Army Drops UGS and Flying Keg

Army Drops UGS and Flying Keg

The final decision on the future of what we call Son of FCS is in and the Army has decided to scrap Unattended Ground Sensors and the Class 1 UAS, fondly known as the flying beer keg.

Ash Carter, undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics signed a Feb. 3 acquisition decision memorandum making this official. An Army source says the decision does not mark abandonment of the pursuit of the concept behind the Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) program. “This program did what we asked it do,” the Army source said. Basically, the ADM means the service found the Network Integration Kits, the operating system and the wave forms that allow creation of the network useful. It does push the the first fully integrated and tested set of capabilities out to 2015–16 from 2013. The first capability set — not fully tested and integrated into a brigade — should be available in 2013–14.

Here’s the official statement put out by OSD: “The decision to conclude the E-IBCT program and shift the remaining elements to other program offices carefully balances military utility, system performance, and affordability with the immediate needs of our warfighters.”


Boeing, the Brigade Combat Team Modernization prime contractor, said it understood “the Army is having to make extremely difficult decisions based on significant budget pressures.” But Paul Geery, Boeing vice president, said Carter’s memo “continues to demonstrate the importance that the Army is placing on delivering integrated tactical network capabilities that soldiers need today in the conflicts that they are facing in places such as Afghanistan.”

The Army does plan to two more brigade set of the SUGV (Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle), the cute robot with the cameras and tracks, the Army source said.

The Army plans to issue requests for new systems and concepts for the brigade of the future pretty soon, though no firm date is available yet.

Testing of all the remaining elements of I-ECBT (and whatever new ones are found useful), development of CONOPS and such will conducted by the Army Evaluation Task Force’s 4,000-man brigade, comprised of infantry, Strykers and heavy elements.

The official statement from OSD had this line in it, which makes pretty clear just why these latest decisions were taken. Deciding what to buy and maintaining high standards for the Army “require diligent and informed choices as systems are evaluated, tested and fielded in support of this goal.” And the unspoken comment might well have been: the Army did not make diligent and informed choices when it first decided to develop these systems.

As someone who has seen three of the Army’s tests of these systems I am somewhat surprised they killed the Class 1 UAS. Although its range was limited, soldiers during the test I saw identified it as one of the winners of the test because it was good at disrupting the enemy’s ability to deploy unseen. Of course, there was also the clever move by the leader of the Taliban main force (the OpFor) flew kites to discombobulate the beer keg. Capt. Andrew Hitchings said the kites tangled the UAV up and rendered it temporarily useless. But he also said the UAS complicated his life as an insurgent. Was that the death knell for the beer keg? Or did data and test results doom it? I hope it was the kites.

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is there anything that the flying beer keg could do that the Raven UAV couldn’t do? Raven UAV has known costs and performance. why complicate doctrine, training, maintenantce, logistics, etc by throwing the flying beer keg into the mix. Ahhhh FCS the gift that keeps giving. I remember the Class 1 being General Cartwright’s pride and joy and proof that FCS technologies were mature. What a tangled web we weave when first we practice to decieve.

I’m guessing they wanted something that could hover and stay in the air a bit longer. There were probably some improvements in sensors too. Really there is no reason the program should have been so badly screwed up. Yet the Raven can and probably should serve as the basis for future improvements.

Wasn’t the Class I UAV’s predecessor, the RQ-16 rather successful?

Actually yes — the Class I UAV has a hover and stare capability that Raven doesn’t have — it has to circle an area and can’t keep its sensors fixed on a target like the Class I. Additionally, the sensors in the Class I produce a far superior sensor picture than a Raven. Finally, the only person who can see the “take” from the Raven is the operator, who can’t share that image with anybody. The Class I UAV is networked so that their “take” can go all the way up to brigade and, more importantly, across formations at the platoon and company level where it is most needed.

interesting capabilities, it begs the question then why would the Army cancel it? do you have any insight? is it operationally unsuitable? It depends on JTRS AMF right? And how much does the Class I UAV cost?

