The Army’s GCV fait accompli

The Army’s GCV fait accompli

The first Ground Combat Vehicle hasn’t even been built yet, but its cost per unit has already busted the Army’s own original projected limits: Although service officials wanted the GCV to cost no more than about $10 million per copy, their own latest estimate is that it’ll wind up being closer to between $11 million and $13 million. The Defense Department’s office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation believes it’ll be closer to between $16 million and $17 million per vehicle.

As you read earlier, top DoD officials know they need to tread lightly with the cost of this program, which is why incoming Deputy Defense Secretary Ash Carter urged the Army to do another study about it at the same time he authorized it to proceed.  The hope is that if the Army can only find some alternative elsewhere in the market, it might save the costs and possible heartache of building this big new vehicle.

So the new analysis of alternatives will go forward, but the GCV’s program manager, Col. Andrew DiMarco, told reporters on Friday that his team already has more or less decided that nothing else out there has what the Army needs.


“When we looked at the AoA we weren’t finding any vehicle that had the combination of the capabilities we’re looking for,” he said. “Some of them are optimized for an under-belly threat, some are optimized for cross-country mobility, or speed on highways, some are optimized against direct large caliber threats. When you look at it from our perspective, we’re trying to get balance on this vehicle, and optimize a number of areas to have a more balanced vehicle for our infantry squads that will give them not only protection, given the threats I talked about earlier, but mobility, off-road mobility, the kind of lethality we need to deal with future threats, as well as being able to carry that entire nine-soldier squad, deliver that unit to where they can effect success on whatever objective and within whatever mission they’re working.”

So what, specifically, has the Army already evaluated and rejected? DiMarco said it has looked at “a variety of platforms,” including what foreign manufacturers are building these days and the Army’s own inventory of M2 Bradleys and MRAPs. Did the Army specifically look at Germany’s Puma? Yes, he said, it did.

That answers one question: SAIC, Boeing and German partners Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall Landsysteme were in the running for GCV until Thursday with a submission based on the Puma, but they did not get a contract to go forward with technology development. That’s even though DiMarco said it had been an option all along to pursue up to three teams, even though Big Army or DoD — he wouldn’t specify exactly who — decided to only opt for BAE Land Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems.

DiMarco said he views the difference between his and the CAPE’s cost estimates as just a question of methodology — he got his number with a “bottom-up” assessment of how much things cost to build and assemble, whereas CAPE does the same thing but also factors in the costs of “similar systems, taking a look at earlier vehicles with similar capabilities.” In other words, CAPE may expect the GCV to have the same early development issues as the Bradley.

DiMarco vowed he and his team are going to be ruthless about controlling requirements and costs. He even acknowledged it might be possible that one alternative for the Army could be to not build a GCV, if it determined it was paying too much and getting too small an advance in capability for soldiers. But that would be unlikely, and besides, he reemphasized that the Army needs this — needs a bigger, better protected vehicle for the whole squad, one that can grow and adapt the way the famed Abrams tank has.

“We wouldn’t have kicked this program off if it wasn’t important,” he said.

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ain’t no such thing as an “optimal” solution. warfare is dynamic and unpredictable, hello?? “effect success on whatever objective and within whatever mission they’re working” spare us the BS, Colonel… As long as DoD confuses wants with needs we will have stupidity over and over again. We need “good enough” solutions and recognize limitiations no matter how much can be spent in the pursuit of “optimal” With the money you save on “good enough” vs pursuing “optimal”, you apply the resources in other ways to solve problems.

The Bradley was a satire in compromise because the Army wanted a single vehicle to do everything (and spent 20 years getting it to do those things just good enough). Now we’re going to go through that pain yet again. The Army needs to go ask the Marines what happens when you try to get mutually exclusive requirements into the same platform — just in case someone forgot.

The Army has a huge problem. Protection, On/Off Road mobility and fit a nine man squad for undet $10mil per? Yes the Army is asking a lot but what do you give up knowing that the FIRST casualties will be second guessed by a public not interested in the reality of comprimising requirements to get to “good enough” and a press that revels in showcasing negligence when none exists (remember, why aren’t all our HMMWVs armored or the ever increasing amounts of body armor required to be worn?).

To your first point:
What’s with all the armyDODcontractor sympathizing here? It’s like you’re denying that the system isn’t shamefully run. First off, let’s just look at the contracts they’re given, cost plus, it doesn’t bother them if timetables are too cheery and cost estimates ridiculously under, what do they care? How are we supposed to reign them in? By having congress yell at them? Threaten to get rid of the program? Maybe even cancel the program? Why do they care, they don’t because they’re getting paid exorbitant fees and contracts. It would be a laughable joke if it wasn’t such a serious subject.

What the process needs is legislative reform to address these structural problems but the money that is spewed to these contractors turns around and pays for congressional campaigns. It’s a sick and twisted spiral and to simply pretend the problem isn’t there and blame the media is misguided at best.

To your second more specific point:
HMMWV’s should have been up-armored or not used in the role that they weren’t designed for, it’s not uncalled for to ask and expect competence on the part of our government. If the equipment wasn’t ready yet then we shouldn’t have rushed ourselves into Iraq, that simple. If I’m going to play tennis I make sure to bring a tennis racket not a squash racket, and if someone tries to shove a square peg in a round hole, especially when lives are at stake they should be called out for it.

Not sympathizing with DoD, recognizing the Army’s problem is harder than clicking one’s red slippers and wishing a vehicle into existence that addreses all the requirements.

Acquisition IS messed up. Not sure MORE legislation is the solution when paperwork and buearacracy is the cause (when has legislation cut red tape?).

You’re missing my HMMWV point. First you don’t get to have everything you want before the war starts. If that were so we wouldn’t have conducted D-Day until we had Pershing tanks capable of standing up against Tigers. We wouldn’t have sent troops to Korea immediately after N. Korean invaded because the bazooka was obsolete against T34s and we wouldn’t have bombed Hanoi until we had the F117. It doesn’t work that way and history would be drastically different if we waited to have the “perfect” solution before we took on the enemy.

Secondly my armored HMMWV point was to illustrate its hard for the Army to compromise on any criteria because it will be blamed for any shortcomings. When we adopted the HMMWV no one thought we have to armor the majority of them and it would serve as a primary troop carrier and combat vehicle.

You compared “going to war with the Army you want” as the old man said to WWII and Korea which is inappropriate since someone else started those wars. Iraq didn’t attack us or an ally like those two wars. We decided to go to Iraq on our own timetable.

Why does big Army insist on trying to put 10 lbs into a 5 lb bag? Is the Fulda Gap in danger or something?

C’mon! The date and place of D-Day was our choice (so was Africa and Sicily). Heck, WE decided to make Europe the priority. We could have deated Japan first. As for Iraq our timetable went to crap after the enemy voted (there wasn’t a need for armored HMMWVs until the insurgency and IEDs started showing up). But heck, you’re missing the point which is any armored vehicle design has a level of compromise. Too much protection, it can’t move. Too little offensive capability and it doesn’t get the job done.

Satire in compromise? It served quite successfully for over 30 years and in combat (unlike the EFV that never came out of prototype). The Bradley was supposed to do everything? Like what? It was never supposed to be a tank. How were 20 years spent making it good enough?

Its not a perfect vehicle. I’ve never liked that it couldn’t carry a full squad but a satire of compromise? That’s a bit steep.

Defend against tanks with thin armor and a missile launcher, carry infantry but only half the squad, and be a scout vehicle but was taller than most other scouts. As for the 20 year remark, the program that created the Bradley started in the mid-1960s with an RFP in 1964, the first prototype in 1972, and full production beginning in 1981. I never said the Bradley family was a failure, but it took years to get all these requirements into a single hull. The EFV tried a similar approach and as you stated it couldn’t do it and got axed.

Not being prepared for an insurgency was a failure on the planners since half the historians and pundits who were interviewed leading up to the invasion said it wouldn’t be all flowers and parades when we got in there. D-Day was of our choosing, but we still waited until we had enough equipment to see it through. One of the factors in postponing D-Day from May to June was to get more landing craft. I have no problem with compromise on aspects of vehicle design. The Germans in WWII made their tanks so heavy they couldn’t move. The problem I have is with the “make this vehicle do EVERYTHING” approach to weapons development. We build ground vehicles that are supposed to do recon, infantry transport, anti-armor, urban warfare, and be on and off-road capable all in the same hull. We build aircraft that are supposed to do air to air, air to ground, ISR, and EW at the same time. We build ships that are supposed to to ship to ship, ASW, EW, and anti-piracy at the same time, and the DoD expects these systems to be the best at them all. Some of these compromises go against the laws of physics, but we spend years and billions trying anyway.

i wonder why they dumped Puma, it’s by far the most capable platform, esp. if you mate it with the CTA.
OTOH i think they should just upgrade the bradley with better armour and the proposed fcs-like turret (30mm, iphone and all the electronics)

Defend against tanks? Straightleg infantry are expected to “defend” against tanks also. Few of us think body armor is going to stop tanks. Some confuse an ability to kill a tank with the ability to trade blows. Bradleys were never designed to trade blows with tanks. MANY IFV/ICVs have a capability to kill tanks (BMP).

It IS a tall vehicle which is a pro/con for scouts. Did pretty well in Desert Storm at 73 Easting as a scout vehicle. Bradley’s made contact then fell behind the tanks in the Cav scout role and our Infantry BN’s scouts did the same in Desert Storm. Considering the Bradley was designed with a Europe defensive fight in mind the height becomes a wash (fighting from multiple battle positions with covered routes).

Acknowledge the half squad issue which every IFV has had to do when it went to two men turrets. Having been inside BMP1s and 2s there’s no way they can field fully equipped 8 man squads unless they use midgets/kids.

Our acquistion process is a joke and called a satire of efficiency. As for the Bradley its far from being a “satire in compromise” considering its very successful record.

Don’t understand your comment? Do you believe we don’t have a need to move infantry squads aroung a battlefield in the future? Do you not envision the enemy trying to interdict that?

I bet in the end with only a seven year window a newer Bradley is what we’ll end up with. Ref the Puma, tracks are always more mobile than wheels. What else did it have going for it?

