I know many F-15C’s have been upgraded with JHMCS, and 18 were upgraded with the AN/APG-63(V)2 AESA radars with 178 planned for upgrade for the (V)3 radar that began production last year. The F-15E will receive the AN/APG-82 AESA, which is a hybrid of the F-15C’s (V)3 and the AN/APG-79 radar found on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

The F-15K, which is the export version of the F-15E for South Korea is $100 million in 2006 dollars.

Once the research is completed, the cost of the aircraft already built does not change simply because you change the number to be built.

And is fairly obvious to anyone who has analizewd the costs required to provide the same area protection with F-35s that could be accomplished with F-22s, you quickly realize that 2 F-35s to get the same number of A-A missiles into the area, and 2 more F-35s to cover the same area must be combined with a tanker to provide the fuel needed and the cost of using F-35s becomes extremely hig in relatin to the F-22.

When you combine this with the fact that an F-35 would most likely lose a dogfight to a Viet Nam era F-4 or F-105. the F-35 begins to look like a very bad buy. The F-35 is slow, underarmed, lacks maneuverability and range. if supersonic flight is required.

Gates should be fired and Obama should be impeached for placing our country in this danger.

40–50% is still better than the less than 0.01% parts commonality between the F-16, F/A-18, A-10 and AV-8.

“And as for training techs, well correct me if I’m wrong, but don’t the services generally train their mechanics to work on the planes they actually fly? How much does the USAF waste on training redundant AV-8B or Hornets techs these days?”

USAF provides initial training to avionics specialists, E&E specialists, structures technicians, engine mechanics, and metals technicians on airframes that they may or may not work on when they are assigned at their first base. Also, they aren’t locked into a specific airframe or class of airframes (tactical or heavy/strategic). And so these technicians and mechanics can end up working on E-3’s, F-15’s or C-130’s.

Tactical aircraft APG mechanics (crew chiefs) are more airframe and airframe class specific, and they receive their introductory maintenance training (Fighter Commons) with other APG mechanics from other airframes. Afterwards they branch off to their airframe specific training and work on that airframe at their first base. After the APG mechanics are upgraded from apprentices to journeymen, they become eligible to work on other tactical airframes (F-15, A-10, F-16, U-2, F-22, RQ-4, MQ-1,and MQ-9). I’m almost sure that heavy/strategic APG mechanics work the same way. Upon being upgraded from journeymen to craftsmen and promotion to SNCO rank, they become eligible to cross airframe classes… but at that point their job is more management than technical.

For the F-35 the USAF, USMC and USN can teach a wider scope of subjects in the introductory maintenance class compared to the USAF’s Fighter Commons for APG mechanics. Fighter Commons only taught the very basics of maintenance that’s common to all fighters (what a screwdriver is, how to use a torque wrench, how to safetywire, etc). With the F-35 the introductory class can cover the basics of the airframe (hydraulic systems, electrical systems, flight control surfaces). Even with minor differences between the variants, it’s not much of an obstruction to training (for example: “This is X… on the A and C models it moves 10-degrees up, 25-degrees down. The B models have a wider range of movement going 12-degrees up, 30-degrees down. This is of necessity for the fan-lift system.”)

That may be the’thought’, but it’s not an original one. After all, I remember back when they also ‘thought’ about the F-22, and we all know how little that costs to keep running, don’t we? And how much more fuel is that honkin’ big F135 gonna burn compared to the engines in the Viper and the A-10?

As for the commonality –that promise seems to be falling by the wayside,too. What is it now? 50%? 40%.? And remember, ‘cousin’ parts won’t fit any more than will any other wrong part. Still, once the Navy dumps the ‘C’ model, that will help bring the commonality ratio up a bit. And as for training techs, well correct me if I’m wrong, but don’t the services generally train their mechanics to work on the planes they actually fly? How much does the USAF waste on training redundant AV-8B or Hornets techs these days?

Having separate supply lines for four different airframe families (A-10’s, F/A-18C/D’s, F-16’s and AV-8’s) is very expensive when they have less than 0.01% parts commonality. The F-35 variants are advertised to have about 80% parts commonality, and recent independent reports claim it’s becoming less (the accuracy of said reports is questionable). But even if those reports are true and that the actual parts commonality is about 30%, that’s still far more economical.

Also keep in mind that the F-16, A-10 and F/A-18 were designed with planned obsolescence. Meaning a replacement was supposed to have been designed 15 years into the life of those aicraft, begin retiring at 20 years when the replacement is online and operational, and finally phased out completely at 25–30 years. These jets are pushing past 30 years of service, and maintaining and supplying them is becoming more and more difficult (read: more expensive). The F-35 is designed without planned obsolescence, meaning it’s designed to continue service with the uncertainty of a successor.

Programs such as the U-2 and B-52 are living on borrowed time. I know from my personal experience that as these jets get older, replacement parts becomes harder to come by. Especially for the U-2, which was built in limited numbers. Many manufacturers stopped producing parts for it because it’s not profitable, either because they moved on to new manufacturing methods or technologies or because there’s so few U-2’s.

The F/A-18E/F (Super Hornet), F-15E (Strike Eagle) and F-16 Block 40/50 have a bit of an extra lifeline thrown in from the export market, but certain parts and technologies are US or export exclusive and are incompatible with each other. Not to mention variants within each airframe family also have parts exclusivity… the F-15E for example is 60% internally different from the F-15C/D. Eventually the F-15C will become unsustainable from parts non-availability, and keep in mind the F-15E is not as air-to-air capable as the F-15C, a trade-off for it’s strike role. In regards to parts, it’s the same case with older Block 20/30 F-16’s and F/A-18C/D’s.

While we’ll be able to further sustain F-15E’s, F/A-18E/F’s, and Block 40/50 F-16’s for a long time… the older F-15C/D, F/A-18C/D, and Block 20/30 F-16’s will have to be retired once they become unsustainable due to parts. They comprise well over half of our tactical air fleet, and having to retire them without a replacement will greatly reduce US military capabilities.

Designing new parts is not as easy at it sounds with the bureaucratic red-tape and politics involved, and it really shouldn’t be that way.

$90-$115 million a piece for 2500 or so F-35s and $80 million a piece for 400 F-18E/Fs. If the production runs were equal in number, what would the price comparison look like?

This is PROJECTED (based on JET II PROJECTIONS, themselves NOT based on the actual status of the program) per unit TOTAL PROGRAM COST. AND $135 million is the HIGH END of the projection, the low end is $114 million. The per unit TOTAL PROGRAM COST of the F-22 is ~$350 million.

The same numbers for per unit TOTAL PRODUCTION COST are ~$96.36–114.43 million (FY2010 dollars) for the F-35 vs $191.15 million for the F-22 (FY2010 dollars).

The same numbers for per unit FLYAWAY COST are ~$81.91–97.27 million (FY2010 dollars) for the F-35 vs $155.74 million for the F-22 (FY2010 dollars).

BIG WAST OF TIME AND MONEY!!!!!!