle ends quickly. Col. DOUGLAS A. MACGREGOR  Transformation Under Fire
I served under Col. MacGregor as a M1 Tank Platoon Sergeant in the 4th U.S. Cavalry and would follow him into HELL! QUARTERHORSE SIR! </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>when light infantry advances on foot or in wheeled vehicles they habittually conduct movements to defense.Why? When American light infantry is armed with automatic weapons and the enemy has automatic weapons, any resistance encountered is stiff because conditions of symmetry prevail. When these conditions emerge, the light infantry turns to the most powerful weapon in its inventory– the radio,because it allows them to call for help from the air force,the navy, and the artillery. When heavy Armor arrives on the scene the battle ends quickly. Col. DOUGLAS A. MACGREGOR  Transformation Under Fire<br
/> I served under Col. MacGregor as a M1 Tank Platoon Sergeant in the 4th U.S. Cavalry and would follow him into HELL! QUARTERHORSE SIR!</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: SkysoldierRecon</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16457</link> <dc:creator>SkysoldierRecon</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 14:50:17 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16457</guid> <description>Well, the IRAQ detour pretty much screwed this mission. We had them beat..and let them come back..bring on the armor. When you got good air and arty, you could smash them. Maybe we should cross into Baluchistan...i mean, thats where theyre comin from right? Time 4 a DECISION... </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, the IRAQ detour pretty much screwed this mission. We had them beat..and let them come back..bring on the armor. When you got good air and arty, you could smash them. Maybe we should cross into Baluchistan…i mean, thats where theyre comin from right? Time 4 a DECISION…</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: SkysoldierRecon</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16455</link> <dc:creator>SkysoldierRecon</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 14:45:32 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16455</guid> <description>why not a heavy BCT in Helmand? Bet the talibs would run like hell..the Canadians use Leo II&#039;s, why not Abrams or Bradleys? </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>why not a heavy BCT in Helmand? Bet the talibs would run like hell..the Canadians use Leo II’s, why not Abrams or Bradleys?</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: L Berry</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16452</link> <dc:creator>L Berry</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 14:24:37 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16452</guid> <description>A couple of things bother me about our recent activities in Afgan.  First is the new policy of screw the troops, don&#039;t fire near non-combatants.  We are losing a lot of good men because they can&#039;t get Artellary or Airpower because, their might be a civilian nearby.  How can you tell a combatant from a civilian there?  Wait uintil they shoot you, then ask. Second, we are losing a lot of soldiers to IEDs because they need better protection and heavier armor.  But the biggest issue is nothing is being done by leaders to suipport our Commander and his policies.  Obama and his think tank can&#039;t deciede what to order for lunch without a long presentation and follow-uip meetiungs.  Lead, follow or get the Hell out of the way. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A couple of things bother me about our recent activities in Afgan.  First is the new policy of screw the troops, don’t fire near non-combatants.  We are losing a lot of good men because they can’t get Artellary or Airpower because, their might be a civilian nearby.  How can you tell a combatant from a civilian there?  Wait uintil they shoot you, then ask. Second, we are losing a lot of soldiers to IEDs because they need better protection and heavier armor.  But the biggest issue is nothing is being done by leaders to suipport our Commander and his policies.  Obama and his think tank can’t deciede what to order for lunch without a long presentation and follow-uip meetiungs.  Lead, follow or get the Hell out of the way.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: pennst98</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16412</link> <dc:creator>pennst98</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 21:05:58 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16412</guid> <description>MILNEWS is right, It&#039;s about time we pay attention to the source of these &quot;bright ideas.&quot; It seems like the debate is being lead by purists from various diciplines. With this type of &quot;intellectual&quot; analysis we might as well wait for the Logistics officer&#039;s paper that states the key to counter insurgency is better demand forecasting of toilet paper.....