I think we are agreeing on vehicle design (finally).

As for knowing an insurgency was going to happen, agree. What crystal ball would have predicted the widespread use of IEDs? Shinseki and company were saying we needed more troops, zilch on more armored vehicles/body armor etc. Kind of gets back to my point that you go with what you have not what you want?

“D-Day was of our choosing, but we still waited until we had enough” Why is waiting to have 5 Shermans for every Tiger (knowing you’ll lose 4 and the five men in each tank) ok but not having EVERY HMMWV uparmored in OIF when our total casualties in eight YEARS of war were less than the Normandy campaign? Not saying any casualties are good just hammering that you go to war with what you got.

This is another key point I’m trying to make in that whatever the Army compromises on in vehicle development the pundits, ignorant public and chairborne generals will howl about casualties using 20/20 hindsight.

Think Shinseki etc. were saying that without a crystal ball, you can’t rely on forward deployment & POMCUS. You need a heavy/Stryker/airborne task force light enough to initially deploy & sustain by air anywhere where enemies threaten an ally. Forcible entry isn’t essential if a concerned neighbor lets you air deploy to multiple airfields to eliminate MOG concerns and spread the initial defense to allow build-up by both air/sea. Have we learned nothing from Afghanistan about air deploying armor from Diego Garcia and other nearby sites?

How does a 50+ ton GCV that requires more sorties for a Bashur-like deployment & eats more gas thereafter fit into that uncertain future? How does going from $100 a mile to $200 a mile fit into future training budgets and long stability operations where LIGHT forces in Afghanistan cost $100 billion annually? When the air/sea services are voicing anti-access concerns, why is the Army going to put all heavy eggs in the sea deployment basket? That means heavy BCTs not only will get to the Pacific or Middle East slow, but may never get there at all in time for relevance.

Also must mention that you cite low casualties of OIF I. Obviously Marine light vehicles seemed to survive the east approach and M113s and Bradley were not decimated in Army units…to include M113s that did just fine during thunder runs. So why do future heavy BCTs need tank-like armor for infantry given the status quo’s proven ability to survive?

We have paid excessive attention to Lebanon 2006. Yet the Israelis don’t need to deploy and base alongside enemies, have short distances to resupply, and relatively few bridges to cross in a dry environment. Why is that a lesson for a U.S. HBCT that must deploy long distances and sustain on terrain that may have ample bridges and much longer distances?

Agree the current vehicle mix and lighter vehicles are much more conducive to projecting military power. (I’m not ready to promote a wheeled centric approach, even the Soviets kept over 40% of the force tracked).

What everyone is missing is our growing weakness to accept ANY casualties as the price for employing combat forces. That unrealistic standard is driving the train, driving up both cost/weight in the development of our vehicles and even our strategy and doctrine.

HATE to beat a dead horse, Shinseki’s OIF opposition was limited to troop numbers. We used more than POMCUS/forward deployed troops (e.g. the 4th ID). IF we had deployed 400,000 from the get go an insurgency may never have erupted but let’s not confuse that once on the ground you fight with what you got. My point is the whining about not having uparmored HMMWVs on the ground when the insurgency started.

My bad. I was thinking about the wheeled version of the Puma. Looking at the stats of the tracked Puma I don’t see a huge advantage over the Bradley. That might be the reason it got cut? As I said though, when all is said and done I’m betting the Army goes with an improved Bradley. A lot of room could be saved if they remoted the turret.

It will be a troop carrier that can’t carry enough troops, too heavy/slow to be used as a scout, and to costly to justiy replacing the M1-A2 and all the other vehicles. Many of the M-113’s, Brads, M-1’s and Strykers will have to stay on becuase the cost of this thing will ballon. What about the MRAPs? Money down the drain unless they are used. And pawning the legacy vehicles to the National Guard/Reserve is a copout (and just as expensive).

The point is, just like GCV, the Bradley was overly ambitious given what it was intended to accomplish. While the Bradley has served venerably, it failed to accomplish the goals its program set out to, doing nothing as well as it was desired.

In response to the many things said here: the ma jor advantage of the Puma is the Germans have it in the field now. The major difference between the Puma and the Marder is the modular armor. Why am I jealous ? Because with at 1% defense spending to GDP, the Germans can get systems into the field and we cannot. They live within their means and do good engineering. Now — we HAD a functioning chassis in the MGV. The argument was whether 29 tons was too much. If the Army gets a monster size chassis — 45, 50, 60 tons worth — on this pig, for the kind of unit prices they’re talking about…I want some people to eat crow and admit they screwed up when they cancelled MGV. But the real problem is that too many people now do not understand the difference between an infantry fighting vehicle and a tank, so they end up building an infantry fighting vehicle to tank specifications. Benning needs to relent and admit the armor branch back in the force. There are jobs out on the battlefield for tanks to do — stop trying to go it alone, Infantry — you need tanks of different weights and sizes because this is not a one size fits all operational environment we are in.

One of the conundrums of BFV tactics in mechanized infantry units is that the good ATGM firing positions are often quit a bit removed from where your dismounted infantry positions need to be. That’s the operational cost of doubling up antitank platform and battle taxi roles on the IFV. The Stryker sacrifices that former role for mobility’s sake. I agree that the BFV-equipped infantry organizations put too few boots on the ground — we knew this was a problem back in the 80s. Essentially, you can solve the problem two ways — buy more IFVs, and accept the implications that has for structuring infantry squads and platoons (one fire team per vehicle, gets you two vehicles per squad and at least six vehicles per platoon); or you make larger infantry carriers and decide whether they can support other roles in the attack and defense. This isn’t rocket science, but one thing that does need to be considered is the intensity of operations. Do NOT assume (just because it is popular among the think tanks) that mid-to-high intensity conflict is passe’.

I think affordability, strategic & tactical mobility, and reliability should be the most important KPP’s. Once we are on the battlefield, we can employ TTP’s and work as an integrated joint force us to bring us the necessary lethality to accomplish objectives. All the superior lethality and survivability requirements are going to result in serious penalties towards affordability, mobility, and reliability. You will end up with a failed program. Even an M-1 Abrams can be defeated by IED’s and shoulder-fire RPGs.

Benning isn’t trying to do the Armor’s job but ensure the armored force has Infantry. The growth in size of IFVs is a response to our unrealistic expectation that combat should result in no casualties and growing vehicles to defeat IED/EFP threats that can defeat even tanks. Why would you think the Infantry is trying to go it alone? The M1 is much more survivable than Bradleys (partly to Infantry keeping the bad guys from taking pot shots from up close).

BTW, reference percieved german acquisition process efficiency, the Puma is a follow-up project from a mid ’90’s program (they have programs that don’t go anywhere also). Five proto Pumas were ordererd in ’02, delivered in ’06. It took another three years for the Bundeswehr to budget for 450 of them in ’09. First one delivered last year and it will take a decade to make 450. So it took about 15 years for the Germans to “START” fielding a new Infantry carrier and another 10 to field the force.

Jeff, the only area that I can agree is the Bradley did not meet expectations is the amount of infantry each vehicle carries. Otherwise it has met or exceeded its performance expectations. It’s extremely capable of supporting the dismounted infantry delivering them protected to the fight and placing lethal fires on the enemy. It can and has defeated its primary foe the BMP/BTR. As a cavalry vehicle the Bradley served well. Considering the Bradleys operational performance it’s very hard to document it as “doing nothing as well as it was desired’ though it’s an often heard line. I think the reason we hear it so much is that many don’t know what the Bradley’s role on the battlefield was supposed to be.

We will find it exceedingly difficult to field an IFV that carries the nine man squad under cost, under weight and as protected as the GCV requirement. No nation on the planet has. This is new ground requiring either a leap in technology or compromise in the requirements. I fear neither is on the horizon.

Perhaps the Army should determine the future of the Heavy Brigade Combat Teams before committing to a Bradley replacement. If Airborne and Stryker teams are the future of the Active Army, then we shouldn’t sink a fortune into a new mechanized IFV.

Which MRAP carries a nine man squad, defeats RPGs and can go where tracked vehicles can?

Don’t understand your M1 comment. The GCV isn’t supposed to replace it. Are you thinking FCS?

Agree that the Bradleys and Strykers will probably stay on for some time. The Soviets had mechanized and motorized formations. They had slightly different roles.

It is not that the Germans live within their means that allows them to send 1% of their GDP on defense. It is that the US has provided their defense fo 50 years.

I don’t think any high level strategic planning guidance would indicate a diminished requirement for HBCTs in the future. The heavy/low/Stryker ratio is already tipped towards lighter brigades, some would argue in frightening proportions. The case for a new mechanized IFV is valid from both a strategic and an obsolesence requirement. Mechanized IFVs would not need to necessarily be employed solely in a BCT formation, either. I’m sure the Rangers in Mogadishu would have appreciated not having to depend on Pakistani armored tracks for a QRF.

Bingo!

Several yrs ago cartoonist Gary Trudeau, “Doonesbury”, had a strip of converted Bradley’s being sold to civilians to run on freeways with no problems of cars getting in the way. The best one was a soccer mom letting down the ramp for her kids to storm out to the pitch.

The Stryker has done a great job sending infantry to the objective and supporting them. It is heavy and requires a regular amount of tire and suspension maintenance, but considering the mileage we put on them it is much less than the track maintenance on a Bradley. The Stryker was never meant to be at the vanguard of a major assault, and many were destroyed when we tried it.

I think the Buffalo and the MaxxPro can carry a full squad, but one is a route clearance vehicle and the other is a taxi that can’t do much off the beaten path.

Been in a MaxxPro. Six passengers besides the crew.

In the 7 year span of this program the number of vehicles to be ordered will fluctuate with the drawdown of the Army. I’ve read a couple briefings and heard a speech or two seriously questioning if we have too many tanks in the force. Just in the last couple years we converted long-time armored brigades into Stryker units and it sounds like they want to do it to at least one more brigade. We have over 2000 tanks on active duty and defeated the Iraqi Army with somewhere between 200–300 of them and haven’t used that many since. I’m not saying shrink the force to that size, but it looks like there’s room to negotiate. With the way our brigades are organized a smaller tank force=smaller IFV force.

