JLTV Tests Begin

JLTV Tests Begin

The Army and Marine Corps have begun testing competing industry designs for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, a new lightweight replacement for the venerable Humvee that will offer better protection against IEDs and better off-road mobility. Click here for a slideshow.

The Humvee was never intended to carry all the additional armor that was slapped on it as troops fought on IED strewn battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan; the vehicle’s performance and reliability suffered as the engine and suspension sagged under the added weight.

The Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, thousands of which have been fielded in recent year, were stop gap measures intended to rapidly field vehicles with much greater IED protection. Some MRAP versions weigh up to 20-tons and have proven ill suited for Afghanistan where roads are scarce.


The services are taking an entirely different approach with the JLTV. It’s designed from the ground up to be a combat vehicle — not a garrison vehicle like the original Humvee — with excellent off-road mobility and IED blast protection. The services aren’t rushing it into production either, they want to take the time to develop a fighting vehicle designed for a wide range of combat environments.

The Army wants 60,000 of the vehicles, the Marines want 5,500. While program officials said the final number the military intends to buy is constantly changing, it will be the military’s largest tactical wheeled vehicle program. The program could well be worth $40 billion; big stakes for the competing industry teams. Full JLTV production is planned for 2015.

The Army and Marines were hoping the JLTV would cost less than $250,000 a copy, but program officials now concede its likely to cost at least twice that; an up-armored Humvee costs about $200,000.

The services took delivery on May 3 of JLTV prototypes from three industry teams: BAE Systems, General Tactical Vehicles, a joint venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and Humvee builder AM General, and Lockheed Martin. Each team provided 7 JLTV test vehicles.

The JLTV prototypes delivered by the three industry teams each feature some variation of an armored crew “capsule” a blast defecting hull and high ground clearance to get stand-off from IED blasts.

The BAE and GTV vehicles come with a modified V-shaped hull designed to vent explosive energy. The Lockheed Martin vehicle uses an inverted U-shape to vent blast energy.

The new JLTVs have just begun a 12 month technology development phase, testing vehicle performance, blast protection and reliability as well as any new technologies the industry teams built into their vehicles.

The ongoing tests here at Aberdeen will help the services to further refine JLTV requirements, some of which have yet to be finalized, said Army Lt. Col. Wolfgang Petermann, JLTV program manager. The technology test phase will tell them whether the requirements are realistic or “did we ask for a bridge too far,” he said.

“The key will be striking the right balance between weight, mobility and protection,” said Petermann. All three industry offerings are “on target” for the weight requirement, he said.

The JLTV will come in three payload categories and different “scaleable” armor packages. The JLTV “family” of vehicles will come in a 2-seat command and control variant, a four-seat standard version, a six-seat troop carrier, a cargo hauler and an ambulance.

The Category A general purpose vehicle will have a 3,500 pound payload. The larger Category B infantry carrier has a 4,500 pound payload. The Category C cargo hauler will have a 5,100 pound payload.

The JLTV’s standard armor package, or “A Kit,” is designed to withstand IED blasts and provide a “threshold” level of ballistics protection against machine gun rounds and high explosive fragments. On battlefields where larger IEDs are encountered, the JLTV will be outfitted with a heavier “B Kit” armor package which adds thicker armor, thicker ballistics glass and a V-shaped underbelly armor.

Program officials said an additional even heavier armor package will be provided to protect troops against the deadly explosively formed penetrators (EFP). The JLTV is also designed to carry the Tactical Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) Airbag Protection System (TRAPS) built by Textron Defense Systems.

For firepower, the JLTV can be fitted with machine guns, the Mk-40 grenade launcher or the Common Remotely Operated Weapons System (CROWS), that allows crews to fire weapons from under armor protection.

The weight of the new vehicles has become the program’s biggest sticking point. Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway recently told Military​.com that a 20,000 pound JLTV is too heavy for his expeditionary service.

