Army Wants Tough GCV Battle

Army Wants Tough GCV Battle

Col. Bryan McVeigh, the Army’s program manager for the new Ground Combat Vehicle infantry fighting vehicle says the GCV request for proposal was held up by the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer Ashton Carter to make sure that the Army would ensure vigorous competition among several contractors.

The GCV acquisition program “is focused on competition,” and the Army wants companies other than armored vehicle builders BAE and General Dynamics to pitch proposals, McVeigh said. The Army hasn’t kept two builders going head-to-head through the technology development phase since the Abrams main battle tank program, McVeigh said.

“We want to be able to look at other American companies to allow them to break into this niche market. This isn’t just MGV warmed over. I just don’t want one or two companies that were deep in MGV have a competitive advantage in this,” he said.


OSD did not make any major changes to the Army’s plans, McVeigh said. Industry proposals are due in late April, then the source selection process begins, culminating in September with a “Milestone A” decision from Carter’s office, allowing the Army to award the actual production contract.

The Army is trying to build on six years of development work on the FCS Manned Ground Vehicle, and months ago it gave industry that development “body of knowledge,” which laid out the preliminary design, to incorporate into their proposals for the GCV.

Where the Army’s plans for GCV differ most significantly from the ill-starred FCS program is they don’t want “revolutionary” technologies this time around. FCS was all about pushing the technological envelope in everything from high-tech armors to automotive components to sensors, which resulted in a lot of time and money spent with very little to show for it. It’s all about program risk avoidance this time around, all GCV technologies must be at technology readiness level 6, which means they’ve proven to work in a simulated operational environment.

“Our goal is to make sure we get something out to the soldiers within seven years… if we wait for the perfect solution we’re never going to get it into the hands of soldiers,” McVeigh said. We need their feedback to continue and improve the design.

The biggest changes over the original FCS vehicle design is in the armor package and other “survivability” fixes. The GCV will be significantly heavier than the FCS MGV, which started out at 20 tons and ultimately grew to around 34 tons before it was cancelled. McVeigh wouldn’t specify the vehicle’s weight exactly, because he wants to give industry bit of latitude. This is the first vehicle, at least since the Abrams tank, that from the beginning is built to be readily upgradeable, McVeigh said, which means the ability to add more armor.

It will come with a base level, “Level 0,” armor protection for irregular fights of the kind found in Iraq where the big threat is IEDs, explosively formed penetrators and mostly small-arms up to heavy machine guns. While the MRAP is a great vehicle for specific battlefields, he said, it doesn’t have needed cross-country mobility. “Based off the lessons we’ve learned in theater, survivability doesn’t just come from armor, it doesn’t just come from active-protection systems, it comes from not allowing the enemy to channel you into one area.”

The GCV must have mobility equivalent to an Abrams tank. Although McVeigh refused to say so, cross-country mobility, especially on any kind of soft ground or snow, only comes from tracks. In urban areas, tracked vehicles have the advantage of being able to pivot steer, which is a huge advantage over wheeled vehicles.

The “Level 1” armor package, will add appliqué armor that also protects up to auto-cannon, along the lines of the current Bradley. An active-protection (APS) system will be included on the vehicle to provide 360 degree protection against RPGs, which is the threshold requirement; the objective requirements, are an APS that can defeat heavier anti-tank guided missiles and sabot rounds. But McVeigh says builders must demonstrate how they’ll improve on the existing APS architecture the ability to defeat those heavier threats down the road as technology improves. “I don’t want two different computers running it. I don’t want two different radar systems running it.”

The Army is developing an improved version of Raytheon’s Quick Kill APS system. The Army is continuing to develop its APS, contractors can bid any system they want, McVeigh said, as long as they meet the GCV holistic requirements.

The FCS vehicles were designed to fit inside a C-130. That is not the case with the GCV. Transportability requirements are that it must be C-17 and C-5 transportable. “It allows us the weight flexibility,” he said. Trying to keep the FCS vehicles inside that C-130 box forced designers to dump too much armor protection and other important components.

The GCV must carry a 12 man team, a 9 man rifle squad and a three man crew. Cooling the interior of the GCV will be a big challenge, because the vehicle will carry many more computers and video panels than any other vehicles. Built into the design will be a 30 percent margin for growth in cooling and at least a 20 percent growth in propulsion.

I asked McVeigh how the GCV would match up against the current Bradley, which it is intended to replace:

“It will have significantly better mine and IED protection, it will have greater lethality, it will have a bigger cannon. It will allow us to carry more men… a complete squad. It will have about the same mobility of the Bradley but the ability to carry significantly enhanced communications and electronics so I don’t have to divert power from the propulsion system for cooling. It will have significantly improved reliability than the Bradley. It will have integrated non-lethal capabilities, which none of our vehicles have today.”

