Report: SASC supports F-35, ‘but not at any cost’

Report: SASC supports F-35, ‘but not at any cost’

Senate lawmakers are sticking by the F-35 Lightning II, but according to a new report by Bloomberg’s Tony Capaccio and Roxana Tiron, they want to put a lid on cost growth for new batches of jets — starting now:

The Senate Armed Services Committee included a provision in the 2012 defense authorization bill that requires the secretary of defense to use a fixed-price contract with an incentive fee for low-rate initial production of the fifth F-35 lot. The provision requires Lockheed to absorb 100 percent of costs “above the target cost specified in the contract.” …

“The committee supports continued development and acquisition of the JSF, but not at any cost. This provision supports getting the program on track and keeping it there,” it said of the $382 billion program.


The panel’s language reflects “grave concern” that the contract for the fourth and current F-35 production lot “allows the contractor to be awarded a considerable fee even in the event of significant cost growth under that contract.” Bloomberg News obtained the F-35 report language, which hasn’t been made public.

For the fourth F-35 production lot, the $3.9 billion Lockheed contract sets a “target cost” of $3.46 billion for 32 aircraft, plus a “target profit” for Lockheed of $440.9 million, or almost 13 percent, according to the Pentagon’s program office.

Lockheed and the Pentagon would share equally any savings if the jets cost less to build than the target cost. Similarly, they would share cost overruns up to 120 percent of that figure. The full burden would fall on Lockheed for overruns of more than 120 percent.

Two top F-35 program officials — DoD’s deputy director, Maj. Gen. C.D. Moore, and Lockheed Martin’s top F-35 boss, Tom Burbage, said this week in Paris that they’re doing everything they can to get the costs per fighter as low as possible. But it’s a Catch-22 — Lockheed says it could give even better prices if the government bought more aircraft sooner, so it could get its production line running as quickly as possible. But the Pentagon isn’t going to increase the orders of jets as it continues to test them and find kinks to work out — and endures punishing headlines about the latest record-breaking cost estimates for the F-35.

Program officials told Congress earlier this year they think they’re striking the right balance between placing orders and taking a sensible pace in development. It’ll be interesting to see how this Senate language mandating fixed prices and forcing Lockheed to shoulder additional costs will affect this balance — if it makes its way into law.

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After 10 years of blank checks for SDD (about $180B in over-runs), they need to do the same thing for SDD costs. Force Lockheed to submit a Firm Fixed Price proposal for the remainder of SDD. At least then you would be able to see how bad it could (will) get and cap your liability. Without this the USG will still be on the hook for hundreds of billions of dollars in SDD over-runs. Once the pig is at the trough it is pretty tough to stop the feeding frenzy.

Start an “Alternative Tactical Aircraft Modernization Program” structured in several spirals as a hedge in case F-35 goes Tango Uniform, funded with funding diverted from F-35. Spiral one designed to start providing latest Non-Developmental Item strike fighters and CAS aircraft within 2 years max. Spiral two is full scale development & acquisition of next gen strike fighters, such as FB-22, X-32, navalized F-22. Spiral three is concept development for sixth gen tactical aircraft. Put the heat on F-35 PMO and LM by seriously demonstrating that competetive alternatives are available. If we see workers jumping from F-35 to the alternative program, we learn that F-35 is doomed to failure despite the marketing hype. Balance funding & risk between F-35 and the alternative program. If F-35 performs better, divert investment back to F-35. If F-35 continues to fail, increase investment into the alternative program.

Mr. Ewing — I think that the Pentagon needs to be audited first and only after that audit can new weapons and related systems move forward, after the American people see a clean, transparent and comprehensible fiscal slate, a record that clearly shows program goals and outcomes, schedules, overruns and how each investment truly adds to the security of the nation.

To the “Engineer Economist”

You wrote: “Put the heat on F-35 PMO and LM by seriously demonstrating that competetive alternatives are available.”

I don’t know if Lockheed Martin C.E.O.s are naturally subtle, perceptive, intuitive minds, but I would really LOVE to place a very small but well-built, well-painted SAAB “Gripen” model kit ( = a toy!) in U.S.A.F. / U.S.N. / U.S.M.C. colours and with U.S. markings in the center of that polished meeting room table.

Do you think that at any hour of the amenable conversation they would slowly, slowly grow aware of the “innocuous” message placed right in front of them, or are they simply too brutish for that and would accidentally crush my well-finished plane kit under a pile of Lockheed publicity pamphlets?

Which would really anger me very much.

