JLTV Sinking, EFV Wobbly

JLTV Sinking, EFV Wobbly

The Marines, who have voiced concerns for some time about the program, appear ready to abandon or seriously curtail their purchase of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).

“We’ve got thousands of up-armored Humvees out there sitting around [and we’re] wondering what we’re going to do with them,” Gen. James Conway said at the Expeditionary Warfare Conference in Panama City, Fla. according to our colleagues at Inside Defense. “Is there a possibility that we can take the up-armored Humvee, elevate it off the deck, give it a v-shaped bottom, perhaps secure the hull and make it our next Joint Light Tactical Vehicle? We don’t know the answer to that, but we’ve got to find out, because I don’t think we’re going to have the money to buy new.”

The Army has already voiced concerns about the program’s rising price and may substantially scale down its buy to around 50,000 (another tip of hat to the Inside Defense folks). Service support for JLTV has been slipping for some time, as became clear in the Army’s tactical vehicle strategy, which did not include any numbers for JLTV.


All this flows down from the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, which saw the Pentagon pour more than $40 billion into various forms of the MRAP. On top of that, Defense Secretary Robert Gates told the Army to include the MRAP in its budget and force plans, forcing decisions about what to do with uparmored Humvees and JLTV.

In addition to the JLTV woes, support for the General Dynamics platform known as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle seems to be growing shakier. The new Marine Commandant, Gen. James Amos, told the Senate Armed Services Committee “there is absolutely an enduring requirement for the capability to conduct opposed amphibious” operations, but he came down on the side of an EFV capability, not necessarily EFV.

Now we have Navy Undersecretary Bob Works telling the conference in Panama City that the service certainly needs something like the EFV. Echoing Amos’ approach, the folks at Inside the Navy quote him as saying he “wouldn’t count the EFV out yet.” A “slightly modified” version of EFV might do. Or, in a sentence likely to send shivers down the back of General Dynamics, he said: “We might be looking at a different system, but it will all depend on a myriad number of issues.”

Those budget drills inside the Pentagon must look increasingly similar to the devices used by dentists.

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““Is there a possibility that we can take the up-armored Humvee, elevate it off the deck, give it a v-shaped bottom, perhaps secure the hull and make it our next Joint Light Tactical Vehicle?”

Sure! It’ll cost as much as a JLTV (probably more, when you consider the logistics involved in getting all those HMMWVs to the upgrade facility) but you can do it if you want.

But given the way the idiots in Congress think, they’ll probably approve a triple-the-cost “upgrade” instead of a less-expensive “new buy”.

Stick them on a rail train and deliver them that way. Done deal.

Program management disaster by the Army. This program didn’t need half this long and now it’s already been outstripped by the M-ATV; which is basically a heavy variant JLTV.

Now that they have thousands of M-ATV’s (and lesser MRAPs to contend with) they’re questioning how many JLTV’s they can afford given the ABSOLUTE RIDICULOUS design requirements which have inflated the cost of the vehicle; expensive features which can’t be just removed because they’re part of the overall design concept/frame. They might as well kill the program, and issue a new RFP for a new vehicle based on a NEW set of requirements and procurement quantity.

The army once again starts with a simple lock blade knife concept then ends up requesting a Swiss blade knife on steroids. Instead wanting a tactical vehicle with good armor protection, versatile weapons platform, robust drive train and suspension, they want it to power up half a city, with more electronics than a fighter bomber as well.

The Pentagon will continue to make boneheaded procurement decisions like this until someone finally forces them to integrate the existing MRAP fleet into doctrine permanently. We can’t have an armored and unarmored version of every vehicle for every contingency.

MRAPS & MATVS are dead horses, production qty’s already greatly reduced (too heavy — too slow — too prone to breakage — too expensive to buy — too expensive to maintain). Already started transfering some to homeland security for the borders and bomb squads, some to iraq and afghanistan. Expect to only see a few left for EOD units and MP. Armor is being removed from many HUMVEES as well to try and extend thier life, engines and trans are too weak and prone to breakage as is the suspensions. Less gadgets are wanted on vehicles and better more upgradeable suspensions. They wouldnt listen when we told them this in the begining but $$$ talk and all these goodies are soaking them up fast.

Quote: “integrate the existing MRAP fleet into doctrine permanently” — I don’t think GEN Conway has any intention of doing that: “What you have to appreciate though — and I actually had this conversation with the secretary of defense
last week — is that we don’t intend to go into a place that’s sewn with” improvised explosive devices,
Conway said. “We will use speed and maneuver to avoid that. (from InsideDefense​.com)

I guess the Marines are solidifying their position as an offense-only force. Let the Army do the occupation. Can’t say I disagree.

Your military purchase all seem to follow a pattern, start of asking for a bicycle and get a Rolls Royce instead.

I love how you make pronouncements with imaginary #‘s, “triple-the-cost ‘upgrade’”.

2 things your obviously missing:
1) The JLTV is now projected to come in at close to $500K, the upgraded HMMWV is around $200K, the logistics argument is a wash.
2) The JLTV is TOO HEAVY for the Marines, the lightest stripped down version is going to weigh over 22k Lbs.

