Venlet Likes JSF Second Engine

Venlet Likes JSF Second Engine

Ever since Defense Secretary Robert Gates canned the head of the JSF program, Marine Maj. Gen. David Heinz, Capitol Hill aides have hinted that substantial support remained within the Air Force for a second engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. Now we have proof.

A November 19 letter signed by leaders of the House Armed Services Committee cites testimony by Vice Adm. David Venelet, program executive officer for the JSF program. The letter was sent to Rep. Norm Dicks, chair of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee and asked him to include funding for the F136 in whatever spending measure the House might pass to fund the government once current appropriations run out on Dec. 3.

The letter, first reported by my colleague Jason Sherman at Inside Defense, says: “As you are well aware from testimony to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Secretary Gates’ most senior military advisory and acquisition official on the F-35 program, [Vice] Admiral David Venlet, has stated that he believes in competition in the F-35 engine program.”


It is signed by outgoing HASC chairman, Rep. Ike Skelton, his replacement, Rep. Buck McKeon and four other senior HASC members.

What I find most interesting about this is how Gates will react, especially given the fact that F-35 costs have continued to rise on Venlet’s watch. Many people believe Heinz was fired by Gates largely because of his support for the second engine, although Gates cited rising program costs when he made his Feb. 1 announcement.

Here’s what Gates said when he fired Heinz: “One cannot absorb the additional costs in this program and the delays without people being held accountable.” Nothing has yet leaked out about yesterday’s Defense Acquisition Board on the F-35 but all indications are that program costs continue to rise and schedules continue to slip, none of which should be very surprising in this phase of a program like the F-35. Do we follow the logic of Gates’ February comments at the time and conclude he will fire Venlet, one of the most senior military leaders to lead a weapons program? Will Gates order Venlet to shut up or to change his publicly stated position?

Finally, let us all congratulate lawmakers and their aides on keeping this letter so quiet for so long. They may well have wanted to keep it quiet for as long as Gates remains in office. General Electric and Rolls Royce, makers of the F136, remain remarkably silent.

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Scrap the second engine. Scrap the VTOL version. Start production, and fire everyone who F’ed this up. if these people worked for a publicly traded company they would have been out on their asses years ago. It’s embarrassing how little accountability there is in the DOD. Don’t even get me started on the tanker fiasco.

Some of you shop at JC Penny’s too much “the more you spend the more you save”. This is ridiculous, the GE/RR engine has already had malfunctions, and it’s only half way built!!! The PW engine is absurd when it comes to the amount of power it generates. Yea, PW has gone way over budget… but how does spending even more of MY money on another engine help that?? No reports from the GAO etc. have said with certainty that this money that we are giving to the UK to build this retarded extra engine will actually save any money!!!

Reagan, nice quote :“the more you spend the more you save”.

Sounds like it should be slogan for the whole $382B (and growing) F-35 program, not just the engine.

Have you seen that jet? that thing is a massive step forward in our Airforce, Navy, and Marine technology

I’ve seen the prototype at PAX and Videos/photos of the SDD testing. I don’t doubt that could be developed into a capable strike aircraft given enough time and money. What I’m not sold on is the amount of time and money needed to get there and what that means we will have to leave unaddressed due to budget limitations.

I am also unconvinced that this is a replacement for the 500+ F-22s we didn’t buy (original buy was supposed to be 750), that this solves the anti-access problem, or that the B model will work reliably in the field.

thanks for the info. I’ll have to look into that

“and continues to be on-time and within budget” … Dude, you MUST be in GE’s marketing department.

Seriously. So let me get this straight, the GE Team planned for all of those failures over the last several years. They must’ve if their on schedule and budget, no?

Guys like you keep touting that same line of BS from the F136 website.

Ten years ago seven major and six minor JSF development issues were highlighted to Navy, Air Force and OSD leadership, including what year they were most likely to occur in and potential mitigation measures. Additional money was put up to address the first issue (inadequate number of test aircraft), which was later eaten up when costs increased for things the cost estimators said were adequately funded. Additional funding was not put up to address the other issues which could have maintained the development schedule at that time. (The second issue was inadequate number of flight testing hours. The third was avionics software development — the current problem.) As each issue comes due in sequence, managers finally acknowledge there is a problem, put some money against it and draw out the schedule even more. So what might have only taken 50% longer than the very ORIGINAL schedule if addresseed 10 years ago, may now take three times as long.

(continued) This is what happens when (1) you don’t properly recognize the level of difficulty, real cost and time it takes to develop a complex system, and (2) you change the program manager every two years (natural officer rotation), accompanied by no accountability by the contractor (LM) for promises broken. Oh, wait! That might mean that if the Pentagon properly budgeted the real expected cost of its programs it might not be able to buy all those toys!

What happened to FIXED PRICE CONTRACTS? If they scream about technology maturation costs, then cite them a huge number. I’d rather have a five-hundred billion dollar *fixed price* agreement, if that means no cost overruns. You can plan around that. It also lets you stick them with part of the bill when they fail to deliver.