Ahhh. Congressional micro-meddling.
This of course will only drive the negotiated LRIP 5 price higher, perhaps (probably) higher than it should be, in the end, since LM will have little interest (or at least should have little interest) in operating at a loss in executing the contract, and they will assime all the risk. On the plus side, this increases the chances of the contract coming in under the inflated budget.
The irony here is that LM and the government already signed a fixed price plus incentive contract for LRIP 4: which is already unprecedented, since the current acquisition process is supposed to move from LRIP’cost plus’ to Full Rate ‘fixed price’ production by definition. The purpose of LRIP is to reduce program uncertainty and risk — not palm it off on the contractor.
File this under ‘posturing’ by the indifferent members of the committe, and a ‘hopeful setup for a gotcha moment later’ by the weak sisters on the committee.

P.S> Dilletantes: spare us the lame commercial products anecdotes and thought processes…unless the products and the program to bring them to market involve comparable complexity, the product has a similar operational design life for use in as potentially as hazardous an operating environment, and they bring a significantly new technology and capabilities into existence, NONE of them apply.

The Gripen? Why? We’d be better off with an upgraded F-16.

Yeah. We should build hundreds of mistake jets. Great plan. In any event, the design is not stable. With that, there won’t be much production learning curve along with the fact that testing has a long way to go. You make a good point about contracting. The fixed price contract the Hill wants for LRIP-5 will be interesting. Fixed price contracts are usually only successful when there is a stable design and production learning curve of worth. Both currently not present with the F-35. The Just So Farcial is like putting out a requirement for the Brewster Buffalo in 1935 and fielding the aircraft in the early 50’s if lucky. But yeah, all that is the fault of Congress and not the incompetent contractor or morons in the Pentagon.

RE: “Fixed price contracts are usually only successful when there is a stable design and production learning curve of worth.” True enough.
IMHO it is fortunate the gross design change metric as used by outsiders (read: GAO) is archaic and somewhat OBE in the modern design world (KSLOC count is another questionable metric), They both can still be useful but need to be used with greater care in the past. Modern electronic design drawings can be fiddled with far easier than with the old way of doing things. The system using CATIA makes it too painless to fiddle with a drawing, and either cleaning it up or adding clarification without changing design data, or even correcting non-critical typos. I believe this skews the number of true changes to look far greater than they are. Concering the production rates, you’re absolutely right — the Government (read ‘Congress’) has been shooting the program in the foot every time they’ve cut previous LRIP buys making LMs learning curve process doubly tough. As I’m not a mystic, I don’t know if they can overcome that challenge, but then again, I don’t know they can’t.

So.…when are we going to start holding Congress and their henchmen in the GAO accountable for the troubles they’ve caused and are still causing? These kinds of events remind me of an encounter a buddy of mine had at Harvard with a Congressional staffer who opened his presentation to the class with “It is impossible” for Congress to micro-manage defense programs. That only MIGHT be true if they also acknolwedged their role in whatever it is they have their panties in a knot this week.

Earth to the Senate Armed Services Committee…

The LRIP IV contract (we are currently negotiating LRIP V) ALREADY is a fixed price incentive fee structure contract.

Of interest though, the GAO warnings over the F-35 have been correct over the years. And, what about the program and industry “henchmen”?

“We do not agree with that estimate, there is no basis for that estimate, and we do not support it.“
Gen. Charles Davis, then JSF P.O. 2008,

Why do program managers go native to the program instead of representing the taxpayer?

Well, yes. What the Hill now wants for LRIP-5 is a fixed price contract…without the incentive fee. A method that usually only works when the design is stable and production learning curve is high.

we hold Congress accountable every 2 years on election day. and its convenient that you are now slandering GAO when you previously reference them when you need an objective source. quit deflecting and obfuscating.

We need alternatives to the F-35 such as more new F-22Bs in conjunction with UCAS such as Predator C. However since nobody wants to give a new F-22 variant another shot, Boeing should be approached to start work on its FXX fighter now maybe through a black-ops program. Let’s face it the J-20s and PAKFAs of the 2020s will make mincemeat out of the F-35 no matter what the price

bring it back for concept exploration only. as a hedge in case F-35 goes Tango Uniform. It’s called good Risk Management.

i think that would be highly unlikely. if an adversary were seriously defeating us in a conventional war, we would quickly escalate to massive retaliation, possibly nuclear, presuming we still have those capabilities given F-35’s cost overruns and more & more resources being sunk to prop up the zombie.

Engineer Economist has a good idea for modernization. Divert some of the F-35 money to an upgraded A-10. It’s a practical aircraft that serves ground forces. And if the Air Force doesn’t see the sense in that, then the Congress should and authorize the Army to do the modernization.

No we do not need alternatives to the F-35.