TMB hit the nail on the head as usual in terms of the changing face of the Army given few theaters where lots of HBCTs are essential. Let’s say optimistically that the Army ends up with 13 active HBCTs, 10 SBCTs, and 16 light/ airborne/air assault BCTs. 13 BCTs x 60 GCVs = 780 GCVs. Will we really need 1800 to fill out the National Guard? What about all the still competent Bradleys and MRAPs/M-ATVs?

The National Guard seems ideal for MRAPs because they are large enough to handle flood waters ala the famous Katrina scene. Elevated MRAPs also are ideal in the event of a stateside nuclear or leaked natural gas catastrophe be it accidental, earthquake, or terror-related.

Should the analysis of alternatives consider the needs of the whole Army and the composition of the HBCT? As mentioned we have 5,000+ tanks and no place to put them. Could we preposition them in more places so that high speed vessels and airlift could move them the last 1,000 or less miles? Then we would primarily be concerned about moving GCVs from stateside and prepositioning sites in task forces with Strykers and Airborne forces for initial air entry to a neighbor country of an invaded ally.

We have far more airlift than any other country on earth, just as we have far more carriers. The difference is we figure out how to best exploit carriers yet stupidly get heavier in our HBCTs to waste the phenomenal airlift available. Consider putting two tank-like Namers, two converted Bradley’s with remote turrets, and two M-ATVs as the new HBCT mechanized platoon. That would be a deployable, more sustainable and full spectrum HBCT platoon with Bradleys and M-ATV going by air, and Namer-variants going by sea.

I hate to have to point this out, but airtransportability was the major design driver in the FCS BCT design — as well as the MGV design. As far as the Namer is concerned, I’m pretty underwhelmed. 60 tons and all I get is a 7.62 machine gun up top ? Are you kidding ? Puma beats it for top speed with the same or better horsepower to weight ratio (At the 40 ton Protection C level, Puma, Bradley and Namer are all a sluggish 20 HpW. The M1 tank has a horsepower to weight ratio of 26, one of the many things that makes it the finest MBT in the world. Puma at the 31 ton Protection A level — 25 ton HpW. And leave the M-ATV home — a serious opponent will eat those things up. Like paper.

These numbers don’t add up at all. 2000 tanks would be 34 (!!) J series tank battalions. With five heavy divisions, you get 24 (2 Armored Divisions x6 + 3 Mech Divisions x 4). That just shy of 1400 tanks. If I assumed 16 HBCTs with 4 combined arms battalions apiece, I still don’t get to 2000 tanks. Equipment reserves don’t count and neither do Stryker MCS vehicles. All this underscores the “light fighter, infantry-go-it-alone mania” that has taken over our Army. The least likely scenario is another counterinsurgency war for at least a generation to come. But there’s no talking to some people.

One reason the US Army continues to screw up on IFV design is that the Infantry Branch has no clue how to operate as armored infantry. The vehicle is not just a battle taxi and it is more that just a fancy tank destroyer. First and foremost, it belongs to the squad and offers a base of fire for the squad. If you had two IFV’s per squad, then you could have a vehicle section and all the good mutual support that comes from fighting vehicles in pairs (as well as mutual support between the fire teams and the vehicle section) Using tanks like this — as infantry assault guns — is a waste of tanks. The Puma is an excellent design because it does what a squad IFV needs to do. It is well proportioned, with good armor sloping and modular armor design. In the US, such things are an afterthought — although from a design point of view, the MGV ICV chassis was actually not that bad, Turret could have been slimmed down, but the basics were there and they were right.

Might agree that little was wrong with the MGV at 29 tons (it wasn’t if I recall) when a IED kit was going to be added to it…something not well advertised to Sec Gates.

But with water under that bridge, consider the recent trend of using Stryker, Light, and Heavy forces together. If you air deploy task forces with lots of Stryker/Light & little heavy ala Bashur, when the sea-deployed Namers/Tanks arrives you still have the extra light forces available.

If the Namer was expanded to hold 13 plus crew, it could also support the Marines if they figured out how to get it to shore beside Ship-to-Shore connector. The extra space would provide a heavy ride for task-organized light forces during offensives, You would effectively have room for nearly 5–6 squads in two 13-man Namers, two nine-man Bradleys with remote turret, and two M-ATVs (maybe Strykers too). Each Tank/Namer/Bradley/M-ATV (3 squads)/Stryker combination would run nose-to-tail on separate avenues of approach to counter mines/IEDs and provide mutual overwatch during assaults of objectives or movement through urban areas and chokepoints.

What about TMB’s point that we kicked serious booty with 200–300 Bradleys, lighter M113s and Marine LAVs/AAVs. Where is the threat with lots of armor requiring multiple active HBCTs? We certainly will not land any land force on China but we could air deploy some Bradleys,a few tanks, and more Strykers/M-ATV to the east side of Taiwan with adequate warnings/indications.

Do you doubt there would be a long period of stability ops in any defeat of Korea or Iran? Do you see the value in occupying land near the Straits of Hormuz? How about a build-up in Romania to retake Ukraine? Are you going to land those heavy forces ashore in Ukraine or elsewhere in the Black Sea safely?

Replace the term counterinsurgency with unavoidable stability ops that are part of any future use of the land component.

You’re right. It’s more like 1000 tanks on active duty. The numbers I originally saw probably included the National Guard. We have 18 active heavy brigades with 56 tanks per brigade. Wikipedia seems to think we have 5000 in the inventory, but I can’t account for them unless they’re in storage.

I worked FCS training and as you recall it had 10-tank armor companies recognizing there are no more “serious armor opponents” with the end of the Cold War. There are other ways to kill tanks. The BMP is certainly no behemoth. Smart enemies have learned not to mass in the open. Rather they employ no/slow-go terrain and hug civilian/urban areas. FCS never adequately advertised the shift to C-17 transport instead of C-130. The Army seems to be ignoring that it has moved nearly every MRAP/M-ATV to conflicts on aircraft as well as Strykers to Afghanistan. Not every conflict has easy or survivable sea transport access and none of it is sufficiently rapid upfront.

I don’t like Namer either unless it is modified to carry more troops for all that weight and has some manner of remote 30mm turret. Let a modified Bradley & M-ATVs with Hellfire provide support-by-fire for assaulting Namers. But air-deployment of two Bradleys and two M-ATV during initial entry is less weight/sustainment than four Bradleys, Pumas, or Namers!

Not that I totally accept it myself, but.… MBTs may be approaching that same point that horse cavalry hit when machine guns and rapid fire rifles became standard issue for even the poorest of infantry forces, i.e. WW-I or so. When the infantry finds the “threat killer” the threat disappears and the infantry resurfaces for the umpteenth time as the most lethal, and most useful combat arm (sorry, “Red Legs”!). With todays ATGMs (and even RPGs and equivalent) a well equipped infantry unit can effectively engage a formation of MBTs to the point that the MBTs need their own associated infantry just to survive.

Perhaps we need to start thinking about MBTs as primarly “infantry support guns” like the old SU-122 series with a secondary MBT role. Just a thought.… . . :-)

The general rule is that the most likely places in which the US Army may fight in the future are difficult to get to (from a strategic mobility perspective) and hard to support once there. Combine that with the fact that our active force is outnumbered by a good many middleweight powers, and you have the essence of the problem. But it does not get better by using the John Vessey criteria — in the 80s the driving design specification for the Light Infantry Division was 500 C-5 sorties. Everybody held their breath during the early part of Desert Shield when the 82d went into Saudi Arabia to see if the Iraqis would come across the border. In other words, before you worry about post-conflict occupation forces, you actually have to win the land war. I’m reading Niall Ferguson’s “War of the World” right now, where the UK government is contemplating deployment of the BEF to France in August 1914, and realizing that all their contingency plans were wrong, and they really need 50 divisions instead of the 7 they have on hand. We fool ourselves when we think that we can tempt fate forever like that.

No. Having served as a PL in a light infantry unit, a grad of the Armor Officer’s advanced Course, a CO in a Bradley Infantry company and in the Battle Lab at Benning during FCS I can tell you unequivocally that he Infantry school “gets it”. “No clue”? I think you’re way out on a limb.

I can tell you from a experience splitting a squad across two vehicles is VERY problematic. It’s the equivalent of splitting a tank crew physically and expecting the tank to function seamlessly. The Bradley experience was so bad, the Infantry school is absolutely committed to not making the same mistake (splitting the squad) again. We aren’t at the point where the squad leader can control thesquad across two vehicles seperated by distance and obstacles.

The two vehicle argument has been used in the past by the armor school symptomatic of the armor approach to vehicle employment. Wingmen work great when you are talking tanks and aircraft. Not so when you have to deliver a squad to the same dismount point so the squad leader can employ the unit AS a unit. Its the Armor “speed and power” perspective that doesn’t have a clue.

move forward — The Namers seem awesome if you don’t have to deploy anywhere. Also multiple types of vehicles moving along multiple avenues of approach sounds cool until you have to consider the spare parts problem.

Lost you a little in the 5–6 squads part of your post. 45 men (9 man squads) across two “super” Namers? Midgets? Sitting on each other’s laps?

Sorry, just a little reality crashing through the living room wall.

You have a point but armor remains a threat. Mased RPGs can kill an M1. Javelin even more so. Even with a superior tank killing system (e.g. javelin) the trick for the infantry is having enough on hand when the armor attack comes. Toss in enemy ICVs and the antiarmor ammo requirement on hand grows. We learned this with TOWs and Bradleys. Though you can inflict casualties only armor does it quickly enough to stop a determined well resourced attack.

“Consider putting two tank-like Namers, two converted Bradley’s with remote turrets, and two M-ATVs as the new HBCT mechanized platoon.”

Way too complicated. Consider the training, cross training requirement in a platoon alone let alone spare parts. There’s a reason even in our new formations that tank companies are all the SAME tank and Infantry companies are all the SAME Bradley.

cool beans. Stryker’s have served us well.. we need a modern tracked equivalent.

since shoulder fires can defeat 70 ton M-1, we should not delude ourselves into incurring the weight, mobility, and reliability penalties in a quixiotic pursuit of uparmoring our ICVs beyond small arms and shrapnel protection. as soon as you try to have your cake and eat it too, you end up with a 50 ton vehicle that is not deployable and costs over $10M and inevitably gets canceled.

