Even With Petraeus, No Afghan ‘Awakening’

Even With Petraeus, No Afghan ‘Awakening’

When Gen. David Petraeus accepted his nation’s request that he step down in responsibility and take personal leadership of the fight in Afghanistan, many analysts hoped for an Iraq redux.

America’s most dynamic and creative commander in many years would take the hard lessons he learned in Iraq, do his school work in Afghanistan and come up with another impressive showing. We daren’t call it victory, but we could reach for the less inflammatory success. That may happen.

Petraeus is once again surrounding himself with many of the people who helped him make Iraq a success. Surge advocates Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute and his wife Kim of the Institute for the Study of War are in Afghanistan. Army Brig. Gen H.R. McMaster has flown back under Petraeus wings from his perch at TRADOC.


But there won’t be, according to the head of Marine operations, anything like the Iraqi “Awakening” that brought the Sunnis onto the side of what we think of as the righteous and fundamentally reordered the country’s security situation and politics.

“That’s not going to happen here,” Brig. Gen. David Berger told me several days ago.  There would not be a similar shift in Afghanistan because the country’s tribal politics are much more complex. It would be very, very difficult to get substantial numbers of Afghan elders to join NATO and the Afghan national government because Afghans don’t trust the concept of national government, Berger said. Say all you will about the evils of Saddam Hussein, but the fact remains that Iraq had a central government that was the’ preeminent power structure. And that made it easier to rebuild the state once the Sunnis pledged their loyalty to it once again.

Because of the small chance of a wholesale shift as happened in Iraq, the need for long-term commitment — probably well beyond the July 2011 withdrawal date — is becoming increasingly clear and the senior military leadership has stepped up its efforts to educate people and Washington of the likelihood. Petraeus made it pretty clear when he recently spoke of 2011 being the time when “the process begins” and is not the beginning of an American exodus.

Berger’s boss,  Commandant James Conway, made his own pitch for flexibility during his Monday press briefing. Conway said “we know the president was talking to several audiences when he talked about 2011,” a clear nod to the left wing of the Democratic Party who have been clamoring for a smaller commitment in Afghanistan.

But Conway went further, saying that the U.S. has intercepted communications from the Taliban,“saying we only have to hold on for so long,” Conway said. He added  that the 2011 pullout date is “probably giving this enemy sustenance.”

But he also said NATO forces have “momentum” and offered a different interpretation of the same information.

“Okay, if you accept what I offered earlier as true, that Marines will be there after 2011, okay, after the middle of 2011, what’s the enemy going to say then, you know?”

“What is he going to say to his foot troops, where you’ve got the leadership outside the country trying to direct operations within — because it’s too dangerous for them to be there — and the foot troops have been believing what he’s saying, that they’re all going to leave in the summer of next year, and come the fall, we’re still there hammering them like we have been? I think it could be very good for us in that context, in terms of the enemy’s psyche and what he has been, you know, posturing now for, really, the better part of a year.”

He said he’d spoken in Afghanistan with Adm. Bob Harward, who runs detention in Afghanistan for ISAF and heard that the enemy “is getting tired, too.  They’re getting hammered, to a much greater degree than we are.  And they’re asking themselves, ‘Hey is this all worth it?’

That may well be the question Americans, our NATO allies, the Taliban and their allies are asking come the summer of 2011. And someone will have their own awakening then.

Join the Conversation

We need to just pull out and let them come back in, Then 72hrs later go back in with all we have from all sides and kill anyone with a weapon, no quarter given, then swabb the remaining for powder residue on thier hands and shoot them in the head point blank if residue is positive, load up our troops and come back home. If you cant convert them — then deplete and disarm them, dont even leave a pea shooter or firecracker behind.

or…just continue as we have. its not like allied forces are unreasonable: the objective is simple. Play within the boundaries of global society. Taliban wants to blow up their own national treasures, giant 40′ statues of buhda? Ok. Whatever. Want to blow up buildings in fr / de / be / ru / us / cn ? now that is a problem.

NATO forces can sustain an extremely damaging presence indefinitely. The taliban have set themselves up, literally, vs the world. What do the afghan people want at the end of the day? This is not an invasion. It’s a security mission. Do the afghan tribes accept responsibility for stability and security of their country? It’s not a hard demand to meet. If they insist on plotting against NATO countries, then guess what: NATO is going to come knocking. drones can fly around and drop bombs on their pea brains for as long as there are pea brains who fail to see the bigger picture. eventually somebody is going to want to go back to the old days of sheep farming and ak-47 hoarding.

Let everyone have arms. who cares?

Too bad we can’t rewind time and ditch this whole nation building endeavor.

The generals are just reiterating Osama’s strategy — keep America bleeding in Afghanistan forever.

Currently each Al Queada operative is costing us $2.1 billion per year to chase around history’s most expensive goose chase.