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Good Morning Folks,

The game here is that General Dynamics is not really a defense contractor but a private equity group that buys and sells. The DoD has assumed that with out orders being placed for armored vehicles GD will sell out there armored vehicle holding. BAE which is a management company needs GD for the cash and the fact that it a foreign company.

Interesting, GD today announced that it is cashing out of the satellite business and selling it’s interest in it’s Dallas manufacturing to Orbit.

This is the result of consolidation in the defense industry, no orders, no cash flow, no competitive profits the equity guys are our out of here. With out long term commitments form capital and a stable management/labor team, long lead projects like this are all but impossible.

Letting smaller companies bid on these projects is fine but with out access to cheap credit and stable capital investment they will not be able to expand and follow the projects into development and production.

Welcome to the hang over of Reaganenomics.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Byron, if I’m not mistaken, it’s General Dynamics who builds the M1 Abrams. And it was BAE who bought out United Defense, original makers of the Bradley, M88 and other vehicles. Also BAE acquired Armor Holdings, original makers of the FMTV. So if anything, it seems BAE is the true outsider not just due to being a foreign company.

They should get the input of defense labs like Picattiny or TARDEC to design the GCV and then outsource the contractors to build it.

Increased competition among defense contractors will significantly benefit the overall GCV program. More importantly, this approach will ensure our Soldiers receive a platform that will provide greater force protection as well as increase the survivability and reliability of the platform.

In an era of persistent conflict, our combat platforms must have the capability to accept technology improvements. The GCV’s ability to accept various levels of protection will only increase the effectiveness of the warfighter.

Finally, increased competition will ensure defense contractors will deliver the best possible solution to our Soldiers in the Force.

Major Rodney Crenshaw
Student, Command and General Staff College,
US Combined Arms Center
Fort Lee, Virginia

First of all, it’s “Reaganomics,” not “Reaganenomics.” Second of all, nothing you said has anything to do with Reaganomics, which you apparently do not understand.

The problem is the fact of the constantly disappearing technology and industrial base for military applications. This is true in ships and submarines, aircraft and missiles, armor and gun systems, etc.. Too many projects have gone all the way to operational capability only to be canceled because “we don’t need these Cold War weapons;” the Comanche helicopter, Crusader artillery system, Sea Wolf submarine, DDG 1000 and the endless parade of scrapped FCS items are perfect examples. You can’t keep doing that do defense contractors and expect them to stay in the game.

You also can end production of things like M1 tanks, Bradley IFVs, and the F-22 with no replacements in sight and then complain that there aren’t enough companies to hold “strong competitions” for procurement purposes. You can’t shut down aircraft production lines, shipyards, and heavy armor facilities and then wonder why there aren’t any companies to produce prototypes. The laid off workers and specialized machinery aren’t just put into storage until the geniuses in Congress decide they need them.

This isn’t the hangover of “Reaganenomics.” It’s the result of 20 years of people deciding our defense budgets based on the fact that they don’t understand that there is no such thing as a “Cold War weapon we don’t use.”

There are only weapons we don’t have and can no longer build because they let the industry and research that builds them waste away.

sounds good. It has been too long since there was true competition. FCS feel far to short of that mark and their idea of having one integrator and all other contractors worked for them. Bad juju there.

The sad thing is that there will be no tech advancement that went with this. FCS had that in spades. They lost sight of it when they tried to spin that tech to current platforms like an Abrams. Then instead of designing to requirements they were also designing to Abrams and others. Essentially becoming many little programs.

Only two mistakes I think they are making. The first is prognostics as it stands in the RFP. Prognostics will never be achieved.…and I have my reasons. It is a nightmare of a capability whose path to achieve it is far more worthy then the end goal. Lastly the other mistake is trying to ram this quickly. if comparing yourself to Abrams is the model then we need to be prepared to go the distance and buy what we need not what pops out in 6–10 years.

Still the real trick will be if the workforce and politicians can stay focused on the goal. If they loose sight the GCV will be a procurement mess. The workforce needs to focus on contracts and not special interest, the polticians need to focus on the capability and not dollars.…and special interest of course.

Thank you for speaking some sense here. But Byron will dismiss your opinion as part of the “vast right-wing conspiracy.”

Just built something like a medern Chalenger Tank version, that can last for 20 years whithout changing its design.