And once again we&#039;re aruging whether or not to use a particular bit of equipment rather than discussing WHAT THE HELL ARE WE STILL DOING IN AFGOATISTAN 8 YEARS LATER?! </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>MILNEWS is right, It’s about time we pay attention to the source of these “bright ideas.” It seems like the debate is being lead by purists from various diciplines. With this type of “intellectual” analysis we might as well wait for the Logistics officer’s paper that states the key to counter insurgency is better demand forecasting of toilet paper.….</p><p>And once again we’re aruging whether or not to use a particular bit of equipment rather than discussing WHAT THE HELL ARE WE STILL DOING IN AFGOATISTAN 8 YEARS LATER?!</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Curt</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16406</link> <dc:creator>Curt</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 07:55:32 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16406</guid> <description>Small Wars Journal blog has an excellent powerpoint AAR from the USMC 1/5 in Helmand.  It is very instructive to actually see what passes as a road in many parts of Afghanistan. This is the terrain where we need a heavy armored force (with all those associated fuel tankers)? Iraq/Gaza are urban, Afghanistan is about as rural as it gets. What works in one area may not work as well in another.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Small Wars Journal blog has an excellent powerpoint AAR from the USMC 1/5 in Helmand.  It is very instructive to actually see what passes as a road in many parts of Afghanistan. This is the terrain where we need a heavy armored force (with all those associated fuel tankers)? Iraq/Gaza are urban, Afghanistan is about as rural as it gets. What works in one area may not work as well in another.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: elgatoso</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16405</link> <dc:creator>elgatoso</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 05:06:37 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16405</guid> <description>What about a Helo Army? </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What about a Helo Army?</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Trophy</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16402</link> <dc:creator>Trophy</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 01:12:19 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16402</guid> <description>And the Air Force would be unwilling due to non-availability of aircraft for sustaining such a doctrine. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>And the Air Force would be unwilling due to non-availability of aircraft for sustaining such a doctrine.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Cole</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16401</link> <dc:creator>Cole</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 00:47:42 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16401</guid> <description>Mike, I&#039;m not talking about C-130s. All the Strykers in Afghanistan were flown in by Russian contractor aircraft and C-17s from Diego Garcia. To do that with Abrams and Bradely would require many more lift aircraft. Then it would cost much more in fuel once there, endangering logistician lives.
The Namer would not work with the Abrams rear-engine and a tank-sized IFVs would simply double the gas-guzzling of the battlefield&#039;s worst offender. Israel can easily supply its heavy forces and never sea- or air-deploys it. Seem to recall Israel running over buildings in Gaza to avoid IEDs because crews remain very vulnerable and much more money is lost when a tank or Namer gets hit than when a M-ATV gets hit (and crew survives).
Believe a lot of the Stryker and M-ATV armor shortcomings could be overcome in Afghanistan through creation of three-sided HESCO battle-positions within COPs and OPs. Position them and their platoons/squads every few kilometers along key roads and in troublesome populated areas to reduce patrolling distance and maintain a continuous surveillance screen the rest of the time. Just my 2 cents. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mike, I’m not talking about C-130s. All the Strykers in Afghanistan were flown in by Russian contractor aircraft and C-17s from Diego Garcia. To do that with Abrams and Bradely would require many more lift aircraft. Then it would cost much more in fuel once there, endangering logistician lives.</p><p>The Namer would not work with the Abrams rear-engine and a tank-sized IFVs would simply double the gas-guzzling of the battlefield’s worst offender. Israel can easily supply its heavy forces and never sea– or air-deploys it. Seem to recall Israel running over buildings in Gaza to avoid IEDs because crews remain very vulnerable and much more money is lost when a tank or Namer gets hit than when a M-ATV gets hit (and crew survives).</p><p>Believe a lot of the Stryker and M-ATV armor shortcomings could be overcome in Afghanistan through creation of three-sided HESCO battle-positions within COPs and OPs. Position them and their platoons/squads every few kilometers along key roads and in troublesome populated areas to reduce patrolling distance and maintain a continuous surveillance screen the rest of the time. Just my 2 cents.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: solomon</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16400</link> <dc:creator>solomon</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 23:02:13 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16400</guid> <description>1.  Intra-theater deployment against an opposition force has never been done with armored formations.  Even relatively light ones like the Stryker.  Even with more capable aircraft like the C-17 it would be difficult.  I realize its the sparkle in planners eyes but the logistics of it would be too difficult.
2.  Motorized formations are NOT a combat enabler for infantry.  Mechanized formations provide the combined arms task force that is missing from these motorized units.  There is a reason why the Israeli&#039;s chose to procure the Namera instead of the Stryker.  Same with the German Army and the excellent Puma IFV.
This entire exercise of obtaining the Stryker for Army Units was in response to the time right after the 1st Gulf War where everyone thought that major combat would be fleeting and short affairs.  General Shinseki wanted to make sure that the Army was part of the fight and RMA advocates were spouting the party line of being expeditionary.  Many forward thinking critics warned that the Army was giving up too much in the way of staying power but the administration at the time was enamored with the idea of a high tech - light force.