While the Army can accept vehicles that weigh 20,000 pounds, the Marines need something significantly lighter, he said. Conway worries that if the JLTVs are too heavy the Marines won’t be able to fit many of them on their amphibious ships.

The JLTV requirements state the vehicle must be able to be sling loaded below the Army’s CH-47 and Marine CH-53 helicopters and internally aboard the Air Force’s C-130 tactical lifter. It also must

The curb weight of the vehicles, with no armor package affixed, is supposed to be less than 12,000 pounds. The 4-seat JLTV has a curb weight of about 13,000 pounds; adding the B-Kit armor package and weapons increases the weight to about 19,000 pounds.

The 6-passenger version of the JLTV weighs about 23,000 pounds with the B-Kit armor package. “The six passenger is too heavy for the Marine Corps,” said Dean Johnson, the Marine Corps deputy program manger for JLTV.

The Marine threshold for air-transportability is 16,800 pounds, which includes armor, one day of supply, the crew and their gear. “We can beat that,” he said. Yet, to keep the vehicles “lightweight” will require tradeoffs in other areas, program officials acknowledged.

To fit on Maritime Prepositioning Ships, the vehicles cannot be higher than 72 inches. So, all of the vehicles are outfitted with adjustable air suspension that can raise the vehicle chassis up to 20 inches off the ground to provide blast clearance and then lower it to just five inches off the ground to allow it to fit onboard ships and inside the C-130.

The services will evaluate the vehicles from the three industry teams, then down-select two teams for the engineering, manufacturing and development (EMD) phase. The request for proposal for the 24 month EMD phase will be released in June 2011 with a planned contract award for December 2011.

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What entry is that in the photo?

BAE

Check out all three entries at defensetech​.org The GTV is the best looking.

Good Morning Folks,

I see the the “Star Wars” design influence, rather cool, but why does the Army want 60K?

Although no unit price is given I’m sure they are a lot more then commercial vehicles. While I can the JTLV’s use in a tactical/combat environment I this any other use is a gross waste of funds.

The fact that most utility vehicles are used in garrison for rather routine and mundane chores where there is no danger of them being involved in any action more drastic then a fender bender pulling out of or in to the Officers Club/NCO Club, let buy something off the shelf from either Government Motors or Chrysler, give it a GI paint job, bumper numbers and GI tires.

The military has a long tradition of taking gear and equipment that is suitable for tactical/combat environments and using that the same in stateside garrisons. The obvious reason of course is moral of the troops and media image. This is one place it should be easy to find funds for the necessary.

Lets face it there is little concern about IED’s or EFP’s at Ft. Bragg or Camp Pendleton.

ALLONS,
Byron Skinner

Here we go again. As a veteran myself I understand the need for the best equipment possible. But if we try to make a vehicle that will do everything we might as well just start producing more M-1’s. You can’t make a general transportation vehicle cheap, fast, light weight, and protected from everything. That’s how you get another bloated program that winds up costing even more then projected when it’s necessary to go back later and either replace the system with one that works, or modify the existing program so it works.
And why is the MRAP just a stop gap? They bought thousands of these, and they work. What is the problem in Afghanistan? Is there a vehicle that can go anywhere?
We need a replacement for the Humvee, but a 20 or 25,000 vehicle is nuts. How do you make that fast, effective, and easily deployable?

The US purchased 250,000+ HMMWVs. So the Army figured out they need fewer JLTVs because most tactical wheeled vehicle uses is in garrison, etc. HMMWV will continue to be used in the garrison role.

“why is MRAP stop gap?” — careful Bronco, you are asking too many logical questions that if answered honestly might lead to better policy decisions. The CMIC will concoct some story about how poor MRAPs and M-ATVs are in order to justify the big $$ JLTV RDTE project. DoD needs to buy COTS & NDIs, reduce RDTE, increase PROC & O&M, and focus on accomplishing missions, not sending more good money after bad on failed development projects that try to be everything to all people, solve all the world’s problems in one hopelessly constrained program.