Absolutely unbelievable: I just woke up after a 13 hours long sleep and found an article on “Yahoo!”‘s MAINPAGE right now called

“Bat-winged drone bomber in test flight: US Navy” http://​news​.yahoo​.com/​s​/​a​f​p​/​u​s​m​i​l​i​t​a​r​y​a​e​r​o​s​p​a​c​ein…

with a commentary section and even free reign for trolls, and NOT A WORD ABOUT IT both on “D.o.D. Buzz” or on “Defensetech” ! These two cult places are betraying their followers…

Oust Colin Mubarak! (Yep, the mood in Egypt is dangerously contagious)

Yeah. This site is becoming useless other than to give the boy prezident support in dismantling the US military.

I hope so too Colin, the article got me think, how cool the army is today even without war, imagine the last guy reporting to congress, a line of branch freshmen all stacking papers on top of his papers, all saying its a go sir, and him understanding what each one of them meant, its got to be cool to see it all come together efficiently.

Finaly, too bad they didnt realize this before billions were wasted that could have actualy benefited our troops. It took them years to realize this stuff was too heavy for ground troops but rather than cancel they moved it to mechanized units to keep it alive a while longer even though they already had gear to do these jobs. Just more waste fraund and abuse of tax payers money to land a cushy job after retirement.

Boomer the problem isn’t that people don’t realize these programs are failures early enough. There are plenty of smart people at HQ’s and OSD that know that these programs are failures & the systems are not suitable. The problem is getting the politics aligned so canceling decisions can be made. Most program managers & senior leaders are hiding significant dirty laundry in their programs. They’re praying for miracles and hoping not get exposed (ie career survivalist mentality)

you are 100% correct — I have made the same statement more than once and argued against it many times during production or post award meetings. They will do anything to prevent it from getting out that they dont know what they are doing.

well hopefully we are entering a new day and age when poor leaders won’t be able to get away with the tricks of the past. Hopefully we will develop a reformed defense acquisition strategy with real risk management considered throughout the life cycle. We need to end to the wasteful, stupid concepts & programs, so that there will be more resources available for the programs where the need is most critical and for which there are feasible solutions. thanks for your comment :)

Yet what makes a stupid concept? More often there is some good thinking behind whatever program s he Army comes up with, although if you look hard enough I’m sure you can fine some examples that make no sense at all. I seem to see more of those with the Navy however.

a stupid concept is one that involves too much uncertainty & risk based on the requsted level of commitment. MDAPs are only viable if they are well thought out from a life cycle perspective. everything from development to test to production to fielding to training to spares to maintenance to operational suitability is fair game. fail in any one of these areas and we should not proceed with the program. we should conserve resources, and position ourselves for better probability of success, then to prematurely commit our national security on dodgy concepts.

Class I could certainly do something a fixed wing UAV could not do — not only could it hover aloft, it could sit down on a ledge or a cliff and function from that position. I suspect the payload So this post gets –1 from me. I would defer to soldiers in the field who can talk to the benefits and limitations of the Raven. FCS had something similar to the Raven in the Class II UAV — one does get the feeling that the way to keep from getting cancelled was to have been excluded from the FCS FoS — which was definitely not the way the Army envisioned the program to work.

What is kind of weird about this article is that it basically justifies the continuation of the program on the benefits generated by a NIK that controls just one spin out system remaining — SUGV, though you could throw the ARV-A (L) in as a second for Increment 2, I suppose. How does that work, cost-benefit-wise ? While the article does not distinguish between “tactical unattended ground sensors” and “urban unattended ground sensors’, the latter would be a much different kettle of fish…

