Keep Your Rosaries Off My Deterrence

Keep Your Rosaries Off My Deterrence

Arms control elicits strong emotions and sparks great debates. In that tradition, Kingston Reif and Travis Sharp offer a rebuttal to the recent commentary we ran from the folks at the Heritage Foundation. Here’s the take of two dedicated arms control advocates:

In their recent commentary on DoD Buzz (“Will START Talks Go MAD,”), the Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring and Helle Dale recycle a snake oil sales pitch that first emerged at the dawn of the Atomic Age. The illusion is that the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons can somehow be neutralized by a panacea—in this case impenetrable missile defenses. Such reveries call to mind journalist Fred Kaplan’s conclusion in “Wizards of Armageddon” about analysts flogging magical cure-alls: “The nuclear strategists had come to impose order -– but in the end, chaos still prevailed.”

It may offend Spring’s and Hale’s moral sensibilities, but the fact remains that the United States is, and will continue to be, vulnerable to nuclear attack so long as nuclear weapons exist. Dumping tried and true deterrence and arms control strategies that manage and minimize nuclear dangers in favor of an uncertain missile defense-centric approach, as Spring and Hale recommend, would needlessly endanger U.S. security.

It is technologically possible for missile defenses to protect against limited nuclear threats posed by regional aggressors such as North Korea. Yet the technology required to intercept a large number of long-range missiles equipped with decoys and countermeasures does not exist and may never exist. Even the most futuristic missile defenses will likely be overwhelmed by a well-equipped adversary that is willing simply to build more offensive missile forces. Political and military leaders will never be completely sure that missile defenses will intercept all of an enemy’s incoming missiles.

None of which means that the United States and Russia shouldn’t jointly pursue efforts to develop more capable missile defenses. To their credit, Spring and Hale recognize that their missile defense-centric scheme can only be pursued if the United States and Russia both develop defenses, although they don’t stipulate that any realistic effort would have to be joint in order to avoid mutual suspicions and arms racing. Spring and Hale also neglect to justify why they believe continuing development of missile defenses must come at the expense of a follow-on agreement to START I, which will not reduce nuclear forces to a level where missile defenses might plausibly threaten retaliatory capability. The two efforts are not mutually exclusive and framing them as such presents a false dilemma.

A START follow-on agreement offers attractive security benefits for the United States. Its new limits and streamlined verification provisions will ensure a stable and predictable U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. Russia’s nuclear weapons cannot be wished away, and the threat they pose must be dealt with realistically by the United States. New limits and verification provisions will give each side important information about the size and location of the other’s nuclear forces while reducing the chances for misunderstandings that could lead to an accidental or unauthorized nuclear exchange. Moreover, the United States will still be able to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent.

The best way to address the threat of nuclear terrorism is by securing vulnerable nuclear materials and verifiably reducing nuclear stockpiles. U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions – combined with other measures to eliminate Russian delivery systems and vulnerable weapons-grade nuclear material – will reduce the risk that weapons or materials could be stolen and used in a nuclear terrorist attack.
For these reasons, and many more, a START follow-on is supported by a wide swath of conservative and liberal policy experts. In 2009, the bipartisan U.S. Strategic Posture Commission judged that “The United States and Russia should pursue a step-by-step approach and take a modest first step to ensure that there is a successor to START I.” These experts understand that the alternative to a START follow-on is clear: no means of limiting or monitoring Russia’s still enormous nuclear arsenal. Such an outcome would make the United States less safe.

Contrary to what Spring and Hale contend, the Obama administration is currently working to reap the numerous security benefits of a START follow-on without allowing negotiated limits to be placed on U.S. missile defenses. For example, the recently released Ballistic Missile Defense Review noted that “the [Obama] Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses.” American negotiators could have caved to their Russian counterparts on missile defenses or any of the other complex issues that have delayed signature well past START I’s expiration on December 5. But they didn’t.

Despite posturing by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the two sides are likely to produce an agreement that notes the interrelationship between offensive and defensive forces – which is an objective reality – but does not contain any formal or legal limitations on missile defenses. The Obama administration has gone to extraordinary lengths to preserve U.S. freedom of action vis-à-vis missile defenses.
The Russian interest in concluding a follow-on agreement to START will likely outweigh their concerns about U.S. missile defenses for the time being. However, the United States is unlikely to be able to convince the Russians to forego these concerns if future negotiations take place on even deeper cuts in U.S. and Russian arsenals.