The majority of MRAPs we have bought have very poor off-road mobility. While this wasn’t too much of a problem in urbanized Iraq, in Afghanistan and many other countries this severely limits the vehicles effectiveness. When we finally end major operations in the Middle East, some of our MRAPs will end up in depots, some given to the mew Iraqi or Afghan armies, and some of the better models retained in active service.

JLTV is a much more “balanced” vehicle and a real successor to the new M1151 and M1152 HMMWVs. The requirements need to be realistic however, we can’t expect the JLTV to be as survivable as the huge armored trucks that are most of our MRAPs.

Yet another wasteful program where the starting price is three times what it’s replacing with a marginal improvement in capability.

Oblat I have yet to see you actually approve of any program. I am guessing your one of those fools who doesn’t want to spend any money on new military equipment.

There is no justification for a lot of the expense, we need a new vehichle the HUMVEE was never a suitable replacement for the jeep at 10 times the cost and nothing gained (other than weight and expense). There are too many not needed gadgets that only add to the maintenance issues. It just needs to be a basic soild axle front and rear 4X4 trail suspension (no independent weak ones), does not need central tire inflation and tire pressure monitoring, does not need an automatic transmission either. Stay away from the weak GM 6.5 engine and put in a turbo Cummins or CAT, needs a full roll cage and highback seats with 5 way harnesses for all passengers. Stop trying to make it anti tank weapon proof because it wont happen, even making it 50 cal proof once again wont guarantee anything with todays small arms tech.

CONTINUED: A 408 Chytek std FMJ does more damage at a longer range than a 50 cal API and they are avail to civilians. Give it a basic anti small arms hull, and put extra protection around the passengers seats. A round bottom will defect more than a v hull and it needs to extend all the way up to mid body, but the wheels will still get blown off by an IED. I would start with a 2 ton commercial 4x4 frame and drive train(with aftermarket intercoolers and turbos), beef it up and just come up with a cab design that works with all the new gear, should easily be less than 100K each in the real world. Going to the monopoly contractors is not a way to reduce cost in any way

Some good comments here today, but for once I must admit I’m torn between the continuing and scrapping the JLTV concept.

On the side of the JLTV, it’s a new vehicle that is designed for the wars we’re likely to fight. The operational environment for which the HMMWV/Jeep were designed / envisioned was maneuver warfare. In that environment these vehicles were basically modern pack mules, scurrying behind the front lines, supporting the combat units. The problem is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union we lack an enemy to focus our efforts on, and ALL of our ACTUAL combat/engagement outside OIF has been COIN/Irregular warfare. So now there is no Army to flank, there is no front line, EVERYONE is in the fight.
Now our Heavy Armor Vehicles (M1-M2 — HBCT’s) are TOO heavy, and completely unsuited for long patrolling and engagement of small groups of insurgents; our former supply/support vehicles are too light and too vulnerable to be in harm’s way. The JLTV is supposed to be a bridge between the two, a versatile vehicle that can do both patrolling & assaults, as well as logistics & support.

CONTINUTED…… Comparing the HMMWV and the JLTV is like comparing the Bradley and JLTV…..it’s apples and oranges. That being said, this doesn’t mean the JLTV is the answer. Here are some questions that need asking:
1. Almost every vehicle that does everything for everybody fails…..so what makes this different? Aren’t we just going to end up with a vehicle that’s neither fish nor fowl; too light for the infantry, too heavy for support?
2. Why is this booked as revolutionary? (aka why so expensive) This is 1970’s tech brought into the 21st century. Most of the contractors are finished but we’re dragging out the schedule. (6 months for MRAP, and 6 years for JLTV? You’d think the Army was developing a space shuttle with this budget and schedule…
3. Is it too little, too late? We’ve upgraded most of our HMMWV’s, purchased MRAPs/M-ATVs, and have reset most of our Heavy Armor……do we still need this thing?