Here is the counter argument. If IFV survivability is the concern, how is it a good Idea to put an entire squad in one vehicle ? Two vehicle sections were de rigeur long before we called it the “wingman” concept when we went to four vehicle platoons. 6–8 vehicles is a lot for a platoon leader to handle, but I’d rather have that problem (particularly with BFT and GPS to help do the cat herding) that the BFV infantry platoon with 18 soldiers and one fire team per squad — not enough boots on the ground to do the job right. FWIW, if you are going to have infantry fighting vehicles and not just battle taxis, you need at least a TC and driver left to fight the vehicle when the platoon or squad dismounts. Could you put different weapons packages on the turret to keep down vehicle weight and height (also cost) ? Yeah, maybe that would be reasonable. When FCS was conceived, the vehicles were supposed to be modular like that. Think out of the box, but be practical about it. How many ATGM launchers does an infantry platoon really need ? Same goes for automatic cannon, machine guns or anything else you could imagine.

it started out but didn’t end that way, which means it never was in the first place… alot of people talk out both sides of their mouth, promise the world then deliver junk, and there are plenty of gullible people that swallow a lot of used car sales pitches way to easily. they should have never given up on the C-130 deployability requirement. they should have accepted the survivability tradeoff. soon as they gave up on that everyone realized the Army was trying to pull a fast one on the taxpayer.

there was a good reason why FCS was killed. this modular assembling the vehicle in the field BS was one of them. how about this.. could we have a battle taxi with a remote turret 25mm cannon carry 9? soldiers to a squad, with externally stored dragon ATGM. do that all under 24 tons and be truly deployable by C-130? just thinking out the box here…

And while I’m on a roll here, I always though that sending a squad out on point all by itself — whether you were doing travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch — was a really bad start to making contact with “minimum force forward”. You find the bad guys at the expensive of losing a squad — even if the squad is just one fire team, you’ve lost a third of the platoon right off the bat. (Or worse, you lose the platoon leader if he goes Israeli and leads from the front.) So in the movement to contact, I would much rather have a mounted squad in two vehicles able to bound internally in close terrain. In more open ground, you have a different dynamic, but the idea of blending cavalry and mech infantry tactics a bit is not that much of a heresy, in my view. If all these digital gizmos are worth a darn, we should be able make our tactical organizations more flexible and cover more ground. I could get into why torching the ARV-L and the Class I UAV was a bad choice, but that is a different kettle of fish.

In a word, no. But you could design the weapons and their mounts in a way that enabled soldiers to interchange them from vehicle to vehicle without going to depot maintenance. You could adopt modular armor — like the Puma that enables you to transport more vehicles by air without cubing out. In other words, you could write your requirements based on what can be done, not what you wish you could do. You could at least try to design a platform with multiple missions and common components in mind. You could do smart things because it really does save money and time in the long run, and not stupid things because you’re trying to do too many things all at once.

Airtransportability does not equate to “can transport in a C130”. It may be a subtle point to some, but the C130 is an in-theater transporter, not a strategic mobility asset. Despite the inherent goodness of modularity, C130 landing strips are “warm” to “hot” and you may have to come off the aircraft fully ready for combat if that’s the way you go in. Maybe there is a clever way to do it, but I would not waste a lot of time or money trying to get there. Too many other things were important in FCS, and any other Army modernization effort, that will end up (and did end up) getting thrown out with the bathwater. So if you don’t think the Puma is the solution to your problems, what would you pay for a slightly used PzH 2000 ? Or is a state-of-the-art self-propelled howitzer just another one of those wasting assets, sour grapes that the US Army really doesn’t need after all ?

The early entry problem is getting harder not easier. So why do we hear so many voices demanding that we give up our forward bases ? It seems to me that people who talk this way are trying to put as many barriers as they can to prevent the US from intervening on the Eurasian landmass ever again, mostly for ideological reasons. If you look at what many of those people were saying in 1991, or 1981, it was the same old song, even though the facts on the ground were much different. And from maritime strategy perspective, anti-access and area denial are real concerns. The Army has not taken a coherent position on this issue, and it needs to do so. How much risk are we willing to incur ? How do we intend to win the wars of the future ?

Vitesse, when the Interim Brigade (later Stryker) was being developed the Army explicitly stated that combat-ready transport via C-130 was a requirement. When physics caught up with them and they couldn’t make it happen, Secretary Harvey then said “well, we didn’t really require it to be in a C-130, we just wanted the developers to think in that direction.” As SheepDog said “used car sales pitch.” When the Stryker brigade and FCS brigade started development, GEN Shinseki pitched hard for quick strategic deployment of medium-weight armored forces because he was worried about the Army becoming irrelevant since it takes us weeks to deploy a heavy division.

We invaded Iraq with almost entirely CONUS-based forces. The corps headquarters and most of the non-divisional logistics came from Germany, but the ground combat forces came from Georgia, Fort Hood, and Fort Campbell.

Meant to say Fort Stewart, Hood, and Campbell.

Armor COULD be a threat, but… think about it for a moment. Could UNSUPPORTED armor make a successful attack against a well-equipped, heavily anti-armor infantry unit of comparable size, particularly in an urban or built up scenario. Out on the “pool table” of southern Iraq, tanks can fight tanks, in any kind of closed terrain (urban, forest, etc), armor without protecting infantry lives a very hard life.

Let me ask a basic question, Major. Could an unprotected armor unit stage a “rush” on an entrenched, well equipped, artillery supported, infantry without incurring unacceptable casualties of its own.

Cavalry units were previously a mix of tanks and Bradleys. Scouts are mix of HMMWVs and Bradleys. All you are adding is one extra vehicle…and don’t infantry platoons have HMMWVs anyway. Vehicles are not all the same. A combined arms battalion has tanks and Bradleys plus other gear.

To answer your earlier question, with two 13-man dismount modified Namers you could carry three squads, another two squads in the modified Bradley with remote turret, and one squad in the two M-ATV. Half of those infantry would be attached from light units they deployed with. Not all vehicles would need to be manned. Assault with the Namers, overwatch/support-by-fire with thinner Bradley remote-turrets and M-ATVs that can always move up if one vehicle is disabled. The Namers would assault with tanks anyway.

Two Namers would weigh/cost less than four up-armored modified Bradleys and use less cube..but they would need to carry more than 9 dismounts. You could air-deploy some Namers/Tanks to augment a Stryker/Airborne unit but most would go by sea.

C-17/C-5M/Antov, heck we moved M-ATVs by cargo 747s.

Yeah, but didn’t we have a lot of help from prepositioned gear in Kuwait?

lol a C-17 can lift an Abrams. so if air transportability doesn’t mean C-130, then it’s rather meaningless. you could have a 70 ton IFV and be “air transportable”. more nonsense from a department, service, and people that can’t make up their minds.

Heck, MGV could have done it in electric-mode with band tracks and silent running plus active defenses. But you don’t see much sign of hybrid electric drive in the GCV offerings. Most threats will have old RPG-7…not much as effective as Javelins or Hellfires..they don’t have the budget for it. Those systems are costly which is why threats keep it simple and use IEDs.

There are few threats as capable as you describe and few would be fully intact after the “air war.” The Russians did not demonstrate much in Georgia, The Chinese are completely untested. The North Koreans have T-62s and little radar ADA or airpower. The Iranians are constrained by sanctions and faired poorly against the Iraqis who we decimated rapidly.

Meanwhile, we fight as joint/combined arms to include joint airpower. No exposed enemy will fully survive our initial air and artillery onslought. So they try to hide and hug civiilians but eyes in the sky soon thwart that as well. Primarily lead tanks and Namers would need the heaviest armor. Thinner trailing vehicles would protect the flanks and rear and mop up.

You need to research the airdrop/airland that occurred at Bashur, Iraq. Take 60 C-17s over 5 days and you could land 60 tanks…each that requires 500 gallons of fuel every 8–12 hours. What a nightmare with no infantry or fire support to boot.

Or instead you could use 25 sorties to deploy 10 Abrams (10 C-17s), 10 Namers/10 M-ATVs (10 C-17s), 10 Bradleys (5 C-17s), and still have 35 sorties for airborne/light forces, C2Vs, HEMTT tankers/PLS, & towed artillery with a few HIMARS. You could deploy all 60 C-17s to five separate airfields the first night. (too lazy to log in again)

Only a couple brigades worth. The Maritime Prepositioning Ships and Army Preposition Stocks help a great deal in shortening build-up to a big fight, but they don’t provide everything. And Vitesse’s point seemed to be more about giving up our bases in Europe rather than these equipment stashes. Having warehouse space and cargo ships near a troubled area isn’t the same as maintaining massive bases in Germany if there really isn’t much savings in transit and build-up time.

The problem is that what is “good enough” today may very well be hopelessly outmatched tomorrow. You DO NOT maintain the qualitative advantage the US has grown accustomed to with “good enough” solutions.

Quite the opposite. Contractors make comparatively little money on delayed & over budget developement programs (they actually PAY a portion of the delay & budget overruns “out of their own pocket”). They make MORE money when development is ON TIME & ON BUDGET (MOST of their development profit comes from performance award fees) AND they make orders of magnitude MORE money producing weapons systems then they do developing them.

Just becasue the Cold War is over DOES NOT mean that the possibility of high intensity warfare is…

The way things have been going lately you don’t build anything at all if you wait 10+ years to have “the best.”

USAF, we trained for that eventuality. The answer is yes. The casualties might be unacceptable to us but not to some of our enemies. Remember the basic load for a light infantry platoon is two javelins, four rounds and maybe 6 AT4s.

Terrain is always a big equalizer and if you throw in a bunch of combat multipliers you can even the odds. The bad guys have artillery also and it takes an insane number of HE rounds to stop a tank (I vaugely remember the planning factor was 16 155mm HE rounds for one tank back at the NTC and hitting moving tanks was near impossible).

You proposed tanks might be reaching the utility of horse cavalry. I’m a former grunt with a good dose of respect for armor. Its no where near obsolete.