Thus, in the absence of joint missile defenses that assuage mutual concerns, U.S. leaders may soon face a stark choice: reduce nuclear stockpiles below START follow-on levels, or continue to insist on zero restrictions on U.S. missile defenses.

Kingston Reif is the Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Travis Sharp is a Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security. They blog about nuclear weapons policy at Nukes of Hazard.

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“Political and military leaders will never be completely sure that missile defenses will intercept all of an enemy’s incoming missiles.”

This is like saying that a bullet-proof vest won’t help if you get hit by a bus, and so therefore bullet-proof vests are useless.

No one can answer the simple question “Why are we negotiating further arms reductions with the Russians”? Are they a threat to us? Are we a threat to them? Is there really a risk of a nuclear conflict with the Russians? There is no reason to keep reducing nuclear weapons beyond the 2200 warheads under the SORT agreement. I would go in the opposite direction and build back to the original START numbers of about 5000 deployed warheads supported by new delivery systems and a fully modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure able to build and test new advanced weapon designs.

How do you figure? You quoted missiles and missile defenses in the same sentence — they’re saying if the enemy shoots you with multiple bullets and your vest can’t stop every bullet then its useless. Nuclear weapons are a zero-sum equation. If your entire nuclear defense policy is based on interceptors then you better be damn sure to get every single one of them.

IMHO, (as someone who is not a strategic arms specialist) the idea that the U.S. and Russia should jointly develop ABM systems is almost too silly for belief.

You can bet your bottom dollar that the Russkies would build in code to ensure that their missiles would not be intercepted in the case of an offensive launch. There are some within the U.S. who would also advocate similar code but I doubt we’d do it.

And even if the code were left out it would just mean that Russia precisely understood the ABM systems and how to defeat them.

Of all the brain-dead ideas! I’m sorry, just having difficulty coming up with polite language which would describe just how despicably stupid this is.

Oh, and for those who disagree with me… I readily admitted to not being a specialist in the field but I’ve been watching SALTs, STARTs and the like for decades and first looked into the feasibility of ABM systems in the late ’70’s or early ’80’s. I’ve also done some programming and have a degree in Physics (but don’t work in the field). I also tend to understand how people and organizations work. Not totally ignorant on the issues I guess.

Still, I’d enjoy someone trying to convince me that this would make sense…

“If your entire nuclear defense policy is based on interceptors then you better be damn sure to get every single one of them.”

So a bullet-proof vest won’t help if you get hit by a bus and therefore, etc.

Do you really not see the difference between one incoming warhead and one thousand incoming warheads? It’s entirely possible to create a workable defense against the first situation without reducing the threat of the latter. And Russia has those thousand warheads. And Iran does not.

Oh, so the answer is for Iran to just build more ICBMs? You toss that off so casually, like it’s just a matter of changing a line in a spreadsheet. Building working ICBMs and nuclear warheads is not just a matter of mining more Vespene Gas.

Hasbeen you just exemplified the irrational paranoia that still exists in the US — the Russians will do something sneaky but the moral and just US of A would not. Give me a break. Such thinking is only going to ensure that they distrust you, consider you a threat and therefore keep the capability to deal with you. You know what is a brain dead idea, saying that you want closer ties and you are no threat yet install missile systems along their border — particularly when they have said if you are serious you could base such systems in better positions on their soil.

BobbyMike the Russians are only a threat so long as you make them a threat, eg the missile shield mentioned above.The US and the USSR had ample opportunities to nuke each other and they never did. As belligerent as you may think the USSR was it didnt want to be responsible for ending the world. Increasing arsenals isnt going to help. In fact it would be hypocritical to build more and then expect other nuclear powers (India etc) not to follow suit. While not all these nations may be a threat to the US, if you want to prevent nuclear proliferation you have to lead the way. Russia of course would be obligated to follow suit — they have learnt through history how important it is to be able to defend yourself. They have fended off (not an exhaustive list mind you) the Germans, the Swedes, the British, the French, the Germans again. The last time it cost them 27 million lives and trillions of dollars and if they had have lost they would have faced annihilation. They never want to be in that position again therefore it permeates their culture. They do not begrudge anyone having the capability to defend themselves (even the US in the case of Iran and N Korea if the capability exists which is tenuous), and are happy to make a buck helping them, but you can be certain that they arent going to give up their ability to defend themselves for anything and by being caught with their pants down at the beginning of WW2 thanks to Stalin they want to ensure they have an effective deterrant against whatever powers exist at the time; if that just happens to be the US then so be it, just dont take it too personally. It doesnt mean (im certain) they would consider you a threat if the rhetoric changed and constructive bi-lateral action was taken. Its just that for what positive progress the US intends it then does something which undoes all that.