Boomer is wrong and you are wrong. The original FCS brigade combat team (ah, the “unit of action”) concept made sense and in many respects manifested the criticisms leveled by Douglas MacGregor against the Division XXi/Brigade XXI force concept and structure. But the Army went to war, and the Army’s force modernization programs simply got knocked around by the crises of the moment. So you had systems designed for a “medium heavy force” being interjected, well, first it was supposed to be a current force heavy brigade, no — can’t have that, it has to be a light brigade. No, we’ll do both, but the light force is the priority. Yes, if the systems are in fact truly modular, then you get “plug and play”, but any fool could see that the T-UGS was inappropriate for mobile operations, either mounted OR dismounted. And anyone with a speck of military experience would tell you that Class I or the MULE gonna need gas, and you would deploy them selectively, based on the tactical situation. But when they killed MULE-T — a system that would actually help take the load off the soldier, I gave up — there were no lights on in the house anymore.

For all those of you with a keen interest in the F.C.S. and in U.S. American robotic warfare, including in U.S. American remote sensors (U.G.V.s and U.A.V.s, etc.) : I’ve got a link for you that’s gonna leave you all crazy!
http://​www​.myspace​.com/​8​4​8​1​0​5​8​2​/​b​l​o​g​?​p​a​g​e=2

This “blog”‘s pages are massive and take a few seconds to fully open, but afterwards just scroll down BELOW the first story (about the European C.E.R.N. collider) that’s currently on the top of this Web-page, there you’ll find everything! Quite a long article, with many, many videos.

I witnessed this whole fiasco from the inside — floating body armor that is too bulky to actualy move in/ 35mil in a weapon design stollen from the movie aliens that never worked/ vehicles too heavy to go off road and constantly broke down/ trying to put GPS and networking into everything/ everything had a video cam so officers didnt have to leave the bunker to earn thier CIB’s and a bunch of robots that didnt work 90% of the time. the only thing we learned is what doesnt work because we dont have the tech to mimick starwars no matter how realistic it looked in the movie. The original concept may have been good but from the onset it was an abortion.

What vehicles were too heavy to go off road? If you are talking about MRAPs, those aren’t really FCS gear.

Also wasn’t that too heavy body armor issue a Marine as opposed to Army problem?

No I’m actualy talking about gcv prototypes– hybreds– and driverless medvac vehicles, auto feeding mechanized mortars. The body armor was a future warrior thing for the army that also included a ROBOCOP inspired helmet but wore more like midevil armor, and the 35 mil rifle that was full of electronics and cams to fire 5.56 & 20mm lazaer ranged airburst rounds that never worked right or weighed less than 30 lbs empty. Basicly a lot of goofball ideals got tried because of wouldnt it be neat concept.

Well, let’s be specific here. Some of what you are describing sounds more like Future Force Warrior, not FCS. The only MCS prototypes even built were the six NLOS-C vehicles that Congress mandated (one assumes a BAE-encouraged earmark, but who knows ?) 35 mil rifle ? How about a 44 mil automatic cannon ? Firing cameras — yeah, there was that. One of my big beefs was the lack of a turret hatch on the MCS, couldn’t even access the 44 mm from the turret. This doesn’t mean the concept was ever disproven, exactly. But it certainly was never proven, and this was also an area where a good man-in-the-loop simulator would offer real answers without spending out Fort Knox. Oh — and driverless medevac ? Here again, sounds like a MULE-T mission — certainly the ICV variant was not a driverless vehicle. Can you drive a manned vehicle remotely ? Well, can you ?

And while we’re on the subject, just what was wrong with the idea of an autoloaded heavy mortar, anyway ?

why spend (wasted) 80m to put a modified turrent on a palidin to fire 120mm mortars when the howitzer does a better job to start with. If they were going to do it would had been better off building something along the lines of a mk 19 and cases for the 60 mm mortar rounds converting them to sabots like rounds then it could be mounted on smaller vehicles and been more useful.

