DoD’s audit avalanche

DoD’s audit avalanche

The Defense Department’s books are in bad shape. The Pentagon and the military services can’t reliably and accurately account for what they spend in the same way other government agencies can, despite a 1994 law that requires everyone in the federal circus to produce consistent, standard findings about their financial affairs. But Pentagon officials assured a Senate panel on Thursday that they’ll get there too, at some point.

DoD Comptroller Robert Hale and top leaders from the military services told a Senate Homeland Security subcommittee that the Pentagon will be audit-ready by its congressionally imposed deadline of 2017. That may not mean that when that new fiscal year begins the department can immediately begin an audit, though — Hale acknowledged that it may take years after confirming its readiness before there’s an actual audit for the Defense Department. Massachusetts Sen. Scott Brown mused that it might be more realistic to expect DoD’s first audit by 2020 or even 2025.

Of course, few of the senior leaders in the Building will still be around then, and it’ll be up to Secretary Panetta’s successors to keep up the emphasis on this for it to actually happen. Hale, the service witnesses and Asif Khan,  director of financial management and assurance for the Government Accountability Office’s, told senators that emphasis from leadership is one of the most important factors in actually getting DoD to get its books in order.


Hale told the subcommittee chairman, Delaware Sen. Tom Carper, that for many years, DoD just did not take the 1994 CFO Act seriously. Today, however, Panetta has said he wants the Pentagon to try to be ready for an audit before its current 2017 deadline, and Hale said he briefed Panetta about that effort on the secretary’s first day in office. The service witnesses all were careful to affirm that their chiefs, secretaries and senior leaders also were on board with preparing for audit readiness, and they were telling everyone in their services to get on board, not just bean-counters.

Despite all the positive vibes, DoD and the services still have some major problems in getting their act together, Kahn said. He issued a full report on DoD’s audit challenges in addition to his hearing testimony, and it’s eye-opening if you want to get into this green-eyeshade stuff. The services can’t fully track cash they’ve spent; they can’t figure out which agencies are responsible for which jobs; and in at least one instance, they won’t physically be able to accomplish all the piece-work needed to build a coherent picture of what they take in and pay out.

Wrote Khan:

Approximately two-thirds of invoice and receipt data must be manually entered into [the General Fund Enterprise Business System] from the invoicing and receiving system (i.e., Wide Area Work Flow). DFAS personnel stated that manual data entry will eventually become infeasible due to increased quantities of data that will have to be manually entered as GFEBS is deployed to additional locations. Army officials acknowledged that there is a problem with the Wide Area Work Flow and GFEBS interface and that this problem reduced the effectiveness of GFEBS, and that they are working with DOD to resolve the problem.

Still, despite all this, Khan said he thought DoD was making progress from where it’s been, and Carper said there was a new, positive spirit at Thursday’s hearing, compared to ones he’s convened before. He also vowed that his desire to push DoD toward its audit goal would not go away.

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I’m trying to come with the words to describe my opinion. But I cannot find them, except the ones wich say; “This is totally unacceptable. How is this possible? We are talking about billions and billions of dollars (for years and years!!!) and they cannot account for it in a proper way. Unacceptable!

That’s because the systems (all pretty much “home grown”) implement a flawed and broken process that dates back decades. Instead of fixing things, they’ve applied (over the years) multiple “band aids” in attempt to “fix” the symptoms, not the real problems.

For a different perspective on this issue, interested readers might like to review a short article that appeared in the May 2008 issue of Govt Executive magazine that explains why the Congress and the GAO are the problem here, not the DOD.
See: http://​www​.govexec​.com/​m​a​i​l​b​a​g​D​e​t​a​i​l​s​.​c​f​m​?​a​i​d​=​400…

And for those readers who want to learn even more, see the July 2009 issue of the Defense Acquisition Review Journal and the article “Financial Accountability at the DOD: Reviewing the Bidding,” at: http://​www​.dau​.mil/​p​u​b​s​c​a​t​s​/​P​u​b​s​C​a​t​s​/​H​a​n​k​s​.​pdf .

Congress, GAO, and the media have been beating the DOD up on this issue for more than 20 years now. None of them (I would respectfully submit) have known what they are talking about.

Perhaps someone could at least consider the reporting requirements already levied by law or regulation. If you spend all of your time writing/presenting the reports instead of developing the info to go into the reports.… . .GIGO!

Perhaps the answer is replace multiple tiers of “oversight” with simple accountability! :-) (And if you dont know the difference… Hmmmmmm!) Accounting for expenditures feels like one of those “real good things to do” and pretty darned simple, but I can help thinking that if we tried to “legislate” falling off of a log, we would find a way to screw it up.

While application of financial accounting metrics is clearly inapplicable to DoD — or any public sector organization — it is not unreasonable to refactor private sector cost accounting measures that deal with the management of inventory and capital. There is a paradox here, since the military’s capital and labor base plus inventory roughly comprise the force in being, the potential power that military can bring to bear in any given situation. While rising inventories are bad in commercial business, this is not necessarily the case in the military. The system does need to provide asset visibility, and one should be able to track what was spent against what was purchased (on what terms, with what benefit). While unused assets may or may not reflect a problem, inability to measure the use of assets is a recurring problem that needs to be addressed. How hard is that ?