Have we not “led the way” already by massively downsizing out force from close to 12000 strategic warheads to 2200 today. I do not see a single nation that aspires to obtain nuclear weapons pulling back one bit and in fact are charging forward irregardless of what Russia or the US does.

IMO we have downsized enough, neglected the weapons enterprise enough as well as shown weakness by even allowing other nations to dictate to us. You are saying that if all the other nations demanded we go to zero nukes or “they will threaten to build their own” we should totally disarm to appease them? It takes me back to the wishful thinking of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that “outlawed war”. How did that work out for the world?

seesthrubs, I don’t think you noticed that I addressed only a limited aspect of the discussion. I did not advocate any ABM system at all. I also didn’t say that the U.S. would NOT put in the code — but that I doubted we’d do that (based on my assessment of the current administration’s behavior).

I’d notice that you did not address the core arguments that I made at all, simply characterized my thinking as “paranoid”. I’d really rather that you address the issues and show me where I’m wrong.

Oh, and I’d further like to point out that even if one were to assume that the U.S. and Russia were equally evil (or righteous) it would still be unforgivably stupid for us to change our current ABM development efforts into a joint effort. I guess that if one were to attain some enormous and proportionate benefit from doing so it might make sense but I’m having trouble conceiving of such a benefit actually materializing.

“None of which means that the United States and Russia shouldn’t jointly pursue efforts to develop more capable missile defenses.”

No, they are saying that even if you have a bullet-proof vest, you still need to be careful crossing the street.

Any further reduction is just plain stupid, We have no real allies, you cannot base anything against just one country when you may be facing multiple. Russia is constantly in dealings with Iran _China_ North Korea _INdia and such plus all thier former sattelite countries, None of which make any bones about not liking us and could band together at any given time. Even the taliban and hezboula like the ruskies more than they do us. It is just stupid in my mind to further reduce our capabilities or to share missile defense with any other country.

To Colin Clark, thanks for making the effort to balance out the argument. At the least, we have the pro and con debate over this important issue. I don’t believe that the US or Russia will ever get rid of all of their nuclear weapons, not as long as other nations retain theirs. But this idea of missile defense is a technological pipe dream. It’s not that we can’t build a few interceptor sites, it’s that the US government will never be able to afford a comprehensive system that in fact protects the entire United States. It’s a fact, been researched and debated since the 1960s. ____As for why the US and Russia should work cooperatively in this area, it’s because we’re the only two nuclear powers that count. Everyone else has a handful of nukes that do nothing but ensure the status quo remains unchanged. Only the two superpowers have an arsenal that can both promise total destruction of another nation and still absorb enough to ensure retaliation if someone launches on them. So yes, it does good to work with Russia to ensure that there is a calm and deliberate nuclear deterrence strategy in place that keeps the peace and deters more proliferation. “Trust but verify”

Good Morning Folks,

I tend to agree with seedthrubs on this, but for different reasons. I think the current US nuclear weapons arsenal as set during the Bush (43) administration is about right. It is large enough to show that the US can be a player in any nuclear games that any country (s) may chose to engage in, but not so large as to be an intimidation factor to other countries.

The current US strategic force the “Strategic Strike Command” is one that has been designed to draw down our nuclear arsenal. The Tomahawk Blocks 1 & 2 are being retired, the manned bomber element has been reduced to less then 50 B-2’s and B-52’s and there is no intent to do a follow up to the Minuteman 3 Silo ICBM’s. The Minuteman’s replacement the MX “Peacekeeper” or “Midgetman” long ago was reduced to the status an historical relic.

The only naval vessels that are currently nuclear armed are the 14 Ohio Class SSBN’s with the Trident 5. United States ground forces exited the nuclear stage in 1985 with the removal of the Pershing Missile.

What ever the current Russian Federation’s Nuclear Force is currently a matter of speculation, but all known evidence and the actions of it’s biggest cheerleader Valdimir Putin indicates it’s nearly non existent.

After the failure of the Dec. 12 Bulava test and the cancelation of the much hyped Jan. 8 Bulava test, and the “successful” Test on March 6 of the aging “Sineve” liquid fueled SSBM, from a “Tula” Class SSBN, a 1970’s Delta IV with fresh lipstick. Rissian Federation President Dimitiry Medvedev said flat out that it wouldn’t be till 2030 that a replacement missile would be ready. The Tula SSBN Class consist of seven boats. The 2 Typhoons in storage and the two new Borie’s are being saved for the solid fueled Bulava/Topol M ICBM’s.