I would agree that the number of trucks short term is more than needed but long term it is right number. As platforms are replaced (M1151 M998) the JLTV will step in.

Byron: units from BN on up have a GSA van to run equipment and supplies around Base or Post or in your case the O Club. I would agree that M998 should not be replace by a JLTV for running missions on Base or Post.

deciding what projects to continue and what projects to kill comes down to values. we currently face threats for which we do not properly “organize, train, and equip” the forces that are on the frontlines, eg. the USCG cannot cope with oil slick right now, that threatens US economy. As USCG focuses on oil slick, more drug dealers and terrorists slip through. The solutions to our problems do not require reach for the stars technology, only good enough technology in sufficient quantities to provide “Mass” — one of the key concepts of military doctrine, or as one Civil War general put it, “git theyah fuhst with tha mostest”.

To say that JLTV, or F-35, or whatever, provides a security blanket for the missions of the future, ignores the fact that we can’t predict the future. Example: OIF — we went in underestimating IEDs. Into the conflict we realize we need more armored trucks, technology that existed prior to OIF. We get caught with our pants down. So committing massive amounts of resources for projects that won’t pay off until years in the future, that are supposed to meet threats 10–20-30 years in the future, is like Don Quixote chasing windmills. Suppose we build F-35s NOW, we may end up realizing in the future we should have built more F-22s. Suppose we buid more F-22s NOW, we may end up realizing we should have built more F-35s. Or some other alternative. These chess games will blow your mind. Solve the problems now, or there won’t be a future.

Point taken, see point 2.….

There are some points here.
First of pennst98, do we really need this JLTV.
I think there should be a really basic chassis which you can modify for the needs to come, because stopwastingmytax$ is right. The army/marines cannot afford to stand still.
But as always, there isn’t 1 solution. The JLTV will be an asset, if it is build clean. Then the marine’s can devellop theirs further and the army can put their heavy weight variant on the road. And then start to devellop another X-trail (or something) for the area you need and where the JLTV is not good enough.
In that way the Defence org will always have at least 2 production lines to cover the vast amount of numbers written here. There will always be an new problem the next year to tackle.

And if you build neither the F-35 or F-22, you have neither when you do need them. And it takes plenty of time to set up a production line and machinery to build any aircraft, you need to do it in advance.

The Army couldn’t have known they would need thousands of MRAPs prior to OIF. They would have been unwilling to buy any number simply due to their poor mobility.

The MRAP is a stop-gap because it is not based on any documented capability set. It is an acqistion program based on 2005 congressional and military fear and panic that the continued IED injuries and deaths in Iraq will move public opinion to see those folks as impotent. The MRAP is not suited for use anywhere that rough terrain, close urban structures, or thin logistics exist (e.g. Afghanistan). In that theater, MRAP rollover injuries and deaths are, unfortunately, too common. Yes, DoD overbought MRAP vehicles (watch e-Bay), so now they want to provide a vehicle that does the same thing as the MRAP — but better. Same old story. Bring back the Jeep.

please define a mission the F-35 & F-22 can do that another less risky and costly solution cannot do. If we didn’t have a national debt and DoD could demonstrate it can produce quality products on time on schedule I’d be all for pushing the limit with these programs. unfortunately this is not reality. there are production lines open for modern versions of F-15, F-16, and F-18 that are open right now. we can replace fighters that are end of life with these versions, and lose no national strategic capability. now, our BOMBER and REFUELING aircraft fleets are a capability that are dying, with no replacement solution currently in the works. Every joint warfighter’s favorite A-10 and AC-130 are in the same situation. Glad to know our priorities are in order.

well the troops love them, they save lives, we log many mission critical on-road miles driving from FOB to FOB, and the M-ATV is on order and NDI M-ATVs are already in the fight. JLTV will be available when? and JLTV thick logistics are going to be in Afghanistan when??