20% ahead of flight test schedule
30% ahead of test point schedule
no AUPC increase since 2008 (CAFE — admitting their $130 AUPC is/was BS)
production on or ahead of schedule for >9 months

How will the J-20s & PAK FAs of the 2020s make mincemeat out of the F-35?

You mean the moving flight test schedule that changes every year? Compare it to the 2007 schedule and where we should be.

But yeah keep the propaganda going about that low price ( that can only happen if thousands are built). Good luck with that dream.

You seem to have forgotten that Boeing’s stealth aircraft was an absolute pig that could not even perform the basic vertical landing without stalling out its engine. As to the Chinese stealth fighters, I wonder just how anyone can make any sort of prognosis concerning its capabilities? As a guess, about as good a guess as the effectiveness of the Chinese aircraft carrier (it’s neither operational nor Chinese, just like their stealth fighters). Over the last fifty years, in the real world, the Russians have built beautiful aircraft that fly like a dream, and repeatedly get shot down due to the inferiority of the technologies that make a fighter either a killer or scrap metal. As we progress from one “generation” to a higher, the complexities grow exponentially, and it is absolutely to be expected that there will be continuous problems, probably well into the production cycles. The moment I read ad hominum attacks agains one company or another, I tend to disregard the writer as an idiot who thinks in terms of black and white: the world and the people who inhabit it are rarely either.

Hmm, 436 MPH, the radar signature of the moon, nearly zero avionics: an excellent idea!

it’s not designed for speed or stealth. it’s designed for it’s mission: CAS. if you designed it for speed and stealth, it would no longer be able to do CAS. and the fact that it is limited in avionics justifies the case for a new CAS aircraft based on improving the A-10s design. seriously, start making some connections in your brains and lose the sarcasm.

the J-20 and PAKFA are larger and have longer range. Their weapon bays are larger too allowing them to hold longer range AAMs. and more of them(about 10 internal AAMs vs 4 for the F-35). China also will be able to build the J-20 in the thousands because of its 4 trillion dollar in cash reserves and its ever increasing industrial base whereas the US only will be able to afford a few hundred F-35s because of its 14 trillion dollar debt and its ever shrinking defense industrial base. What could save us would be building new tactical nuclear weapons, but what we are doing is dismantling our nuclear arsenal and prohibiting our nuclear weapons experts from developping new more reliable warheads while China is greatly expanding its nuclear arsenal which at some point will exceed the US cold war peak arsenal of 30000 nuclear warheads. We are fostering our own annihilation.

The FXX looks promising. We are talking air superiority here, not resurrecting the doomed X-32. The F-35 is too small to carry an effective long range AAM in the future compared to the J-20. See my reply above. The writing is on the wall, if we want to have a chance in a cold war with China in 10 to 20 years we better wake up

well, we. have gambled away the F-22 for very little

As far as I’m concerned, if we wanted something along these lines we could resurrect the old F-16XL design, fully upgrade the avionics and sensors, use modern composites, and give it a new F100-PW-132 engine. Plus we would be building it here in the US.

The Gripen has RCS reduction measures, but nothing more extensive than what the other Eurocanards and the Super Hornet have IIRC.

At the time the X-35 was selected, the X-32 just couldn’t meet the STOVL requirements. There wasn’t enough thrust even without the weight growth the aircraft would experience when it became the “F-32″.

So the truth comes out that YOU want to do everything possible to ensure that the F-35 is unable to meet cost &/or schedule & then use the fact that it could not achieve the imossible to waste even more time & money on already rejected projects…

The F-35 IS NOT failing!

We are closer to the 2007 schedule (AND COST) than we are to the 2010 schedule & moving closer to the 2007 schedule.…

YOU keep the propaganda going about that high price &/or that thousands aren’t going to be built.

And the USAF shouldn’t have to sacrifice the F-35s they have already scarified the F-22 for just in order to pay for A-10s.

I love the A-10C, it is a great aircraft, but there is no excuse not to have both. The DoD budget ought to be large enough for that.

Did any of you folks paid any attention to the upgrading of the A-10 fleet to the “C” standard, which includes considerable avionics and glass pit upgrades, intended to give it commonality with the current crop of PGMs and allow improved night ops capability, map systems, target views, and data linking? http://​www​.thewarthogpen​.com/​A​-​1​0​C​.​h​tml

A-10A pit: http://​www​.thewarthogpen​.com/​a​-​1​0​c​_​f​i​l​e​s​/​p​i​c​5​.​JPG

A-10C pit: http://​www​.thewarthogpen​.com/​a​-​1​0​c​_​f​i​l​e​s​/​p​i​c​4​.​JPG
note the two prominent MFDs, which aren’t just some one-fuction display)

There are/were even plans in the works to design and build new wing sections for the aircraft. http://​boeing​.mediaroom​.com/​i​n​d​e​x​.​p​h​p​?​s​=​4​3​&​a​m​p​;it…

Talk about straw-manning…F-35 fanboys: get back to us when the Lightning is actually doing some real CAS for grunts on the ground. When will that be again? 2025? 2030?