An autoloading mortar would be a good idea. Failure in design or inplementation does not mean the idea is faulty or worhty of scorn. For a small concept conversion look at the 40mm Mk19. A breech loading chain gun drive could be doable up to about 82mm or so. And I think Mr. Bell explained that sometimes you spend time finding out what doesn’t work.

If you look at the history of the Class 1 UAV from Honeywell (formerly the Honeywell MAV, and the Honeywell T-Hawk) it is filled with failures that have been covered up. The vehicle was never able to meet the range, speed, and flight time it had promised. The larges complaint from field trials was the horrid noise from the two stroke engine. The vehicle hoving above or near a group of soldiers would give away thier position, causing as much harm as benifit. The vehicle also grew to be overwieght and over the original size that was promised, becoming extremly cumbersome to transport in both size and weight. While the user trials found the technology to be novel and usefull, the vehicle was operationally unfeasable and from those who tracked it closely it was doomed for fielding failure. Unfortunatly large government contractors and lobbysts kept the program alive and sucked millions of tax payer dollars. The 5 previous predicessors funded by DARPA all failed, in the end it took fielding trials where something like kids kites taking it down in flight, or when doing the fancy “sit and stare” you can hit it with a rock or a slingshot and destroy a very expensive peice of hardware.

FCS has a long and sordid history of failure, and yet it still seems to live on in some form. It was formed out of optimistic and flawed schedules and assumptions, built around immature technologies. The software rests on a useless layer of bloatware called SoSCOE. The NIK takes an inordinate amount of time to boot up from a cold start — they should issue a “time out” flag whenever a NIK has to reboot, cause it will take at least 15 minutes. And the cost? Well, don’t get me started on that.…

A lot has been written about the CL-I UAV, the so-called flying beer keg, which can be defeated with a well thrown rock, not to mention a kite. Imagine what you could do to it with an AK-47…The sucker is noisy and has lousy endurance and has plastic pieces that break off on a hard landing. The UGS (unmanned ground sensors), are likewise useless — there are countless way to defeat them. All of this after at least six years of development — the biggest waste of time, money and talent. Brought to you by Boeing — the company that brought you SBINET — the so-called “virtual fence”.

That was just what I was thinking but in a purely urban environment. I can’t see how the flying beer-keg would have enough loiter time in the field, even with the occasional cliff. Plus — it was noisy, which may not matter in a noisy city, but in the sticks — naah!

It is the whole buying votes with military earmarks thing that is making it stupid. A politician will do anything to buy votes for his district/state. What they need is a resolution committee to look at each earmark and trade it for something that makes sense, so the prospective congressmen aren’t left holding the bag for their constituents. Or else get rid of the system as it is — fat chance!

Did Rome fall in a day?

The one I like was trailer mounted and could be pulled into position with a HUMMER, then left by itself, in case of counter battery fire. Test footage showed them being placed in pairs about 30 meters apart, and then remotely controlled — I assume from the vehicle that brung it. I think that one was an 81mm. It had a regular mortar tube with a front loader.

Mechanically I couldn’t see anything wrong with the design, but then remote networking is in trouble in the Army anyway — apparently. The trailer looked light enough an ATV could carry it — but of course, ammo isn’t light.

You could pretty much see all those negatives for the flying beer-keg, just watching it in action in news footage and videos. I could just barely see it — maybe — being useful in a noisy urban environment, but personally I would rather have a toy RC plane with a camera on it. They sell those in the stores already, and they work pretty good! Even the camera mounted RC car that comes with the game Black Ops is more useful!

They would have been money ahead letting the ground troops order the newest RC toy from the internet. Heck, I would have payed outta pocket for that, if I were in the field! Wouldn’t have been the first time I bought my own gizmo for duty.

I remember in the eighties when we needed a cheap solution to communicate between vehicles in a road march. We didn’t have enough commo equipment to do that, so we all chipped in a bought those cheap wifi headsets that became the craze back then. Worked like a charm, and we reduced our accident incidence to zero. The range on those things was so short, they could have been used sparingly even in combat.

see the informed opinions of the Class 1 UAV below from David B, Dave, and JCitizen, you marketing puke. i’m stripping you of your wonk title. ignoramus suits you better.