You can’t sling it w/a helo, its too heavy for the already overloaded ships.. its a non-starter for the USMC.

If recent reports from pakistan are anything to go by you don’t run over IEDs instead you pay subcontractors to plant them in their own vehicles so you have to pay them full compensation for their losses while after they have sold the fuel on the black market.

Having been involved in weapons systems procurement from design to delivery both in and out of uniform, I see the current inevitable competitive bid, contract award and program process as the main culprit.

Contractors often don’t know what it will take to deliver a finish system either in cost, time or design. Too often they are making educated guesses based on past experience for new and radically different concepts. Yes, that has always been true to some extent, but the need to win the contract results in intentional or unintentional underbidding, higher than anticipated costs as contractors eventually learn what it really takes to build out a product that passes. The services are often to blame also with frequent changes to specifications along the way that contractors conspire to make not an issue in order to stay in favor with the customer. I have seen that first hand as a designer of a major weapons system trainer while in uniform and as a contractor after.

Then of course the contractor will often try to recoup early costs incurred in bidding and start up later in the program to avoid stockholder issues with low/no profit contracts.

When you ask for the moon, micromanage the product to include (depending on which gov’t agency it goes through like OPM) setting minimum pay packages and more; eventually you have to pay for what you asked for.

The USMC has lost its way. It has evolved into US Army(Light). We do not need 1 and a 1/3 Armies. Now that former CoMC is out of the Whitehouse look for a swift down sizing of the USMC. You see for all of their inability to grasp modern tactics, logistical incompetence, and field failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USMC is the image that our foreign friends and foes think of when they fear or respect the US Armed forces.
The Obamites will wiltle the Corps down to a politically correct size.
So do not worry about programs worry about survival. The correct model would be 3 Commando, Royal Marines, the REAL MARINES.

Ah, another soldier whining about how the big, bad Marines make his service look like a bunch of wusses. If the Corps turned into the Army(lite) it was because the Army couldn’t perform the mission required.

The JLTV program needs to be rebooted and become HMMWV 2.0 rather than trying to jam a MRAP into a smaller frame. Currently the “Light” part is missing in the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program.

Earlier model HMMWVs fitted with armor weren’t designed for that weight and thus there was some real wear and tear on the HMMWV fleet. Dedicated armored HMMWV variants (M1114) had heavier duty suspensions, but they couldn’t have that base armor removed and their utility was limited. And despite upgrades to the suspension and other components, all of the additional armor beyond the default level did nothing to help matters.

The M1151, M1152, and other new variants of HMMWV should be viewed as a model for JLTV. These HMMWVs only have certain key components protected by armor by default, but are designed to be easily fitted with armor kits that can be removed if not needed. They also have the suspension and power to handle this weight. Yet even these may be overloaded by FRAG kits and similar configurations which are simply trying to do too much with the HMMWV.

(Had to break apart my comment because I don’t have post size-limit defying touch of Byron Skinner.)

JLTV should be designed with a similar “modular” armor concept and possibly feature a v-shaped hull, yet we shouldn’t be expecting this vehicle to provide the same level of protection as MRAPs, and we shouldn’t try to get into these scenarios where massive IEDs are everywhere. If we go into Iran, lets not try to rebuild their country. Lets kick their ass and leave.

As far as MRAPs go there isn’t much room for them in the force structure outside of EOD and some engineer and MP units. Perhaps some may be useful on the Mexican border. Yet when it comes to all of the extra MRAPs left over we should put the best designs in storage and sell or give away those designs that proved less popular with the troops.

That maybe why the GREAT victory in the USMC’s one AO in Iraq Al-Anbar came after Army SF and CA units turned the Sunnis(mainly the sons of Iraq) to our side. And pushed for the final “victory” after the province was filled with 8,000 soldiers. In their great battle, Fallujah, all Marine units were lead into battle by Army Armor, as USMC armor was deemed “combat ineffective” in September 04 for piss poor maintenance. The 03 invasion, total incompetence by USMC leaders. the Army was ordered to stop three times, fought Iraqi Army units(not street gangs), and still got to Bagdad 6 days before the USMC.
If the Italians and Poles had brought Tank Bns, they would have beat the USMC to Bagdad. JAV move out of your Mom’s basement.

The fact that you equate a solid model of what the USMC says it should be, 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, with whining show you are just what Truman talked about in the 50s, “the most effective Marine department? Easy, the PR dept”.
1st I have served in 1st and 5th SFGs and supported Marine and Army units. They guys are great. But there would be no discussion of a complete overhaul of the USMC(started in 2006 under Bush) if their performance had been stellar.
2nd I have work on my Senator’s staff for two years now. The USMC will see a 30–40% cut in manpower and funds in the next 10 years. The other forces 20–30%.IMO USAF should be cut 50%+.
3rd the Royal Marines model of a lighter,flexible, mobile, Special Operations capable assault force is what the USMC claims to be but is not. 3–4 Brigade sized assault forces is what the USMC should be.
4th Your inability to live in reality should qualify you quickly for USMC OCS.