The A-10 is operating on borrowed time: highly effective for Low-Intensity conflict, rapidly aging airfrmes (Hog Up! non-withstanding) but of limited use against a near-peer adversary. Absolutely the right platform for ‘the time’ as it actually unfolded, but thank goodness the Fulda Gap scenario it was deigned for never happened.

It isn’t us saying “if we go with the F-35 we have to drop the A-10″, it’s you guys.

Apparently, William, it’s your fault Boeing’s design failed to meet one of the most basic design requirements, which is that a version of the jet be capable of STOVL. I also agree with your statement that the F-16 could be modified into a good stealth platform. That’s the saddest part about Boeing not playing by the rules and designing a jet that could take off and land vertically. If their jet were a viable contender, Lockheed would be developing a low observable version of the F-16 right now at their own expense to keep Boeing somewhat honest. Instead Boeing ripped off the taxpayer by not doing what they said they’d do with our money (they were happy to take) and betting instead that they could get the requirement changed before the competition was finalized. It was a bet they lost, but really we all lost because of their incompetence.

The point is we do not hold Congress accountable because 99% of us in a representative democracy tend to think (or at least hope) that just because we pay them to look after our interests in DC while we are making ends meet in flyover country. When the late John Tower resigned from the Senate and was making his farewell tour to the various committees, he testified at one point that Congress has never complained more loudly about the acquisition process, and Congress had never before been more responsible for it. I believe it was this testimony, more than his well-known fued with Sam Nunn, that kept him from confirmations as SecDef for Reagan. Congress mucked about at the margins at that time compared to their waist-deep meddling today.

Just to clarify, please read that first statement with the intended sarcasm.

So far, actual LRIP costs have not only beat outside budget wonk estimates, but have beaten Program estimates. This fact informs my opinion of estimates. The latter may stop but with the newest inflated CAPE methodologies, the former will probably occur more often than not.
Slander isn’t possible when there’s only the truth involved, and I’ve summed the quality of GAO’s ‘predictions’ already: http://​elementsofpower​.blogspot​.com/​2​0​1​1​/​0​4​/​r​a​gin….

Rookies should also enjoy this oldie http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2007/12/new-fighter-comes-under-fire-will-f-35.html" rel="nofollow">:http://​elementsofpower​.blogspot​.com/​2​0​0​7​/​1​2​/​n​e​w​-​f​i​g​h​t​e​r​-​c​o​m​e​s​-​u​n​d​e​r​-​f​i​r​e​-​w​i​l​l​-​f​-​3​5​.​h​tml

Advocating a clean sheet restart btw is hilarious. One would presume an ‘Engineer-Economist’ is aware that the ‘sunk-cost’ fallacy only applies if the thing in which the cost was sunk has no hope of succeeding within an acceptable total cost. As the Nunn McCurdy review recertified, the powers that be have determined that it is still worth it to proceed. Tell me you are not so Hybris-ridden as to presume superior knowledge to those involved and responsible?

Struck a sore spot, did I?
Or did you just lose sight of reality?
Part of the sales pitch of the F-35 was ALWAYS to eventually replace the A-10, F-16, and F-15 in ground war support roles in USAF service.

And at some of the recent speculative arguments suggesting the F-35 will cost $1 trillion over 30 years… Where and what do you plan on cutting to fund it?
Like most F-35 cost estimates we’ve seen prior to reality setting in, I expect $1 trillion is a conservative estimate.
Since when have the USAF and USN been given an unlimited blank check where they can just split $1trillion between them on this program, yet still manage to fund the few trillions needed to cover everything else, from personnel to equipment, they both would like to have over the next 30 years?

wrong again. we do hold Congress accountable. we threw the Republican bums out in 2006 and we threw the Democrat bums out in 2010. budget cutting is politically popular right now, and failing programs like f-35 are on the table. if f-35 was performing well, they wouldn’t be in this situation. i agree with you that Congress can make things challenging, but programs & the services have to be situationally aware of the politically charged environment they are in. no one has the luxury of operating in some perfect world of their own desire. programs that play by the rules and perform well and accordingly within the systems will do just fine. and, 99%?? come on now, i’ve learned to expect much better scientic observations from an ORSA genius.

