Likely Winners, Losers for FCS Son

Likely Winners, Losers for FCS Son

A surprisingly bounteous desert stretches across the horizon, bound by craggy peaks. Bright yellow flowers dot the landscape, highlighted by the green scrub growing around them. Huge, parti-colored grasshoppers lumber along, mating in the ground cover.

Three M-ATVs rumble down a track toward the building on whose roof we’re standing. The sharp crack of AK-47 rounds ring out from the barrel of a Taliban marksman at the edge of the roof. One of the M-ATVs 50’s opens up with that distinctive thump, thump. American soldiers roll out, hit the side of the building and move in, according to the best TTPs.

And then their commander politely asks four members of the press to step inside a room adjoining where the Taliban will be captured and killed, so that it can all be done with some authenticity. That was the scene last Friday at the White Sands Missile Range during the Army’s full-scale test of the — get ready for the official name so the Boeing and Army folks don’t scream at me — Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Increment 1 Limited User Test.


This is the latest in a long series of tests of the technologies that are becoming so familiar to Army watchers: the flying beer keg (also known as the Class 1 UAV); the family of “unattended” tactical sensors; the small remote-controlled ground vehicle for which no one can come up with a better name than SUG-V; and the software programmable radios known as NIK that are the heart of the exercise and provide the rolling secure Wi-Fi that is supposed to give US troops improved situational awareness.

More than 800 soldiers are taking part in the test, including testers, faux Taliban, real US forces, faux ANA and faux ordinary Afghan villagers. Two weeks remain in the test. One thing that forcibly struck me was how much more vigorous this test was, compared to the early summer event. And the command atmosphere was much more vibrant and demanding.

The technology that looks like the biggest winner of the bunch, according to the lieutenants and sergeants I spoke with, is the flying beer keg. It forced the faux Taliban forces to be craftier, seek new routes and sometimes travel at night, they told us.

But, in a fabulous example of enterprise and cunning, the leader of the Taliban main force (the OpFor) hatched the idea of flying kites to discombobulate the beer keg. Capt. Andrew Hitchings said the kites tangled the UAV up and rendered it temporarily useless. He said he was not allowed to destroy the flying beer keg but he clearly took great satisfaction in having made its life miserable.

The ground sensors were another winner, although our sergeant said they didn’t operate at the distances they were supposed to.  They got “positive hits” at distances of up to 3,000 meters but they were “supposed to” work up to 9,000 meters, he said. The sensors depend on a transmission antenna and I heard from several of the soldiers serving as the US side they worried the antenna could be spotted, even the camouflaged one that rolls up. However, folks with the main Taliban force told me they had not spotted the antenna and had found the sensors a source –at least — of uncertainty.

One of the sergeants expert in the ground sensors capabilities and reliability told me they worked pretty well against helicopters, if they fly low enough or land, and had proved pretty good at detecting heavy vehicles.  I didn’t ask him about Toyota pickups. The camera sensor, hidden in brush, had done a fine job providing data for force protection but, the sergeant said, didn’t provide detailed enough imagery to get license plates or other critical data. If it sent video instead of still pictures that might help, he said.

The NIK — centerpiece of the test — appeared to be functioning much better than it did early this summer. No test results were available yet since the test runs. It was projected to function 89 hours between serious failures during the LUT, according to an Army document. Before the tests began the Army made 86 design changes to the technologies since last year, out of 160 corrective actions to improve equipment performance and the NIK received several substantial software rewrites.

Initial results indicate that the NIK was maintaining an average quality link of one on a scale of zero to three, Lt. Col. Luke Peterson, product manager for network systems for PEO Integration told us. Two is optimal. The NIKs are transmitting files of an average size of 500 kilobytes. That allows commanders to send and receive operational orders, meaning they don’t have to waste time travelling 20 kilometers or more each way, he said.

The Army mounted 15 NIKs on three different types of MRAPs, four Humvees, one Bradley and one was placed in the TOC. The biggest difference this time, aside from increased reliability, was that the network is operating across a considerably larger area than it did last time. And it is reaching into places it couldn’t before.