Regarding the cost of whatever product we decide on, maybe the way to minimize the cost and keep this program from getting bloated is to make it in-house in a government plant. Employees only slightly less people (exclude the marketers and lobbyists), who still pay local taxes. Plus we can get it done and get it out. But I like a hi/low mix for on-base in garrison mode (lo) and deployed forces (hi).

Boomer, have you modeled round bottom hull designs? I think you are going in the wrong direction. I’m not saying that a V-hull is the end all, but rounding it out doesn’t deflect a blast. Further, ballistic protection is not the issue. It’s blast that drives the design, and there isn’t a 2 ton commercial chassis that is going to support the kind of cab weight to meet the blast requirements and also isn’t going to turn into shrapnel when it gets hit.

What can the F-22 and F-35 do that the F-15 and F-16 can’t? How about obtain air superiority against any opponent and be less restricted by modern integrated air defense systems. Legacy aircraft would have a difficult time against opponents with SA-21s (S-400) and multiple layers of SAM coverage.

You want a new bomber? So do I, but that involves spending money which our politicians would rather waste on something else. Ignoring that problem, what should the design’s features be? Should it have a high level of stealth or not? Should it subsonic or supersonic, and if supersonic how fast should it be cruising at? I don’t think the USAF itself knows what they want for sure.

We certainly need new tankers but the problem isn’t unwillingness to buy them, the problem is this whole contractor Boeing vs. EADS mess.

The hi / lo mode should be normal. There is no need for a full-spec JLTV (or HMMWV etc) on the bases. Exept for training and a little backup of course.

It amazes me that there is such a rush to produce a new product that like most of the products that have been produced in the past will just corrode away and cost more to fix than it would have if considered in the initial planning. Look at the HUMMER. When I was involved with them they were a corrosion nightmare. Look at the MRAP another corrosion nightmare. Will they never learn? Do they need all of this haste and waste to produce another product that will just be another maintenance problem. Take time and make it durable and sustainable for the team.

It is fact that a round or rounded structure deflects more blast because there are no flat spots to impact. AN IED in the ground blows up and out as do a lot of conventional non shape charge mines thus any flat spot is going to be impacted. Also I said start with a two ton chassis and go from there. It doesnt have to be as heavy as an MRAP, if a tank cannot withstand anti tank weapons then how can a light vehicle. They need to be light weight to be multi terrain and dependable, the drive train also needs to be caple of handling added weight from modular armour should it be needed in theater at a later date so that the drive train does not become the week point. Our nex war could be in a jungle or frozen tundra where an over weight vehicle will become useless and our troops on foot or scurry to by a bunch of light weight 4x4’s off the shelf as another stop gap like the MRAP.

yup you hit the nail on the head — that’s the way this industry and defense leadership work. rather than solve the O&M problems of existing fielded systems, they would rather take a leap in the dark with excessive high technology promises and a monolithic impossible to manage too big to fail acquisition program, which opens up a whole slew of new problems. bottom line is, the 18 year old troops fighting for our freedom will forever be attempting to accomplish missions and risking their lives with flawed systems. the real problems do not get addressed adequately enough. Excessive high tech working in a lab & test environment means nothing if it cannot O&M properly anywhere in the world in the fight all environmental conditions. don’t get me wrong i’m not opposed to high tech, just exorbitantly expensive ones that promise much more than they can deliver.

Eh.….I’m 50/50. Do we need the JLTV itself? I can give you an emphatic no. Do we need something in this catagory, yes.

Just to be clear, I’m not arguing with stopwastingmytax$, I was just trying to balance the arguments against a bloated program that is taking forever to deliver old tech, and comparing the JLTV to the HMMWV based soley on cost. At <$250K a unit, we could really use it. At >$500K a unit, don’t bother.