This indicaes at most the Russian Federation intends to have only a sea bases token nuclear force, for the next 20 years.

Other then the rogue states issue, which in my opinion is vastly over blown in order to keep the US spending large sums of money on BMD and our nuclear arsenal, is currently the only nuclear issue on the table. I say for what its worth, sign a treaty with “The Russian Federation” and move on.

Byron Skinner

Byron, what of the vaunted Strategic Rocket Forces? I realize many of the Russian’s land based delivery systems are in disrepair, but they didn’t invest (insert word here)-illions of rubles (after one bypasses quadrillions who knows anyway, right? Currency devaluation can be such fun.) in land based delivery systems to just let them all fall away, particularly in regards to enormously expensive mobile units such as the topol or hardened permanent silos housing SS-18s. Their navy is a shadow of the second rate force that menaced us during the cold war, but don’t discount their land based strategic forces

I do have to correct you on one point _ TOMAHAWK block 1 and 2 is just electronics packages, A — alpha are nukes, B– bravo are anti ship, C– are land attack (2 configurations). The A’s were put into deep cold storage in the 90’s because even though they were not in violation of any treaties the ruskies claimed they gave us too much of a upper hand because they cannot defend against them, the bravos went away about the same time as did HARPOONS because they were so heavy (i.e. short range) and not really needed when you have MK48 torpedos on board which can run down and take out anything on the ocean.

Bobbymike, no I am not advocating *any* cuts unless you expected other comparable nuclear powers (of which there is only really Russia) to cut their inventories too but this needn’t go far since they are not the real threat and there is no point in negotiating your nuclear strength away with a nation who is not interested in attacking you. I’m certain Russia wont want to see its arsenal reduced in case they are needed against other states (ie China) so they are unlikely to offer to reduce their nukes and ask the US to reciprocate. Russia wont tell you China is a concern because everyone is careful about treading on the great Dragon’s tail at the moment. Therefore I agree with the article that i see any new agreement simply involving limitations.

I just think its unnecessary to spend considerable sums of money on new nukes or nuke technologies, particularly given the current and imminent needs of the other military branches, since its going to invite others (ie Russia) to develop counters; and as we have seen over the last decades they certainly have the innovation and ability to match or gain superiority in different systems. At the end of the day you are no safer. An ABM system would make you safer and, though I think it would be unlikely too, a joint ABM system would protect both countries not simply from each other but any potential rogue states and the potential enemy which cannot be named.

Yes the US has been involved in arms reducation but what i meant was that if you wanted to say to a nation “Dont build nukes” you are in a far weaker position politically if you are building them yourself, and good luck if you wanted to take action or impose sanctions etc. That nation will justifiably call double standard and be even more determined to acquire them.

Bobbymike, do the warhead counts associated with current treaties include our arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons?

Good Evening Folks,

To Jim. The term “Strategic Forces” is an old Soviet era term and under The Russian Federation many of these sub commands have been consolidated, the function of SRBM’s and Tactical nuc’s still exist. Most Russian Federation SRBM’s that are operational and in the field appear to be in the Amur River area.

I’m not sure that tactical nuc’s are even part of what is being negotiated at this time. The issue of what is or is not counted is “Classified”. It is of note that earlier in the week Putin made a proposal to the EU that the could lease nuclear fuel for The Russian Federation and return it when it was spent for recycling by The Russian Federation. The source of this fuel rods that Putin is trying to peddle is coming from Russian plutonium that has been removed from Russian nuclear weapons, by US supervised contractors and a US security contractors guarding the disassembly facilities, then the plutonium is brought to the US for reprocessing into commercial grade fuel rods and returned to The Russian Federation.

This material when returned to Russia is no longer suitable for reprocessing back into weapons grade plutonium.

To Boomer. Yes, You are right, but if you may have noticed in my postings many come up short on technical information on issues Nuclear, ASW, MINE/COUNTERMINE and on SIGNET.

The terms Blocks 1 and 2 are commonly used in open literature on the nuclear Tomahawk.

As I’m sure you are aware Boomer that two different specifications about any of these issues that are in and of themselves not classified, but when put together become “Classified” material is rather common.