We got a very staged example of this when the S-UGV was dropped into a concrete tunnel about 20 feet deep. It maintained its link to its operator and, presumably, the image it got of four reporters, a cameraman and at least one Army spokesman was fed back to units via the network. And that, one of the soldiers said, was what it was all about. He wouldn’t have to crawl through a tunnel with his 9mm pistol in hand, hoping there weren’t any booby traps or insurgents waiting for him as he had to do in Iraq.

Biggest loser, according to our sergeant, was a group of sensors that bear a striking resemblance to the home security monitors you buy at Radio Shack. While they can provide detailed images from up close and are handy for such uses as a sniper team using them to protect their back, or for force protection at a house that a platoon might occupy for a few days, he said, they “don’t work very well. Yesterday it worked well — no rain, no clouds, no wind. Normally we can’t even get it to work at 100 meters. “Usual working range was about 15 meters. And to get a good image the subject needs to be about four feet away from the sensor, he said. One of their biggest drawbacks is that if they are planted in an unfriendly’s house they stick out like a sore thumb.

Best quote of the trip came from the brigade commander, Col. Dan Pinell: “I guarantee when I’m done that southern New Mexico will be safe from counterinsurgencies.”

[Full disclosure: Boeing paid for our flights to and from Fort Bliss.]

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Part 1 / 4

“the small remote-controlled ground vehicle for which no one can come up with a better name than SUG-V”

1) “SREC” (“Small REmote-Controlled vehicle)

2) What if a determined enemy decides to pick it up, gift-wrap it and offer this “ReCoVe” (REmote-COntrolled VEhicle) to his son?

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“family of ‘unattended’ tactical sensors”

But how do U.S. troops place or hide all these sensors in a busy city center in the first place? (For low-intensity conflicts only?! Ok, I help you remember: Beirut, Sarajevo, Mogadishu, Baghdad)

(Continued)

Part 2 / 4

“More than 800 soldiers are taking part in the test, including testers, faux Taliban, real US forces, faux ANA and faux ordinary Afghan villagers.”

And how many I.E.D.s ( = the BIGGEST killers) ? The enemy is there before you, remember? It’s a natural pre-condition to any “defense”.

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“flying kites to discombobulate the beer keg.”

You just launched a feverish new commercial activity in the Himalayas: Selling fishing nets in the mountains.

(Continued)

Part 3 / 4

“The ground sensors were another winner, although our sergeant said they didn’t operate at the distances they were supposed to. They got ‘positive hits’ at distances of up to 3,000 meters”

3.000 meters? Then how will that Capt. Andrew Hitchings cope with the information flood of a single sensor in a city? Or are these surveillance technologies “good” only for flat empty deserts?

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“the ground sensors (…) worked pretty well against helicopters, if they fly low enough or land, and had proved pretty good at detecting heavy vehicles.”

1) “Helicopters” ? “Heavy vehicles” ? What exactly is being tested here: Sensors for low-intensity conflicts or for high-intensity conflicts? (Do the testers know?)

2) The sensors actually detect people at between 3.000 and 9.000 meters but proved only “pretty good” at detecting “heavy vehicles” ? Where: Behind the horizon?

(Continued)

Part 4 / 4

“The camera sensor, hidden in brush, (…) didn’t provide detailed enough imagery to get license plates”

You want to get license plates? Ok, low-intensity conflict.

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Next time invite ME to these demonstrations: I ask the right questions! (I’m free Wednesday morning)

Boots on the ground and spooks in the air is the only way to control an area. While some would argue it puts the men on the ground in greater danger, the truth is that it is more dangerous to go into an area based soley on electronics data. The troops dont need this garbage, what they need is better personal gear, weapons, training, and less micro management. When a unit leaves the base then the team leader is in charge until they return to base, he should not be getting permission from a guy sitting by the AC in the TOC to take out suspected bad guys.

Colin– Good Article.. J. Cryer

Thanks. I had good material to work with, which helps.

Please stop posting unintelligible, poorly-formatted tangents. Brevity is the soul of wit.

You lose. Class I is here to stay.

Except that the Taliban considers kite flying (a popular Afghan pastime) un-Islamic. At least the keg is going to make them eat their words. :)

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