LRIP costs without a MS C, heck, even MS B was rescinded are invalid. Nunn McCurdy is good but the powers that be too often rubber stamp it. you’re not that naive are you?? how many Nunn McCurdy’s did SBIRS go thru? now in your distinguished (i’m not being sarcastic here) career I’m sure you’ve encountered the situation where because of your technical knowledge & experience you knew more about something and could make better policy decisions than leaders appointed above you? spare me the hybris accusations.

The USAF wanted to replace the A-10 with the F-16 back in the day. I have opposed both plans to replace the A-10, but there is flat out no excuse to use the A-10 as a justification for cutting the F-35.

$1.01 trillion is the cost to buy 2,443 F-35s, plus operate and maintain them for 50 years. Now I’d question the wisdom of operating the same fighter design for 50 years but that’s the DoD policy to calculate life-cycle costs. That’s some $20 billion a year and our military budget can certainly afford that if we aren’t handing out bailouts in the hundreds of billions every year!

A lot of our bomber and support A/C and helos are 50 yr old designs or fast approaching 50 yrs already: B-52, C-130, H-1, H-46, H-47, E-2/C-2, H-3, H-53, C-5…

Wrong: The great majority of an A-10’s potential targets worldwide is still easier and safer to attack than 30 kilometers wide and deep phalanxes of Soviet tanks from the 80’s. There is still plenty of “fodder” to be found today for all A-10s.

Otherwise: Show me any plane today that supersedes the A-10 at what it does best, at both giving and taking! Waiting…

When DoD committed us into F-35, the budget of $233B was set and we were supposed to get an F-35 that among other things would give us a replacement for the A-10. now the budget is $380B, we have no idea when we will get F-35, we have no idea if it will be effective at CAS, and we are forced to operate A-10 beyond a sane operating lifetime because F-35 is FAILING. The problem is not that the friggin budget is not “large enough”. The problem is incompetent bozos that get us committed to these “too big to fail”, and “doomed to fail” concepts that take a decade and $50B to get us into the mess we are in. The budget “ought to be large enough” — but it is not — because the money is going into failure programs like F-35.

The USAF never wanted a dedicated replacement for the A-10. Back in the ‘90s they wanted to replace it with the F-16, and when JSF emerged they wanted to replace it with that. People have been quick to call the Abrams, Bradley, B-1, B-2, F-22, Stryker, and a whole host of other designs failures when it wasn’t the case. I have concerns over the F-35 but I don’t think it will fail.

I was at FRC for the duration of the A-10 program, and the joke was that if it were a U.S. Army program we would be building 4,000 of them. With all sincere respect to USAF pilots and ground crews, since the Bermuda Conference in 1962, USAF command echelons do not want the fixed-wing CAS role, and yet they do not any other service to have it, either. Their whole attitude is rendered moot by the advance of the drone wars.

JSF IS WORTHLESS.…. Chris you are full of Shit. I few A-10A’s, B-52H and F-16CJ’s. The A-10 was always a Great Platform for the Air Force. The A-10A really influanced the Cold War and the utimate victory of Russia and their Warplans in Germany. You obviously do not no what you are talking about. Go Back Home and do some additional Research. JSF is Worthlesss. STEALTH is DEAD. This Platform is DEAD and Useless, as is the B-2 and F-22. This crazy integrators continue to railraod DOD Leadership with another Paper Aircraft. The fucking reason we did not purchase any additional F-22’s years ago is becasue we knew STEALTH was DEAD. Leon will fix this shit and drop this Program. We do not need a platform that cost $160,000,000.00 Million each, times 2600 when we could purchase enough UAV’s and other plarforms to kill any target on earth. Lockheed continues to blow shit up the JCS ass.… And the bullshit story continues.

You have no idea what the hell you are taking about. JSF is Worthless just like F-22. We do not need another Paper non-stealth Platform.

Stealth isn’t dead and the JSF isn’t worthless! How many times must people repeat this? F-22 production was halted thanks to idiot politicians and clueless individuals like yourself.

Sorry, If you want someone to beat you up verbally it is going to cost $2.99/minute just like in the ad in the back of the magazine you are trying to hold with one hand.

P.S. You forgot to scream “STEALTH IS DEAD!!!!!!”

what.
a.
maroon.

Well compare my “The purpose of LRIP is to reduce program uncertainty and risk ” with your description. There is no conflict and mine has the benefit of being more descriptive. Dusting off my (not so) old DAU material, my summary sentence could easily introduce the DAU bullets on LRIP purpose:
– Result in completion of manufacturing development.
–Establish an initial production base for the system.
–Permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the system, upon successful completion of operational testing.
Your description.…not so much.
As to the rest of the squawking about milestones: ‘Concurrency’ is ‘heck’ ain’t it? It messes up all those nice clean diagrams and makes it tougher to deal with risks, Yet the people responsible decide it is worth the effort and we go and get it done. Golly.