Here is a suggestion: Why don’t some of the active duty combat veterans of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force have a set down and from their knowledge come up with a design for an armored vehicle for all four branches of the military. They and their fellow combat members are the ones who are going into to combat in these puppies. So they should have knowledge of what they would like to see in one of these vehicles that they are betting their lives on. I bet they would come up with a good one. (I read somewhere that the first armored mine t vehicle was made from a VW frame by troops fighting in Africa, and it worked).

People like you have been predicting the end of the Corps for 200 years, forgive me if I don’t quake in my boots with your threats. I write two sentences and you write two long posts and invoke your SF and Senate “experience”. I don’t believe a word of it. I’ve worked with SF before and have a cousin who went to AFG with 5th Group. We all know real SF folks don’t troll on blogs challenging the other services-they are too professional for that.

I spent my time in Iraq, in Anbar Province performing civil affairs (funny, finishing the job the Army finished, according to you), not in mommy’s basement. Suffice to say that I spent enough time interacting with the Iraqis (including SOI and provincial government) and in briefs at high levels (MNF-W, MNF-I, etc) to know what was going on. I know what we did, and I know what the Army did. The Army deserves credit for their part, the Corps deserves credit for theirs. You’re the one trolling the web knocking everyone else.

Good luck with that Senate job. No matter which side you’re on, you’re boss will need it as an incumbent in Nov.

“we don’t intend to go into a place that’s sewn with improvised explosive devices”

Because obviously that’s worked so well so far.

The facts speak for themselves. The Marine Corps has far fewer IED deaths per capita than the Army. Tactics are crucial.

All this ‘progress’ caused by some bohunks with AK47’s, RPGs and some homemade explosive devices? Amazing!

And the beauty of it is that the next war scenario might occur in a place, or against an enemy with the effect that all these innovations to thwart the bashi-bazouk, turn into new weaknesses and liabilities. ‘You go to war with the army you have, and not the army you wish you had.” And sometimes even the ideal isn’t what its’s cracked-up to be.

My intent was not to knock anyone. I wish the USMC the best. But what is best for the USA is for the USMC to return to a lighter more flexible formation. Set the USMC, and also the Army Ranger Rgmt, apart by returning them to full time Ass Kickers. Make them unit packages that really can go any where in the world quickly, not too of heavy formations with light, flexible goals.
As for new vehicles I see the Iveco “Lince” as the best availible without a protacted, very expensive Defence Contractor lead procurement program. Just Buy it.
Also for the USMC ‘s EFV just check out the Italian Super AV 8x8 or the Polish Rosomak. You see, I really hated watching my soldiers looking bewildered after joint operations when smaller, poorer allied nations have substantially better equipment.

I am a Marine. I was attached to the 42 Commando Royal Marines in Malta in the early 70’s after my last tour in Vietnam. Very good troops. I was impressed. They kept saying they hoped to be as good as we are, one day.

That day has not arrived. And in no way is this a reflection on their troops. In the end it is entirely about leadership.

“There are only two kinds of people that understand Marines: Marines and the enemy. Everyone else has a second-hand opinion.” — Gen. William Thornson, U.S. Army

I wonder how much longer you and your master will be in Washington DC?

Go figure.

“We can evade reality, but we cannot evade the consequences of evading reality” — Ayn Rand

You guys in the US cannot get with the picture and buy Aussie Bushmaster’s or the latest ASLAV vehicle, as someone said “swiss Army pocket knife stuff.
Our soldiers have had a lot of imput into what they considered would be best for THEM in the field.
We learnt from the Rhodesian’s and South Africans from the 70’s and 80’s.

General Conway’s “concept” is just a counter-step to the bad guys who’ll figure out how to be faster and more agile in setting these devices.…

Joe,

I’ll help ya.…The General is Full of It.…He has no inside track on ‘common sense’ and logic…His statement is as ridiculous as can be.

Signed, A Marine Veteran

Nice job, stirring up all the Leathernecks in the entire free world.…

Last time I checked the UK’s Royal Marines did not add up to 10,000 Marines. Lemme see.….US Marines @ around 200,000, though likely to drop to about 178,000. So, a slight difference in size. Then there’s the mission: they’re different. Then there’s the whole process of personnel management: a lot of turnover in the US Marines, much less so in the RMs.

I’m afraid your reasoning is unfounded: in the context of the United States and the US Marine Corps, the “correct model” isn’t the Royal Marines.

There was not today’s IED technology in the 70s or 80s, otherwise the Bushmaster design would have been neutralized even then.

they should drop the jltv program and buy 50,000 m-atvs they are saving lives and are troops love them

Do you have information on troop feedback regarding the M-ATV? I thought I read there were some visibility problems (poor window design) or something like that with the vehicle.

oshkosh is working on a new design for the windows it will be much better visibilty for are troops

I’m the chief metrologist for the power plant in the JLTV being put foward by GTV. I’ll keep it short and sweet and just say although I want this program to take off and have put my heart in soul into. I want the armed forces to have the best equipment possible whether it’s us or none of us at all.

it’s called a patria, not a rosomah

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