It’s not a bad idea, the Govt. used to do a lot of this “in house.” The real problem is staffing. So much of the Army (and DoD) leadership is piss poor and mired in political patronage you won’t end up hiring talented professionals, you’ll end up hiring a “diverse” workforce of know-nothings and former PM’s that couldn’t find their ____ with two hands a flashlight. If you don’t believe me ask yourself how many great weapons and innovations have come out of Picatinny arsenal? (if you said less than 3 in 5 decades, you’re right)

You also face the private/public disconnect; private industry has MUCH more leverage in terms of salary and benefits than the government could ever hope for. So if it’s like most agencies it will end up subcontracting 90% of its duties due to lack of talent/vision, thus contributing little while adding expense/waste to an already untenable system.

What is “light” about 23,000lbs? or 19,000, or 13,000? This is an albatros for the Marine Corps.

Right this very minute there are issues within the Marine Corps over vehicle towing capacity and compatibility between varisous near-traditional towed loads, i.e. the ubiquitous ‘trailer’, and so-called prime movers, e.g. the HMMWV, MTVR, MRAP, and MATV. Slapping a mess of armor on a vehicle.…and not having capacity to tow a trailer weighing a couple of tons.…is counter-intuitive. General Conway is right on the mark.…right smack dab in the “V” ring.

It is about time that the military woke up to the fact that a HUMMER was a replacement for the M151 and never intended to be a real fighting vehicle. My question is will we need to get a bigger rotary wing aircraft to carry the new tactical vehicle?

Remember when a jeep would fit in a 46?

I like the General Dynamics version, from the pictures, it can be used in Garrison and in theater (Iraq/Afghanistan). But how are these vehicles on speed, durability and easy access, in & out of the vehicle without and/or with wearing the body armor? That is something they need to have in mind when it comes to the soldiers who have get in out of the vehicles with ease in a combat situation.

What I got from the article is Contracting is going to hold them to a performance based payment/ The criteria can only support this is there have been no changes to the contract. Payment on delivery of accepted after performance testing is legal; to hold a contractor t o a delivery date when changes have been made to the spec’s leaving the contractor to front a R&D change are illegal unless the contractor signs the change in the contract language; I can’t see any contractor to do it, especially when the friendly interacting seems to have gone south. We (government) get more from a contractor when bonus’s are paid for performance exceeding the timeline fir delivery by the contractor; threatening to screw with a companies $$$ when they are putting out to all the required assets to deliver is wrong and will be readdressed at the end of the contract where there are no more promises of additional quantities being dangled, legal will tell you to pay, with iterest.

To tell them you don’t trust them yet you are still doing business with them insures the high ground when arguing your case. Remember they are some of the largest corporations in the world and will get legal costls added to claim award. Play nice, they do want return business and in many cases give more as incentive to be the first called to notify them to bid. Remember most Government retiries go to work with these companies; think about it.

Big bombs are more effective, less costly and don’t allow counter-fire.…go crusher bombs !!!!

Have you ever been shot at or blown up let alone ride in a humvee that is not suited for the weight we put on these vehicles with makeshift armour???? I didnt think so!

The MRAP was a knee-jerk reaction to save lives, but it was not properly planned and we will see ballooning lifecycle costs to maintain the numerous variants procured in recent years. (Different manufacturers = different parts = increased supply inventories & maintenance costs) One of the best MRAPs is currently finishing production and was made on a dumptruck chasie with a dumptruck engine. One issue with MRAP vs JLTV is the modular capability. JLTV offers modularity and common parts which should reduce some of the longterm/lifecycle costs.

The JLTV will not fully replace the HMMWV. The Army has over 180,000 HMMWVs. The current JLTV acquisition projection of 60,000 is less than 1/2 of the projection of +140,000 from a year or two ago. This is probably in responce to the price tag that is almost double of the old desired $250K mark. ($418-475K) As for the slow process to procure this system, the government’s idea is to increase competition to get a lower price (open bidding for the next phase starts next summer) and a detailed development process to reduce technical risks/snags in the system development and testing.

At 60,000 units at $418K each, the unit acquisition costs alone will run over $30 Billion for the Army.

Transpo CPT (RET)…now a consultant.

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