MacGregor is right.  Its a shame that the lessons learned from the fighting in Iraq are already starting to fade.
Oh and as far as the entire Army becoming Airborne, that would be a major money pit.  You&#039;d have to pay everyone jump pay, keep everyone jump certified and have a willing Air Force to help out. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1.  Intra-theater deployment against an opposition force has never been done with armored formations.  Even relatively light ones like the Stryker.  Even with more capable aircraft like the C-17 it would be difficult.  I realize its the sparkle in planners eyes but the logistics of it would be too difficult.</p><p>2.  Motorized formations are NOT a combat enabler for infantry.  Mechanized formations provide the combined arms task force that is missing from these motorized units.  There is a reason why the Israeli’s chose to procure the Namera instead of the Stryker.  Same with the German Army and the excellent Puma IFV.</p><p>This entire exercise of obtaining the Stryker for Army Units was in response to the time right after the 1st Gulf War where everyone thought that major combat would be fleeting and short affairs.  General Shinseki wanted to make sure that the Army was part of the fight and RMA advocates were spouting the party line of being expeditionary.  Many forward thinking critics warned that the Army was giving up too much in the way of staying power but the administration at the time was enamored with the idea of a high tech — light force.</p><p>MacGregor is right.  Its a shame that the lessons learned from the fighting in Iraq are already starting to fade.</p><p>Oh and as far as the entire Army becoming Airborne, that would be a major money pit.  You’d have to pay everyone jump pay, keep everyone jump certified and have a willing Air Force to help out.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Tanksaway</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16399</link> <dc:creator>Tanksaway</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 22:35:33 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16399</guid> <description>C-130 capability provides for in theater deployment over obstacles (mountains, large rivers, etc) or  to suprise an enemy that thinks there is only one AoA. Similar to the AirCav concept but with armored combat capability. It is not there for strategic deployment, that is for the C-17 and C-5 (just like tanks). Motorized formations is a combat enabler for the infantry. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>C-130 capability provides for in theater deployment over obstacles (mountains, large rivers, etc) or  to suprise an enemy that thinks there is only one AoA. Similar to the AirCav concept but with armored combat capability. It is not there for strategic deployment, that is for the C-17 and C-5 (just like tanks). Motorized formations is a combat enabler for the infantry.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: elgatoso</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16397</link> <dc:creator>elgatoso</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 21:55:33 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16397</guid> <description>I could be wrong but make sense  the entire Army to become Airborne. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I could be wrong but make sense  the entire Army to become Airborne.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Curt Kastens</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16396</link> <dc:creator>Curt Kastens</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 21:20:19 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16396</guid> <description>Party Poopers </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Party Poopers</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Solomon</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16394</link> <dc:creator>Solomon</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 21:00:04 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16394</guid> <description>Amazing.  The 9th Infantry Division did an experiment with Motorized Infantry and it died because of its lack of lethality and protection on the modern battlefield.  Fast forward to the 1990&#039;s and we&#039;re back to motorized infantry formations.
The saddest part of all this is the C-130 capability.  It just doesn&#039;t make any sense unless the entire Army is about to become Airborne.  Additionally the units that could make the best use (as the concept is laid out) don&#039;t use the Stryker at all!  The 82nd and Rangers would seem to be natural fits for the vehicle but they don&#039;t use it because they emphasize Infantry skills above all.
I just don&#039;t understand how a concept which was abandoned ---has made such a big comeback and is on the verge of affecting the Army in the same way that the F-22 affected the Air Force...it will become the focus of the entire service at the detriment of the entire service.  The replacement for the FCS can&#039;t come quick enough.  Lets hope that its more like the Israeli Namera or the German Puma rather than a reworked Stryker. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Amazing.  The 9th Infantry Division did an experiment with Motorized Infantry and it died because of its lack of lethality and protection on the modern battlefield.  Fast forward to the 1990’s and we’re back to motorized infantry formations.</p><p>The saddest part of all this is the C-130 capability.  It just doesn’t make any sense unless the entire Army is about to become Airborne.  Additionally the units that could make the best use (as the concept is laid out) don’t use the Stryker at all!  The 82nd and Rangers would seem to be natural fits for the vehicle but they don’t use it because they emphasize Infantry skills above all.</p><p>I just don’t understand how a concept which was abandoned —has made such a big comeback and is on the verge of affecting the Army in the same way that the F-22 affected the Air Force…it will become the focus of the entire service at the detriment of the entire service.  The replacement for the FCS can’t come quick enough.  Lets hope that its more like the Israeli Namera or the German Puma rather than a reworked Stryker.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: MILNEWS.ca</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16391</link> <dc:creator>MILNEWS.ca</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 20:37:19 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16391</guid> <description>2 points:
1)  A former armored officer saying more tanks are the answer - does that not ring any bells here?  No disrespect meant at all, just saying...