If a vehicle of this type is really what the US Army needs (and that’s a wholly separate question), then increasing competition requires drawing overseas suppliers into the bidding. Otherwise, the set of possible suppliers is dominated by BAE Systems and General Dynamics. A vehicle with that much armor and the offroad mobility of an Abrams tank will almost certainly be tracked, and the recent entrants into the armored vehicle business–Force Protection, Navistar, and Oshkosh–don’t have that technical experience.

Textron indicated a few months ago keen interest in producing the Namer troop carriers that IMI is proposing to source from a US factory; this suggests one possible US assembler and another possible overseas technology provider. Rheinmetall and KMW, given their experience with the rather heavy Puma vehicle, are another pair that may seek a US partner.

But without firms like this in the bidding, there’s no “increased competition”.

Good Morning Folks,

On the privatization of the defense industry, it did happen during the 1980’s and the Reagan administration. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq the short coming of that ill-advised policy came to bare fruit, in ammunition shortages and other supply problems. For anyone really interested I would suggest you go and look up the 3ID’s after action report, which was public for a few days and read it. It gives a strong picture of how un-prepared we were for the invasion of Iraq and many of the problems are still there.

Wit the Army and armored vehicles the Army need the ability to build small numbers of several ideas and work through them as they evolve to the next level of warfare. There is a eight year old model for this in how the Navy advanced shipbuilding technology in the 1930’s and when WW II did come along we were ready to put some very advanced hauls into production.

The Navy contracted with a private firm named Gibbs and Cox to work with the Navy’s Bureau of ships on new ship designs. When an idea seed to work the Navy could quickly build a few say Destroyers and send them to the fleet, the Navy owned and controlled their ship yards. During this 10 year era, 1932–1942 you had twelve different classes of Destroyers come into the fleet some like Farragut, Porter, Bagley classes had only eight ships in class and the Dunlap class had on two ships built.

When the war came the US was ready with the newest technology in ships. It is noted that after Pearl Harbor the Japanese didn’t build one more new carrier, the US built over a 150 carriers and over a thousand Destroyers. Contrary to popular myth the US was ready for WW II all they had to do was start bending and welding steel. Neither Germany, Italy or Japan the aggressors were anywhere near ready. That is where we should be in the future.

This is the capacity that the Army and dare say Navy and Coast Guard need today, the Air Force is so screwed up it might be better to disband it and sart all over again.

Irony the last small run for concept of armored vehicles the M-8 Bueford AG, (8 made, I think), worked out well for the 82nd. and the 101st Divisions but the Army didn’t want enough of them for GD to build them and make a profit so those eight are sitting in a parking lot some where in Pennsylvania, while America is at war. If the Army owned and controlled a plant that made armored vehicles they M-8 may have been built and might have been a game changer for the light division.

Something has to be done. The $4 billion that the DoD has allocated till 2017 to do R&D for future armored vehicles is not enough to feed the current system. If there are no defense contractors interested there is no competition.

The Army needs to get back into controlling the manufacturing process and dong it’s own design work on weapons platforms and systems. Army officers who have been in combat know a lot more of what the Army needs then a bunch of civilians who never laced up a pair of combat boots, the Army also needs the ability to try new ideas that may or may not work and not bust the bank. The order what the Army needs, not the number of units some contractor needs to sell to get an expected return on equity.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

IMHO we need to stop trying to produce a do everything vehicle. If you autocannon support, build the M-8 in two versions, one with the 105mm and one with a 30mm then build a new APC/AFV.

Good Evening sw614,

Right on, I agree 100%. In fact, I will defer to any serving/former members of the 82nd who were involved with the testing of the M-8 but all the written reports and the testimony that I’ve seen says this was the platform the light fighters wanted.

It was even briefly on order but it appears that the number of units was to small to justify a production line. This was before 9/11 in the mid 90’s. Also, the then Sec. of Defense William Cohen had other things on his mind and securing equipment for light infantry was not even on his list.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Actually, the M-8 Armored Gun System(AGS) was planned for fielding in the 82nd Abn Div and the 2nd Cav Regt(L). At no time was it ever considered for fielding in the 101st Abn Div (AASLT).
Considering that the M-8 was a product of United Defense (formerly part of FMC) it is kind of absurd that you would think GD was some how behind the canceling of the program. in fact I believe BAE LS&A still is marketing variants of this platform.

Actually, at the time of the canceling of the M-8 AGS program the Sec. of Def. was William Perry. Sec. Perry instructed the Army that they would need to cut 20,000 in ’97 to pay for requested modernization. As is evident, the M-8 was cancelled instead.