Sheepdog, not a good example. A single lucky bullet will take down anything from an Apache to an F22. Shouldn’t we build cheaper aircraft? Of course not. You are addressing the symptom (unrealistic protection requirements) instead of the cause a public misconception that war is bloodless. THAT’S a tough nut to crack and until we do we are DOOMED to developing Maus sized armor that is too expensive, too heavy and take too long (if ever) to field.

The real question is how do we teach the public and politicians that expect no risk when we put Joe in the line of fire that acceptable risk is an unavoidable cost of warfare?

Like I said, TOUGH nut!

No, you can wish but reality will kick in the door every time. I can ask you to trust that I know what I’m talking about being a light/mech infantry experienced guy with a solid armor background but you might need some nuggets to hand your hat on.

The individual soldier is not tied into the digital battlefield. Once off the vehicle he’s invisible and efforts to integrate the infantryman into the digital battlefield don’t extend past the SL and often stop at the PL. Today we don’t even typically issue radios below squad level. Ok, now think fire/manuever when the SL can’t even talk to his separated fire team let alone not know exactly where they are on the battlefield. Feeling my pain yet?

The problem with many Tankers/Cavalrymen is they don’t understand that the squad is as much a fighting element as a tank. Separating it makes as much sense as physically displacing a tank crew and expecting the tank to work.

BTW, we try and make contact with a fire team not a squad.

The Germans didn’t split their Infantry across two halftracks, niether did we. In fact we NEVER did it until the Bradley. There’s a reason for that somewhere…

I never liked 5–6 troops in a Bradley. I made due with a bad situation and the Infantry learned a great lesson and not against a tier one opponent (a blessing). Let’s not tempt fate?

IMO any future ICV/IFN has to carry a 9 man squad and crew. It might be possible in a Bradley with a remote turret.

BTW, the Bradley can be made to be as modular armorish as the Puma. You still have the same problem when you get there. The armor has to be flown in and installed.

But this is all a dream until you can curb unrealistic protection requirements and our nation’s inability to accept that our people get killed in war also.

Cav and scouts units aren’t infantry. Similar but different mission. If they were the same why would we have different schools, doctrine and organizations (cav squad is 3 — 5, infantry squad is 9).

You proposed 3 types of vehicles, 6 vehicles in a mech platoon. Maintenance of 4 bradleys, trainig Bradley crews, training infantry squads and traing together are a lot to ask. You want to add another type of vehicle? Why, do we get more points for raising the difficulty level? (just joking)

Recently some infantry squads in Iraq had Bradleys and HMMWVs, They weren’t running/training on all 4 bradleys at the same time and were operating from a fixed location.

Your “Super Namer” infantry squad numbers are still confusing me. How big are these squads? Did you just shrink them with no discussion of the cost? There are MANY good reasons we have 9 man squads.

BTW, Namer is NOT deployable enough for the nation’s needs and is too heavy.

Agree on the Namer. Just too big BUT it seems to answer the politicians and publics expectation of bloodless wars even if we can’t get it into theatre.

Not buying your Puma propaganda. Why not remote the Bradley turret? MUCH CHEAPER!!! Heck we might even be able to reanimate some super M113 solution!

Besides that I just hate buying German. We didn’t buy the Leopard and look how that turned out. Why is it tankers want to shortchange the Infantry?

Speed & Power, posted a response. Waiting for the mods to approve it.

I really dont think that tanks are quite at the point of horse cavalry (and even horse cavalry still has a place in special circumstances, i.e. SOF in Afghanistan for example), but.… at a point about half way through WWII the major combatants started converting BB hulls into CV hulls. Even though one could still argue a valid BB role today in terms of littoral warfare, the BB just plain had been shifted off of the pedistal and the CV became the standard unit of power. Im thinking that a tank, or something very close to a tank, will continue to be a military necessity for quite a while but perhaps about the time of the next generation of infantry anti-tank weapons (in terms of range and lethality), massed armor might start looking more like a target rich environment than an awe insiring threat. (And that does not even consider the increasingly lethal anti-armor capabilities that are on the edge for artillery and air assets.)

How much more time and money do we invest in landbound BBs?

I’m imagining that “73 Easting” could easily come to be seen as the more successful, modern version of the charge of the Light Brigade.

Darn it disappeared. It was good to.

You are missing some points about how the infantry is tied in digitally… Its not. Once the Infantry dismounts they are digitally invisible. In fact most Infantry doesn’t have radios below the squad level. So imagine being the SL trying to find your other fire team that you can’t see, don’t know where they dismounted and can’t call them.

Tankers/Cavalrymen don’t get it. Fighting the squad must begin from a start point where the SL knows where all his men are and can control them. Imagine a tank platoon reacting to contact but not knowing where the other section is and not being able to communicate with them! Or imagine how well a tank would fight if you couldn’t speak, see, touch with half the crew!

NOT so easy?

Just dont forget, as some did in the 80’s and 90’s, that aside from the stateside role, the National Guard also goes to war! Over the last 10 years, I think that a lot of Army and AF planners have had to scratch their heads and marvel at how much capability had been conveniently shifted to the Guard only to be absolutely required to sustain combat.

As has been proven several times since Stalingrad, you cant really air lift and air supply any meaningful armor capability. Who really cares that we could deliver a tank company to any place in the world within 24 hours to face off against an indigenous armored division? Even with the M1s argueably head and shoulders above the threat armor, 150 (which is all we could get into an expeditionary location if we dedicated our entire C-17 fleet to that one payload, forgetting about fuel, ammunition, support vehicles, spare parts, crews, or the associated Bradleys, infantry, Paladins, artillerymen, etc) might have a very hard time.

Er… to buy more tanks? :-)

Well, I think all this underscores the fact that infantry fighting vehicle design is closely related to the organizational design of the (Mech) infantry from fire team up to company level…now, I am frankly rather insensitive to an argument that you have to cram the entire squad in one vehicle because it is too hard to get two vehicles to the same dismount point and get the infantry off in shape to fight. That’s why you have battle drills and training. Realize that not all NCOs have the sense God gave a goose, but we should purge out the real dummies, and ought to expect more from these guys. The real problem is that the guys riding in the back have no situational awareness until they hit the ground, and if they come off the track misoriented, they’re dead. The broader issue — on the effectiveness of digitizing the individual infantryman — has been discussed ad nauseum on this board, and I am just waiting for the usual suspects to leap in and tell why it is a bad idea to give each soldier a cellphone. Much less an iPad.

pfcem when we want your opinion we’ll give it to you. “hopeless outmatched”?? give me a break. we’ve heard better pitches from used car salesman. here are the flaws in your analysis. first, it is impossible to predict what tomorrow’s threats will be 10–20+ years in the future — ie, the design period required for your hopeless constrained optimal super platforms. second, get your head out of your rectum and understand that warfare & national security strategy is much more than platform vs platform. There is logistics and DOTMLPF & TTPs, for example. What you need to get through your head is that cost matters. The cost to design your super platform wet dreams is too uncertain, risky, and exorbitant. Then the cost to procure and O&M them is even more strategy prohibitive. I’m certain you as a profiteer don’t care much, however, those of us involved in the greater picture do care. The cost that we save vs pursuing realistic technology vs your wet dreams are real resources that we would apply elsewhere to accomplish missions, as opposed to spending infinite billions and wasting decades on more marketing power points from prime integrators.

Maj Rod you have many good points but I think you are overstating the impact of casualty aversion on vehicle design. This may be more an internal Army jam up then unrealistic expectations from outside the Army. The antidote to the problem is to have the integrity and discipline to require that APCs/IFVs be C-130 deployable. If the Army would grow a pair and stick to this requirement, everyone would understand the necessary tradeoff — we would still armor the vehicle as best we could within the constraint. And then employ proper DOTMLPF & TTPs to accomplish missions & minimize causalties. Right now by trying to have our cake and eat it too we end up in hopeless constrained situations, we end up with failed programs and failed force modernization. And we don’t adequately support ground troops with tracked armor vehicles because Abrams & Bradley are too heavy, and the Army hates M-113s and light tanks for some reason.

sounds like we should just develop a next generation of M-113s. 2 crew + 9 troops. Strategic & tactical mobility: C-130 deployability and helicopter sling loading should be the priorities.

Agree with the latter, but when I see high profile vehicle designs and poorly sloped armor, that tells me that both the combat developers and engineers are not doing their job. You end up with silly solutions like the Stryker bird cage. All my comments so far presume a vehicle that carries only 6 men in the back. But let’s expand the trade space. What is the real trade space ? Why not develop a vehicle with just four men in the back ? Why is more men in the back inherently better than fewer ? What is the weight hit per person ? Benning and Big Army have put a stake in the ground on 9 men — take off 2 for the crew and you have a seven man squad ? One man more that a BFV squad/fire team ? We’re having this argument over one guy ??? Or is the assumption that you leave one man back and dismount an eight man squad ? I’m starting to wonder whether I really understand the thought process behind the vehicle requirements at all. They did analyses of alternatives — against what assumptions ? When I look at the end result, it really doesn’t add up.

it’s not a matter of can’t it’s a matter of didn’t. look at Blackhawk Down. A QRF of Bradleys & M-113s could have bust in and exfil’d those guys. Look at Afghanistan, we are having COPs overrun by punks with RPGs. We just started deploying Abrams to Afhganistan like 10 years too late. We need tracked armored assets for ground dominance. And they don’t get to the battlefield unless they are light enough, and affordable enough that we can properly O&M them and they don’t get canceled cause they are stuck in development H*LL cause the requirements are hopelessly constrained cause we don’t have the integrity & discipline to accept some survivability tradeoff in exchange for all the many benefits of having lighter vehicles.

Were you in the mix when we started finding that the Taliban “SL“s were using COTS Garmin Rhinos to communicate with and track their individual fighters?

If I remember correctly the Army imposed an official ban on “concerned parents” shipping Rhinos to their sons and daughters in theater disguised as cookies and trail mix in care packages. My feeble memory says that those Rhinos ran about $149.95 ea. at Walmart! LOL!