RE: “because of your technical knowledge & experience you knew more about something and could make better policy decisions than leaders appointed above you?“
I never make those assumptions because I know that those above me are informed by factors of which I have no or little knowledge. To do so knowingly would be “arrogance in one’s ignorance” , and that is a VERY satisfactory definition of ‘Hybris’.

Liar. Look at your own statements regarding Congress. You are so pathetic. You’re dangerous too, because you’ve got technical knowledge, but combine that with arrogance and poor moral character and we have a recipe for disaster. Thank God we have Service oversight, IG’s, OSD, and GAO to keep fools like you in check. It’s a sad day for America that all that oversight is even necesssary however.

actually your statement was more vague. please enlighten me, what F-35 software version will be ready for IOT&E? will IOT&E include live fire testing and interoperability testing with the rest of the platforms in the battlespace? or is the plan to pitch F-35 a softball, and then, like F-22, we’re going to wait until the production run is complete to learn we have a critical design problem with something like the oxygen system? and then we have to research back in to A-10 and F-16 to relearn how it was done right?

is it not fair to expect performance according to the original baseline?

no it’s not. drones don’t carry 30mm cannons with depleted uranium. nor do drones inspire our ground troops the way the A-10 does.

Yes the J-20 & PAK FA are larger. You don’t know what their range will be. Longer ranged AAMs are of little use vs VLO adversaries. By time J-20 &/or PAK FA are in service, the F-35 will carry 6 internal AAMs & NEITHER the J-20 or PAK FA will carry 10 internal AAMs.

You clearly do not understand economics.

NONE of which is ANY indication that J-20 &/or PAK FA will even achieve parity with the F-35 much less make mincemeat out of it.

Yes we DO have an idea when we will get the F-35 & yes we DO have an idea how SUPERB a CAS asset it will be. The F-35 is NOT failing! The only thing “forcing” us to operate A-10s longer than they should be is US Presidents’ & Congress’ unwilling to provide suficient funding for the US military to recapitalize its larger 1980s-era forces.

Wrong. The F-35 has NEVER been pitch to replace ANY F-15s. The BS $1 trillion is over 50 years & is NOT based on costs related to the program itself but rather that of legacy platforms.

Ahhh. So because you either do not understand the Chain of Command, and/or are somehow unaware I am loooong-retired from the military, in your febrile noggin’ that makes me a ‘liar’? Citizens boy’o! Congress is supposed to work for me and you– Not vice versa.
And do not mistake my unwillingness to suffer noisy children or foolish hybris for ‘arrogance’. It is ‘intolerance’ of same.
Now, setting your Congressional Clown Posse (GAO) aside, I’ve never had a problem with accountability to any LEGITIMATE oversight organization.
Poor moral character? WTFO and where did that come from? Heck If been married for 36 years and my wife’s never even let me date! But on the bright side rookie, at least you finally said something original, though still clueless.

Heh. You obviously haven’t been round very many advanced or complex projects. Find a cutting edge post-WW2 US airplane that you ‘believe’ didn’t have growing pains and I’ll tell you what they were. I specify US only because it is not worth it to brush up on a foreign language or spend more than 30 minutes just to smack you down. Citing the A-10 and F-16 as examples to research tells me you have no working knowledge of complex defense project histories. The A-10 was a kiddie car compared to anything since and it is still working through original design issues. BTW, LIve Fire testing (of minimal use on a stealth aircraft — don’t argue the point, I don’t have time to school you on susceptability vs. vulnerability) is already in progress (heck of a lab developed for full-up test on AA-1), and critical mission systems demonstrations are already conducted in conjunction with major exercises as risk reduction ahead of the full F-35 participation. The rest you can ask the JSFPO yourself, although I’d note that IMHO a weaponized Block 1 aircraft is more lethal than a Block 50 F-16 or F-18E/F, so who cares what version of software is loaded at IOC?

Liar. Look at your own statements regarding OSD. You are the one exhibiting childish or hybris-ridden behavior. I’ve made arguments that you persistently avoid, regarding the blown baseline, delayed DAB, and cost overrun. Poor moral character was not an indictment against your faithfulness to your wife, it has to do with your advocacy of the defense acquisition strategy that gives us late, overbudget, unneccesarily and unreliable weapon systems.

you are habitually wrong, it’s hilarious. my fingerprints are all over DoD and DHS technology portfolios. really gets one to think about bigger pictures. Of course it is understandable & expected for aircraft (or any system) to have growing pains. What is not acceptable is for PM’s to not perform within budget or schedule — ie, contingency planning & risk management is the PM’s job. When an APB is blown as badly as F-35, and there’s no consequence, it contributes to overall portfolio and enterprise-wide failure. We have a systemic cultural problem of people like you thinking that the status quo is acceptable.