Stewart & Stevenson’s Tactical Vehicle Systems originally produced the FMTV, which was bought by Armor Holdings in 2006(?), which in turn was acquired by BAE in 2007.

Good Morning Folks,

Although I was using the M-8 as an example of a problem with numbers, I will not disagree with anything about the specifics that FormerDirtDart brought up, with the possible exception of the 101st., The 101st. and the other then light Divisions (10th. and 25th.) under one of the pre 9/11 reorganization schemes were to get an armored Battalion attached to the Division HQ’s.

The basic problem with this type of planning will be the predictable of a post Afghanistan personal drawdown or RIF. Some of the futurests at DoD are predicting the Army at 350K, The Navy, Marines and Air Force at 150K active strength each.

The Army will keep one heavy Division active, most likely the 1st. Armored Divison at Ft. Bliss, the rest of what ever manned, perhaps 8, Divisions will be a mixture of Stryker Division and Light Infantry. The plan for the Army is to keep some active Division size HQ’s like the current 7th. and 24th. to be filled out with NG Battalions. as needed. Most of the Heavy Units, Armored and Mech. (MRAP) Infantry Battalions will be in the National Guard Divisions.

The National Guard will have a small personal increase from pre 9/11 numbers because of increased Homeland Security duties that be assigned to Guard units.

I won’t get into the projected size of the other forces, but a 200 ship Navy is almost a certainly and a two active Division Marine Corp, with the third active Division being a heavy Brigade in the Pacific. The Air Force will exist mostly in the Air National Guard.

One use for the Air Force will be to take over the what is now Army Combat Support Brigades currently, 1 active (Ft. Polk La.), 2 Reserve and 30 in the National Guard. Under this plan the AF would be assigned with the tasks of setting up, securing and running base camps, maintaining C4ISR and logistics in forward areas.

Future Armor buys almost certainly will not be at the Abrams, Bradley or even Stryker levels.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Byron, you really must keep up with things. Both the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions were deactivated in 2006.
Having been assigned to the 101st during the mid ‘90s I know for a fact that there was dialog on the development of a training/round-up relationship with an M1 tank battalion from the KYNG, which was also stationed at Ft. Campbell. This was eventually discarded because the 101st already had an almost unmanageable air load-out requirement due to the massive logistic tail of the divisions aviation brigade. This was also around the same time the 82nd replaced all of their AH-64s with Kiowa Warriors to reduce it’s air force lift requirements, which had already been greatly reduced by the deactivation of the 3/73 Armor Bn.

Good Afternoon FormerDirtDart,

Me thinks if you look you will find that the 24th. Division has an HQ/HQ Div. at Ft. Riley and that the 7th. has a HQ/HQ Div. at Ft. Carson. I believe that during the course of the war in Iraq both 7th. and 24th. Div. HQ’s did a deployment as a HQ Command.

I personally know that in 2005 the 7th. Div. at Ft. Carson was organizing and training NG battalions and forming a brigade for deployment to Iraq. The “7th. Division” Commander attended a meeting I was attended and did a power point on what they were doing at Ft. Carson.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Wow, I hate to have to explain this. But, 2006 comes after 2005, at least in the universe I reside in. And, both the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions were deactivated in 2006.

Byron, if you wish, you may continue to make your case on the status of 7th IN DIV with the historians over at First Army Division West;
“The establishment of Division West eliminated the requirement for the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, which was inactivated in a ceremony at the Mountain Post on August 22, 2006.“
http://​www​.hood​.army​.mil/​d​i​v​_​w​e​s​t​/​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​.​h​tml

Byron, the 7th and 24th Divisions were inactivated as deployable units in the mid-1990s. Their division headquarters, and I use that term loosely, remained as the command elements of Fort Carson and Fort Riley with a National Guard training mission until a few years ago. With the resettlement of 4th ID and 1st ID in the last couple years, the 7th and 24th are gone for good.

Byron, you don’t know anything about GD. It is not a private equity holding company, it is a defense company that is traded on the exchange. With the exception of their Gulfstream division, their entire portfolio is defense related, i.e. ships, subs, combat vehicles, defense IT stuff. There is no relationship between GD and BAE except possibly some teaming that goes on inside of specific programs. Both BAE and GD went through a significant acquisition effort from the late 90’s through 2008. Lately they have both been watching the defense market to see where this administration is headed.

Yeah, those type of futuristic force levels have been floating around for 20 years, I think I first saw something similar just before ODS, so early 1990 or so. One set force level at well below a million for all AD components. What was actually proposed and partially implemented was Base Force which set total,manning at 1.63 million. BF was scrapped after President Clinton took office and Les Aspin’s Bottoms Up Review was done and it just happened to coincide with what the President campaigned on.…imagine that.