FCS followed the same pattern — bait with the promise of C-130 transportability, then switch to a gadget ladened system engineering nightmare MGV. I’ve seen pictures of Stryker loading/offloading C-130’s, I don’t know if this is done in any meaningful way to support combat operations. I know they have to waive air safety requirements to get the Strykers on C-130s. Newt Gingrich was right: The C-130 deployability requirement should be non-negotiable for an Army IFV: http://​www​.freerepublic​.com/​f​o​c​u​s​/​f​-​n​e​w​s​/​9​1​3​8​1​9/p…

McMaster would have probably gotten a “No Go” at Fort Knox for his actions at 73 Easting. Charging into a reverse slope defense at battlesight range was far from normal tactics, even if a great feat of arms. If you read McGregor, he was basically maneuvering a cav squadron as if it were a tank battalion — box formation and all. I learned from that book that HR did his platoon time in the first M-1 battalion, which was influenced by the drillbook tactics of the DRS study — the very anthithesis of the Depuy tactics of the 70s. We had a middle way worked out in the classroom — not all of which got into doctrine. Bounding platoons was a high pressure issue since NTC and European experiences conflicted on, the DRS study wanted to throw out bounding and the NTC OPFOR was winning without it. 71-1J had an expanded section on urban combat, a good piece of work that I sincerely regret got chopped out in the review process. Going back even further, you can see the same dynamic in German doctrine in the late 30s and 40s. As far as I can tell, they invented bounding, even as they were trying to figure out how, when, where and why to move in large formations.

On the other half of the question, policy wonks use tanks as a unit of measurement because, quite frankly, they are easy to count. Look at O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, “Crisis on the Korean Peninsula’ for a taste of this treatment.

Thank goodness the command and control systems failed miserably and that “NOGO” decision never got made or transmitted to McMaster and company. :-)

I remember an NTC exercise where the Colonel was playing with the very early “breadboard” prototype of FCS. He used his laptop, and the GPS systems on all of his tracks to perfectly position his defensive assets IAW all of the Ft Knox wisdom. When OPFOR popped over the hill, they saw the regiment deployed in a perfect textbook defensive array, but with all of the tracks parked 20 meters or so from all of the beautiful deflade positions in the little gullys and out from behind the salt brushes. All of the vehicle commanders saw the perfect ridiculousness of the colonel’s commanded positioning, but the boss is always the boss (and the resultant smoke grenades and flashing lights did not require letters to families! ) .

Needless to say that particular NTC “exercise” went very quickly to the “hotwash”! LOL! Sometimes you just have to accept that the guys on the ground are right in spite of Ft Knox’s inputs. So was McMaster

There was a time when the Leopard was a better tank than the M-1. Warren finally came through, but only after a competitive test was held and kept their feet to the fire. Talking about M113 variants only reminds me of the Fox/Fuchs buy. The Army had yet another semi-functional prototype NBC Recon Vehicle, and the program went badly enough that they bought German — first, and perhaps last and only time that happened. In truth, I have no personal interest in whether the Army pursues the Puma, but I do think the two-way street is way dead, and our bilateral relationship with the Germans has seen better days. A lot better. And it isn’t all the Germans fault.

USAF, we don’t use Garmins in country because they can be jammed and hacked using Radio Shack technology.

Sheepdog, Strykers can be flown via C-130 under two conditions: one, the vehicle is stripped bare, tires are deflated, and all the fuel, ammo, troops, and extra armor flown in a second plane and two, the range of the C-130 is drastically reduced. There are probably safey issues that just aren’t my lane, but it wouldn’t surprise me.

You may think I’m overstating but its not rocket science to figure out protection requirements are the only factors competing with deployability and weight. You characterize the Army’s inability to push deployability as a lack of courage. Courage needs fear to exist. What is the Army afraid of? Not buying enough steel?

I believe its justifying to politicians/public that soldiers die in combat and protecting against every eventuality just makes the grunt a slower target. The Army percieves that message as being too hard to press and maybe that the messenger will be shot. Just look at our reaction to body armor and inflicting the michelin man look on our troops in Iraq.

How do you explain the Army’s lack of “courage”? Think about it…

You can be “insensitive” to getting two vehicles to the same dismount point but having trained and done it, its not so easy. You may not like the whole squad in one vehicle but that’s how the WORLD has been doing it since WWII. I think its a bit vain to believe you know better.

I’ve given you some pretty basic and HUGE obstacles ref the employment of the Infantry squad split across two vehicles. No impact I see. Tankers have been trying to break up the squad because that’s how they see cavalry units work. Not the same.

When I worked for General Dempsey back when he was a BN commander and I was his infantry company commander he wanted to do all kinds of things with my Infantry company. He listened to what I said I could and couldn’t do given the number of grunts and the Bradley and adjusted his plan accordingly. We had a pretty succesful CMTC rotation and he wrote my BN CDR a personal letter ref me and my companies performance. Funny, he thought I knew what I was talking about and you don’t.

USAF — Keep a sharp eye on active defense measures. They could be the next equalizer against the AT missile.

The OPFOR had more vehicles and were following Soviet doctrine. It works when they get behind you. At CMTC one Bradley killed 12 “BMPs” because of the speed and steel approach (hint: start at the end of the formation).

The problem I was refering to was the Colonel trying to act like a Lt in a tank without the benefit of being able to see that a slight repositioning from the “textbook” position afforded a huge advantage due concealment. The remoted colonel could not see or know about those little dips and holes. It was compounded when the O-6 refused to listen to the Sgts and Lts in the individual tracks, since he was the boss and obviously knew better how to position for a tank battle! LOL! The purpose of NTC is “lessons learned” and there were a few this day!

Perhaps… but I was told recently that the idea of an “active” self defense (High power Laser) of a strategic bomber was way to far out in the future! Didn’t believe that either! LOL!

When you can, as a matter of course, affordably install a system on a tank that will take out an ATGM or RPG, repeatedly, and in simultaneously fired multiples (without killing too many friendlies!), then perhaps you have found the Maxim-proof cuirasse for the warhorse! Until then, those pesky little infantrymen and their increasingly deadly missiles, rockets, and recoilless rifles are going to be a very hard nut for unsuporrted armor to crack. (Then make your active defense work against GAU-8s, CBU-87s, Mavericks, and that ilk. .. .… :-) )

Given that Im most partial to ice hockey players, I’ll take one!

i don’t think the cost, schedule, performance, interoperability, fratricide, weight, power, space, thermal, maintenance, logistics, reliability, political etc. penalties incurred by trying to stick APS on a vehicle are worth the benefits. Let’s atleast build a demonstrator on a moving, vibrating platform and launch things at it 360 deg full hemispherical. When we realize that we can’t even get it to work in lab/test conditions maybe then we can refocus our resources on building better systems for troops. The more systems, and the better organized, trained, equipped we are, the more options we have for negating those dismounts. Airpower scares the crap out of em for one thing.

Ah, that explains a lot. I was a little hesitant in explaining the nine man squad becasuse I’ve been making a very reasoned argument for while and it bounces off you like 5.556 off an M1. Now I understand that your underlying premise is wrong.

BTW, grunts kind of chafe when tankers try and design the Infantry squad. Its like the Infantry school designing the next tank. Where you at the armor school in 2002? We had these arguments all the time over the stupidity of the FCS ICV. Thought we settled it then.

Why the 9 man squad? A LOT of historical data and reasoning but I’ll try and condense.

Historically bigger squads do better over time. When casualties are taken or the unit deploys understrength larger units handle sustained combat better. Systemically we try and avoid replacing individuals. FNG’s historically take higher casualties. Some of that is a combat learning curve another part is learning the team. We do the same with tank crews. In Desert Storm the plan was to replace units/crews NOT individuals. You should be able to understand the utility of that approach. Marines have 13 men squads. No rocket science here.

Smaller squads = less frontage in the defense and offense. They also = less fire impacting ability to achieve fire superiority upon which fire and manuever rests.

Our whole scheme of manuever is based on fire/manuever. One casualty historically takes two men to evacuate. Starting with a five man squad, you now have a buddy team left during casevac. ONE casualty and you’ve effectively taken a squad out of the fight.

Six man squad leaves you with three men. Can’t fire and manuever because you need a buddy team to provide mutual protection for the individual soldier (one’s shooting, while the other is loading).

We have a 9 man squad for a reason. The element is designed to function optimally with 9. It can function with less. M1s are designed for a 4 man crew. Decrease the crew 20% and see how that impacts the tank.

“That’s different, its a tank.” No, no different, more complicated or less important than the Infantry squad. Having been to the M1 Commander’s course and an Armor Advanced Course grad I understand tanks are not mobile pillboxes. Infantry squads are much more than local security for tanks to keep anti-tank teams away.

No problem as long as we fight in flying weather.

Not to start a political debate, but if we were involved in wars that the public thought was worth the sacrifice we’d probably have an easier time sustaining a casualty rate.

The problem is that the Army wants the GCV to replace the M2/M3 AND the M1. Not gonna happen. It’s Hitler’s Maus. Upgrade what we have and pass the funds to logistics and the new carbine.

We didn’t dump the Puma. We were never getting the Puma. The closest you could say is that it was looked at a part of one or more of the analysis of alternatives but ultimately rejected for failing to meet too many requirements.

And YOU actually think that the US Army/DOD just made up some number & didn’t actually do a MUCH more involved analysis as to how many are needed than you you probably even think of?

Also note that US ground forces are made up of the US Army, Army Reserve & National Guard (+ the USMC but it does things a bit differently).

No, the GCV is a Bradley replacement PERIOD. There is no M1 replacement for the foreseeable future. The closest we are going to get is the “M1A3” what ever (IF EVER) that ultimately ends up being.

And what sort of C-130 variant are we talking about? I’m fairly certain a loaded Stryker (without the slat armor and other things they’ve added to them) can be transported by C-130J a good distance.

With earlier C-130 variants it is probably a different story however.

The Army insists on cramming their eyes firmly closed and repeating the whole FCS debacle over again — unobtanium in spades. They just flat out refuse to learn. And all because they don’t want an upgrade and recapitalization program rammed down their throats for Bradley and Stryker. There is no way on the green earth that industry will *ever* build a vehicle that is immune from a 4-pi steradian (global) explosive threat and carries a full squad. It won’t happen at less than 80 tons, and if it happens at that weight, the vehicles won’t move fast enough off-road. The physics of real-world armor materials just aren’t that forgiving.