Byron Skinner

HasBeen if your core argument was that a joint ABM is a bad idea then I hope I addressed this in my response to BobbyMike. Id also add that, as touched on in other comments, Im pretty certain the US and Russia could develop an ABM system which could intercept small numbers of nukes and thus offer protection against the more likely (but still remote) threat of crazy nations, but be ineffective against a mass salvo which both countries could, in the worst case scenario, conceivably throw at each other. This maintains the balance and the deterrent. The thing about nuclear war and deterrence is that you dont actually have to have the capability to strike and defend yourself from a counter strike, its about the *belief* that you have this capability which spells the end of deterrence. Then it gets very dangerous. Thats why ABMs are a very touchy subject and were severely limited in previous agreements. If you take the lid off them you open up a whole new arms race. To be frank, the US doesn’t want security with Russia. The US wants to retain the ability to nuke them — otherwise actions would be taken (and avoided) in creating that security. Ill give you an example. Georgia. The US trained and armed the Georgian military who then attacked civilians and Russian troops lying in their beds in the middle of the night in their efforts to seize Sth Ossetia. The Georgian President even stated he got the OK from the US. Even if this was a misunderstanding on his part, what do you think the Russians are going to think? Its like if Mexico decided that they wanted a piece of Texas and came storming across the border in the middle of the night killing soldiers and civilians, I dare expect you not to think too highly of Mexicans and that they would be pushed back and their ability to attempt such actions again taken away.

Boomer are you familiar with the old saying ‘keep your friends close but your enemies closer?’ Russia might be close with China but you can bet that they dont trust them completely. What better way to stay one step ahead than to supply to a country. Russia does not have the influence (or will) to unify a disgruntled bunch of nations against the US. Russia moved some S-400s to the East as some insurance against North Korea so this gives some indication as to how close they are not. Iran, well, given their dependence on Russia, Russia’s influence may come in useful in the future. Its quite useful to have someone who can communicate with such nations. As for India, I recall the US tempting them with the JSF, one of the jewels of American military technology, if they opted for the F-18E.…it seems they cant be too bad.

William C — the quick answer is no. But that is another area where the US has disarmed almost unilaterally. I believe the most current “tactical” weapons count is around 1000 for the US and 5000 for Russia.

What is really dangerous is that Russia has weapons production lines up and running while the US has no current production line in operation and has not built a new nuke for 20 years. We are losing key personnel on an almost monthly basis due to retirement as our infrastructure rusts away. It is a very dangerous situation.

character capped — just with the above example, further imagine if the Mexican forces were actually trained by and at least partially armed by Russia. The US is not going to think particularly fondly of Russia and rightly so. Now you might understand the situation that exists and why the US makes life hard for itself on occasions.

Starting to enjoy the thread — and am learning a little.

I still think a joint ABM system is an extremely bad idea. There is more breadth and depth to the nature and types of threats than has been credited so far. I guess I don’t care to argue the point too much but I appreciate seesthrubs taking a pretty reasoned approach to his response.

As always I enjoy Byron Skinner’s posts — but don’t totally agree. I think there is too much discounting of the threat from current or incipient nuclear entities such as Iran or North Korea. Unfortunately, much of the ABM effort is going into avenues that I don’t think do well at defending against this type of threat anyway so it may not be terribly relevant to the current discussion… (I do expect some to take exception to this but I’m not going to worry about that).

On a broader scale I’d note that I do think pursuing arms control treaties is worthwhile but I think that they have to be to our advantage militarily and economically (understanding that this advantage does not necessarily imply a disadvantage to potential aggressors). Arms control for political reasons is typically dangerous and we’ve done too much of that in the past.

I would also flatly agree with those who have intimated that anything approaching an impervious ABM shield is expecting too much. In fact, I’d say that this type of protection against a modestly capable nuclear opponent isn’t even on the horizon. Even if you could design it I don’t think you could test it to the level I would require to be confident in the capability. If you are not confident in the system then you really can’t utilize it effectively so there isn’t a whole lot of point in owning it.


Nuclear warfare just isn’t what it used to be back in the good old days. It has become pretty passe. China is doing to us what Kruschev promised he would do. And that is if you recall correctly, was to bury us economically. Russia has learned to forego the 5 Year Plans and to seek the almighty US dollar. Nuclear bombs just mess up the place when you are building a capitlaistic power house to own the world. All thew millionaires in Russia would really disapprove of this nonsense.

Some one please give me a single logical, realistic reason N. Korea would attempt to land one or two low yield devices in our back yard and suffer the slings and arrows of our non-nuclear forces? No one thinks like that. Well maybe a few paranoid folks on our side.

Nuclear war is obsolete. It came and went without happening. Fortunately the right people realize this.