When the objective is to provide “national security” (as opposed to “make money”), measuring the use of assets is indeed a recurring problem that does need to be addressed. That’s why more than 30 years ago, the DOD began supporting (mainly in its FFRDCs) the development of measures and models that would allow DOD planners to show the relationship between budget requests and expected levels of material readiness (e.g., weapon-system mission-capable rates) and sustainability (e.g., days of combat before resupply would be necessary).

After the passage of the CFO Act of 1990, however, and the accompanying rise in the use of revolving-fund financing mechanisms for supply and maintenance activities, financial measures tied to financial statements (e.g., Net Operating Results) began to supplant measures of readiness and sustainability measures as the preferred measures of performance — leading to the sad situation we have today that U.S. Senators and Representatives now spend more time grilling DOD leaders about passing financial audits than they do asking questions about the Department’s ability to meet current security threats.

I’ve said it before. Clean audit is not the problem and doesn’t add value. But the boss — in this case, Bob Hale — needs to lay down the law and dictate that everything needs to be done in ONE year. We can destroy an enemy in war in less time. Time for DoD to act like this is important.

You’re right, taxpayer — a clean audit will not add value. So why should Mr. Hale “lay down the law” that it must be achieved “in one year” ? (or, for that matter, ever?)
Based on past experience, DOD will piss away another $1.0 billion in fiscal 2012 continuing its non-value-adding pursuit of auditable private-sector-style balance sheets and income statements That money could be much better used elsewhere — or even saved (perish the thought).

A major problem that DOD has compared to the private sector is that there are so many accounting systems attempting to roll-up to the Pentagon. There is no reason DOD has individual accounting systems for each service and multiple sub-agencies (such as Corps of Engineers). Ask the CFO of General Motors or Microsoft to get a clean audit while using a dozen accounting systems that date back to the 1980’s and they would simply laugh.

Contrary to your assertion, there are a number of very good reasons why the DOD should have distinct budgetary-accounting systems for each Service. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are separate Military Departments that perform radically different kinds of missions requiring radically different kinds of support. That ‘s why they submit separate budget requests each year. To be sure, those requests are rolled up into the single President’s budget for DOD submitted to Congress each year, but the Secretary of Defense chops on those budget requests separately before they go to the White House, and the Congress then makes its final authorization and appropriation decisions separately as well.

Re your GM comment , there’s some relevant history worth keeping in mind:
In 1988, former GM Executive VP Donald Atwood became the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Laboring under the same kind of misguided “insight” you have offered, Mr. Atwood personally launched a DOD-wide program called “Corporate Information Management.” CIM was specifically aimed at establishing a single, “corporate” IT system for the entire Dept viewing as a whole After 10 years of good-faith effort under both Republican and Democratic DOD administrations to implement Mr. Atwood’s “vision,” the CIM effort was finally abandoned after having having accomplished literally nothing except the expenditure of more than $10 billion dollars.

That pathetic history is now being repeated today, again at a cost of about a billion dollars a year, in the form of the DOD’s current “Business Transformation” effort aimed at replacing all of the Dept’s support IT systems with single, commercial-style “Enterprise Resource Planning” systems that will “seamlessly” be able to produce consolidated, private-sector-style financial statements for the Dept each year, as if the Dept were a single corporate entity like GM, GE, or Microsoft.

In absolute contradiction to what you’re calling for, what the DOD actually needs are MULTIPLE MANAGEMENT COST ACCOUNTING systems, tailored to the needs of managers in each of the Dept’s many varied activities — not a one-size-fits-all, private-sector-style system that produces balance sheets and income statements as if the DOD were a “business.”

OK despite all the incompetency in Congress and the GAO, shouldn’t the DoD be able to account for it’s own funds?

Yes — the DOD needs to be able to show the Congress (and, by extension, the taxpayers represented by Congress) that it has executed its appropriated budget each year in accordance with the Congress’ wishes as expressed in authorization and appropriation legislation. That is why the DOD Comptroller has now focused the Dept’ s accounting resources on producing a “Statement of Budgetary Resources” (i.e., a financial statement showing what was appropriated, what was obligated, and what’s left ) able to win an unqualified opinion from independent auditors That is the only kind of “accountability” (as opposed to balance-sheet and income-statement accountability) that makes sense for the DOD — and if the DOD weren’t being distracted by the fools errand of producing balance sheets and income statements, it woudl have produced clean Statement of Budgetary Resources years ago..

One other important note: To BUDGET properly, DOD managers need to know what it COSTS to do the things they have to do to meet mission requirements. THAT requires good management cost accounting, which the DOD does not have. Why doesn’t it ? Because, for the same reason budgetary accounting has languished, so has cost accounting, becasue the Dept has been forced by Congress wia the CFO Act to expend all its accounting time, talent, and money for the last 20 years trying to produce private-sector-style balance sheets and income statements. For the DOD at least , the CFO Act of 1990 is one of the most ill-advised pieces of legislation the Congress has ever passed –and the only way the DOD is ever going to be able to sensibly describe hwo it uses the funds the Congress gives it is to be given relief from the private-sector-style financial reporting requirements embedded in the CFO Act.

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