So Earth to Army Leadership: get over yourselves and go back to square one. If the requirement isn’t right, then the acquisition never will be!

i believe there are safety issues with the size of the vehicle affecting aircrew egress in event of emergency. This just goes to show that you have to be intentional about C-130 deployability in vehicle design. If you start flirting with size & weight because you cannot accept the performance tradeoffs, you end up with a bunch of BS. Keep the vehicles light for pete’s sake Army. It’s probably too late for GCV…

“how do we teach the public and politicians that expect no risk..that acceptable risk is an unavoidable cost of warfare?”.. Answer: be honest & teach the public & politicians about risk and correct their expectations. I deliver the good, bad, & ugly the TRUTH every day in my job and people give me all sorts of h*ll. tough crap. If I can do it so can everybody else.

Big companies pay a fine when the law is broke, versus putting folks in jail where they belong. No one goes to jail anymore because there are bodies buried all over the place. Over budjet by 10 million per copy (more or less) ensures more millionaires spining off and keeping folks employed who keep our troops in danger since their job security is more important than the welfare of warfifgters . All you have to do is look at the new gear issued to troops (that work properly) in the last 10 years and you have the answer. Full and open competition made our country great and now its time to get back to basics and give the warfighters a choice in gear through transparent competition.

USAF — Was serving at the Infantry Battle lab. It’s not really new. Something soldiers did since the 80’s when I started. We had them in my rifle platoon at Campbell. Security was/remains an issue.

The Army has rarely resourced the individual conventional fighter as it should but its never been better. Ranger BNs issue radios today down to the individual soldier. A sign of things to come.

These systems don’t tie into fielded digital systems though. Interesting point. Doesn’t really impact the current situation or discussion.

TMB — No, historically we’ve always reacted poorly to heavy casualties no matter how popular the war. Look at the civil war and WWII. Lincoln almost lost his second term there was so much resistance to the war and we were seriously second guessing ourselves in WWII reference the invasion of Japan. There are also numerous examples of the Gov’t supressing reports of casualties because of a concern on the impact on the war effort.

IMHO the answer is winning quick. We do that well. Designing the force to defeat the enemy quickly and handing it off to the UN woulkd likely be the easiest way to addrerss future warfighting.

“If I can do it so can everybody else.” just isn’t a realistic answer to a complicated problem. If it were true we wouldn’t have poverty, racism and the Yankees wouldn’t have 27 pennants.

I learned not to “expect” that if I can do something so can everybody else. If that were true we wouldn’t need welfare and everybody would be Delta type material. You ignore that “will” is even more important than ability.

Its a day to day fight that takes persistence/dedication and a level of integrity that isn’t as common as we’d like. Look around. There are few that tell it like it is. MOST go along to get along hence very little resistance to the video game approach to warfighting.

sure it is. the problem is in people’s minds, like you said, political will. we generated the political will to go to the moon and back. we generated the will to put a black man in the oval office, and he had the will to cancel FCS and the presidential helicopter, programs that at some time people thought couldn’t be killed. a lot of people think it is impossible to reform medicare and social security. and look what Paul Ryan has done, got a bold reform proposal passed through the house, and now there is alot of movement to draft him for a Presidential run. USAF embraced “Integrity First” when I was in my commissioning program. course it has slipped and not lived up to its values. sooner or later though, often out of necessity, we’ll get back to valuing integrity.

don’t have to limit ourselves to UN either. any multinational coalition would do. we need to win hearts and minds from the global perspective. if i may quote John Boyd, we need grand strategy: “A grand ideal, overarching theme, or noble philosophy that represents a coherent paradigm within which individuals as well as societies can shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances—yet offers a way to expose flaws of competing or adversary systems. Such a unifying vision should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst or beacon around which to evolve those qualities that permit a collective entity or organic whole to improve its stature in the scheme of things.”

Sheepdog, no need to insulting (“head out of rectum”) really takes away from the rest of your answer. The car salesman comment could be considerered funny if not sarcastic but c’mon.

Yeah sure, what he said :)

USAF & VP. Let me remind you McMaster was a CPT at 73 Easting and it was a troop not a squadron he commanded. Big Difference! His assault into a reverse slope “D” in hindsight might be questionable but the conditions were a dust storm and our acquisition was a tad better than the Iraqis. That dust storm negated a lot of the pros of a reverse slope “D” especially when the Iraqis didn’t post elements forward to ID the enemy in limited visibility conditions.

History is full of lead units biting off more than they can chew. Some ended well others not so (thinking Gettysburg from both perspectives here).

Anyway McMaster behaved exactly as tankers were taught in the cold war. Fighting outnumbered was drilled big time as was being a chainsaw when we were successful. Nice fella, we were both cadre at the Academy when he was writing his book and I was a CPT in the lead BN of 3AD that passed through his Cav Reg’t back in the day.

TMB, you were right the first time. A third of the 3ID is at Benning.

Absolutely

That is how I see it. You might as well make the next vehicle light and fast, and put some of those automatic RPG deflectors on board. The new designs show very well on test footage, and I’m convinced there are low fratricide issues. I’m doubly sure it would be less problem than the RPG actually hitting the vehicle, as that can cause exterior casualties also.

BAE seems to come out with pretty good designs of their own, but even they give the Bradley a new lease on life:
http://​defense​-update​.com/​f​e​a​t​u​r​e​s​/​2​0​1​0​/​j​a​n​u​a​r​y/g…

Their Recce vehicle (CV90), leads me to believe they could be a contender for the next design. They have been consistent with their R&D for the last ten years, and pumping out successful projects one after the other. Despite paying a US fine recently, I really think they have a future.

Conventional alternatives:
1) Do nothing…least cost, Army permanently loses FCS money,
2) Buy 3 Namers per platoon…Army becomes non-deployable and eats excess gas but has the basis for a future tank,
3) Buy 4 new BAE mediums per plt or modify 4 BAE Bradleys with a remote turret…Army spends least on the Bradley & is more deployable, expending less fuel & has a basis for a common vehicle to replace other C2V, Artillery, Mortar, Scout, etc like FCS.

The unconventional alternative is tailor the future to full spectrum operations and hybrid warfare where we first must get there with a credible air-deployed force to defend the remaining build-up by sea/air, then transition to offense against potent foes, followed by stability ops.

The sole option that accomplishes it at reasonable cost is the Bradley remote turret, Namer, and M-ATV option. You don’t need to mix them together but prepare to fight together task-organizing from a heavy CAB with tanks/Namers. and a medium CAB with fewer tanks and more Bradley remote turrets (or new medium vehicle) and M-ATVs.

You say: too many vehicles? Recall we bought 19 MRAP types in 4 categories. Recall we also will have multiple vehicles replacing C2V, artillery, ICV, mortar, and scouts because we gave up too soon on FCS MGV…because the rest of FCS sucked. We have 6500 M-ATVs, effective for years to come.

The National Guard could substitute the best MRAPs replacing M-ATVs and fewer Bradley remote turrets. They become our best option for stability ops force as well as civil emergencies. Namer only works if the Marines buy it & it’s modified to hold 13. Not hard in a space 8′ x 12′ in the back…heck look how many EFV and AAV held.

You may ALWAYS quote John Boyd.

You should change your screen name to superman.

The Apollo program took a very charasmatic leader to get it off the ground, a clear competitor with the same goal and plentiful resources to achieve the goal. None of those exist with this program.

Before you get too metaphysical let’s stick with the problem at hand. The development of a new vehicle to replace the Bradley that is reasonably transportable, carries/protects a 9 man squad and is less than $10mil a copy. What’s the plan for convincing America/politicians/the Army that providing tank like protection to our Infantry is unrealistic and makes the Army less responsive to the nation’s needs?

Agree on your COA’s (- Namers), don’t on multiple vehicle type reasoning.

We’re fighting an enemy whose anti-vehicle capability is RPGs and IEDs. We’re not running continuous offensive vehicle centric ops away from fixed facilities. On the move you either fix the vehicle with parts on hand or destroy it. You don’t have the option of leaving it at the FOB until an airplane brings the part.

The Namer is a non starter unless we have a radical change in US foreign policy stating we’ll fight them on the beach. Too heavy/expensive. Got to say, you’re focused. The Army has said NO to the Namer.
Do you think if your bring it up enough DA will change their mind? You can be whimsical. I was just looking for real answers.

Ref the MRAP family, read up on JLTV discussion (HMMWVt replacment). You’ll find many of the same issues we’ve been discussing (size, weight, maintenance, cost, multirole). Also check out the Marines perspective who WON’T BUY if over 10t and may abandon program over it (deployability). The MRAP family might replace the JLTV but busts the size bubble (like the Namer).

Buffalo carries 4

I hope you are right about the Namer. When you see them picking GD, it casts doubt that they are considering ASCOD, especially when an article mentioned an engine sized more for a Namer or Merkava.

The same article mentioned a possible hybrid engine for BAE so maybe the smart selection will occur. The worst possible outcome would be a whole HBCT filled with nothing but 4 Namers per platoon. Do believe they would make ideal OPs and mini-COPs in stability ops…essentially mobile pill boxes despite that term not being palatable.:) But look how successful a few tanks are in Afghanistan.

I’m well aware of JLTV which sounds great on paper, but I’m concerned there won’t be enough money because they are pricey. The Army still must figure out what to do with all the MRAPs and M-ATVs.

Make the JCIDS process work better. Identify the capability gap for a modern C-130 deployable tracked IFV. Make it the threshold KPP in an ORD (battle ready, not this assemble in the field BS), and have the discipline to stick to it, unlike the FCS & Stryker approach. We don’t seem to have a problem convincing America that there is a need for and responsiveness of 82nd Abn, 10th Mtn, 101st AAD, and those infantry guys don’t get tank like protection. I guess I don’t have a problem with requirements for both a non-C-130 deployable heavy IFV and a lighter C-130 deployable IFV, in both tracked & wheeled variants. Platforms of various sizes & configurations can all have valuable utility. The approach I don’t agree with is trying to develop an impossibly constrained swiss army knife with operationally unsuitable and technologically unready gadgets, taking a decade, wasting billions, and hoping programs stick through political vs technical merit. aside from that, I’m also curious do you have opinions on the value of an IFV that could be sling loaded by a helicopter and what do you think of the m-113 c-130 air drop capability?