A little bit too negative.

I’m glad to hear some realism out of some of the commanders. As a former Army type I’m disappointed that I first hear it out of Marines.

Afghanistan is complex and it will not truly be a unified country for a long time to come. The basic organizing unit is the tribe and their modes of behavior are essentially tribal. A good Afghan National Army for an extended time period will erode that situation as will education — but it will take a very long time because at this time if you take away the delicate and dynamic tribal balances you really will have chaos.

The other thing to remember is that the terrain is even involved in establishing and maintaining a tribal structure. It is very difficult to get to some areas or even to communicate with them and that means that even communications is difficult let along control and support. So it just isn’t practical for a remote tribe to try to function as a part of a national whole — they aren’t going to see the government, hear from them, or be able to exchange goods with them without great delays and difficulty.

We can win this but we have to take down the Iranian regime and be very persistent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Recognize that this is primarily a light fighter’s war and try to shift the regular forces mode of behavior a little more toward something that looks a bit like what Spec Ops does and give our troops firearms that can really reach out and touch someone (too many engagements at ranges at which our M4’s aren’t really effective).

FWIW

“We can win this…”? Utterly ridiculous. Afghanistan cannot be won.

Nothing about Afghanistan is worth the life of a single Westerner.…that’s right, no soldier or civilian in any army or working for any contractor is worth sacrificing in Afghanistan. Let the whole GD country slip back into the 14th century where it belongs.

It is true, that if you can’t get the everyday Afgani to fight for even his back yard, let alone the local province, you are just pissing in the wind.

Citation.

There’s still a job to be done in Afghanistan, but it’s out of the scope of what can be accomplished in the immediate time frame. We should focus on reducing our conventional forces in Afghanistan, and recognize this as a regional issue. Switch strategy to focus on decentralized non-conventional operations throughout the entire Middle East. Utilize Western Special Forces to mobilize sympathetic local groups as we did in Afghanistan in 2001. Reinforce these groups with U.S. global strike capability.

Terrorism is a problem bred out of global political economy and nothing else. Military force can only be used to suppress it, not eliminate it. The necessary changes will come to the Middle East and Asia in time. In the meantime, the West needs to stop attempting to solve an mobile and asymmetric problem with conventional and geopolitically immobile forces. Focus on small-scale, geopolitically mobile forces that can be deployed sustainably and build similarly asymmetric allies.

Good post! I wouldn’t doubt if the Armed Forces didn’t wish this was already the posture they were in; but since they have to keep the civilian political system happy, they will have to drive on with what situation they are already in.

Perhaps we will be there by the announced date? Hmmm.

Yea sounds great until you realize that it was the strategy for the previous 50 years and it lead to the demolition of the twin towers.

Is it not possible to have the right kind of strategy, but doing it wrong, and also for the wrong reasons? The US can be one of the clumsiest in foreign affairs of any nation, I will admit.

My only argument is, we could have done things smarter, and we shouldn’t have dropped Afghanistan just because they got rid of the Russians. Engagement towards mutual self interests, is not a bad road to hoe IMO.

As far as Iraq goes, we probably should have ignored Saddam after we chased him out of Kuwait. Their is no doubt we were right for ridding the world of him; the fact that the Iraqis were left in a power vacuum is not our fault, but still obviously bad planning if you believe in mutual self interest between countries of the world. I’m not sure we should have held him to sanctions; but then, if Hitler had been sanctioned, would that have prevented the holocaust and maybe WWII?

We will never know until history proves out which is the better strategy.

Their is no doubt that in the past, fiddling with Iran’s internal affairs was a stupid dastardly act — history has already shown that out! I am waiting for big dumb countries to realize this and change tactics. It would still take more than a hundred years just to begin to unravel past errors.

Oblat, your assessment is count-historical. We did not have a sustained special operations effort hunting radical elements overseas. Additionally, air strikes against positions established by Osama were infrequent, and poorly supported by the political process. The literal definition of Al-Qaeda is “the base”, named after the bases set up by Bin Laden and his supporters in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda wasn’t even considered a credible threat by the White House or CIA until the early ‘nineties.

Any other incorrect assumptions you’d like to bounce off the wall of history?

Bad part about all this is that due to lesser American military presence, the bad guys are migrating to Iraq and increasing thier presence and violence. They keep moving back & forth and will continue to do so untill we are 100% out of there.

Now that BG Mcmaster is in country things can only improve in that region. I served under the man and he is second to none in all aspects of warfare. Although controversial at times he always seems to get the job done. I hope he rises to the top of the food chain in todays army. I would follow that man into the gates of hell, and go to battle with him any day.
SGT. Taverna 1/3ACR C TROOP

*required

NOTE: Comments are limited to 2500 characters and spaces.

By commenting on this topic you agree to the terms and conditions of our User Agreement