2) +100 to everyone saying &quot;you need all sorts of tools in your belt&quot; </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>2 points:</p><p>1)  A former armored officer saying more tanks are the answer — does that not ring any bells here?  No disrespect meant at all, just saying…</p><p>2) +100 to everyone saying “you need all sorts of tools in your belt”</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Rick W</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16383</link> <dc:creator>Rick W</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 20:02:31 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16383</guid> <description>MacGregor skipped right past the the part where the vehicles he wants so badly are the same vehicles Hezbola ripped to bits in Lebanon.  The Israelis counted on armor to replace proper combined arms tactics and paid the price in blood.  He also slid past the bit where a soldier in an Abrams tanks that hits an IED is almost twice as likey to become a casuality as a soldier in an MRAP. Seems enough explosive will bust MRAP, saran wrap and a tank.
There is no single vehicle type that is going to meet all of the needs in urban combat. There are going to be many times when the best vehicle for the job is a tank. There are going to be many other times when a Stryker type vehicle is not just adequate for the job, but actually better for the job. The key is having the assets you may need on hand and using the ones that are appropriate to the task. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>MacGregor skipped right past the the part where the vehicles he wants so badly are the same vehicles Hezbola ripped to bits in Lebanon.  The Israelis counted on armor to replace proper combined arms tactics and paid the price in blood.  He also slid past the bit where a soldier in an Abrams tanks that hits an IED is almost twice as likey to become a casuality as a soldier in an MRAP. Seems enough explosive will bust MRAP, saran wrap and a tank.</p><p>There is no single vehicle type that is going to meet all of the needs in urban combat. There are going to be many times when the best vehicle for the job is a tank. There are going to be many other times when a Stryker type vehicle is not just adequate for the job, but actually better for the job. The key is having the assets you may need on hand and using the ones that are appropriate to the task.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: roland</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16368</link> <dc:creator>roland</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 19:58:27 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16368</guid> <description>I think we need to re-define our main goal in Afghanistan to prevent lost on troops and budget. At first I taught  our main goal is Osama bin Ladin and his militant. But when the Taliban failed to surrender Osama during the Bush Administration, Mr Bush decided to go against the Taliban too. The problem on this plan is do we really know how manny they are, where they are and who they are ?  I think the plan and strategy in Afghanisstan are needed to be revisited and re-examined. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think we need to re-define our main goal in Afghanistan to prevent lost on troops and budget. At first I taught  our main goal is Osama bin Ladin and his militant. But when the Taliban failed to surrender Osama during the Bush Administration, Mr Bush decided to go against the Taliban too. The problem on this plan is do we really know how manny they are, where they are and who they are ?  I think the plan and strategy in Afghanisstan are needed to be revisited and re-examined.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: CharlesHouston</title><link>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/16/iw-needs-armor-firepower/comment-page-1/#comment-16373</link> <dc:creator>CharlesHouston</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 16:45:23 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.dodbuzz.com/?p=11367#comment-16373</guid> <description>On Point 4: our experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that Special Forces and light, mobile forces are great for getting you into a huge dogfight. Once you are there, you are the smallest dog in the fight and are gonna get the snot kicked out of you.
Rumsfeld and his band got us into the fight and we are just now seeing the results of the Surge (that John McCain was a big supporter of) that is gonna get us out with some residual honor.
Still, I see our lessons as being that we need a variety of vehicles - some heavy and well armored, some light and fast, and some in the middle. If we only buy one type - we have a 33 percent chance of having the right one when we need it. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Point 4: our experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that Special Forces and light, mobile forces are great for getting you into a huge dogfight. Once you are there, you are the smallest dog in the fight and are gonna get the snot kicked out of you.</p><p>Rumsfeld and his band got us into the fight and we are just now seeing the results of the Surge (that John McCain was a big supporter of) that is gonna get us out with some residual honor.</p><p>Still, I see our lessons as being that we need a variety of vehicles — some heavy and well armored, some light and fast, and some in the middle. If we only buy one type — we have a 33 percent chance of having the right one when we need it.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> </channel> </rss>
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