VP, understand why the 9 man squad is the line in the sand?

lol ok but you have to appreciate the history of pfcem’s comments and his language towards anyone with a different view.. what goes around comes around.. when you’re talking to a wall sometimes you got to use the sledgehammer…

“pfcem when we want your opinion we’ll give it to you.” Sounds a bit dictatorial, big guy! Somehow I thought that everyone was allotted one of many different things, even if they did not agree with most people, and certainly if they tended to disagree with any one person. And does that not come under the first ammendment to that old piece of paper tha most of us on this forum have been sworn to support and defend? Hmmmmmm!

Now for your orginal post (to which I had not really paid too much attention up to this time)… no better military authority than Gen Eisenhower said something to the effect that the plan was nothing and planning was everything. Thinking through that “next war” is Eisenhower’s “everything” but putting too much stock in ones conclusion is very risky. Part of that planning process must be to plan on the equipment you want to bring with you, assuming that the equipment will be exactly right is more than just a bit egotistical and pretty darned dangerous! :-)

The problem is that more often than not “Good Enough” means just good enough to give the bad guy a “fair fight”. I would contend that “Good Enough” must be defined in terms of Tsun Tsu’s “overpowering” force unless we really want to accept 50–50 exchange ratios. If we make the threshold of “good enough” that point at which the bad guys consider themselves to be suicidally insane to even attempt mischief.… the exchange ratio goes to 0–0 and its called deterrence, and that is perhaps the best fighting situation of all. That level of “good enough” that would satisfy our ancient Chinese philosopher/warrior is expensive until you start thinking about the 50–50 exchange ratio in a fair fight! :-)

i give pfcem a fraction of what he dishes out.
here’s something for you to think about.. for the trillions we spent in the 90’s and 00’s preparing for the next war and still needed to pay out the nose on an emergency basis for MRAPs. and we still don’t have helicopters that can self defend worth a dang against shoulder fire threats.
what i’m saying is resource management is critical. committing decades of resources on uncertain, risky, foolishness of taking decades to develop impossibly constrained optimal platforms against unknown threats, is a significant cause of our perenially inadequate and non-recapitalized force structure. Dumping more into this way of thinking perpetuates the problem. We doom ourselves to repeated failure when we insist on repeating the same mistakes.

i reject your contention. with the diverse set of our portfolio of current capabilities (crumbling due to the pfcem optimal technology philosophy), we have overmatch over any state/non-state actors. all attempts to quantify exchange ratios between future untested platforms always leave out some variables — intangibles & uncertainties. thus they are subject to the corruption and bias that yields the results we have so painfully come to experience as business as usual. our acquisition strategy should be MDAPs is no place for risk taking. we should be focusing on recapitalization and sustainment of our current capabilities. it makes no sense to lose what you come to depend on when you are modernizing, unless you embrace retrograding for some irrational reason. we can pursue technology development with separate buckets of risk capital / mad money. when it comes to needing a replacement for war proven systems, no way.

You two might have a history I’m unaware of. I have a similar situation with some on military​.com. I try and let them take the first punch per thread just to make it clear I’m responding.

He uses lots of big words and long sentences, with lots of commas, that confuse poor lil ole me! :-(

Okay, now you’ve made an argument that makes some sense. I was gonna disrespect DBBL’s overreliance on firepower attrition models, but at least I can pull out a spreadsheet and see that, on your line of reasoning, there is no real difference between, say, a 6, 7 or 8 man squad, since it takes three hits to make your 9 man squad ineffective, versus two hits for the smaller sizes. I could try to counter, but that would be tendentious and not very productive. Just remember you do have a track (or two :) and to use its capability. It is not that a nine man squad is an “optimal” number. You still have span of control issues, and I don’t even want to get into the Army-Marine Corps argument on how many fire teams belong in a squad.

But consider this — there is a logic in four man tank crews for the same reason you bring out with buddy teams. If you go down below four, I would actually prefer a two man crew to a three man crew. Admittedly, one guy could get wounded, and then what do you do. Well, you end up calling in the wingman for help, and yes, that takes out the section. Same logic as you scenario. But a three man crew is just a waste, If we’re going for crew reduction, then keep the buddy team in the crew, because otherwise, three’s a crowd, and I’d rather deal with the casevac problem than bad group psychology and poor task balance. Obviously, in the real world, you always have to make adjustments.

We did not achieve (nor will we maintain) the ‘overmatch’ you speak of choosing “good enough” solutions.

We ARE focusing on recapitalizing & sustainment of our current capabilities. Recapitalization being replaceing old systems with new, more capable systems in order to MAINTAIN our qualitative advantage & sustainment being maintaining/updating old systems until they can be completely replaced by the new, more capable systems.

You don’t make a lot of money on technology development, good like finding many willing to take the risk without the ‘promis’ of a BIG payoff from production…

Of course you can’t predict tomorrow’s threats. Yet standing still and waiting isn’t a valid strategy here.

The Bradley has provided 30+ years of good service, yet compared to the Abrams there isn’t much capability for future development left on that platform. If we set aside our budget woes for a second, a new vehicle would probably be best.

Back in the ‘90s the ASM plan called for a “Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle” would would have the same level of armor protection as the Block III MBT that would replace the existing Abrams. The weight goal for the MBT was between 58–62 tons so the IFV probably would have been a similar weight or somewhat lighter.

Then we went to the FCS plan. There was certainly some promising features planned for these vehicles, yet some things like the C-130 airlift requirement were simply idiotic. By the time these requirements were dropped it seems FCS had lost much of it’s support, spelling the end for the XM1206.

So the way I see it GCV should aim for a weight between these two prior programs, while using a mix of proven and new components and technologies. Some requirements really ought to be examined. Why does this thing need non-lethal weaponry from the start? Consider such things for future upgrades once we actually get a working combat vehicle. How many sensors and communications systems do they need on this thing? Don’t try to jam everything that is inside of a dedicated command or reconnaissance vehicle into an IFV.

I am rather disappointing that the offering based off of the German Puma has already been dropped from consideration. The base vehicles doesn’t meet the requirements but it seems like it would featured an enlarged hull and many other modifications.

what is the basis for your assertion that “we will not maintain” overmatch? Are you aware of some large scale live fire exercises by which such an assertion would even be supportable with actual data, or are you dependent upon Xbox 360 type simulations to support all your biases? Why don’t we stick to what we know. war is political. despite all of our technological dominance we cannot accomplish decisive victory in either Iraq nor Afghanistan. We do know that there are critical shortages of “non-high tech” requirements such as translators, bomb sniffing dogs, human intel, and pretty much logistics anything (we depend on Ctrs for everything). We do know that real world experiences exposes flaws in our high tech systems, again in operational suitability areas such as B-2’s needing additional deployable shelters. We do know that there are critical shortages of assets such as CAS, SOF, ABM, etc. We have a wide variety of capabilities that need better integration and realistic widespread testing. We can dump more unknown billions into cost overruns, or we could use the resources in a more rational manner to logically organize, train, and equip the entire force structure.

plus I’m not entirely against high tech. it just needs to be divorced from major defense programs, because system integration is complicated enough in its own regard. We need more investment in technology development in risk reduction, concept technology demonstrators, before we try to integrate it. We need to prove this stuff is/is not operationally suitable prior to decades and billions upon billions in commitments. So given all the risk, “incremental improvement” is closer to the mark for my view on acquisition strategy. “Good enough” is the fallback for when “impossibly constrained due to hopeless optimization” (your way) becomes evident through REAL wasted dollars.

Not for pursuing programs that don’t deliver.

A light IFV? Well, I’d like to fix the heavy force first but sure a BMD like vehicle would add punch to the light forces. Its a whole new can of worms though and raises the protection debate all over again.

I’d advise ditching the helo lift capability. That decreases helo range so much you have to be in theatre with significant resources on the ground to utilize it. If we’re going to do that, we can have a heavy bde.

There’s a lot to be said for having a C130 friendly armored force but I’m not convinced it has to be tracked. Wheels are lighter and less training/resource intensive. I also question the viability of giving a whole division that capability. One BN per BDE should be plenty and provide a large enough force to “airland”. Buying foreign would simplify acquisition greatly for such a small requirement. Test in one BN?

Back in the day the 24th ID kept a small Bradley/M1 force on alert ready to deploy. Resurrecting that capability would be worthwhile and teach us much.

I’ve always understood and supported four man crews. I’ve done maintenance on a tank. Its also MUCH easier to pull your own security (now that’s a concept!). Why would you bring it up?

You have to abandon the wingman concept when you talk infantry. The vehicle’s primary purpose is to support the Infantry not the other way around. You are making the typical tank centric approach mistake. It would be like me arguing pill box uses of M1s.

You are fixated on splitting the squad. Fine for cavalry, not for Infantry. Grunts are called upon to go where the vehicles can’t (think air assault) cavalry is not.

BTW, DBBL died in ’02. It became Soldier battle lab (always hated the term dismounts, do we call tankers “mounts”) and now is the Manuever Battle Lab.

Ref the firepower attrition model. Why do you percieve it as an over reliance? Maybe I don’t understand what you are calling the firepower/attrition model. Don’t you realize more guys means you can shoot more?

Read “Development of the Squad: Historical Analysis” by the Center for Naval Analyses.

They could get Expeditions, or Suburbans for about $60,000 and they have GPS for that.
We have to decide do we want a personnel carrier; or tank that carries nine extra people.
Unless we build these things like MBT’s with that level of armor; they are going to be susceptible
to the nearly the same threats as a relatively thin skinned vehicles.
The troops need protection; but we need to stop adding bells and whistles to these things.
It’s just nuts to have twelve million dollar battle taxi’s; there has to be a way to do this for less
then that! Doesn’t there?

And yet they cancelled the EFV because of its cost of 16 mil per copy, and the EFV had capability of 2 modes…Land and Sea…

And it carried 17 personnel vice 9..

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