That doesn’t contradict what he said, and what he said was correct.

A friend of mine once brought up a great point that the founding fathers never intended for one Senator to be more powerful than another Senator. They would most likely be shocked at the current committee structure and the power it gives to seniority. Solution would be term limits for the Senate, or perhaps possibly consecutive terms are not allowed. Another solution would be to give the American people another vote on Committee memberships. Then each Senator would have to campaign again for why they would be the right choice for any committee position or chair. Hopefully then we would learn to make veteran status an important qualification for committee membership.

You asked a straight albeit question — expecting a submissive response. The man gave you a straight answer that didn’t support your prejudiced views, and now you throw a fit when it is pointed out to you. That little tirade earned you just one more –1.

Thanks ffb, very interesting! I notice a lot of the video is removed by user. You suppose they got some pressure for informational security?

the informed views below reflect the operational unsuitability of the Class 1 UAV, the poor performance of the NIK contradict the claims of exceptional ability to push ISR data across formations. There are professionals here who understand operational suitability, systems engineering, and the acquisition process. You are the one who is prejudiced. FCS and Class 1 UAV are gone, you lose. Learn more about defense systems and try better next time.

how many $B’s sunk in to FCS? how many FCS products received MS C approval and were fielded to the warfighter? Zero, right? I’m sorry for you that you are unable to accurately assess historical evidence. As far as your reference to ‘complexity’ — that provides a lot of the explanation for why FCS, and many similar failure defense programs, fail. too complex. Less complex, risky solutions to defense acquisition modernization exist. We just have to break through the mental deficiencies of people like you in order to implement them. Yes, this is your problem.

Its really a self-fulfilling prophecy. John Young made it clear to the program that every system had to get over the line on its own…and yet, when they tore off the system-of-systems framework, the whole thing fell apart. That has nothing to do with TRL levels or cost overruns. All the way to PDR, the program kept saying to itself, “on time, on budget”. The government terminated for convenience, and keeps turning off each of these systems — one by one. When I say, “not my problem’, it is not to say “I don’t care”. I cared a lot and still care a lot. But the problem runs much, much deeper than program management or systems engineering or anything to do with execution. So now the CG in charge of RDECOM is gaga over cellphone apps. That’s how far this has fallen. Bad deal all around. The people who need firing are the ones with no guts, who take no risks because they see what has happened to the people with vision and energy.

if you compare the program acquisition cost estimate at MS B to what the final was, you can see quite massive growth, due to the out of control nature of the program, so yes, cost overruns a factor. the program should never have been approved. you cared about the wrong program. if you really care about the army, you should try to become the asa alt, or even join osd or gao and help the army to grow up. your last opinion on the people who need firing is especially juvenile. suppose you imply i am this type of person? well, as usual, your judgment is incorrect. i, like all people, take risks. there is a sharp difference between people who understand to analyze risk and make wiser decisions accordingly from the people who take foolish risks. sadly, the govt is full of people who take these foolish risks, and people like you confuse them as people with vision and energy. there is nothing admiral about foolish risk takers. it’s taxpayer’s money they are gambling with, they do not act so foolishly with their own earned capital.

I have worked with CF UGS the dream scape for Future force UGS which included the “Flying Beer Keg”. The idea was great and leaves us with a void in its demise. The actual equipment itself did not perform as it was demonstrated to perform and failed miserasbly in meantime between failures department..Their were tons of U-UGS and T-UGS manufactured and some actually fielded down range only to fail our already taxed soldiers who do not have time to worry about high tech equipment that is down more than operational. We have great unattended ground sensors that perform well„„ what we really need is support funding to keep those programs healthy…Not Star Wars technology and a huge bill from some DARPA Contractor who is getting fat on dreams not reality..

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