Geez, now you’re just being a humorless little prig. I haven’t avoided your arguments at all, just cast scorn on them as hybris-ridden rantings of a manager wannabe. If you can’t Grok that the objectives and goals of the processes are more important than the processes themselves, that we have rules and processes to foster success and order–not to DEFINE success and order, that is not my problem. Let me flip your arguments back on you: tell us EXACTLY WHY what is so overarchingly important to you, should be just as important to me, and EXACTLY WHAT will be the consquences if your worst fears come true if no one listens to you.…and I will post a complete fisking of it at my place.

As to my positions…If OSD does something stupid, I have no hesitation calling them on it, If a Sec Def is an empty suit, I have no problem pointing that out. Now explain how anything I’ve written about the OSD is childish, etc. Be specific, and don’t just call names or libel or exhibit any other behaviors you wouldn’t have the cojones to carry out in person (Now that’s ‘childish’!).
Assigning ‘Poor Moral Character’ to someone without knowing them –your Hybris’ is without end.

Maybe you should have opened the portfolios and read them. Seriously, now you’re just regurgitating Acquisition LIfe Cycle 101. And because you don’t like or see the consequences doesn’t mean there aren’t any. Get back to us when:
1. You work a program with REAL complexity. There has never been anything as complex as the F-35 program to date by any measure– programmatically, technically, geopolitically.
2. You understand the ‘real’ costs involved and their sources. (I’ll help you out some more http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2011/06/f-35-and-misleading-cost-estimates.html)" rel="nofollow">:http://​elementsofpower​.blogspot​.com/​2​0​1​1​/​0​6​/​f​-​3​5​-​a​n​d​-​m​i​s​l​e​a​d​i​n​g​-​c​o​s​t​-​e​s​t​i​m​a​t​e​s​.​h​tml) .
I think you’re sufficinetly exposed now. Go have a beer with NoMoreCost Overruns. You’d like him.

RE: since the Bermuda Conference in 1962, USAF command echelons do not want the fixed-wing CAS role, and yet they do not any other service to have it, either.

Myth.

Well you’re going to have to wait a little longer Troll-boy.
I’m only about 6K words into a major post on this very subject, but I’m working killer hours at the moment. You’ll know it when I drop it on you.
While you’re waiting you can request permission to brief the Pentagon as to why you’re right and they’re wrong. Or maybe in the meantime just ponder this: CAS is a mission, not a platform or delivery method.

yes you have avoided the arguments and you are still avoiding them. you have faith in and are selling us on the unit cost estimates when development is far from complete. again, I have to explain to you, the F-35’s latest SAR shows MS B as being rescinded, and all the dates for IOT&E, IOC, MS C, FOC, are all TBD. That means there is no schedule. They canceled the DAB that was supposed to determine these dates. They can’t even hold the DAB the program is so screwed. If you’d pay attention I wouldn’t have to REPEAT to you over and over again why this matters. F-35 continues the repeated failing pattern of late, overbudget, and underperforming programs. If we continue to reward such programs, the problem will just get worse and worse. We will fail to properly recapitalize our defense system portfolios, forcing us to operate legacy systems longer & longer and greater risk. If I just say “DMS” are you able to make the connection or am I going to have to explain THAT to you as well?

Loren Thompson (and you) are obviously not cost estimators. I don’t have issues with the $1T LCCE. In fact, F-35 critics should avoid that argument because it plays into your obfuscating hands. As far as F-35 carrier testing goes, F-35 PM will have to pay for any required carrier modifications. The element is Site/Ship/Vehicle conversion under Operational/Site Activation — which would be a Fielding/Deployment cost. I’m pretty sure they should have it in their LCCE. Only time will tell if they’ve estimated and planned accordingly. If in the future we hear of more unexpected bills to the taxpayer driving more F-35 cost overruns, I am going to whip you harder than ever. There is some precedent in this with the special shelters for the B-2. Enlighten me — were these paid for out of B-2’s estimated APB defined at MS B or were these an unexpected cost? As far as your #1, you don’t deserve to see my resume and I prefer to stay anonymous. As far as your assertion that I’ve never worked on a program with REAL complexity, the objective truth is you are WRONG… again and as usual.