The problem with fixed price contracts is that you better also have fixed requirements and technological maturity. For instance, buying trucks makes a lot of sense for fixed price contracts, but the initial development was cost plus. Buying F/A-18E/Fs under fixed costs is great but the initial development was cost plus. Buying F-35s under fixed cost also makes sense when the plane reaches maturity. It doesn’t work so well under developmental programs because it is virtually impossible to develop technology on a fixed price and schedule. Look at the A400, developed under a fixed price contract, which isn’t really that big of a technical leap. EADS did not meet the requirements, is vastly over budget, and seriously behind schedule. Net result, contract was renegotiated because the alternative was EADS walking away from the program and EADS has stated that they would never again do fixed price programs to develop a new military aircraft.

Yeah and guys like you keep touting the same lines from the f135 website and your paid off cagw.

The very fact that pw is investing so much time, energy, and $money$ into slamming the F136 over and over again is just a testament of HOW SCARED THEY ARE. Do you really think we are that stupid to believe that pw is on a quest to SAVE THE POCKETBOOK OF THE AMERICAN?

No. If pw wasn’t legitimately scared about the F136 being favored over the f135, then they would just sit back and let things play out.

The facts are that since 2006 the F136 has been embattled and funded at 80%. You can read the GAO report that states that the F136 has NEVER been over cost since its inception. The engine is on schedule considering the fact it was started later as was the plan since 1996.

Curt,

I agree with your basic premise, other examples are A-12, C-5. You can’t go FFP is the technology is still being developed like F-22 but under DoD5000.2 you are supposed to be at TRL 6 before MSB so the technology is suppoed to be ready to go with minimal risk.

The new push to FFP contracts is being implemented in a haphazard way (what else would you expect). SDB II is FFP, JAGM is not (as of latest DRFP). F-35 is now about 9 years into SDD. They should be able to go to FFP for the development after this much time. In fact that may be the way these things should work where the first 3 years are CPIF and then you transition to FFP. Then the DoD would know what the final bill is going to be. Problem with F-35 is that after 9 years of SDD the schedule and price are still skyrocketing dramatically.

Good comment, I would only add/clarify that the way it is supposed to work is that the development is done as a Cost Plus Incentive Fee and that once a system is ready to move out of LRIP and into Full Rate Production is when the risk is considered low enough to buy using a balance of need and economic order quantities. This lower risk point is where the DAU textbook signals the move to Fixed Price + Incentive contracts is warranted. The fact that LM and the USG were even able to close a FPI deal during LRIP is pretty extraordinary. Too bad the Innumerati can’t grasp how really different buying a weapon system you’re going to use for 30–50 years is compared to buying a car at year-end closeout.

BTW, I take exception only to the last sentence. The costs are only ‘skyrocketing’ to the extent that the program is being drawn out AND the creative accounting being performed by its critics.

“Too bad the Innumerati can’t grasp how really different buying a weapon system you’re going to use for 30–50 years is compared to buying a car at year-end closeout. ”

What’s really too bad is that the fanboys can’t grasp the reality of the fact that it is extremely unlikely that anything like the F-35 will be able to operate against a near-peer adversary 20 years from now, much less after 30–50 yrs. Moore’s Law and the accelerating advances in sensor and nano-technology will spell the doom any fat , ungainly transonic blowtorch that tries to penetrate protected airspace at med altitude. And for the dirt wars, you just don’t need the exorbitantly expensive benefits of stealth and Buck Rogers-grade avionics.

Very well said Brian. TomG just does not understand.

Would the LM PowerPoint show insisting that the JSF is going to cost $60 million each which they’ve been spewing for years be considered creative accounting, or just flat out lying?

Now we have an official price at an average of $125 million each for LRIP IV, yet the total expenditure will come in somewhere between $4.6 — $5.1 billion dollars, not the $3.5 billion quoted by LM. This is glossed over by the same moronic double talk about non-reoccurring development costs that won’t apply later, like at some point in the future the JSF Program will actually cost less then forecast (hasn’t happened yet)!

It doesn’t take a math genius to see that the BS is flying again, and that costs per aircraft are actually much higher then the latest “official price”.

This intense effort to cover up the real total costs of the JSF program can only be explained by one thing, the F-35 is rapidly approaching the market price point of the much hated F-22 much to the embarrassment of Mr. Gates.

Then there’s the elephant in the room ignored to this point, the greatly reduced initial orders from the international partners (the nations of the unwilling). How will this impact the overall price of the JSF Program?

;I don’t believe GE is on a quest to save the pocketbook of the American taxpayer. So before you start throwing accusations out there maybe you should clean the dirt out of your eyes.

I believe GE is only in the game to:
1.) Protect their own money they’ve invested in this program.
2.) Continue to develop the engine they’ve been developing for quite some time now.
3.) Not be done in by a scared pratt & whitney who wants to play dirty by pulling the rug out from underneath them.

Any savings from the alternate engine should be credited to the people who initially funded the f136 oh about 14 years ago…not GE.

The real question you have to ask is whether the price of the second engine can be justified. At the price of research of the second engine whatever impact on price this “competition” has would have to be fairly significant. Between whatever “saving” the unit price of the second engine might have and the reduction in price to compete on a price point would need to amount to $2M per plane (+30% spare engines) to break even on the research cost. At last referenced the price was about $10M for the first engine, so financially they’re looking for an almost 20% price reduction on the engine, to break even.

This is exactly why no company will pay for the R&D for anything big the government wants. Imagine if they had developed the engine on their own dime, they’d either need that 20% margin to justify the research. Companies need that 20% to fund future research.

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