I doubt Congress will ever go along with that level of cuts.

Hi MAJ Crenshaw. I have developed (seriously) a vehicle system and C-IED devices for use by coalition forces. Would it be possible to communicate with you via e-mail to run it by you for your opinion before I submit it to JIEDDO?

Regards,
Pete
MAGIC-Concepts@Paradise.net.NZ

The big thing to watch out for here and should be put into legal documentation is that BAE/ GD or any of the other big guys hoarding all the contracts cannot purchase the winner during the contracted period. I say this because more than once they ( big guys ) have back doored the system sponsoring and funding a small business under the table in order to get a contract and then buy them out before building begins. It’s not just BAE and GD doing this either. The selection board need to make sure who ever they choose is actualy financialy as well as mechanicly able to perform the job, other wise the big guys swoop in and the budget goes out the window.

I’m tempted to put a copy of the GCV schematic drawing on my private blog right nrxt to the Puma with the question — “which vehicle would you rather go to war in” ?

Harumph — I’ve not read the ICD, but reading the RFP, they really want post-PDR maturity designs going into the bid. Now where would one find that ? Either in a mod to the MGV ICV design, or the specs for a vehicle that has already been built. So — KMV can come in with the Puma CAD drawings, send in a note saying — this design meets all your essential specfications. What would you like us to change ? But why would I buy a top-heavy vehicle with a high silouhette and lots of ground pressure, even if I could put in a hybrid engine, bolt on an APS, and maybe stick some short range video cameras inside.

That drawing up top isn’t the GCV, rather it is a concept drawing for the earlier XM1206 which was part of the FCS MGV program. The final proposal for the XM1206 looked a bit more realistic than that however.

Puma could work with some major modifications. New turret and capacity for 9 dismounts. The current Puma design only carries 6 dismounts.

Pete,
I would be happy to assist you; however, I’m not a subject matter expert on IED’s. I can perhaps give you a sanity check from my past experiences. email is rodney.crenshaw@us.army.mil

Ooops! This is going to be very interesting and extremely expensive. I will even bet that the mechanicals drivetrain, engine, controls etc. will be old outdated design, cheap or refurbished parts!

Don’t mind Byron. He’s long on words but short on facts. See his rant above about “Reaganenomics.”

OK, so is there something wrong with the Abrams and the Bradley and the Stryker? I’m a Marine foot guy, so it’s a half-honest question.

If I remember, we recently put a whole bunch of former “foot mobile” infantry into MRAPS. Not a tank, but certainly better than a 2.5-ton truck.

Are we just looking for new stuff because we can, and not because the enemy has something better?

I worked on the M8 program, and it was very close to production. At the time of the cancellation we were bidding the Low Rate Initial Production program. The explanation we were given was that the Army had to pay for the Bosnia effort out of their own money, as Congress was not going to give them any additional money. They shelved the M8 project. We had built and tested 6 vehicles, including an air drop from a C-130, which it survived just fine. Since then UDLP, now BAE, bought the remaining 5 vehicles and up-gunned them to a 120mm and converted them to Hybrid-Electric drive, which opened up additional space for carrying infantry, and tried to market them that way. Nothing ever came of it.

There is this law of diminishing returns problem to contend with. Not just economies of scale associated with equipment purchases, but old fashioned principles of war like mass and economy of force. I defy anyone here to try and defend using the reserve components to round out the active force — that has never really worked out for us — or increased reliance on the reserves. If anything, we will have less time, not more time, to do force generation. The Army leadership really needs to draw a line in the sand and say (in effect), if you cut force structure below 10 divisions, we are all quitting. I defy anyone to tell me how a 350K Army, a 200 ship Navy and a two active division Marine Corp is a fair and balanced force structure. To the devil with politics, the Marines need to belly up and pay their fair share of any force structure cuts.

The Army Modernization Plan has the GCV replacing all Bradley variants, but takes the Stryker forward to doomsday. In the meantime, they are changing out one heavy brigade for Strykers. In response to the latter question, there were some really revolutionary ideas embedded in the FCS Brigade Combat Team. Those ideas will eventually come to the fore, but not in a light force context — they require networked battle command and lots of ground vehicle mobility to work. In the end, we’ll probably reach a happier medium, but the current acquisition strategy makes it much harder to pull together, and Army leadership has pretty much been beaten senseless for having original and innovative ideas and trying to bring them to fruition.

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