My “obfuscating” hands? LOL! Now THAT is some Grade A “projection” you have there. One of us (not you) is asserting that the F-35 is being hammered publically with ‘obfuscating’ cost assertions and the other is insisting the JSF’s sky is falling based upon their limited cognizance of the program (there’s that ‘Hybris’ ….again) status and making assertions based upon the same obfuscating numbers that F-35 critics use to compare the F-35 to alternate COAs or legacy aircraft.

What I wrote at my place and to what your reply apparently refers: “Solomon over at SNAFU has a good post up on F-35 shipboard integration where they talk about the F-35 program paying for the cost. Some integration and a lot of other costs for legacy programs have not always been booked against the airplane program proper. The F-35 has the most inclusive cost numbers I’ve ever seen. This [is the] kind of cost accounting disparity between F-35 and legacy programs that Loren Thompson refers to above.…” Within your unnecessary expounding on cost accounting I find nothing to conflict with anything in that post written by myself or quoted from Loren Thompson. Your observations do however illustrate perfectly how those who seek to use the higher cost estimates typically do so by ‘obfuscating’ the apples and oranges nature of the estimates in comparing the F-35 to past or alternative weapon systems.

Interesting you should bring up B-2 ‘special shelters’. I assume you mean the actual hangars at WAFB. Those were funded as MILCON just like any other hangar AND I believe they were included in the inflated “$2B Bomber” B.S. cost used to smear the B-2 as “too expensive” at the time. This is where the ‘interesting’ part comes in: When NG proposed recapitalizing the bomber fleet by retiring legacy bombers and building additional B-2Cs at $650M per on a fixed-price contract, ‘status quo’ interests in DoD and elsewhere ensured the proposal was evaluated using the ungrounded assumption that existing bombers would NOT be retired. This drove ginned up cost numbers for building completely new base infrastructure. This gamesmanship added $200M more per unit for OGC(Other Government Costs). And so that is another data point reinforcing my position that cost numbers cavalierly thrown about should be suspect until closely scrutinized.
Minor observation: Why would anyone want to see your resume? You’ve given us all the information we need to pass judgment on your rants.

Swing and a miss. But I’ll still ‘fisk’ your poor response before the night is out, and let you know here when it is up.

Deliver Us From Bean Counters http://​elementsofpower​.blogspot​.com/​2​0​1​1​/​0​7​/​d​e​liv…

you wasted a lot of time. your faith in the LRIP lot costs and future unit cost estimates for F-35 is laughable. F-35 DEVELOPMENT IS NOT COMPLETE. can you understand why a current LRIP unit cost is not valid? Learning curve theory is dependent upon stable configuration throughout a production run (find your own source on the web for this, maybe someday I’ll have time to give you a day long lecture on good and bad application of it). There is no precedent for a stable production configuration, and given inevitable DMS/Obsolesence issues there is little to no probability of maintaining stability throughout the production. You have either never had mathematical proof/logic or you need to retake the class. A conclusion based upon axiomatic violations is invalid. There are wiser alternatives to burying our heads in the sand and praying that F-35 will succeed. Looking forward to explaining them to you on another DoDBuzz page. Out.

let me try to clear up some obfuscation then. DoD as a whole, and more specifically the PM, are responsible for a great deal of the obfuscated situation we are in. Certaintly there are variables outside of control (macroeconomic inflation, eg.). However with the $66B+ sunk it is reasonable to expect that the PM and its contractor are supposed to converge towards a successful program by managing risk, generating knowledge, and effectively executing a program. If you are 10+ years/$66B+ sunk into development, and you are rescinding milestone decisions and can’t commit to milestone dates, it means you have not effectively used the resources to manage the program. It’s sad but true. Whining about how difficult the extraneous political environment and black swans is no excuse either. Every other PM operates in the same environment, and many do deliver on cost, schedule, and performance. And whining about how complex F-35 is just begs the question why it needs to be so complex in the first place when there are less complex & risky alternatives available.

No I mean the deployable B-2 shelter system. PM’s are supposed to deliver us operationally suitable systems. B-2 as acquired was not operationally suitable for wartime environments, so the new B-2SS program had to be developed. This became an O&M cost competing with all the other O&M requirements for readiness & for GWOT/OCO. We’ll probably find the same problem with F-22 and F-35 when we deploy them, resulting in additional unplanned cost. As to your question “Why would anyone want to see your resume?” you sure are one dense dbag. You insult me by stating I haven’t worked on programs of real complexity, my resume and positions show otherwise. I’m sorry to have spoken metaphorically I’ll try to be clearer to you.

well shame on USAF then. they’ve always despised and underfunded the A-10. This supports the argument (however false it may be) from our joint bretheren that USAF isn’t whole heartedly commited to the joint fight, contributing to DoD’s overall dysfunctional culture.

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