I wish it were obsolete. Unfortunately, it ain’t quite that straightforward. One neat little scenario is where Iran or NK loads relatively short range nuclear capable missiles onto tramp freighters. Sail them to the vicinity of our coasts, launch the nukes to act as EMP devices and sink the freighters. You could virtually destroy the U.S. as a viable entity with 4–6 nukes and the U.S. might not be able to achieve certainty as to who attacked them and (depending on the administration) might not effectively retaliate.

Other potential scenarios are possible as well. Oh, and several years ago Iran actually conducted an exercise involving launching scuds from a freighter.

Check out “Nucler Tipping Point”-Colin Powell, Kissenger, ect-all the old heavy weights of the Cold War deterrance policy are now coming out in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons for the simple reason that “suicide bombers, are by definition, not deterrable.“
Remember the Japanese fishermen who were killed by atmospheric nuclear test fallout? SALT 1 and 2?
Amongst responsible nations (even China) nuclear weapons are “self-regulating”-they’re just chips in a poker game in which everybody with any common sense is bluffing.
The real danger is the the rogue state that wants to get into the high stakes game, but doesn’t have the political stability or control to keep its weapons secure from radical factions or terrorists, whose sense is anything but “common”. Granted, Al Qu’da’s real agenda is a lot more secular and monetary than most muslims are aware of. Still, Al Qu’daz, itself, is under very lose control. Consider Iran building a bomb, and then losing it to jihadists trying to take over the Pakistani gov’t, or possibly, the A’jab gov’t crumbling under popular dissient, and the Talban stepping into the power vaccuum.

Or maybe just maybe that thing called deterrence worked.

Also about North Korea. If they attacked Seoul and If the US had no nukes (the basis for your premise) and the only US response would be to massively mobilize and attack with conventional forces risking hundreds and thousands of lives, would we? What if the NORKS said we have ten more bombs in US cities so if you try and defend South Korea we will set them off.

As HasBeen said quite nicely it’s a little more complicated.

And just as many former Cold War defense secretaries, military experts, etc. take the opposite position. No one has a monopoly on wisdom.

In truth we don’t know who has what, look at how long it took us to realize Korea, Iran, and China were building facilities. We used to be close to Isreal and din’t even know they had nuclear weapons till they threatened retaliation against Iraq during dessert storm During which time we broke out our Patriots which were supposed to of no longer existed due to Russian pressure about them. The best defense is being able to conduct long range surgical srikes against possible threats before they can launch or take out thier ability to react once we start a stategic launch. That is why I’m for bringing the Tomahawk Alpha back which is capable of doing the job and let the other countries scream all they want about it being an unfair advantage. We already lost a big advantage sharing Tomahawk technology with other countries, we dont know for sure our enemies dont have them on thier submarines right now. Treaties only work against you if your the only one abiding by them and I dont trust any other country, especialy ones so vocal against us to abide with a treaty.

Long before Desert Storm I thought it was common knowledge that Israel had nukes.

I also didn’t realize our Patriots were ever decommissioned or taken out of service? Could you remedy my knowledge deficit in this matter?

if its RUSSIA that unloads on us we are gone,but they also will be gone (thats if our president can give that order).….if its IRAN we will take them out with our subs before there’s re-enter and this will be a big test if we can hit there incoming.….

The Patriot Missile system is still in service. The PAC-3 had 100% success rate in OIF.

THAAD is on track with 2 line batteries in service at Fort Bliss.

Anyone who talks about decoys in ballistic missiles is high on crack.

Yes you can put decoys in a missile, at the cost of warhead. Remember the missile has a fixed weight so that the engine can propell it to the target. Chaff, ‘balloons’ etc. do not work in space. Period.

Our radars have the resolution to see that the enemy has deployed decoys.

Yes Russia has many missiles and does use decoys mostly because our older systems can be fooled. But then again the Russians are our ‘friends’ now.

The Russians are a midget with a big right arm. Weaken that arm and you show how weak and sick Russia is. The Kremlin also loves selling it’s missiles to oil-sucking dictators and unstable regimes (more so now that they need cash). Less US missile defense, more Russian sales.

The decoy argument has been going on since the 1970’s and 80’s. That hound don’t hunt.

The cuts on our side will happen because the stupid hippes hate nukes.

The Russians don’t want to admit that they are weak. They can’t be trusted unless our president holds them to the treaty.

Yeah right.

Peace through superior firepower. Worked for Regan and Bush.

–a 14E with an attitude.


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